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SUMMARY 
This thesis aims to assess the importance of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga 
and his state in early quattrocento politics. The central geographical 
position of Mantua placed it in the forefront of the conflict between 
Venice and Milan which dominated Gianfrancesco's life. It was a conflict 
during which both protagonists tried to exploit Mantua to further their 
own expansionist aims. 
Such a clash of interests naturally placed immense pressures 
upon Gianfrancesco. As always, his primary aim was to maintain the 
existence of his state and this meant that he had to manoeuvre himself 
between the two rivals. He was to place the strategic advantages of 
Mantua and his own talents as a military commander first of all at the 
disposal of Venice, the traditional ally and protector of the Mantuan 
state, and subsequently, in 1438, when he became suspicious of Venetian 
motives, at the disposal of Filippo Maria Visconti. The central portion 
of the thesis investigates Gianfrancesco's relations with these two very 
different masters and attempts to clarify the issues and motives which 
prompted his change of loyalty in 1438. 
In many respects, the role which Gianfrancesco was called 
upon to play was an unenviable one. While it is true that he himself 
obtained a considerable degree of prestige as Commander of the Venetian 
army as well as the 'kudos' of an Imperial title, the dual role of ruler 
and soldier of fortune which had been thrust upon him bristled with 
problems, and these are also investigated in this study. 
i. 
The period of Gianfranceso's rule provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to observe the problems and decisions which 
confronted a small state like Mantua at a time of political crisis. 
The part which Gianfrancesco and Mantua played in that crisis has 
been underestimated and this thesis attempts to redress the balance. 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Gonzaga gained control of Mantua in 1328 by seizing power 
from the Bonacolsi family this was not hailed as anything particularly 
startling or new. Such a process of inter-family rivalries within Italian 
city states was an established fact of life. What was so much of an 
achievement was the length of time which Gonzaga rule in Mantua lasted. 
Their tenure of power for the better part of four hundred years is very 
surprising; especially in the context of the political vicissitudes which they 
had to live through. In a very real sense the history of Gonzaga supremacy in 
Mantua is a classic lesson in the art of political survival, and never more 
so than in the period of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century. 
In general terms the achievement of the fourteenth century had been 
the establishment of Gonzaga supremacy in Mantua and the establishment of 
Mantua as a significant factor in the political and diplomatic life of Lombardy. 
The fourteenth century, as we shall see, provided the Gonzaga with valuable 
experience of the problems of survival in the widest sense; lessons which 
the Gonzaga were not slow to learn and to put to good use in the serious 
situation which was to develop in the 1420's when they became inevitably 
embroiled in the clash between the two great territorial states of Milan and 
Venice. In particular, the fourteenth century had taught the need for the 
maintenance of an active and varied diplomatic life and also of the supreme 
importance of internal stability and security. !/ 
Gianfrancesco Gonzaga was called upon to maintain and develop the 
achievement of the trecento. The fourteenth century may well have been a 
crucial one for the establishment of the Gonzaga as a family, but the early 
2. 
fifteenth century involved both the destiny of the Gonzaga as rulers of 
Mantua and, more especially, the survival of Mantua itself as an autonomous 
unit. In this sense the problems of the trecento were greatly accentuated. 
It was precisely because Gonzaga supremacy was no longer seriously challenged 
in Mantua that the fate of the family and the fate of the state became 
inextricably combined. It was this added dimension which was to condition 
the policies and diplomacy of the early fifteenth century. There was now 
very much more to lose. It was a situation which, to a certain extent"was 
externalised by a desire to make Mantua into a cultural centre in which the 
added prestige would underline Mantuan autonomy. 
The rule of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga (1407-1444) has been unjustly 
neglected by scholars. ~/ As yet there is no scholarly assessment of this 
period as a whole. ~/ While it is true that the history of Mantua as a whole 
is better served today than it was by Brinton and Quazza ~/ there is still a 
great deal of scope for a more analytical approach. This is especially true 
with regard to the period covered by this particular study. It may well be 
true that Gianfrancesco is overshadowed by his successors in the later 
fifteenth century when Mantua became firmly established as a cultural 
Renaissance centre; but it is all too easily forgotten that such an achievement 
rests firmly upon the basis established largely by Gianfrancesco. His rule 
is an excellent example of the sort of policies which smaller states n~eded 
to adopt in the political and diplomatic atmosphere of the age and as such 
is able to give us a valuable insight into the conditions which motivated 
smaller states at a crucial period which witnessed the pressures generated 
by the larger territorial states. 
No one can doubt the extreme importance of the history of northern 
Italy in the early fifteenth century. Especially, it provides a backgroun~ 
3. 
without which the real extent of the so-called 'crisi militare' 
cannot be understood. In itself it is a very important transitional 
period in a number of senses. First, the evolution of large states such 
as Milan and Venice created considerable diplomatic problems; the prime 
question being one of the relative balance of power between them. This 
inevitably affected the fortunes of the smaller states,especially as regards 
diplomatic alignment. Secondly, under the pressures which this situation 
generated, states were com'pelled to review their military organisation and 
their military defences. In particular, we wee a much more permanent 
relationship developing between state and military commander and a careful 
organisation and development of military resources. Thirdly, because of 
the nature of the aims involved in the inter-state conflicts there is a 
parallel development in military techniques. 
The history of Gianfrancesco is a very important case history in all 
these respects. Mantua's position as a buffer state, one of the best examples 
in Italy, dictated a flexible and vigilant diplomacy in which Gianfrancesco 
had to be continually reviewing the strengths and we~esses of neighbouring 
states in a period of considerable flux. In addition to this Gianfrancesco 
was able to use his own military experience as a further selling-point to 
supplement the advantages which could accrue from Mantua's position 
grographically as a 'fulcrum' between Milan and Venice. Furthermore, because 
the aims of the war between these states were imperialistiC, the 'decelerated' 
and more static type of warfare which this involved (of necessity) and the 
important need for the maintenance of acquisitions, dictated a change in the 
approach which the state adopted towards military problems to parallel this 
politiG:al need. 
A study of Mantua in this transitional period is aQ important 
illustration of such generalizatizations. Because it is a 'pressure point' or 
4. 
an exemplum of larger issues, a history of Mantua at this time can go 
a long way to explaining the sometimes complex and seemingly unintelligible 
fluctuations in inter-state relationships. 
The paucity of scholarship is even more surprising because of 
the wealth of archive material which exists in the Gonzaga Archive in 
Mantua for this period. Despite the somewhat uneven documentation which 
exists for the very earliest years, it is extremely full for the most 
crucial sections of the period covered by this study. Because the Gonzaga 
were very careful to keep their records there is consequently a very full 
documentation of their policies and projects. Not only can we discover 
the details of the policies themselves, but we can also trace the discussions 
which went on beforehand. It is not surprising that the Mantuan archive has 
frequently provided material which has either disappeared or did not exist 
in other documentary collections. ~/ It is interesting and significant to 
note that the 'E' series which deals with foreign correspondence conducted by 
the Gonzaga occupies 1,600 out of a total of 3,719 buste, an excellent 
indication of the importance attached to diplomacy. 
In his commentary, Luzio emphasises the importance which the 
Gonzaga attached to the selection of ambassadors, who were encouraged, rather 
like their Venetian counterparts, to submit very full reports which not 
only covered aspects relating to a particular mission, but which took in any 
other information about the general situation which could possibly be useful 
to Mantua: 
" ••• i'inviato di Mantova era percio trattato quasi 
abitualmente su un piede di familiarita, che ad 
ambasciatori delle maggiore potenze restava gelosemente 
interdetto, per non lasciar sorprendere, nell'abbandono 
di confidenti colloqui, Ie segrete motivazioni d'una 
troppo spes so tortuosa politica." ~/ 
5. 
In the 'E' series there are some 35 buste dealing with our period, 
in addition to numerous references in the 'B' (treaties) and 'F' (home affairs) 
series as well as the 'Libri dei Decreti' and the 'Gridario' for internal 
affairs. The Gonzaga were also careful to keep copies of the letters 
which they sent to their ambassadors and to other states, a factor which 
greatly facilitates the work of the historian. Similarly there also exist 
copies of letters which were sent from other states in order to inform 
Gianfrancesco of events elsewhere in Italy. In this respect Niccolo III 
d'Este's correspondence is very revealing about events in Tuscany and the 
Romagna. The impression certainly is that during our period Mantua would 
appear to be a sort of 'clearing-house' for diplomatic information. 
In addition to this there is a good documentation of Gonzaga 
relationships with the provincial areas of the Mantuan state. Such sources 
frequently provide a commentary upon the larger affairs of state. It is 
easy to forget that as far as internal defence was concerned, and the 
Gonzaga had a persistent preoccupation about this, a co-operative effort 
was essential. 11 
The chronicle sources for this period are of variable value. ~I 
In many cases their accounts do tend to be somewhat coloured by their 
indebtedness to the Gonzaga or otherwise. However, if one makes allowances 
9/ 101 11/ for this, such writers as Equicola,- Aliprandi - and Platina - present, 
in varying degrees, a sense of the continuity of events which documentary 
sources amplify and correct. 
In the light of the documentary sources available this present 
study aims to look more closely and more analytically than hitherto at 
6. 
the rule of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga in order to give a clearer picture of 
its true significance. It aims to show that the strategic position of 
Mantua in the diplomatic context of the age dictated a complex diplomacy, 
of 
thatla buffer state in which decisions were sometimes incredibly difficult 
to make. However, in the light of this it also serves to illustrate the 
motivation which runs through Gianfrancesco's policy. His actions, far from 
being faithless or capricious, were directed to one single end - the 
maintenance of Mantuan autonomy at a time when the threats to its very 
existence were at their greatest. In examining in detail, the policies of 
Gianfrancesco with their constant modulations, the personalities and 
pressures which were to influence them, and the extent of his diplomatic 
activity both within and outside Italy together with its military implications, 
it is hoped to clarify still further the day to day realities involved in 
running an Italian state of these dimensions. Furthermore, this study aims 
to assess the externalisation of such policies in the way in which Mantua pro-
jected its image in Italy; how, under the pressure of external political 
and diplomatic events, Mantua was to project a much more aggressive spirit 
of corporate identity. The Gonzaga were to give a recognisable guise to this, 
not only in the sense of the prestige which the marquisate bestowed upon 
Gianfrancesco by the Emperor Sigismund in 1432 generated, but also in the 
attempts made to make Mantua into a centre of cultural achievement. There 
is a political side to the presence of such people as Vittorino da Feltre 
and the establishment of the Mantuan 'studium', both encouraged by 
Gianfrancesco, as well as the more obvious cultural side. 
In short, in attempting to assess the significance of these events 
in the context of general trends, it will be seen that the rule of Gianfrancesco 
Gonzaga, as well as being a period of broad continuity with the past, is also 
in a very real sense a period of beginnings. Many of those trends which put 
I 
7. 
Mantua on the map both in diplomacy and culture stem from this period; 
a point which has been too easily glossed over in the past. One recent 
writer while acknowledging Gianfrancesco's military qualities, nevertheless 
12/ 
wrote of him as "mediocre rna non s·.gradevole". - A man who could manoeuvre 
himself and his state between such formidable forces as Filippo Maria Visconti 
and the Venetian Senate certainly does not deserve such a weak epithet. 
Although young and inexperienced when he succeeded his father on the 20th 
March 1407, he soon showed that he appreciated the legacy of the trecento 
and was willing, and indeed capable, of using it. 
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a much more objective account. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE TRECENTO 
CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE TRECENTO 
I 
The Str~gic Position of Mantua 
"Di fronte agli stati di Milano e Venezia, Mantova 
figurava un po' come un vaso di terracotta, 
costretto a viaggiare con vasi di ferro. Tutta 
1a politica de' Gonzaga nei secoli XIV-XV si 
risolve in una forzata altalena tra due calorosi vicini 
che potevano schiacciare 0 assorbire chi non aveva 
nessuna inc1inazione ad esser divorato." 
10. 
So wrote Luzio, one of the most scholarly directors of the Mantuan 
Archive. The M~nian image is certainly a colourful and compelling one in 
that it perfectly sums up the strategic situation in which Mantua found 
itself. How had this situation evolved in the fourteenth century and what 
precisely were the lessons which experience had taught the Gonzaga? 
The starting point for any discussion of Mantua must always be an 
appreciation of its geographical position. The first and most obvious 
observation is that it lies roughly eqUidistant from Milan and Venice and that 
it is encircled by a number of smaller cities, namely Brescia, Cremona, Parma, 
Ferrara and Verona. This was to be the area of the most active Gonzaga diplomacy. 
The city of Mantua' itself is situated on an island formed by two 
branches of the river Mincio, which flows from Lake Garda. This is part of a 
network of rivers, such as the Adda, the Oglio and the Adige which flow into 
the Po. There are many other smaller rivers, but this diviSion of the Lombard 
Plain into a number of compartments seperated by rivers was to be an important 
2/ determining factor as far as military tactics and strategy were concerned. ~ 
11. 
The natural defensive position of the city was further'improved 
in the thirteenth century by a scheme which was intended to control the 
flooding which the variable level of the Po sometimes caused in the area around 
the twin branches of the Mincio. ~/ The scheme involved the construction of 
dams to regulate the normal flow of the river which subsequently formed 
the three lakes (Superiore, di Mezzo and Inferiore) which surrounded the 
northern side of the city. Some thirty years later it was completed by 
the Lago di Paialo and the creation of the Serraglio. The latter scheme 
fulfilled the double function of providing adequate defences on the southern 
side of the city and also ensuring the safety of an extensive area of good 
agricultural land. Not only is the creation of the Serraglio a significant 
piece of engineering, but it also shows an early appreciation of the defensive 
possibilities of the city. ~/ The fact that the second stage in the 
fortification of Mantua's natural poSition was prompted by Ezzelino da Romano's 
siege of 1256 shows an ability to learn from experience which was to be repeated 
consistently during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It led to the 
construction of solid fortifications at Curtatone, Governolo and Borgoforte, 
with its all-important bridge, which could act as a lifeline for supplies 
and reinforcements. As the fourteenth century progressed it became 
increasingly important for the Gonzaga to ensure that these primary defences 
were kept in good order. 
Similarly, the destruction of this defensive ring of fortifications 
became an obsession with Mantua's enernies~ An extreme example of this is 
when in 1393 Giangaleazzo Visconti tried to divert the Mincio to drain the 
protective ring of lakes. The maintenance of defences was also a frequent 
bargaining counter in diplomacy. It was with ample justification that Platina 
could say that Mantua was "omnium urbium italicarUDl natura loci et manu 
munitissima". 
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12. 
It can be seen, then, that geographical and strategic factors 
are a continuing preoccupation in two basic senses; firstly in the defence 
of the city itself and of its immediate surroundings, and secondly, in 
the implications which this had for other states. The geographical 
location of Mantua made it at the same time a potentially valuable 
acquisition for other states and also a valuable object of diplomacy, 
especially as the northern boundaries of the state stretched right up to 
the shores of Lake Garda, a point which was to become increasingly crucial 
as the Lombard Wars progressed. Because it was sometimes important to 
get Mantua's friendship, there was ample opportunity for the Gonzaga family 
to gain maximum benefit from this. This was the main experience which the 
trecento provided and its benefits were cumulatiVe. 
II 
The Rise of the Gonzaga 
From the beginning the Gonzaga had to struggle to survive: first 
within Mant~a against the Casaloldi and Bonacolsi families, and then against 
the Della Scala family of Verona which had initially supported the Gonzaga 
in the eventual hope of being able to establish its own supremacy in Mantua. 
The genealogy of the Gonzaga family, or the Corradi di Gonzaga as 
they were originally termed, is extremely blurred at its source. Luzio's 
researches have brought many fabrications and documentary falsifications to 
light. 1/ It would appear that there is very little evidence to support 
the exalted theories of the family's origins which were put forward in the 
seventeenth century by the Gonzaga themselves. 
§/ 
13. 
Although the family is mentioned in 1199 in the affairs of Mantua 
when Gualtiero and Corrado were named as having taken part in the peace 
negotiations between Mantua and Padua, ~/ it seems very likely that the family had 
not emerged as an important one in Mantua until a relatively short time before 
the assumption of power in 1328. As late as 1268, for instance, they are 
not included by the chronicler Aliprandi among the foremost families of Mantua 
9/ 
in his 'Annales Mantuani~. - However, this does not mean that certain 
members of the family were insignificant. In fact, it is largely through the 
dynamism of these early Gonzaga that the family gradually brought itself to 
public attention. As early as 1228 Giovanni da Gonzaga was important enough 
to be appointed a canon of the cathedral. 
In fact, it is to the Church that the Gonzaga largely owed their 
position as a landed family. They held extensive lands from the monastery of 
San Benedetto in Polirone. The first benefactor here was Gualtiero da Gonzaga 
in 1196. The investitutes of land were regularly renewed, the last one being 
in 1392 when Pope Boniface IX's donation granted the lands to the Gonzaga 
in their own right. lQ/ As far as area was concerned, however, the property 
which they owned around Marmirolo was the most extensive, and it was upon this 
basis that the wealth and poSition of the family were to be built. 
As early as 1257 it would appear that they were seen as a possible 
threat to be reckoned with in the future. The geographical positioning of 
their lands between Mantua and Reggio from the beginning dictated a complex 
policy, something which was to resemble very closely the diplomatic situation 
of Mantua itself in the early fifteenth century. The very fact that they 
were expelled from Reggio in 1257 and again from Mantua in 1264 proves how 
much they were regarded as potential rivals by the established families. 
14. 
By capitalizing upon inter-family rivalries the Corradi di Gonzaga 
were most effectively to make their bid for social advancement. In the late 
thirteenth century their main rivals were the Casaloldi family, who were 
second only in importance to the ruling Bonacolsi. The jealousy of the 
Casaloldi had previously resulted in the confiscation of the Marmiro10 
11/ 
estates, - and consequently it proved relatively easy for Pinamonte Bonacolsi 
to secure Gonzaga support in order to expel the Casa101di in 1272. 
The success of this 'coup' contributed considerably to the growth 
of the family's importance. Part of the Casaloldi patrimony was granted to 
the Gonzaga in 1272 and this, together with the recovered lands of Marmirolo, 
meant that the Gonzaga had joined the ranks of the foremost landowners in the 
area. 
This could be regarded as the real 'take-off' point for the political 
advancement of the family. From now on the Gonzaga are closely associated 
with the Bonaco1si in the affairs of the city. In 1279 in the ratification 
of the peace between Verona, Brescia and Mantua the first citizen named after 
the Bonaco1si is Antonio Gonzaga. 
After having eliminated their most powerful rivals the Gonzaga 
increased in wealth and influence very rapidly indeed. By the beginning 
of the fourteenth century their possessions were extensive and included 
12/ lands in Brescia, Ferrara, ReggiO, Cremona, and Ivrea. - Such landed 
wealth, combined with the lands (including important castles) in the Mantovano 
itself made the Gonzaga not only a powerful force in the area, but tended to 
encourage even greater aspirations. If their territories were, in effect, 
more extensive than those of the Bonacolsi, l~/ it would appear to be the 
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next logical step to supplant them as the most important family in Mantua. 
The whole process is yet another illustration of the intrinsic problems 
which tended to beset prominent families in city-states of this kind. In 
effect the Bonac01si, in encouraging Gonzaga support to expel the Casaloldi, 
had merely succeeded in putting the Gonzaga in their place. In essence 
the political balance within Mantua had not changed and it could be argued 
that in rewarding the Gonzaga the Bonacolsi were only encouraging them to set 
their political sights even higher. It was, in the final analysis, a dilemma 
which they could not escape from and which was to teach the Gonzaga a valuable 
lesson; that of being able to consolidate their position so securely that they 
did not depend to any great extent upon the support of any other single family 
within Mantua. 
It is clear that by this period the Gonzaga were showing a much greater 
vitality than the Bonacolsi. They most certainly showed an appreciation of 
the value of marriage in strengthening their position. A series of very 
profitable marriages was responsible in great part for the consolidation of 
land. Territories in Cremona and Brescia were thus acquired by the marriages 
of Filippino Gonzaga to Anne of Dovara and of Luigi Gonzaga to Riche1da Ramberti 
respectively. Throughout the later history of the family and especially during 
Gianfrancesco's time, there is a great emphasis, sometimes even obsessive, 
not only on contracting marriages which would also benefit the family 
territorially, but also on marriages which would raise the prestige of the 
family both at home and abroad •• In this respect a good example is the 
14/ double marriage which was contracted in 1354 with the House of Habsburg -
which was to be echoed in Gianfrancesco's period by the marriage of his son 
Ludovico to Barbara of Brandenburg. As we shall see, the preoccupation 
with extra-Italian relationships, particularly with Germany or the Empire, 
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was to be quite a consistent theme in Gonzaga policies. Although, judging 
from his will in 1221, Gualtiero Gonzaga could be regarded as the founder 
of the family's fortunes, the eventual stability of the family is surely 
due to Luigi, who lived surprisingly into his nineties and had nineteen 
children by three marriages and who was the nominal head of the family at the tim 
the Gonzaga took over in 1328. 12/ In reality power seems to have rested 
in the hands of his three eldest sons Guido, Filippino and Feltrino. With 
their considerable talent for governing, combined with the fact that Luigi was 
grooming his favourite grandson, ugolino, for eventual orfice, it appeared 
at the outset that the Gonzaga succession was assured. The assertiveness 
and dynamism of these crucially important members of the family certainly . 
showed itself in the delicate period after the 'coup' in which firmness and 
a sound sense of direction were all-important. 
The o~igins of the conspiracy are very difficult to clarify. 
It would seem that there were other elements in addition to the ambitions 
of the Gonzaga themselves who, by this time were the only viable alternative 
to the Bonacolsi. In his 'Cronaca Universale' Amadei relates how contempories 
sensed that for some time resentment had been building up against the 
Bonacolsi, and such events as the killing of Alberto de' Conti di Riva, a 
prominent citizen, tended to emphasise it. They even suggested that there 
was a smouldering resentment between the two families because of an illicit 
affair between Franceschino Bonacolsi and Filippino Gonzaga's wife, but this 
16/ is not given any substance by a complete lack of documentary evidence. -
It is certainly true that Cangrande I della Scala of Verona had a 
definite interest in the successful outcome of the revolt. The Della Scala 
of Verona were very powerful and Cangrande was very alive to the possibilities 
inherent in getting a foothold in Mantua. 11/ One of the most enthusiastic 
17. 
supporters of the revolt of 1328 was Guiglielmo di Castelbarco,son-in-law 
of Luigi, who commanded a detachment of men sent especially by Can grande 
to support the rebels. It is almost certain that Luigi himself played 
little or no part directly in the coup. The main motive force came from his 
sons and, if we are to judge by subsequent events, from Cangrande himself. 1~/ 
There seems to have been very little opposition offered and events on the 
16th August moved quickly. Rinaldo Bonacolsi was killed in the fighting 
and a few days later Luigi was given the charge of governing the city by public 
acclaim. The Gonzaga family had finally 'arrived', but the fact that Cangrande 
had played an important part in this immediately placed an intolerable 
limitation on their freedom of action. Luigi and his sons were soon to find 
out that their problems were only just beginning. 
III 
The Diplomacy of the Fourteenth Century 
While it is true that an important theme of the fourteenth century 
is the Gonzaga freeing themselves from the threats posed by the Scaligeri, 
they are nevertheless acting in a new political milieu. The decline of Imperial 
power in Italy after the successes of Henry VII's expedition combined with the 
absence of the Papacy from Italy meant that there were no longer any checks 
on the more dynamic states of the North. Despite the relative impotence 
of the Emperors in terms of real power, the Gonzaga were to be consistently 
concerned with the prestige which Imperial recognition seemed to give; 
moreover, the Gonzaga were most anxious to obtain Imperial recognition of their 
hereditary rights to the vicariate of Mantua and it sometimes seemed that 
19/ 
the legal rights were more important than real tangible possession. -
18. 
Later on this obsession was to be extended to negotiations for 
the erection of the Mantuan territory into a Marquisate. Francesco tried 
to obtain this title from Wenceslaus in 1395 but negotiations broke down 
201 over the question of cash. - This was to continue long after the Gonzaga 
had firmly established themselves. The history of the Emperor's dealings 
with Mantua is a very telling illustration'inparvo' of the true nature 
of imperial power in Italy. 2!/ 
In terms of real power, however, the most tangible experiences 
were to be gained from the relationships with other Italian states. Here 
the fourteenth century shows the in~ense vitality of the Gonzaga in that 
we see a consistent policy of territorial aggrandisement. This was to be 
achieved from the start by using the bait of Mantuan alliance in playing 
one state off against the other. In the fourteenth century this involved 
the Visconti and the Scaligeri. At the outset the Gonzaga were forced to 
exploit the political situation of the day out of a need for sheer political 
survival in the formative period of growth. Because it was never really possible 
to remain aloof from active involvement in Lombard affairs the Gonzaga 
quickly learned that it was politically unwise to align oneself too rigidly 
to one particular side and it became almost an axiom of policy to maintain 
as many diplomatiC channeis open for as long as possible and as long as 
it suited Mantuan interests to do so. For instance, although the Gonzaga 
got inevitably caught up in what passed in theory for a Guelf-Ghibelline 
struggle, the alignment was never constant. Indeed, as with other Italian 
states during this period, the ideological connotations of Guelf and 
Ghibelline had ceased to have any relevance at all. Mantua was only 
Ghibelline in the 1320's out of self interest in order to ally with Verona 
in order to reap any territorial benefits at the cost of the Gue1f centres 
of Ferrara, ReggiO or Modena. In 1341 it suited Mantua to be Gue1f because 
19. 
22/ 
of the renewed dangers which came from Verona. - There were· a number 
of considerations which always affected such changes. Firstly, there was this 
policy of the avoidance of over-commitment, and secondly, there was always 
a great need to observe closely the orientation of the most dynamic power, 
Milan, especially the attitude which it was to adopt towards Verona. 
Thirdly, in the background there was always felt to be an important need not 
to jeapordise relations with Venice because commercial relations were so 
valuable to Mantua. 22/ At the end of the fourteenth century this commercial 
relationship was to be transformed into a political one, especially when 
Venice decisively entered the political arena after 1397. Because of all 
these political considerations it could be argued that diplomacy operated 
on two levels; on the surface an attempt, frequently a strained one, to keep 
on friendly terms, and beneath the thin veneer there was the vital question -
which side would help more effectively to preserve Mantuan interests? 
This is why there is such a constant momentum in Gonzaga diplomacy. The 
picture was also complicated by the need to observe the movements of smaller 
towns and cities, but in the final analysis it was the larger states which 
counted. 
While this is not the place to present a very detailed appreciation 
24/ 
of the fourteenth century situation - it is, however, necessary to establish 
some sort of perspective through which the early fifteenth century can be 
Viewed. Generally speaking, the period divides itself into two halves, 
dominated respectively by relations with the Scaligeri and the Visconti. 
Inevitably there is a certain degree of overlap which tends to be super-
imposed by the continuing problem of Imperial recognition and alignment. 
Whatever judgement may be passed upon the nature of Gonzaga 
diplomacy in the trecento, it must always be recognised that it depended 
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implicitly upon stability at home in the first instance. There is little 
or no impression of discord in relation to Luigi's policies within 
Mantua itself. In fact, the changeover of power in 1328 seems to have 
been achieved very smoothly. On the 28th August Luigi was named as 
Captain-General of the Comune and was given the right to nominate a 
successor. 
Luigi's three sons seemed to work well together and this was 
probably due to the fact that each tended to specialise in one particular 
aspect of policy. Feltrino was in charge of defence, Guido was the 
diplomat, and Filippino had a considerable amount of military talent. 22/ 
For the first half of the century at least, there was an absence of any 
real discord which was surprising in a family so large. However, in the 
second half of the century, as we shall see, this harmonious picture was 
to change and bring with it inevitable diplomatic complications. 
It was fortunate that at the outset of their rule the Gonzaga were 
unhampered by any constitutional wranglings. All that had occurred was a 
simple transference of power from the Bonacolsi. There were no flickerings 
of the spirit of the Comune in Mantua, this had already been quenched as 
early as 1308. 2§/ However, the family was wise to refrain from an 
ostentatious display of political power in this delicate period of 
transition. 
The formal alliance of the 17th August 1329, 21/ between the 
Gonzaga and Alberto and Mastino della Scala seemed on the surface to be 
merely a renewal of the agreement of mutual friendship reached with the 
Bonacolsil but, as later events turned out, added to the fact that the 
21. 
della Scala had helped the Gonzaga in the previous year, it can be seen 
as yet another stage in the insinuation of that family into Mantuan 
28/ 
affairs. - It was also connected with the expedition of Lewis of 
Bavaria in 1327-9 and the possible danger of a Guelf reaction from Robert 
of Anjou. We can see, then, that almost immediately the Gonzaga were 
drawn into issues which had wider implications than those of their immediate 
locality. 
The expedition of John of Bohemia in 1330, however much it might 
have produced a Ghibelline reaction, also shows the blurring between the 
two sides. The possibility of an accord between John and the Papacy 
produced an Italian League at Ferrara in September 1332 which consisted 
of both Guelfs and Ghibellines. Such a league is a sure indication that 
behind the now bankrupt notions which such titles once implied the main 
motives were those of territorial expansion. 
During this period it was Verona, rather than Milan or Venice 
which was undergoing the most vigorous expansion and the fact that Scaligeri 
interests in Tuscany and the Veneto produced an inevitable reaction of 
resentment from other states tended to compromise Mantua's position even 
though the Gonzaga were trying to remain aloof from the impending conflict as 
much as possible. 
By 1336 the Scaligeri state had reached such an advanced state of 
development that the absorption of Mantua now only seemed a matter of time. 22/ 
There is even documentary evidence of a plot to assassinate the most 
important members of the Gonzaga family. 3Q/ 
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Both Florence and Venice were frightened at such a dangerous 
rival both for economic as well as political reasons and negotiations 
were begun which were to result in the first anti-Scaligeri League of 
June 1336. In this the Gonzaga and the Este to a certain extent were 
placed in a very difficult position. They were very nervous of the Della 
Scala but were very unwilling to antagonise them even further by an open 
support of their enemies since it was by no means certain that the league 
would be strong enough to defeat them. It was, of course, impossible to 
remain diplomatically on the fence without any ill effects. The Venetians 
had previously been on excellent terms economically with the Gonzaga 
and Luigi had been admitted to the Venetian nobility. 3!/ But now Mantua 
and Verona were both subjected to economic sanctions. In addition to this all 
Mantuans who had resided in Venice for less than a year were ordered to 
32/ leave. -
The situation for the Gonzaga was far from easy and their position 
was made more difficult by the renewed attempts to get them to join the league. 
Together with the Visconti and the Este they were invited to Venice, 
ostensibly to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement, but in reality it 
was an attempt to detach the Gonzaga from the Veronese alliance. The aims 
of the League were made remarkably clear; it was nothing short of the complete 
33/ destruction of the power of the Scaligeri. - It was when the aims and 
the extent of the League and its potential strength were discovered that 
the Gon~aga began to waver in their Veronese alliance. 
On the lOth March 1337 Mantua, Ferrara, Florence, Venice and Milan 
joined together with the rebel town of Reggio against the Scaligeri and it 
was agreed that Mantua would be the jase for the main attack on Verona 
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itself in which the size of the armies involved was considerable. 3~/ 
It is interesting to note that Guido played a very important part in 
these negotiations. 
As it turned out, the Gonzaga had acted wisely in joining the 
League, because the outcome of the was was completely to cripple the 
Scaligeri state. The treaty which ended the war was signed on the 
24th January 1339 and it virtually amounted to a dismemberment of the 
territories to the advantage of Florence, Venice, Milan and the Carrara of Padua. 
The revolt of Parma in 1341 also meant that Lucca was virtually lost. In 
fact Mastino was forced to sell it to Florence for the sum of 250,000 florins. 
The Scaligeri only retained Verona and Vicenza. 
Although the Scaligeri were no longer a force to be reckoned with 
does not mean that they had ceased to figure in Lombard affairs. Although 
superficially the relations with the Gonzaga had improved after the war 
there was always in reality a tremendous amount of mutual suspicion, and 
up to 1350 Mastino was always looking for an opportunity to revenge himself 
upon the Visconti and the Gonzaga and from time to time, despite the repeated 
attempts of Clement VI to compose their differences, there were minor 
incidents which tended to keep the Gonzaga continually vigilant. 
One important result of all this was that it placed the Gonzaga 
in much closer contact with the Visconti and this new orientation was to 
become much more pronounced in the 1340's. It became an important part 
of Mantuan policy to draw closer to Milan while maintaining good relations 
with Venice. In the early '40's the Viscontean attachment is shown in a 
number of ways. On 20th August 1341 the Gonzaga joined in a mutually 
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defensive league lasting for ten years with Milan, Riniero da Donoratico, 
Lord of Pisa, and with the Correggio family against Lewis of Bavaria. 
Also from this time there was a Mantuan agent resident in Milan. 
This rapprochement with Milan tended to exacerbate once again 
the rather delicate relationship with Verona. 3~/ Indeed, there is ev.ery 
justification for Waller's reference to the Scaligeri as the 'bete noire' 
36/ 
of Gonzaga diplomacy. -
In 1341 the Gonzaga were closely associated with Viscontean 
interests in Tuscany , when Pisa appealed for Milanese help against what 
it regarded as an increased threat from Florence after their acquisition 
of Lucca. 
operations. 
In fact Filippino was appointed to take command of any military 
321 
It soon appeared to many of the smller 'signorie', however, that 
although the Della Scala state had been destroyed, another state was beginning 
to take its place - Milan - and the reactions to this new threat by Florence, 
Venice, Ferrara and the Papacy were once again to complicate Gonzaga 
diplomacy. While the advantages of allying with a state in the ascendant 
were self evident these always had to be weighed against the strength of 
potential opposition, a situation very similar to that of the '30's with Verona. 
In order to examine this proposition perhaps a good example is 
the 'war' of Parma of October 1344. The Visconti had designs upon this 
city which had been sold by Azzo da Correggio to Obizzo d'Este for a sum 
of 60,000 florins. Such a situation virtually made war inevitable. The 
pattern of alignment is a very characteristic one, that of the Este, the 
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Scaligeri, the Pepoli, and the Da Polenta against the Visconti and the 
Gonzaga. The base for operations was Reggio and once again Filippino was 
to spearhead the attack. 
The situation is very interesting because it does reveal the intrinsic 
character of the relationship between Milan and Mantua in which Luchino 
Visconti was using the Gonzaga to further his own ends. As far as Milan 
was concerned there appears to be little concern over any reassurances Mantua 
might want. This is borne out by the way in which events turned out. In 
the end there was no military action and Obizzo agreed to sell Parma 
to the Visconti. The Gonzaga were not included in the treaty between Milan, 
the Della Scala and the Estensi, even though they did have assurances of 
Milanese protection. 
This protection, however, was not always forthcoming. For instance, 
in July 1345 Luchino refused to send men to defend Mantua from the possibility 
of attack by Veronese troops in transit for Parma. In the following year 
only- little was done to alleviate the pressure of Veronese incursions 
into the Mantovano. This alarming state of affairs was a pre-echo of what 
was to happen in that crucial year of 1438. As the Viscontean ambitions in the 
Bresciano and the Cremonese, in which the Gonzaga possessed territory, 3§/ 
made the Gonzaga aware of their status vis-a-vis Milan, another much more 
frightening danger loomed over the horizon, the threat of political 
isolation. The dangers of this situation became very apparent in 1348 when 
Luchino began to pick upon the slightest pretext to cause trouble between 
Mantua and Cremona. Because of the military superiority of the Milanese 
the Gonzaga were ultimately in no position to resist by their own unaided 
efforts even though frantic attempts were made to prevent matters from 
escalating. 
- i 
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As was expected the Milanese were very successful. Not only 
were the territories in the Bresciano and Cremonese occupied but Milanese 
troops entered the Mantovano itself. They reached Curtatone after having 
sacked the surrounding area. 
Surprisingly, however, no further advance was made due to internal 
disputes in the army and also to the strength of the fortifications of the 
Serraglio. It was an unexpected outcome and although Aliprandi paints 
a picture of triumph,32/ this fortuitous result was not to end the 
Milanese threat by any means. 
Although there was a temporary check to Milanese policy by the 
death of Luchino in 1349, the Milanese occupied areas were much too close 
to Mantua for comfort and in 1354 the Milanese were using such areas as 
Rubiera, Coriano and Sologno as bases for an attack upon Reggio and 
Modena. Although there was a certain amount of success at the outset when a 
contingent of Mantuan and Venetian troops under the command of Filippino 
repulsed a Milanese attack from the Bresciano, the situation soon became 
very dangerous indeed. No doubt encouraged by the avowed intention of the 
40/ Emperor CharleslV to support the anti-Viscontean leagues, ,- there was 
an association in 1356 of the Gonzaga and the Estensi to fight against 
Francesco Ordelaffi of Forll who was struggling against the papal legate 
Albornoz to keep his independence. Bernabo Visconti supported him because 
he himself had ambitions of expansion in the Romagna. This was an excellent 
opportunity for Bernabo to settle once and for all with the Gonzaga and, 
despite some early Mantuan successes, primarily at Reggio and Borgoforte, 
the Serraglio was soon overrun and Mantua itself was cut off from the outside 
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world. There were desperate attempts by Ugo1ino Gonzaga to raise more 
men but the situation was hopeless and when negotiations were opened in March 
1358 the Gonzaga had no alternative but to give in to the humiliating demands 
of surrendering all their patrimonial possessions in return for which they 
became the vassals of the Visconti. 4!/ 
For the time being Milan was too powerful and Mantua too vulnerable. 
until its defences could be rebuilt it was unwise for the Gonzaga to commit 
themselves very far in any direction. 
It was clear that whatever success the Gonzaga may have achieved 
in the first half of the fourteenth century was, to a considerable extent, 
due to the unity of purpose within the family. Whether or not he was 
merely a figurehead, the patriarchal figure of Luigi was a stablizing 
factor. His death in 1360 heralded. a much more unstable period. A certain 
amount of jealousy noW became apparent, especially at the prominence and 
encouragement which Luigi gave to his favourite grandson Ugolino, Guido's 
son, who was being groomed to succeed his father as third captain of Mantua. 
Guido's other two brothers who had worked with him had now faded from the 
scene. Filippino had died in 1356 leaving a daughter and Feltrino and his 
family had retired to Reggio. 
Ugolino was now the dOminating inflUence in Mantua. He had proved 
himself an able administrator and displayed a considerable interest and 
talent in diplomacy. Having married Bernabo's niece Caterina he was in 
a fairly influential position. ug01ino'9 prominence, encouraged by his 
grandfather, provoked the jealousy not only of his two brothers Ludovico 
and Francesco, but also of his two cousins, the sons of Feltrino. Indeed 
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it has been suggested that one of the reasons for Feltrino's family 
retiring to Reggio was due to this intolerable position in Mantua. 
This resentment boiled over in an attempt in 1356 by Feltrino's 
sons to assassinate Ugolino. Although the plot was discovered and the 
matter ended in a rather 'touching' family reunion, it was nevertheless 
significant that the sons fled to Verona after this plot was discovered; 
a taste of the special difficulties which could be created by family 
troubles of this nature, especially when it involved a question of political 
power. 4~/ 
Luigi's two surviving sons never really made up their quarrel and 
Feltrino, in his attempts to keep control of Reggio, generally allied with 
anti-Viscontean leagues and this tended to compromise Guido's relations 
with Milan. However, it was not merely a question of alliances; the family 
rivalries were unfortunately to have more tangible results. Ugolin~ 
was finally assassinated by his brothers in 1362; Francesco in his turn 
was assassinated by Ludovico in 1368 who finally ensured that an ordered 
form of succession from father to son was achieved. 
The unsavoury spectacle of a family tearing itself apart cannot 
have failed to attract the attention of the rest of Northern Italy. 
In particular, the murder of Ugolino produced a violent reaction from 
Bernabo Visconti. The Della Scala, who never ceased to be vigilant in 
their attempts to revenge themselves upon the Gonzaga now saw this as a 
marvellous opportunity. Cansignoria della Scala suggested an alliance 
, 43/ 
with Bernabe to revenge Ugolino's death. - It is not really clear why 
the campaign came as late as 1368 but it may be partly explained by the 
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fact that Cansignorio only turned to Bernabo as a last resort after 
having failed in his attempts to provoke further discord within the 
family by playing on the resentment felt by the children of Luigi'S second 
marriage at their being virtually excluded from any power. In particular 
Corrado had gone to Verona in 1366 according to Aliprandi. 4~/ He may 
well have been urged by Cansignorio to write a letter to Ludovico warning 
of a plot against him by his own brother Francesco. In the circumstances 
Ludovico behaved with admirable restraint in showing the letter to his 
brother and his cousin Antonio who was also implicated. Their violent denials 
and in particular Antonio's anger resulted in his challenging Corrado to 
a duel. This caused Corrado to admit that the entire matter had been a 
fabrication on his part and this resulted in yet another superficial 
reconciliation between the two brothers. As subsequent events turned out 
Corrado's letter proved to be prophetic and in the final analysis may even 
have achieved its object in arousing Ludovico's suspicions. At any rate 
there may well have been a more than casual connection between the death of 
45/ Francesco in 1368 and the Verona/Milan campaign of the same year. -
The Della Scala and Bernab~ certainly did pick an opportune moment; 
this is partly why they waited so long. In the previous year, and contrary 
to the wishes of Bernabo, work had been started on rebuilding the fortifications 
of the Serraglio, especially around the crucial area of Borgoforte. The 
work had been intensive but there was certainly doubt as to whether Ludovico 
could resist such forces unaided. He hoped that Ferrara would be able to 
back him up and there is a certain amount of correspondence in the Gonzaga 
46/ Archive to support this. -
Despite the fact that Ludovico did send a modest fleet of eight 
ships to reinforce Borgoforte the enemy armdes found little real resistance 
30. 
and once again the Serraglio was overrun. The all-important bridge at 
Borgoforte was destroyed thus laying Curta tone open to attack. The Este 
fleet was convincingly defeated on the 24th April in its attempt to recover 
lost ground at Borgoforte and with the Scaligeri troops encamped at 
Ostiglia communications with Ferrara were well-nigh impossible. Once again 
Mantua was in severe difficulties and the only glimmer of hope was that the 
arrival of the Emperor Charles IV could redress the balance. In fact, by 
the end of May his troops were very close to Mantua and the pressure was 
47/ 
consequently relieved. 
The resulting negotiations were fraught with difficulties and 
mutual suspicion. What is particularly important is Ludovico's obsession 
with the rebuilding of the Serraglio fortifications, a project which Bernab~ 
opposed so violently that he organised another campaign later in the year 
48/ to undo once again the work of reconstruction. - It was clear that 
Milan had emerged as the most aggressive power in Northern Italy and the 
acquisition of Reggio by Bern~ in 1371 signalled the beginning of yet 
another attempt to intervene further to the south, especially in Modena and 
ultimately Bologna. 
Any influence which Ludovico could hope to exert was neutralised 
by the fact that Mantua was unprotected and this meant that he could not 
afford to antagonise Bernabo during his campaign for Modena. The relationship 
with Milan was thus based primarily upon fear and this is a very significant 
factor. But this was also tempered by the fact that he could equally not' 
afford actively to alienate the anti-Viscontean powers 42/ and it is a 
testament to Ludovico's cautious policies that he managed to remain aloof 
from any conflict for the rest of his rule. Indeed, he made it abundantly 
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clear on a number of occasions that he wished to remain apart from any 
major commitment. 
It was frequently difficult to reconcile a policy of non-involvement 
with his frequent fears for the security of Mantua. The negotiations for 
a marriage between his son Francesco and Bernab~'s daughter Agnese in 1380, 
however, showed that he appreciated the important function of marriage in 
going a long way towards neutralising the potential danger which would come 
from Milan rather than any other single source. 
The peaceful succession of Francesco in 1382 sees the beginning 
of an uninterrupted succession from father to son and effectively ended 
this period of instability within the family. Ludovico could never feel 
totally secure and this was as much due to the means by which he eventually 
came to power as to anything else. As late as 1372 there was another plot 
to overthrow him. 
Although Francesco was generally regarded as a much more attractive 
personality than his father 52/ the political situation and the means which 
he employed to deal with it were not really changed at all. In fact, during 
the period of his rule the problems of the relationship with Milan were, 
if anything, accentuated. Under Giangaleazzo Visconti, who seized power 
from Bernabo in 1385, the rapid expansion of the Milanese state exacerbated 
the already tense diplomatic situation in Northern Italy and finally prodded 
Venice to take a much more direct part in mainland politics. 
It is not really surprising in the circumstances that we see a 
continuation of his father's policies. The experience of the incursions 
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into the Mantovano, and especially into the Serraglio, had taught him to 
place a considerable emphasis upon fortification. The castle of S. Giorgio 
started by Ludovico, was finished in l406~ 5!/ Governolo was improved; but 
most important of all, the bridge was reconstructed at Borgoforte. This 
obsessive desire to ensure an adequate defensive system for the Mantovano 
is to be seen in his somewhat excessive demands when in 1385 two leagues were 
formed in orderto ward off the danger from the mercenary companies. 5~/ 
Although the early years of Francesco's rule were relatively 
quiet ones he soon showed political opportunism and foresight in supporting 
Giangaleazzo rather than his father-in-law. It has been argued that a 
very important reason for this was a political one. Giangaleazzo, as a 
reward for Francesco's support, was willing to secure a release from ',Wenceslaus 
of the humiliating terms of vassalage of 1358; a request which was granted 
in 1383. 
The relationship with Giangaleazzo was very close judging from 
Francesco's frequent visits to Milan and his being chosen in 1389 to 
accompany Valentina Visconti to France for her marriage to Louis of Valois. 
Moreover Giangaleazzo was very anxious to grant him a number of privileges 
including that of quartering the Visconti viper on his coat of arms. 
From hindsight it is relatively easy to see the underlying 
reasons for such an affable relationship. When one considers the aims and 
extent of Giangaleazzo's policies it can be seen that at least for the 
time being it was very useful for him to secure the friendship and support 
of the Gonzaga in the initial stages of Milanese expansion, particularly in 
his elimination of the Carraresi and the Scaligeri in 1385 and 1387 respectively. 
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While he was establishing good relations with Milan Francesco was 
also careful to cultivate the friendship of Venice. In 1388, the year in 
which he was formally elected Captain of Mantua, he went to Venice where he 
was received by the Maggior Consiglio and was aggregated to the Venetian 
bil ' 53/ no ~ty. - There was nothing ambiguous in this because even Giangaleazzo 
was anxious for Venetian friendship. For instance, Venice was closely 
involved in his policy over the division of the Carrara possessions in 
May 1387. 5~/ 
The measure of his suppott for Giangaleazzo, or rather of his 
nervousness with regard to him, can be seen in the way in which he disposed of 
his wife. In 1391 Agnese was tried and executed on a charge of adultery. 5~/ 
Although this episode shows a less savoury side to Francesco's character, 
the political reasoning behind it is easy to understand. Agnese had very 
little love for the man who had deposed her father and her open pleasure 
at any failures by Giangaleazzo must have been extremely embarrassing and 
most certainly tended to compromise Francesco's poSition with Milan. Anyhow, 
she was not particularly attractive, she was sickly, and what is more, she failed 
to produce a male heir. Moreover, it has been argued that her personal 
conduct was not as innocent as some nineteenth century writers would have 
us believe. 5§/ 
A little over a year later, however, on September 1st 1392 
Francesco joined the League of Bologna which had the moral backing of 
Venice and which was to oppose Giangaleazzo for the next six years. 
This apparently violent turnabout in Francesco's poliCY underlines the contention 
57/ 
that he only supported Milan out of fear. - By 1392 the Milanese state 
had expanded so much that alarm was felt by Florence and Venice which now for 
the first time had a common frontier with Milan and began to fear for the ' 
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security of the 'retroterra'. This is why it became Venetian policy 
to try to ensure the independence of the smaller states in order to 
cushion herself against the logical consequenCes of such expansion. 
Venice did not wish to become too actively involved but we see here the 
first glimmers of a new orientation which was to bring Venice eventually 
into the mainstream of Italian politics. 
Beneath the amicable surface of Milanese/Mantuan relations at 
this time Francesco was feeling increasingly frustrated at the way in which 
he felt he was being used by Milan. Whatever such writers as Intra and 
Fiorio might suggest 5~/about the execution of Agnese Visconti as the result 
of a Viscontean plot, Francesco's motives were purely political. Once 
again it seemed that Giangaleazzo ignored any Mantuan requests. For instance, 
Francesco did not receive the three Gonzaga castles of Castel d'Ario, Canedole 
and Pinforte which he had hoped to receive as a reward for joining the anti-
Scaligeri league of 1387. Similarly in 1391 Giangaleazzo decided to redeem 
a pledge by which, for payment of 50,000 ducats, he had four months previously 
awarded him the valuable castles of Castellaro de Laqusello, Asola, Canede 
and Villimpenta. It is not really surprising in the circumstances that 
Francesco felt that he had received precious little in tangible terms from 
Giangaleazzo in return for his services. Anyhow, Giangaleazzo had proved 
such a suspicious person that the tension involved in keeping on friendly 
terms with him was becoming too great to bear. 
However, an examination of the detailed treaty of September • 
shows how nervous Francesco was at the prospect of aligning himself openly 
59/ 
against Milan. - Once again there is an overwhelming insistence upon 
the allies guaranteeing the defences of Mantua and especially the bridge 
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at Borgoforte. Under normal circumstances such demands may well have 
been regarded as excessive but the fact that the allies were prepared to 
accede to them proves how valuable the Gonzaga alliance was to them. 
War did not break out immediately. In fact there were five 
years of very tense peace in which Giangaleazzo, because of a realisation 
that he could not really afford to go to war with such a powerful league, 
tried his best to break it up. In fact, it would seem.that the motives 
which inspired the League of BOlo9na were based upon the assumption that 
'cold war' was better than open war. One of the most important members 
of the League, Florence, for instance, explicitly wished to avoid any 
major military commitment. 
This made Francesco's position very difficult because now 
Giangaleazzo's resentment against him for his betrayal made him the prime 
object, and the most easily accessible one, against which a successful 'cold 
war' could be waged. Hence the attempts in the Spring of 1393 to divert 
60/ the Mincio in order to deprive Mantua of its lake defences. - Even 
such overt tactics failed to draw Florence into active opposition and 
Giangaleazzo was able to gain added time as protracted negotiations over 
this matter proceeded. In the end it was fortuitous that the technical 
problems which the scheme involved resulted in its being dropped for the time 
611 being. - However, it was enough to frighten Francesco seriously, and 
it did not seem to bode well for the future as far as the effectiveness 
of his new-found allies was concerned. In fact Giangaleazzo's plan was 
attempted once again in 1397. 6~1 
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Throughout 1395 Giangaleazzo was trying to break up the League 
by exploiting its inte~nal disagreements. He concentrated a great deal 
on Florence and Venice, for her part, was trying very hard to keep the 
allies together. Giangaleazzo's purpose behind his project for a mutually 
defensive league against the mercenary companies was ultimately to achieve 
the isolation of Mantua but the League's insistence on the maintenance of 
the terms of the treaty of 1392 thwarted such plans. 
Giangaleazzo was finally stung into action by the treaty which 
the Florentines concluded with the anti-Orleanist party in France in 
September 1396 which, when ratified by Francesco on December 22nd promised 
him possession of Asola, Reggio, Mirandola and Ostiglia if they were captured. 
Giangaleazzo's campaign was very fierce indeed in the Mantovano, 
and the fact that Milanese forces commanded by Jacopo dal Verme and 
Ugolotto Biancardo were immediately sent to attack Governolo and Borgoforte 
show just how justified Francesco's obsession with fortifications was. 62/ 
The Milanese were devastatingly successful despite the considerable 
amount of help which the allies, especially Bologna, provided. After the 
capture of Luzzara, Suzzara and Marcaria, the Borgoforte fortifications 
were destroyed and the Serraglio was overrun. Although Carlo Malatesta 
was able temporarily to make some headway towards the end of August, the 
Milanese were much too strong and prospects for the future were grim. 
Deprived of French assistance after Nicopolis there was only one way in which 
this desparate situation could be alleviated and that was the decisive 
entry of Venice onto the scene. There was no other option in the circumstances. 
but the threat of Venetian intervention was enough to check Giangaleazzo. 
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Venice had only to show a limited military presence 6~/to encourage 
the beginning of negotiations which were to result in the truce of Pavia which 
was to last for ten years and which in March 1400 was transformed into a 
full peace treaty. 
The war of 1397 had shown how very important Venice was as a 
political counterweight and had brought about a close friendship with 
Car-to Malatesta into whose family Francesco had married. Carlo was 
eventually to become a co-executor of his will along with the Venetian 
Republic. The fortifications could once again be built, but Mantua had 
only just managed to survive this time. Francesco did not immediately get 
his property back; it was held by Carlo Malatesta pending a restitution 
settlement. Although they were restored by the peace of 1400 Francesco 
had to fight hard to get them back. 
It is not surprising, then, that Francesco became somewhat 
disillusioned with the League of Bolojna and he decided after the sobering 
experience of this war that it would be more realistic to reach some sort of 
modus vivendi with Milan. After all the fact that Venice had shown her hand 
in the war was enough to make Giangaleazzo think twice before launching 
any more campaigns in that direction. In fact, from now on until his untimely, 
or fortuitous, death in 1402 Giangaleazzo was to concentratehisaxpansionist 
policies elsewhere in Tuscany and the Romagna. 
From now on until his death in 1407 Francesco was to concentrate 
on policies which were designed not to alienate either Milan or Venice, 
and the fact that in the process he managed to add more territories to the 
Mantuan state shows just how adept he had become at the diplomatiC game of 
of manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre. For instance, he helped Giangaleazzo 
in his campaign against Bologna in July 1402. Also at the battle of 
Casalecchio in the same year he captured Giacomo Carrara and sent him as 
a prisoner to Mantua. 
There can be little doubt, however, that the relationship with 
Giangaleazzo was still very uneasy and it was fortunate for Francesco 
that the former did die in September 1402 because, had he been able to 
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carry his policies in Tuscan~' and the Romagna to their logical conclusion, 
he would have been in a better position than ever to attack Mantua once 
again. As it was, the Milanese state now entered a period of disintegration 
and Francesco could relax for the time being. 6~/ 
His final years were devoted to strengthening his already 
strong ties with Venice and his dealings with the Venetians not only show 
that he believed that close ties with Venice were essential for future policy, 
but they also indicate the measure of Venetian interest in the terraferma. 
The war of 1397 stimulated a new interest in this long neglected area. 
As far as Venetian interests were concerned this was a very good opportunity 
to experiment with a new approach to the Iretroterra ' • The death of 
Giangaleazzo had in a sense created a power vacuum into which Venice could 
now step without suffering any serious military consequences. This is shown in 
their attitude to the elimination of the Carrara family. 
This collapse of Milan encouraged a number of minor families to 
reassert themselves. This was especially true as regards the Carrara family 
who had been able to acquire Brescia, Verona and Vicenza. The Venetians 
were no longer prepared to tolerate this and in their direct intervention 
in a campaign to crush them we see the first tangible fruits of this 
new policy of territorial expansion. 6§/ 
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It was in Venice's interests to secure Francesco's help primarily 
because Mantua was such a good base for the conquest of Verona and, as far 
as Francesco was concerned, he felt that his support of Venice would greatly 
strengthen his hold upon Ostiglia, Villimpenta, Castellaro de Lagusello, 
Belforte and Peschiera, all of which were on the Veronese frontier, and which 
had been acquired some time after 1402. The retention of these territories 
was also to preoccupy Gianfrancesco in 1440. 
The League of August 3rd 1404 with Venice included a standard 
condotta arrangement with Francesco. Although Francesco was to have the 
command of 100 infantry and 200 lances as well as the sum of 500 florins 
a month his actions were nevertheless closely supervised by a Venetian 
provveditore. Upon the successful conclusion of the war in 1406 Francesco 
was given possession of the frontier strongholds but it was also very clear 
from the agreement that the Venetian Senate was careful to insist on its 
own rights, especially as far as dues and tolls were concerned. 61/ 
When Francesco died in 1407 the alliance with Venice was very 
strong indeed, so much so that the Doge was entrusted with the guardinaship 
of his young son and heir, Gianfrancesco. This was the principal 
diplomatic legacy which Francesco left. 
IV 
Conclusions 
While it is especially dangerous to make generalisations in 
Italian history because the resulting picture is somewhat 'over-tidy' 
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the general configuration of the history of Mantuan relations with the 
larger Italian states is relatively simple, and it would be useful to 
conclude this chapter by summarising the points discussed abOve. In the 
earlier part of the century the desire to counteract the dangers from the 
Scaligeri drove the Gonzaga into the arms of the Visconti. Whilst 
coming to rely increasingly upon Milan, the Gonzaga nevertheless continued 
to court the Scaligeri despite the great instability of the relationship. 
As the century progressed and as Milan's position became increasingly 
powerful, especially under Giangaleazzo Visconti, the Gonzaga were forced 
to rethink their diplomatic position to counteract the threats of absorption. 
It is, in a sense, the gradual realisation that Mantua was being used by 
both sides which generated the ambivalent policies of the future; it was 
a process of coming to terms with the facts of diplomatic life. It taught 
the Gonzaga to appreciate both the merits and dangers inherent in their 
strategic position. They were very conscious that they were at all times 
playing a very dangerous game; hence the obsession with problems of 
internal defence. 
It was fortunate that there was no incompatibility between the 
pro-Milanese alliance which the Gonzaga adopted and the maintenance of 
trading relations with Venice during the greater part of this period. However, 
it must not be imagined that things always went smoothly. For instance, in 
1353 there was a potentially dangerous situation created when Venice reacted 
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unfavourab1y towards the Milanese acquisition of Genoa. This was the 
first occasion when the Gonzaga were placed in a very difficult position 
of having to make a choice. 6~/ Although Luigi Gonzaga eventually 
managed to avoid any exclusive commitment, possibly because Venice 
was not in a position to back up its threats, the incident is a foretaste 
of the difficulties inherent in a conflict situation between Milan and 
69/ Venice. -
However, Luigi Gonzaga's unwillingness to forego the friendship 
of Venice could also be explained by a growing awareness of the danger posed 
by a Milanese state which was gradually advancing towards his own. Relations 
with Milan had become much more unstable after 1348 when the Visconti became 
actively interested in acquiring territories in the Cremonese and Bresciano; 
areas in which the Gonzaga themselves possessed land •. 
The way in which Luchino Visconti more or less forced Mantua 
into war is a good illustration of the dangers posed by a heavy reliance 
on Milan. In 1348 Luchino was trying his best to stir up trouble between 
Mantua and Cremona which was urged to demand lands which had been unjustly 
siezed by the Gonzaga on pain of a forcible occupation by Milan. Despite 
desperate attempts by the Gonzaga to avoid a conflict Luchino was determined 
to attack Mantua itself. Mantua had no allies who could offer any real 
belp and the war, which finally broke out in July taught the Gonzaga two 
things. Firstly, that in view of the unstable nature of Milanese friendship, 
a consistently pro-Milanese policy on the part of Mantua could bring with 
it the reaction of political isolation; in other words it was wise to keep 
one's diplomatic options open for as long as possible; and secondly, the 
fact that on this occasion the defences of the Serraglio resisted enemy 
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attacks reinforced the obsession with fortification. However, they were 
still lucky that Luchino died in 1349. 
For the rest of the century relations with Milan were to be generally 
bad. When Mantua was once again threatened by Bernab~ Visconti in 1357,72/ 
the fortifications were seriously damaged and it was precisely this factor 
which prompted the humilating negotiations for peace in l358,7!/and heralded 
a more tranquil period in relations with Milan. 
However, this did not last for long and we see the same sort of 
events repeating themselves in the war of 1368 where the campaigns were 
characterised by an interaction of river and land warfare; something which 
was to be used so effectively in the early fifteenth century. 
The position which Ludovico adopted in the war of Modena (1371-5) 
shows that he realised how a thoughtful diplomacy could go a long way towards 
saving Mantua from the destruction which had often been so near. Here we 
see the 'buffer state' mentality emerging. Ludovico tried to remain on good 
terms with both sides. While friendship, or at least non-aggression, with 
Bernabo was of fundamental importance for the survival of Mantua, he could 
not run the risk of alienating the anti-Viscontean League. His very active 
diplomacy in playing one side off against the other is a very significant 
72/ development in the right direction. -
The rule of Francesco Gonzaga developed the themes we have already 
discussed. The question of Milan, however, was now very much more serious 
because of the phenomenal expansion of the Milanese state under Giangaleazzo. 
The whole period was, in effect, a gradual modification of the·state of affairs 
which had persisted for most of the century. Because of the very much more 
serious threat posed by Milan, there was a consequent reaction from 
other states, primarily Florence and subsequently Venice. The greater 
need for protection was to drive Francesco more and more towards Venice 
but by now he had learned not to become too closely attached to anyone 
state. He appreciated the need for diversifying diplomatic links on a 
more extensive scale than hitherto7~/because he realised that he could 
never implicitly trust anyone state. 7~/ 
The part played by Mantua in the war against Milan in 1397 shows 
the dangers which a buffer state could face. The fact tha t Mantua was 
regarded as a significant obstacle to his progress eastwards was clearly 
indicated by Giangaleazzo's sometimes frenetic tactics. 72/ In a sense 
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this campaign pOinted very much to the future because the same situation could, 
and indeed did, operate the other way round with Venetian westward expansion 
later on. 
However, the success of Mantua's resistance could also be regarded 
as a decisive blow for Mantuan independence: 
"Per il minuscolo stato gonzaghesco era un bel pas so 
innazi ed era una notevole affermazione di prestigio." 7§/ 
Although it was fortunate for Mantua and Florence that Giangaleazzo 
died unexpectedly in 1402, and that this brought about a temporary collapse 
of Milanese power, the campaign had a more sinister side to it because this 
war, perhaps more than any other single event, was to make the Venetians 
alarmingly aware of the need to adopt a more consistent terraferma policy 
and this was ultimately to have baleful consequences for Mantua yet again. 
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What, then, was the legacy of the trecento? 
Basi"cally, we have seen it as the science of survival. This 
meant the o~ganisation of defences and a continuous assessment of the political 
state of play among other powers, both great and small. The lessons were 
taken to heart. Against the background of the development of the Milanese 
state and the repeated attempts by the Scaligeri to reassert themselves, the 
Gonzaga had learnt the art of constant vigilance; that the game of politics 
possessed its own peculiar brand of morality, a morality ultimately to be 
enshrined in Machiavelli's "Prince". In addition to this they had appreciated 
that it was essential to remain on good terms with Venice and as many smaller 
states as possible in order to compensate, in part, for any escalation in 
relationships with Milan. 
However, the trecento in a sense presented a less complex set of 
alternatives to the Gonzaga than in the succeeding century. For the greater 
part of the century the main danger came from one direction - Milan. The 
fact that Mantua managed to survive is a great tribute to the skill of the 
Gonzaga and bears out the proposition that they had learned how to make the 
best out of a sometimes very difficult and dangerous situation. It also 
shows the disadvantages as well as the advantages of the position which nature 
and Gonzaga ingenuity had created for Mantua. Whether it liked it or not, 
Mantua was to be deeply involved in any repercussions resulting from even 
the slightest change in the balance of power between Lombardy and the Veneto. 
It had become a significant wedge driven between Milan and Venice. 
The situation was temporarily eased with the uncertain period after 
the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti but when the spectre of Milanese 
45. 
imperialism was to raise its head once again, this time under the auspices 
of Filippo Maria in the 1420' s it was to be in very different circumstances. 
It was this phenomenon, combined with a much more dynamic and possessive 
V~netian attitude towards its mainland territories in Italy which was once 
again to drag Mantua into the power game of Northern Italy; but this time 
. 77/ the game was much more dangerous, and the stakes were much higher. -
It was just as well that the Gonzaga had some experience in dealing with such 
similar situations in the fourteenth century because now Gonzaga expertise and 
flexibility were to be tested to the full in order to prevent Mantua from 
being submerged once and for all. This is why the rule of Gianfrancesco 
occupies such a crucial period in the.history of Mantua when it becomes the 
focal point of Milanese and Venetian policies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EARLY YEARS 1407-1420 
I 
Gianfrancesco's Succession 
"Amaraval Forte 10 popol mantovano 
Perche ben zovenetto Ii paria ••• " !/ 
It is with these words that the ch~onicler Aliprandi announces 
the succession of Gianfrancesco Gonzaga to the signoria of Mantua on the 
7th of March 1407. The reference to Gianf~esco's youth is by no means 
without significance because this was the first time since the Gonzaga 
had seized power that the problems of a minority had to be faced. The 
trecento may very well have established Gonzaga rule in Mantua as the 
norm, but this was the first time that the succession was to be put to a 
severe test. In many ways this was an exceedingly delicate moment and, as 
we shall see, it had to be handled with extreme care and tact. It did not 
require very much political perception to appreciate not only the pressures 
which a minority could generate within Mant~a itself, but also the problems 
which this could cause vis-a-vis other states and smaller signorie. The 
political situation in Northern Italy was so fluid that it was only by 
continually projecting a strong and stable image that a state like Mantua 
could hope to avoid being submerged. There were always people like 
Ottobuono Terzi of Parma who were waiting to pounce on even the smallest 
indication of weakness to try and strengthen their territory at the expense 
of a less powerful neighbour. 
We have already seen how the central geographical position of 
Mantua affected Gonzaga policies in the fourteenth century and we must 
now pause to consider the nature of the political situation in Northern 
Italy at the time of Francesco Gonzaga's death in order to estimate how 
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such a situation could affect Mantua at such a delicate and crucial moment. 
It is certainly clear that, faced with the untimely death of such a strong 
personality as Francesco, such matters were of paramount importance to those 
who had the responsibility of ensuring continuity of power and policies. 
Alarming though the death of Francesco was for Mantua, there was 
one mitigating factor as far as the political picture was concerned. Relatively 
speaking, his death occurred at a quiescent moment in the history of Northern 
Italy. As far as Lombardy and the Veneto were concerned the keynote here 
was construction rather than confrontation. Although this period provided 
the genesis of future conflict in the larger spectrum of Lombard affairs, 
and, indeed, of the situation which was to occupy Gianfrancesco for the better 
part of his life, there was in 1407 no serious threat to Mantua from outside. 
On the other hand, however, this did not mean that external matters could 
be ignored. Experience had taught that a careful monitoring of the actions 
and attitudes of the larger states was essential. Indeed, it will be proved 
that vigilance in this field was largely responsible for the success of the 
arrangements made by Francesco for the smooth transfer of power to his son. 
The starting point for any such survey must inevitably be Milan, 
the source of the chain reaction which was ultimately to bring about a 
conflict situation. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the main threat 
to Mantua in the later fourteenth century had come from Milan; but now the 
Milanese state itself was passing through a period of crisis and this in 
itself was to point a lesson which could not be ignored by contemporaries. 
The state which had been built up so carefully and ruthlessly by Gianqaleazzo 
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Visconti collapsed on his death in 1402. Apart from the obvious difficulties 
resulting from the amorphous character of his state, problems which surely 
would have confronted even Giangaleazzo himself had he lived longer, the 
real source of the crisis lay in the fact that his two legitimate sons were 
minors. ~/ Although the parallel sit~ation in Mantua in 1407 was rather 
different in that the extent of the territories involved was much smaller, 
it did however, provide a stark picture of what at all costs was to be 
avoided. Once the strong personal~ty of Giangaleazzo had been removed from 
the scene, rivalries both within the Milanese state and within the Council 
of Regency itself could be given a much freer rein. ~/ 
It is interesting to note how important the figure of Francesco 
Gonzaga himself was in Milanese affairs around the time of Giangaleazzo's 
death and in the period immediately after it. He was, in fact, named in the 
Secret Ducal Council of Seventeen and was also mentioned in a codicil to 
Giangaleazzo's will of the 25th August 1402 as one of the tutors and defenders 
of his children. ~/ It seemed that, despite the basic instability 
in the relationship between Francesco and Giangaleazzo, which we have already 
discussed, Francesco, along with Pandolfo and Carlo Malatesta, enjoyed a high 
reputation in Milan. Of course, this bore rich fruit as far as Mantua 
was concerned. It is surely significant to note that on the map of Milanese 
possessions in 1402 Mantua was the only state left intact. Its geographical 
position as a buffer state is possibly at its most obvious to date here. 
Indeed, it becomes increasingly clear just how skillful Francesco was, 
not only in the field of diplomacy, but also in the tricky sphere of 
contingency planning. Even though his death was unexpected, it is clear 
that he wished to bequeath to Gianfrancesco in some way something of the 
, experience which he had gained in his dealings with Milan; and this he was 
to do eminently well in his choice of Carlo Malatesta as one of his son's'tutors. 
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Those faced with the job of holding the Milanese state together 
in 1402, then, were confronted with an impossible task. The admittedly 
ephemeral unity of the Milanese state was quickly dissolved when the 
ambitions of the various military commanders came into play. Whatever 
dubious unity had been imposed by Giangaleazzo was now replaced by something 
infinitely more dangerous. 
This is not the place to go into any great detail concerning the 
many shifts of emphasis which took place during these years. Generally 
speaking there were two opposing groups of condettieri; the so-called Guelfs 
were led by Pandolfo Malatesta ~/ and the GhibellineS~ were led by ~cino 
Cane. §/ The former group comprised the heirs of Bernab~ Visconti who were 
to take a prominent part in these troubled years. Such alignments were in 
reality only a front for personal ambitions; the aim was the total dismember-
ment of the Duchy. This disintegrating process spread outwards from Milan 
to other centres such as Brescia, Pavia and the Valcamonica, where resentment 
against the Visconti, long suppressed, broke into open rebellion. 
Although the Duchess Caterina tried desperately to bring about a 
peaceful solution by trying to get the French to intervene, the situation 
was in effect exacerbated by the resentment which was felt by Montferrat, 
Savoy and especially Florence, which was very active in trying to get the 
involvement of Venice against Milan. Any sense of continuity in the 
government of Milan was hampered by the widespread resentment which was 
felt against the Barbavara. 
It was not surprising that on all sides we see a shrinkage of 
the territory which was effectively ruled by the Visconti at the expense 
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of the condottieri, especially in Umbria and the Romagna. The Carrara 
family were able to dominate in Padua and Verona, and Facino Cane was able 
to build for himself a personal state in Valsesia. §/ The net result 
was that by the end of 1404 Milanese territory had been restricted only 
to Lombardy itself, and even that was at the mercy of Pandolfo Malatesta 
and Facino Cane, the latter perhaps being the more ambitious of the two. 2/ 
The only solution for Giovanni Maria Visconti was to engage the 
services of a soldier who was powerful enough to combat Facino Cane 
effectively. That person was to be Jacopo dal Verme who was appointed 
in February 1406. Very closely associated with him in his attempts to 
restore some orderto the Milanese state was Carlo Malatesta who was called 
back to Milan. Carlo was very highly thought of; not only was he a soldier 
of some repuu, but he was also a very able politician, and had been closely 
associated with Francesco Gonzaga in the attempts to bring about peace. 12/ 
The attempts of Carlo to ensure a stable government in Milan are worthy of the 
highest praise. l !/ 
On the 22nd of February 1407 the decisive battle of Binasco was 
fought against Facino Cane against whom dal Verme was able to unite a force 
consisting of Francesco Gonzaga, Otto Terzi, Cabrino Fondulo, Pandolfo 
Malatesta (won over by his brother) and also, significantly, a detachment 
of Venetian troops. Cane, defeated by superior numbers, was forced to flee 
to Alessandria. 
Although this could be arued to be the starting point for a 
rehabilitation of Milanese fortunes it is clear that the Visconti in 1407 
would not pose any serious threat to Mantua, at least for the time being. 
The five years since the death of Giangaleazzo had shown that although 
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Milan itself would not prove troublesome to Mantua, the consequences of 
the disintegration indeed could. This may well have been partly the 
reasoning behind Francesco's attempts to prevent the situation from 
escalating still further. After all, Giangaleazzo's state had almost 
totally surrounded Mantua and any modifications in the political picture 
would of necessity be of the utmost importance. This was amply borne 
out by Francesco's attitude towards the Carrara family. However, the most 
positive thing to emerge from Francesco's experience with Milan in the 
last five years of his life was surely his choice of Carlo Malatesta, a 
man of proven ability in an allied situation, to guide the fortunes of his 
state after his death; and this is something which will be considered in 
due course. 
Francesco Gonzaga's help in the eventual downfall of the Carrara 
family also ensured that in 1407 Venice would be favourable to Mantua. The 
12/ position of Venice has already been discussed elsewhere. - but the position 
which Frncesco was to adopt vis-a-vis Milan and Venice shows how adept 
he in fact was at contingency planning. The weakness of Milan was responsible 
for the development of Carrara fortunes which in turn alarmed Venice which 
was already beginning to take a much more active part and interest in the 
mainland, even though Venetian attitudes to the terraferma was to change 
more radically after the acquisition of Friuli in 1421. The first stages 
.were admittedly tentative and defensive but it soon became very clear that 
it was very valuable for Venice to preserve the independence of a number 
of smaller satellite states in order to cushion herself against the 
possibility of a revival of Milanese power. This, coupled with the fact 
that Venice was definitely the most dynamic state in Northern Italy at that 
time resulted in a virtual identity of interest between Venice and Mantua. 
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As we shall see, both sides would potentially gain from Francesco's 
appointment of the Doge as joint tutor along with Carlo Malatesta. In 
1407, then, Venice was in a very favourable position as far as Mantua was 
concerned. 
All in all, then, as far as the larger states were concerned, 
political circumstances in Northern Italy gave no trouble to the new regime 
in Mantua and this was due as much to the expertise and foresight of 
Francesco Gonzaga as it was to the diplomatic situation itself. 
As far as the rest of Italy was concerned there was very little 
or nothing to worry about. Florence was too concerned about eradicating 
Viscontean influence in Tuscan'y . to be over-concerned about Mantua, and the 
Papacy, divided by the Great Schism, was too concerned with its own internal 
difficulties. The only possible problem could have been the ambitions of 
Ladislas of Naples whose policies, facilitated by the weaknesses of the 
Papacy, took him as far north as Rimini and Siena. l~/ Florence was organising 
, 
a league against him in 1410 which involved CarlQ ·s brother Malatesta Malatesta. 
Gianfrancesco was to involve himself in Romagnol affairs when he fought on 
the side of John XXIII at Bologna in 1413. Indeed, he was to play host both 
to John and Martin V. However, such matters were of peripheral interest 
to Mantua itself: the involvement in BO»gna was useful experience for a 
young soldier following in his father's footsteps and the presence of Martin V 
could be interpreted in terms of prestige rather than any firm sense of 
political commitment. Nevertheless Gianfrancesco was to be continually 
interested in the affairs of the Romagna in so far as they concerned his 
wife's family. 
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As far as the immediate future was concerned, the situation 
presented no problemS provided the transfer of power was reasonably smooth. 
This last condition was a very important one because the diplomatic situation 
could never be relied upon to continue unchanged. Milan was on the brink 
of a political comeback and, confronted by a new orientation of Venice, a 
reasonably safe situation could so easily turn dangerous. If anything, 
the situation required even more vigilance from Mantua and in addition to 
this it was very necessary to keep both Venice and Milan happy by trying 
to preserve the status quo. Such a state of affairs demanded, at least for the 
time being, a broad continuity with the past, and especially the immediate 
past. 
Much, then, depended upon the situation within Mantua at the death 
of Francesco. When Francesco assumed power in 1382 at the age of only 18, 
it was assumed that his rule would be a long one. His sudden death in 1407 
came as a great shock; the illness which struck him down was very short. 
What tended to make the situation more alarming than ever was the fact that 
his second wife Margherita Malatesta had pre-deceased him by some eight 
14/ years, - thus leaving Gianfrancesco an orphan. It was, then, a doubly 
difficult position and would be a severe test of Gonzaga rule. It must be 
remembered that although the Gonzaga had been in power for seventy years, an 
unchallenged succession from father to son was by no means inevitable, 
especially when the realities of the immediation situation looked so disconcerting. 
It is not always easy to gauge the nature of public opinion, but 
there is much to indicate that Francesco's rule had been popular and, indeed, 
successful as far as Mantua was concerned. His name was closely bound up 
with the whole business of Mantua's sense of corporate identity, something 
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eminently proved by the events of 1397. He had always appreciated 
the importance of fortifications;2/ Indeed, there is no documentary evidence 
to indicate that there was any resentment against him in Mantua. The 
acquisition of lands in the Veronese had rounded off the Mantuan state. 
He had taken a great deal of interest in the religious life of the city 
lending his patronage to a programme of new building and re-furbishing, 
something thich was to be continued by Gianfrancesco and his wife. l§/ 
Francesco had also taken an interest in organising the internal 
administration of the city and was particularly concerned with regulating 
the form of the Consiglio Maggiore, something which had not officially been. 
done before. 12/ He had also shown an important concern in supervising the 
economic life of Mantua; something which is shown in his regulation of the 
Universita dei Mercanti l~/and the Arte della Lana, l~/ in both cases 
tightening his control over them. 
Francesco had made many positive achievements, but perhaps his 
major aim was to obtain from the Emperor the title of Marquis; and this, along 
with all the other factors we have mentioned, marks a strong element of 
continuity with Gianfrancesco. Imperial recognition was, in effect, a double-
edged advantage. Not only did it underline the legitimacy of ~nzaga rule in 
20/ Mantua, and in particular the question of the hereditary succ~ssion, -
but it also gave added lustre to the standing of Mantua as a state. It would 
most certainly have improved Francesco's standing in relation to either Milan or 
Venice. It was a great disappointment that the negotiations broke down over 
the eternal question of cash in 1383, but Francesco did not give up and 
negotiations were subsequently reopened with Sigismund,· Wenceslaus's 
successor who seemed favourably disposed towards Mantua. The whole question 
21/ 
was not finally resolved until 1432, but Francesco's attempts -
show an intense concern not only for the standing of his own family, but 
also for the stability of the Mantuan state. 
To sum up so far - it would appear, on the surface at least, 
that in 1407 Gonzaga rule enjoyed popular support in that it had become 
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intimately bound up with both internal and external security and this, together 
with the relatively quiescent political situation generally, would tend to 
ease a smooth transfer of power. This would almost certainly have been the 
case had Gianfrancesco been old enough to rule in his own right. However, 
the fact that he was twelve years old and an orphan, and that there was also a 
negative side to the obvious political advantages which followed the breakup 
of the Milanese state, obviously generated considerable anxiety. Clearly 
everything depended on the quality of the arrangements made by Francesco 
and the efficiency of their execution. It was indeed fortunate that on his 
deathbed Francesco was clearsighted enough to foresee the difficulties which 
could lie in the way of his son's succession; and it is to the arrangements 
which he made to offset these that we must now turn. 
II 
The Arrangements for the Regency 
Some three years before his death Francesco had reformed the Statutes 
of Mantua which more or less guaranteed the security of the succession of 
22/ his family. - His sudden death, however, meant that there was a hiatus 
or uncertain period which could prove very dangerous and very fruitful for 
possible opponents, if they were given time to act. Carlo Malatesta was 
in Milan when news reached him of Francesco's death and even though he hastened 
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with all speed to Mantua to take up his duties, much hinged upon the quality 
of Gonzaga support in Mantua initially. The Council of the city was very 
important in this dangerous period because it still had the right to elect 
Gianfrancesco as 'capitano' 22/ and however amenable it may have been to 
Francesco there was naturally bound to be a division of opinion over the 
feasibility of appointing one so young. Gianfrancesco was aged between 
eleven and twelve years old at the time and it would be at least two or 
three years before he would officially be able to assume any real influence 
in the affairs of the city. 2~/ In political terms this was quite a long time 
and the question of security would inevitably be raised. In view of the 
contemporary situation in Milan, anxiety over the possible attitudes of neigh-
bouring states such as Parma, coupled with memories of the recent past, such 
anxiety can only have been reinforced. Unfortunately, documentary material 
for this period is not very plentiful because of a fire which occurred in the 
25/ Palazzo Vecchio a few years later. - However, much can be deduced from 
other sources forthis period provided they are viewed in a critical light. 2~/ 
While it is not possible to document clearly the discussions which 
took place in the council it is nevertheless fairly easy to deduce the 
immediate issues at stake. Apart from the discussions over the feasibility 
of Gianfrancesco's succession they wouldhave to consider whether a return 
to a commune would be possible or desirable, whether any other family from 
within Mantua could assume power, and finally, failing the latter two, the 
validity of the arrangements bequeathed by Francesco to deal with a minority. 
There does appear to have been a certain amount of opinion within 
the council which doubted the logic of entrusting Mantua to a minor. 22/ 
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The whole notion of a minority could never really be popular but the 
question in everyone's mind was what alternative existed which was compatible 
with the interests of Mantua? Did the opposition have any viable alternative? 
Because of the very fact that Gonzaga rule had never really been seriously 
questioned up until this moment no coherent body of opinion had managed to 
form itself within the council. This was especially the case given the 
sudden death of Francesco. 
As we have seen, the spirit of the commune in Mantua was long dead 
and even if there had been a flicker of Republicanism it would have appeared 
somewhat antiquated at a time when the trend was towards the consolidation 
of princely power. Any such notion would be seen by outsiders as a weakness 
and thereby seriously jeapordise Mantuan security, the very thing which was 
uppermost in everyone's mind. 
Similarly there was no one else who had sufficient influence within 
Mantua to step effectively into Gonzaga shoes. The very success of Gonzaga 
rule over the past seventy years together with the fact that the Gonzaga 
had ensured that the situation which had brought them to power would not be 
repeated suggested that such a solution would inevitably bring about an 
inner conflict which again would present the wrong political image. Such 
a move would surely nullify the positive achievements of the recent past. 
It seemed, then,. that the odds were in favour of sticking to a 
course which had proved successful in the past. The opposition did not 
really have time to organise itself and, moreover, those in favour of 
preserving the Gonzaga succession had a powerful and persuasive spokesman in 
Donato de Preti, who was largely responsible for persuading the council to 
adopt the measures suggested by Francesco. Donato was a highly respected 
man of affairs; in particular he had had a considerable amount of experience 
in judicial matters, being a "legium doctor de collegio jUdiCium",2~/ and 
his opinions were likely to carry a great deal of weight. Indeed, he was 
to figure on a number of occasions in theearly years of Gianfrancesco's rule 
in a diplomatic capacity. His speech, reported by most of the chronicle 
sources consisted of a staunch defence of the advantages of hereditary 
29/ succession. - Few needed reminding of the advantages which had accrued 
from Gonzaga rule in the past. In addition to this he was able to convince 
the council of the feasibility of the plan of entrusting the'tutorship 
of Gianfrancesco jOintly to Carlo Malatesta and the Republic of Venice. lQ/ 
HoweVer, it is also significant that the formal election of Gianfrancesco 
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as the fifth 'capitano' of Mantua only took place on the 20th March 1407, 3!/ 
and the thirteen day interval serves to give some indication of just how much 
discussion over the question of the succession there was. 
There was, then, no real alternative to the continuance of Gonzaga 
rule. At a time when there was simply no margin for governmental error there 
was more to be said for a continuation of the status quo even in the person 
of a young boy than in trusting to untried alternatives. In many respects 
the only salvation lay in broad continuity. If other cities had suffered 
under their 'tyrants', this was not true of Mantua. By the beginning of 
the fifteenth century the Gonzaga had so successfully woven their personality 
into the fabric of government that there resulted an identity of purpose 
which tended ultimately to suffocate any opposition. In a very real sense 
Gianfrancesco became almost a symbol of the Gonzaga hereditary succession 
and his public acclamation on the 20th March virtually amounted to the 
biggest ever vote 6f confidence in it. 
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However, we must beware of reading too much into this as far as 
practical matters were concerned. In the hard, back-biting world of politics 
there was no room for sentiment and consequently supreme importance must 
be attached to the acceptability of Francesco's choice of tuto~s to guide 
Mantuan affairs during his son's minority. 
The fairly unusual measure of entrusting the guardianship of 
Gianfrancesco jOintly to Venice and Carlo Malatesta shows at one and the 
same time Francesco's perceptive reading of the contemporary political situation 
and also postulated a sound solution to any possible conflict which might 
arise between Venice and Milan in the near future. In other words, it 
encapsulated his own political experience. Francesco, in effect, could not 
have chosen a better pair of tutors for his son because each partner furnished 
unique qualities which, when combined, would make for the greatest possible 
security for Mantua in the circumstances. Let us now examine the positive 
qualities which each tutor was to bring to to the task in hand. 
The choice of Carlo Malatesta was extremely popular with the 
Consiglio Maggiore. The first, and the most obvious advantage, was his close 
relationship with the Gonzaga family. This was something of the utmost 
importance given Gianfrancesco's age. Of primary importance was the provision 
of a stable emotional background for the boy; and this was most evidently 
supplied by Carlo's wife Elisabetta who was, in effect, Gianfrancesco's natural 
aunt, just as Carlo was his natural uncle. 3!/ The family ties were the 
closest~possible and this, in great part, would make up for the emotional 
vacuum caused by the death of Gianfrancesco's parents. Indeed, the influence 
of Elisabetta on Gianfrancesco was much greater than some writers have cared 
to acknowledge. Having no children of her own she virtually adopted 
Gianfrancesco as her own son. 
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In addition to this the relationship between Carlo and Francesco 
had been very close indeed. As we have seen, they had both been involved 
in Milanese affairs after Giangaleazzo's death and Francesco consequently 
had the greatest possible confidence in Carlo's abilities. Indeed, the 
chroniclers generally had a very high opinion of Carlo at the time, even 
though his popularity with the Mantuans seemed subsequently to undergo 
a decline. Not only was Carlo a fine soldier, a very positive quality in 
the circumstances, but his reputation in Mantua and in Northern Italy in 
general as a diplomat was very impressive. His achievements in reorganising the 
Milanese administration and his attempts at a policy of appeasement were 
most noteworthy. It was with considerable justification that Poggio Bracciolini 
33/ 
could say of him "fuit Carolus vir, tum belli, tum pacis artibus egregius". -
Here was a man who could be universally respected, not only for his military 
prowess, but also for his achievements in the arts of peace.and this was the 
ideal balance for the job which he had to carry out. In addition to this it 
was very difficult to forget the intense debt of gratitude which the Mantuans 
themselves owed Carlo for his instrumental help in the crisis of 1394 when the 
city was beseiged by the Milanese. 3~/ 
There is one more facet to the choice of Carlo which must be 
mentioned. Car1o's successful career in Milan had basically two advantages 
for Mantua. Firstly, it provided an amicable link with Milan itself, a 
matter which could not be ignored, and secondly, in the event of any 
difficulties with Milan Carlo's inside knowledge of Milanese affairs could 
be a distinct advantage for Mantua. As far as Francesco was concerned the 
second possibility may well have been the more pertinent given his own 
personal experience. 
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If the choice of Carlo Malatesta had many positive advantages, 
so did that of the Republic of Venice. Francesco's own standing with Venice 
was very high indeed. He had served the Republic extremely well in a 
military capacity offering both his own personal services and the strategic 
advantages of his city as a base for operations against the Carrara family. 
As we have already indicated, it was a choice which worked to the advantage 
of both sides. Not only did it give Venice a mandate to intervene in 
Mantuan affairs for her own benefit, but it gave Venice an even greater interest 
in maintaining the integrity of the Mantuan state as a possible buffer against 
Milanese expansion; and there was also a strong possibility of Gianfrancesco 
entering into military service with Venice when he became older. 
Francesco, however, was surely thinking of the diplomatic value 
of Venice when he was considering the question of the minority. As a 
powerful, thriving and expanding state, Venetian support was instrumental 
as a counterweight against the growth of Milanese power. In effect, when he 
gave Venice the responsibility of acting for his son, Francesco was bringing 
into play the psychological as well as the physical support of a state in the 
ascendant, and this would prove to be very powerful sanction. If, as Raulich 
35/ 
would have it, Venice was Francesco's "nuovo astro protettore", - and this 
act was to relate Mantuan interests to Venice much more closely than hitherto, 
it was at the time paradoxically one of the best ways of securing the 
maximum degree of independence for Mantua. This was admittedly a situation 
which had both advantages as well as disadvantages for ~antua in the long 
run, as later events were to show; but in doing this Francesco was being 
supremely realistic in that Venice in 1407 was the best, and indeed the only, 
state to protect Mantuan interests. 
68. 
The Doge of Venice, Michele Steno, was very quick to accede 
to the will of Francesco. On the 10th of April 1407 he addressed a 
letter to Carlo referring to Francesco's will: If in eius testamento 
in scriptis, tutoribus et curatoribus executoribus et comisariis una 
cum nostro duca1e dominio.1f 3§/ The letter goes on to refer to the 
solemn reading of Francesco's will and contains an assurance that he is 
prepared to accept the responsibility which it imposed and also to work hand 
in hand with Carlo. This was given a practical guise in the appointment 
of Francesco Foscari to represent Venice in the government of Mantua. 
Sanuto also mentions that Foscari was accompanied by Girolamo Contarini 
with 150 lances expressly designated for the defence of the city,321 thus 
at the same time maintaining a Venetian military presence. As the Venetian army 
as a whole consisted of only 500 lances at this time, the relative strength 
of the contingent sent to Mantua indicates how seriously the situation was 
being taken. 
This dual system is perfectly in accord with Francesco's 
way of thinking. It seems certain that he intended Venice and Carlo Malatesta 
to fulfil rather different functions. Although there was a physical presence 
of Venice in Mantua, the day to day running of affairs appears to have been 
decisively in Carlo's hands. However, it must not be assumed that Venice 
was a mere cypher in any way. The function of Venice perhaps served to back 
up and reinforce what Carlo was going to do. It would be wrong to judge 
Venice's position as being purely nominal because there were a number of 
subsequent occasions in which it made its presence felt. In fact,the 
Venetians were perfectly content to remain in the background as long as 
they approved of what was going on in Mantua. Anyhow, together Venice and 
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and Carlo presented the strongest possible front to neighbouring states. 
Finally, it must be remarked that Francesco was very wise in not 
appointing tutors for his son from within Mantua. The Gonzaga in general 
were very wary indeed about whom they appointed to the highest offices. 
In the particular circumstances which existed in Mantua in 1407 it would 
have been very unwise to make an internal appointment. It would have 
so easily caused jealousy and unrest. This was certainly to be Gianfrancesco's 
judgement after the unfortunate experience resulting from the ambitions 
of the Albertini family. 
In conclusion, then, the arrangements for the minority were the 
best, and indeed the only logical solution in 1407 and the arguments and issues 
which surrounded them are a very good example of the problems which could 
confront states like Mantua lying in the shadow of the great territorial 
powers. They owe much of their success to the judgement and foresight 
of Francesco Gonzaga. 
III 
The Orientation of the New Regime 
The paucity of documentary evidence forthese years makes it 
difficult to present any definitive statement on the orientation of 
the new government. However, despite this major difficulty there is 
enough in chronicle sources and such archive collections as the 'Libro 
dei Oecreti' and the 'Gridario' for us to form a general picture of the 
issues which the new regime was to face. It must be assumed that Gianfrancesco 
himself had little or no part to play in these years, but in view of remarks 
made by contemporaries regarding his precocity, 3~/it would be reasonable 
to suggest that he was an intelligent boy and much attention had been 
given to his education by his parents, especially Margherita Malatesta, 
39/ 
who herself came from an exceptionally well educated family. - In later 
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years, Gianfrancesco, along with his remarkable wife Paola Agnese Malatesta, 
were to show themselves a very considerable interest in the education of 
their own children when they invited Vittorino da Feltre to Mantua. 
Gianfrancesco's tutors took their responsibilities seriously. 
In particular there is a certain amount of evidence to indicate how 
punctilious Carlo Malatesta was in carrying out his duties. It would appear 
that in his zeal for defending his nephew's interests he was prepared even 
to question the rights of his own family. In 1408 he sided with Gianfrancesco 
against his own brother Pandolfo in a dispute over the rights to the castle 
at Piubega. From their dealings with each other in the period immediately 
preceeding the battle of Binasco it would appear that Carlo's powers of 
persuasion were quite considerable over his somewhat wayward brother. 42/ 
As an issue in itself the dispute over the castle and its land was 
a small one, but the te.t of the letter itself does give us an indication 
of the image which Carlo's administration was aiming to project. In the 
short letter there are constant references to Francesco Gonzaga, and it 
seemed, in general, that Carlo intended to model himself very closely upon 
his erstwhile colleague in the policies which he was to adopt. In this 
particular instance it refers to agreements previously reached over the 
question of Piubega between Francesco and Pandolfo. In short, it seemed 
that even Pandolfo was aiming to capitalise upon his brother's position in 
Mantua for his own benefit, and this, as we shall see, was to be the main 
general problem which the new administration was to face. 
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Those who had hoped to take advantage of Gianfrancesco's youth 
and inexperience had reckoned without Carlo, who seemed at once to 
appreciate the immediate problems he had to deal with. These problems 
were basically two-fold. It was essential to make the new regime acceptable 
within Mantua in order to silence any potential opposition; and also to 
project a strong and resilient image to neighbouring states. There can be 
little doubt that many people such as Terzi and Niccolo d'Este would be 
very interested indeed in the direction which the Mantuan government was 
to take. 
The first and most obvious point worth making is that a strong 
impression of continuity was given. This was only to be expected from Carlo, 
a man who had been so closely associated with his father. It was most 
immediately important for the administration to allay any fears which there 
may have been as to the efficiency of the government. Quite apart 
from this matter there was, in effect, no real need to make any major 
changes at all in view of the fact that Francesco's own administration had 
been efficient and popular. Given the delicacy of the situation caution 
was the only sensible course. If we are to believe the stories of the 
chroniclers it would appear that the Mantuans were very jealous of their 
customs and liberties and they were prepared to voice their opinions if they 
41/ felt that they were being interfered with. -
Generally speaking, this was a period of successful consolidation, 
of providing a sound basis upon which Gianfrancesco himself could build when 
he was to come of age. Judging from the extant sources it seemed that the 
new administration intended to be fair and impartial while on a number of 
occasions being strict. During this initial period there are no instances of 
any corrupt practices, and on the whole the affairs of the city proceeded 
quietly and smoothly: the same officials continued in their posts. 
The intention of the new government were proclaimed quite 
uncompromisingly in the very first 'grido' of the 24th of March 1407. It 
said of Gianfrancesco; "le gratie le quale luy (Gianfrancesco) intende 
de fare siano libere e gratiose 0 senza a~auno premio over tributo" 4~/ 
This same 'grido' goes on to declare that having stated is intention to 
be equitable the government will punish severely anyone who attempted 
to use bribery in order to secure favours. Not only would.the favour be 
nUllified, but there would be a fine of four times the amount of the bribe. 
I~. 
There were the usual rewards offered to those who gave information leading to 
the discovery of such malVersation. While we are not in a position to be 
able to judge whether or not these measures were successful, they at least 
indicated the good intentions of the administration. 
Similarly, the only other decree from this year, issued in the 
same 'Gridario' for 26 March indicated the desire to be merciful. Pardons 
were issued to those who had committed minor offences and were living outside 
Mantua. In addition to this debtors were given a period of grace to return 
and settle their affairs in order to avoid a term of imprisonment. 42/ 
The new regime was quite naturally preoccupied with the question 
of internal order and there consequently appears at regular intervals in the 
'Gridario' the reminder that the carrying of arms in the city was prohibited. 
There was also a continuing interest in the maintenance of fortifications. 
44/ On 14 June 1407 repairs were made to the bastion at Ostiglia. -
As we have seen, there is nothing very startling or original 
here. In effect, the government aimed to maintain a low profile in so 
far as it was consistent with the preservation of the status quo. 
The motto appears to have been 'strength without ostentation'. 
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In projecting this image Carlo had shown that he had got his 
priorities right because it was only upon the basis of a government which had 
the approval and confidence of the city that he could turn his attention to 
the second, and perhaps more pressing, of his immediate problems - Mantua's 
relations with other states. 
This was a field in which Carlo could bring into play his own 
special knowledge and experience. In the wake of the decline of the Milanese 
state he had not only to convince other states of the strength of Mantua 
itself, but he also had to insure against possible trouble by providing Mantua 
with as many allies as possible. 
What was needed here was a policy of consolidation without too 
much active commitment. A minority could be an especially difficult time 
for foreign policy unless there was a strong sense of direction. Carlo had 
to show, above all, that Mantua was no mere 'push-over' for other states 
who wished to appropriate Mantuan territory for themselves. In particular, 
the area to the south of the city, the so-called 'Serraglio', was especially 
vulnerable. Indeed, it had been the object of Milanese policy in the last 
stages of Giangaleazzo Visconti's expansion. 
Initially, the best form of protection lay in establishing harmonious 
relationships with neighbouring states in order to supplement the support 
which would obviously be forthcoming from Venice. Here Carlo could not on;y 
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count upon family connections to help him, but also upon his own considerable 
personal reputation. 
Carlo already had the friendship of Ferrara. Just before his 
death Francesco had reinforced his already strong ties with Niccolo III d'Este 
by signing with him on 22 February 1407 a league of mutual aid. 4~1 
The relationship between Gianfrancesco and Niccolo was to be very close 
indeed; it was the most constant factor in his foreign policy and was a 
relationship later to be reinforced by strong family ties which was to stand 
him in good stead particularly in the crisis year of 1438. 4§1 
This alliance was something which Carlo co uld build upon and 
consequently it was not surprising that on 27 July 1407 another league of 
mutual defence was signed with Venice, Ferrara and Pandolfo Malatesta. 411 
This was the first treaty of Gianfrancesco's rule and provides us with an 
excellent example of what Carlo was trYing to do. The inclusion of Pandolfo 
Malatesta in particular was a very politic move in that it gave both 
Mantua and Brescia an interest in maintaining the status quo as far as 
territorial demarcations were concerned. It was clearly Carlo's aim to 
provide the maximum protection of Mantua from as many sides as possible. 
Moreover, two other factors may be deduced from the details of the 
league, which was to last for five years. These details were published on 
5 August and the fact that the league was autho~ed not only by Gianfrancesco's 
tutors but also by the podesta of Mantua shows just how anxious Carlo was 
for his actions to receive the approval of the city authorities. 4§/ The 
details of the military arrangements also show how small Mantua's commitment 
was. Venice was to provide 300 lances, Pandolfo Malatesta 125, Ferrara SO, 
,j 
but Mantua was only to provide 40. This may well have been in deference 
to Gianfrancesco's youth, but the fact that all Mantua lands "citra Padum 
quam ultra Padum" were to be protected would ind±cate a very good bargain 
49/ indeed. 
The negotiations between Mantua and Venice, however, were not at 
all easy on the point of the size of Mantua's military contribution. It 
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would appear even at this very early stage that Venice was most anxious to 
50_' insist that Mantua should pull its weight from a military point of view. 
The key word in relations with other states, then, was defence; but 
such notions did not always dictate a passive policy. Mantua was prepared 
to take very positive steps to prevent any encroachment upon its territory 
and this is amply demonstrated by the dealings with Ottobuono Terzi of Parma. 
Terzi's actions, which were extremely unpredictable, served only to 
put neighbouring states on their guard. He made repeated incursions into 
neighbouring territory and, if we are to believe Delay to in his "Annales 
Estenses", the nature of these expeditions was extremely violent. His tactics 
of terrorization apparently made him extremely unpopular in Parma itself. 5!/ 
As far as Mantua was concerned, Terzi's activities were alarming. 
The geographical position of Parma to the south of Mantua meant that Ottobuono 
could more easily threaten an agriculturally fertile area which Mantua wanted 
undisturbed. Although, relatively speaking, Ottobuono was not a particularly 
dangerous threat, it could not go unopposed, and this was an opportunity to 
bring into play the system of alliances which Carlo had built up during the 
previous year. 
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This was also a good opportunity to enlarge the circle of 
Mantuan alliances and the league which was formed in May 1408 included not 
only Ferrara and Brescia but also Cabrino Fondulo of Cremona and Giovanni 
Maria Visconti of Milan. The Milanese alliance was once again a very 
politic move, but in the circumstances it was hardly surprising given Carlo's 
standing in Milan. 5~/ 
The action of Mantua against Terzi is perhaps more valuable as a 
question of principle than merely for itseLf As matters stood it was imperative 
for Gianfrancesco's administration to show a strong front. Tarducci discusses 
a letter which Gianfrancesco had written in reply to Terzi on 3 September 1408. 
Although it is not possible to discover anything about the background to this 
document, which presumably refers to an incursion which had been made into the 
Mantovano, the wording of the letter is very significant. Although it was 
couched in the language of diplomacy, it indicated a very strong determination. 
It was not to be imagined that Terzi could hope to take advantage of Gianfrancesco 
53/ 
even though he was young and inexperienced. -
In the end it was Terzi's own unpopularity which finished him rather 
than any military action. There was an engagement between Terzi and the league 
on the 19th of June 1409 which was a foregone conclusion. Terzi's defeat 
convinced him that he could never hope to succeed by himself and he consequently 
applied to Niccolo d'Este ~o mediate a settlement. During the course of the 
negotiations at Rubiera Terzi was assassinated, apparently by one of the 
marquis's retinue. 
This was a fortuitous solution to the problem. It would seem that 
everybody was relieved to have him out of the way. Delay to's account, a rather 
I I • 
exaggerated one, of Terzi's wretched end in which an infuriated mob near 
Modena "carne ac intestinis illius detestabilis cadaveris manducaverint" 
shows the tremendous hatred which the double dealing victim had generated 
against himself, 5~/ and served as a sobering example to any other aspiring 
minor signore. 
Not only had Mantua preserved its prestige in this affair, there 
was also a territorial reward. Mantua gained the valuable territory of 
Bozzolo in the Cremonese, according to Platina "sese sponte dedens". 52/ 
Such a spontaneous act, in addition to underlining the resentment which was 
felt against Terzi, is also a testament to the confidence which was felt in 
Mantua's powers of protection at that time. 
The early years of Gianfrancesco's rule, then, are characterised 
by a cautious consolidation of power. The careful administration of Carlo 
Malatesta had not only guaranteed confidence within Mantua itself, but had 
also provided a sound diplomatic framework which could be built upon in the 
future, even though by this time he was beginning to fade from the Mantuan scene 
because of commitments elsewhere. Moreover, the Terzi affair had shown just 
how resilient Mantua could be. By 1409 it was perfectly obvious that 
Francesco Gonzaga's plans for the transference of power had been the best 
possible solution. 
IV 
Marriage 
Marriage had always been an important part of Gonzaga policy and 
that of Gianfrancesco was no exception; in fact, a good marriage here was of 
crucial importance. However, as far as this matter was concerned, no especial 
problem presented itself because once again Francesco had also provided for 
this contingency. As was normal at that time he had selected a prospective 
bride for his son and his choice underlined the very close attachment with 
the house of Malatesta. 5§/ Faola Agnese Malatesta, daughter of Malatesta 
Malatesta of Pesaro was both a natural and a safe choice. 51/ It was 
certainly likely to receive the blessing of Carlo Malatesta who no doubt 
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played some part in the selection. Quite apart from this it was always valuable 
to have the backing of a person like Malatesta Malatesta who had qUite a 
considerable reputation as a military commander. At the time of the wedding 
Malatesta was still active; in fact he was involved as the commander of the 
Florentine troops in the war against Ladislas of Naples. 5§/ 
Paola was more or less the same age as Gianfrancesco. It is not 
possible to stipulate her exact age but most of the chronicle sources agree 
on the age of sixteen. The only document in the Mantuan archive referring to 
59/ Paola's age is very vague. -
she was over the age of fourteen. 
The only deduction one can make here is that 
Towards the end of July 1409 Gianfrancesco left Mantua for Pesaro 
60/ in order to claim his bride, stopping some three days in Ferrara en route. -
Gianfrancesco was accompanied by an entourage befitting his status, a matter 
of considerable importance fat the projection of the right image. 
According to Paola's own testimony the marriage took place on the 
22nd of August 1409 in the cathedral of Pesaro immediately after she had 
formally renounced her rightsof successcion to her father's, mother's or 
61/ brother's property. ~ A copy of this document exists in the Mantuan 
archive and it also states the details of Paola's dowry: " •••••• dotatam in 
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quinquemillium ducatorum auri et in pannis vestimentis et iocalibus sibi 
assignatis pro eius arsinia et fulcimentis juxta et secundum conditionem 
ips.ius. ac dicti sui genitoris". Amadei also mentions the granting of 
some lands in the Bresciano 6~/ but there is no evidence for this. 
In fact the dowry was not paid promptly at all. At that time 
Malatesta was chronically short of money. Arrangements were made for the 
payment of the money on the following 23rd April but it was not forthcoming 
despite the fact that the documents had been prepared beforehand. 6~/ The 
money was not paid in Malatesta's lifetime and the sum was included in his will 
of April 1.42: ........ item, relinquo •••• Paulo filie mee quinqua milia ducates 
auri pro detibus suis, pro matrimonie iam contracto inter ipsam et 
Mag. Dom. Iohannis Francisco ••• " 
The Choice of Paola was a fortunate one in a number of respects. 
Quite apart from the advantages of her family connections she herself was a 
person of quite considerable talents and education. She was an excellent 
example of that philosophy of equal educational opportunities for girls of 
gentle birth which characterised the Italian Renaissance. Aliprandi said of 
her: 
"Honesta, gratiosa e cortese, , 
da lei zaschun bone risposta avia, 
li sue virtu a ugnun eran palese." 
She was certainly well equipped to take a full and active part 
in the political and administrative affairs of her husband and we shall see 
that Gianfrancesco came increasingly to rely upon her to run his affairs in 
Mantua during his absences; she was to be the only person he could implicity 
trust. 
I 
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It was not at all surprising that her intellectual talents should 
have been encouraged from an early age because education had occupied an 
extremely important position in both her mother's and her father's families. 6§/ 
In particular, her father had considerable talent as a poet in his own 
right and much of his work appears to have been inspired by a deep religious 
67/ 
sentiment. - Indeed, it would appear very likely that Paola's own 
very deeply religious nature owes a great deal to her father, and both in the 
field of eccleSiastical patronage and education Paola was to leave an 
indelible mark upon Mantua. 
Her personal qualities were such that Vespasiano di Bisticci named 
h d h d ht iIi . 11 i of their day. 6_8/ er an er aug er Cec a among the most 1 ustr ous women 
He c~rtainly believed that she was responsible for drawing attention to Mantua 
as a cultural centre. He said: "Fu nel suo tempo la casa sua ispecchio di 
grandissima onest~; 0 fu esempio non solo a tutta la terra dov'ell'era, ma a 
tutta Italia." Such a judgement is also corroborated by other chroniclers 
and commentators. 62/ 
From the very beginning Paola showed herself to be a very organised 
young woman. Initially she was helped very much by Elisabetta Malatesta, 
Car~o's wife. Not long after her arrival at Mantua she had a detailed 
inventory made of all the articles in the Gonzaga household. 72/ 
There is no documentary material to account for the time they spent 
away from Mantua. From the dates of the wedding festivities in Mantua itself 
which were recorded in the 'Libro dei Decreti' we must conclude that they did 
not return until the January of the following year. 
The festivities in the city were considerable. They appear to 
have lasted from the 6th to the 25th January. All legal activities were 
suspended during this period of public holiday. 7!/ An amnesty appears to 
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have been granted to certain prisoners "contemplative festivitatum nuptiarum 
ad adventum magnifico et excelse domine Paulo ad maritum." From this 
document, and others relating to the festivities it seems as if Paola had 
arrived in Mantua some time after her husband and that Gianfrancesco may well 
have personally supervised the preparations for the oelebrations. 
This was really the first opportunity since his succession for a 
pretigious event in Mantua and it was consequently a very important exercise 
in public relations. This was precisely why the celebrations were so protracted. 
The details of the guests who attended were impressive. According to Platina 
there were delegations from Ferrara, Tuscan~ . and Venice among many others 7~/ 
and the details of the gifts which they brought gives us some indication of 
73/ the magnificance of the proceedings. - Gianfrancesco made a special request 
to Venice for "caratellos centum vini". 7~/ In the end only sixty were sent 
because the bride's father provided forty himself. It was not surprising that 
the chronicler Aliprandi waxed eloquent over the general rejoicing: 
"Li Mantuani non manche in niente 
si li ricevero cum alegra fronte 
e di honorarli si non fano lente 
••••••••••••••• e tanto 10 sonare 
che tutto l'aire per quello risonava 
non si poria a pieno tutto con tare 
la ~ran festa che per tutto si facia". 
Contemporaries are fairly unanimous in their descriptions of the 
splendid tournament which featured as the centrepiece of the festivities. 
Tournaments were by no means unusual but the Mantuan one see~s to have been 
especially extravagant including some 43 cavalieri~ 7§/ 
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It may well have been events such as this which prompted some writers 
to remark upon the extravagance of Gianfrancesco. 72/ However, such a display 
was important in orderto demonstrate the stability and prosperity of Mantua 
to outsiders. It was clear that Gianfrancesco appreciated this because 
there was at least one other subsequent occasion when he showed that he 
was sometimes prepared to pay quite dearly for things which were likely to 
increase Mantuan prestige. 7~/ The attendance at the wedding celebrations 
in itself is an indication of the success which Mantua had achieved in this 
field. 
v 
The Albertini Ascendancy and its Consequences 
It is interesting to note in the inventory of wedding gifts 
received by Paola on 18 January 1410 that the third group of persons 
mentioned after Carlo Malatesta and his wife is Carlo Albertini and his 
brothers who gave "unus zoiellus auri cum una domina tenente in pectore 
unum ballassum et in summitate capitis unum smeraldinum cum perlis quinque 
a conto." 7~/ Both the value of the present and the high position on 
the list indicate that as early as 1410 the Albertini family had come to 
occupy an extremely important position in Mantua. Over the next four years 
Carlo and his brothers were to dominate Mantuan affairs and their careers 
were almost to nullify all the good work which had been done to date. Indeed, 
the consequences of this ascendancy were to have a lasting effect on 
Gianfrancesco's whole approach to the problems of government. 
The tutorship of Carlo Malatesta had one disadvantage. The fact 
. 
that he had other interests both in Rimini and Milan, and later in Venice, 
imposed responsibilities which inevitably tended to draw him away from Mantua. 
Naturally the very nature of his position in Mantua was temporary, although 
as a close member of Gianfrancesco's family there would be no doubt that he 
would continue to show a very keen interest in Mantua. 
It was, however, unfortunate that after two years or SO he began 
to fade out of the picture because his departure created in a sense a power 
vacuum at a time when Gianfrancesco was not yet experienced enough to fill it. 
The lesson he was about to learn was hard, but very salutary in the long run. 
It was not exactly clear when Carlo Malatesta relinquished his 
responsibilities but at the end of July 1409, when Gianfrancesco left for 
Pesaro, Carlo Albertini da Prato was left with full powers in his absence. 
This, in effect, coincided with the period when Carlo Malatesta was drawn 
away to Milan to take up more onerous duties as a Ducal councillor. He had 
lately replaced Jacopo dal Verme in this capacity. 
Carlo was later to be involved in the service of the venetians 
in the war against Sigismund in 1412. In fact, Carlo was very much in demand 
throughout the period of Gianfrancesco's minority. Not only was he continually 
involved in Milanese affairs, but there is also evidence of his being involved 
in the Council of Pisa in 1409 in order to mediate between Gregory XII and 
his rebel cardinals. He continued in Gregory's service into 1411 as 
Governor in the Romagna. It is not, therefore, surprising that his attendance 
in Mantua tended to become more and more intermittent. 
As their title suggests, the Da Prato family were of Tuscan origin, 
but they had probably settled in Mantua in the second half of the fourteenth 
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century. 8Q/ They soon entered the service of the Gonzaga family 8!/ 
and the obvious talents of Carlo, Francesco and Stefano were brought to the 
attention of Carlo Malatesta. One of Carlo Malatesta's most important 
preoccupations at this time must have been to ensure that there were people 
sufficiently well qualified to advise Gianfrancesco during his absences. 
There is little doubt that the Albertini brothers were high in Carlo's favour 
at this time. As later events were to prove, they were an extremely ambitious 
family, eager to push themselves forward at the slightest opportunity, and 
it was this, combined with their considerable abilities, which were to make 
them especially dangerous. 
The confidence which Gianfrancesco showed in Carlo Albertini is well 
illustrated by an entry in the Book of Statutes for 16 July 1409 8~/which 
states explicitly the powers which were to be accorded him during Gianfrancesco's 
absence. The fact that he is described as "consocii nostri amatissimi" 
itself demonstrates how close he was to the centre of power. He was given full 
powers: " ••• potestatem balyiam et specialem et liberam facultatem onmes 
et singulas apellationum reclamationum et supplicationum causas quas ad 
ad nos tam de iure comunis quam ex forma st~tutorum nostri comunis Mantue 
specialiter devolvi continet per id totum absentie nostre tempus comittendi 
~ delegandi uni et pluribus, secundum quod ei videbitur convenire et 
quemadmedum nos si presentes esseTnUS aut faaemus aut faaere possemus." 
83/ In other words he was to have full viceregal powers - which extended not 
only to the city of Mantua itself, but also to all territories comprising 
the Mantuan state. 81/ These powers were to last for the total period 
of Gianfrancesco's absence. Although this document is in Gianfrancesco's 
name, it is clear that this was very much the wish of Carlo Malatesta. The 
granting of such extensive powers to one man can only have been made to 
someone who possessed exceptional alility. In addition to this Carlo's 
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brothers could also be useful. They already seem to have drawn attention 
to themselves in Francesco's Gonzaga's time. While Carlo's talents were of a 
political nature, Stefano had considerable legal talents and Francesco was 
a soldier. On the 31st of March 1412 he appeared with the title of 
Gianfrancesco's Captain General to whom the defences of Mantua were entrusted. 821 
There was a1so a fourth brother named Luigi who was not as prominent as the 
other three although he was to figure considerably in· Gianfrancesco's dealings 
with Pope John XXIII. Together they proved quite a formidable team. 
In the period from July 1409 to 28 March 1414 their ascendency 
seems to have been absolute and throughout this period they were consistently 
rewarded with powers and gifts. There are some nineteen decrees in their 
favour in the "Libro dei Decreti" during this time which in itself would 
indicate the extremely high favour in which they were held. From the wording 
of these decrees it will be seen that Gianfrancesco's faith in the Albertini 
brothers was absolute and apparently uncritical, another indication of his 
political immaturity. In fact, it needed a near disastrous policy and 
considerable diplomatic embarrassment vis-a-vis Venice to make him realise 
the dangers of the position which he had unwittingly allowed to develop. 
We shall see that it was the diplomatic implications of Albertini policy which 
eventually contributed to their fall most of all because Mantua's extremely 
delicate position was severely compromised. 
It would be worth while pausing to consider the main bequests which 
Gianfrancesco made to this family because of what they can tell us about 
his motives in rewarding them so lavishly and also because they represent 
the only really large bequests which were ever made by GianfranceSCo to any 
Single family. The fact that they were never made again on this scale 
is indicative that Gianfrancesco had become very wary of making any more 
reckless gifts during the period of his political maturity (i.e.· from 
1414 onwards). 
Very soon after granting Carlo full powers in 1409, Francesco 
was given a considerable amount of land and property mostly in the area 
to the north of Mantua on the border with the Veronese towards Villafranca 
and Castiglione Mantovano. There were also smaller bequests to the east 
(Casalromano) and to the south (Reggiolo). This lengthy document 8§1 
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shows the very high esteem in which Francesco was held: " •••• de bono in melius 
..... semper crescat." The first part of the document consisted of 
an extravangant eulogy of Francesco's qualities. The bequests were to be 
hereditary. There would seem to be little doubt that part of the reasoning 
behind these grants was defensive, given Francesco's military abilities. 
After all, it was an important consideration given Gianfrancesco's absence 
from Mantua. On 15 August 1410 he was also granted property in Mantua 
itself, 8]/ and a similar bequest was made to Ludovico in November 1412. 8~1 
On 28 September 1410 Francesco's rights over some of these territories were 
extended. These consisted principally of fiscal immunities. 8~1 
On 7.August of the same year Carlo was granted the sum of six thousand 
901 ducats "quam possit emere quandam posessiones in Veronensem". - It is 
very interesting to note the very considerable Albertini power which was 
building up in this area. In the preamble to this document a great deal 
of emphaSis was placed upon the continued fidelity of the Albertini family 
and recognition is made of their past services. 9!1 The important bequests 
for this year were completed by the !ranting of judicial powers to Stefano 
during Gianfrancesco's absence. On 25 October he was granted powers to deCide 
"orones et singulos questiones et causas quarum comissio ad nos spectare ••• " 9~1 
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From the very beginning, then, the Albertini brothers were closely 
associated together in guiding the affairs of Mantua. Even by the end 
of 1410 their power and influence tended to make them potentially dangerous 
and before long they were to gather around themselves a significant group 
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of supporters. - This can be seen as the start of an insidious build-up 
of power, 9~/ and this is further underlined by gifts of land to Stefano 
and Francesco. On 16 March 1413 they were granted lands around Reggio in the 
area of Gonzaga, Luzara, Guastalla, Nuvolari and Coreggio 92/on much the 
same terms as those granted to Carlo previously. Exactly a month later, 
on 16 April 1413 Stefano, who at the time was Podesta of Mantua, was once 
again granted extensive powers of a judicial nature during Gianfrancesco's 
absence. 9§/ 
At this early stage it was obviously politic to keep on good terms 
with Carlo Malatesta and his family. Carlo Albertini was particularly 
fortunate in this respect because it brought him even more property. There 
is the well documented instance when, in November 1411, he was invested with 
land around Piubega which Gianfrancesco held in common with Pandolfo 
Malatesta. The final document was drawn up on 22 November ·1411 91/but there 
are references in the "Libro dei Decreti" concerning this on 13 November. 9~/ 
There had been an agreement between Francesco Gonzaga and Pandolfo that the 
fortress at Piubega should be destroyed~ but Carlo was expressly absolved 
from this provision 9~/ and moreover his control over the area was to be 
absolute.lO~/ This document more than any other demonstrates how powerful 
Carlo's hold over Gianfrancesco had become. In November of the same year 
when Gianfrancesco had to be absent he placed his trust implicitly in Carlo. 
101/ The viceregal powers were continually renewed, - the last one occurring 
102/ 
on 16 October 1413 when Gianfrancesco was absent in Bologna. -
All these bequests added up to a formidable concentration of 
power and Gianfrancesco had allowed this to happen not only because he 
wanted stability and continuity during his absences from Nantua, but also 
because he was anxious to keep their friendship. While such generosity was 
perfectly in accord with the estimation of contemporaries concerning 
Gianfrancesco's nature, it would be more indicative of a lack of personal 
confidence on his part; it showed his lack of experience in handling men. 
Moreover, the Albertini, with considerable political experience behind them 
together with Gianfrancesco's unquestioning support, were quick to appreciate 
this fact and also to act upon it. It was not surprising in these circumstances 
that the Albertini began to take an increasingly prominent part in formulating 
Mantuan policies, policies which were designed primarily to further their 
own ambitions rather than explicitly to serve Mantuan interests. Such 
developments in Mantua were clearly disturbing to Venice. As early as 29 
May 1410 the Senate decided to send an embassy to Mantua with precise 
instructions to find out what was going on. They were charged to make discreet 
inquiries about the precise nature of Albertini power: "de statu et 
conditionibus suis, et sui regimini ac modos quibus conservantur fortillitia 
et loca sua." They were urged to insinuate themselves into their 
confidence if at all possible: "debeatus omnia trahere et comprehendere de 
mente sua". It was, therefore, Venice's intention to monitor very closely, 
though quietly, developments in Mantua. 102/ 
The first manifestation of a new policy occurred at the end of 
1411 when Mantua abstained from actively joining Venice in its war against 
Sigismund. In fact, the tendency during the years of the Albertini ascendancy 
was for Mantua to orientate itself more and more towards the Emperor and the 
Austrian princes, rather than sticking exclusively to the traditional 
alliance with Venice. This policy contained within itself important 
89. 
complications. It meant that Gianfrancesco was going against the avowed 
policies of his two tutors who had done so much to establish a strong 
basis for his position. On 25 January 1412 Carlo Malatesta was appointed 
as Captain General of the Venetian army against Sigismund lO~/ and it would 
have been natural to assume that Gianfrancesco would join him. This, after 
all, was an excellent opportunity to gain valuable military experience. The 
neutrality of Mantua, therefore, must have come as a great s~prise to 
Gianfrancesco's uncle. 
There can be little or no doubt that the responsibility for this 
decision lay totally with Carlo. It is very difficult to explain 
Gianfrancesco's reasons for following this policy other than that he had 
placed himself entirely in Carlo's hands in this matter, trusting to his 
greater experience of such affairs. It has also been suggested that 
Gianfrancesco wanted to demonstrate his independence of his tutors by 
f 11 . 1· 105/ d 1 d h· o ow~ng a separate po ~cy - an, moreover, that Car 0 encourage ~m 
in this line. While there may very well be a great deal of truth in this 
argument, it must nevertheless be emphasised that at this ,juncture Mantua's 
official position was one of neutrality and there was no active military commit-
ment on the side of Sigismund. 
However, it was potentially dangerous to arouse the suspicions 
of Venice which up to this point was the only state powerful enough to protect 
Mantua. It was impossible to maintain a position of neutrality indefinitely 
and, taking into consideration the recent history of Imperial intervention 
in Italian affairs, a pro-Imperial orientation would be likely to prove 
extremely impolitic. This is precisely why Carlo Albertini's policies 
could largely be interpreted in terms of selfish motives. 
It had already been noted that the Albertini family owed a 
great deal to the Emperor; in fact they had always been pro-Imperialists 
whereas the Malatesta had been Guelf in sentiment. However, it would 
be erroneous to assume that the issues were as clear cut as a straight 
Gue~/Ghibelline confrontation. In this respect the arguments put ~orward 
by Tarducci need some qualification. lO§/ 
A pro-Imperialist policy was not completely disadvantageous for 
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Mantua. In 1412 Sigismund was badly in need of Italian support especially 
as he was most anxious to undertake the 'Romzug', and he might be prepared 
to pay quite highly for it. In particular he might well be persuaded 
. 107/ to reconfer the t~tle of Marquis upon Gianfrancesco - and this issue was 
to play an important part in the secret discussions conducted during this 
period. Any success obtained in this field was clearly likely to strengthen 
Albertini influence with Gianfrancesco. 
Another possible argument for supporting the Emperor at this time 
was that the political situation in Italy in.14l2 was more conducive than 
ever to success. Only Venice was strong enough to resist, and possibly 
Ladislas of Naples; but Milan and the Papacy were much too weak to put up 
any fight. If Sigismund were to be successful here Carlo would expect 
to be highly rewarded for his help. 
In examining the relations between Mantua and Sigismund during 
this period it is very important to emphasise that discussions were conducted 
in almost total secrecy. In fact there is only one official document 
in the Gonzaga Archives which could be used to illustrate the subject matter 
of these negotiations. lO~/ The only informat~on available comes from the 
records relating to the arrest, interrogation and trial of the Albertini 
brothers and their accomplices in l4l4.l0~/ The documentation here is 
very full and offers statements from a number of different people which 
can give a number of different sides to the same story. Although these 
papers have been examined by Tarducci in some detail, ll~/ it would now 
91. 
be opportune to reassess them in order to answer two important questions. 
Firstly, why Gianfrancesco was prepared to allow these potentially dangerous 
relations to proceed; and secondly, why the Albertini brothers fell 
from power so rapidly. 
It had already been suggested that a pro-Imperial policy by Mantua 
was not necessarily incompatible with maintaining good relations with Venice, 
provided that this excluded any definite military commitment. It could well 
be argued that it might be positively advantageous for Mantua to keep its 
options open for as long as possible. It has even been suggested that it 
was likely that Carlo Malatesta may have favoured Gianfrancesco capitalising 
upon Sigismund's financial needs in order to facilitate the re-conferring 
of the Marquisate. ll!/ This was especially true in the period following 
the truce between Venice and Sigismund in April 1413 when the possible 
diplomatic complications were somewhat eased. 
In short, it would appear that Gianfrancesco was perfectly 
happy for discreet negotiations with Sigismund to proceed as long as they 
did not actively jeopardise Venetian relations unduly; espeCially as there 
was always the alluring possibility of an Imperial title over the horizon. 
This reading of the situation would account for the nature of the missions 
to the Emperor of Gasparo.da Mantova whose evidence in the trial papers is 
of crucial importance. Although he was a highly intelligent and persuasive 
92. 
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man, - the choice of a friar to conduct these delicate negotiations would 
underline their secretive character. 
Throughout the detailed account of his five missions to Sigismund 
can be detected two definite strands: the first, which amounted to 
protestations of Gianfrancesco's loyalty, and second, the fact that Carlo 
Albertini's own name was being continually pushed forward, another indication 
of Carlo's extreme resourcefulness. 
"Prima via fuit de mensa aprilis 1412 ad Hungariam usque Budam". 112/ 
This first mission of Gaspare's took place during the active hostilities 
between Sigismund and Venice and precisely because of· this the nature of 
his mission was extremely general. It consisted only of general affirmations 
of obedience and an apology that Gianfrancesco was not able to send an 
official embassy to Sigismund for fear of openly going against his tutors. 
Furthermore, he promised personally to pay homage to him as soon as he came 
to Italy. On the surface these were extremely weak arguments to justify 
sending Gaspare; in reality Gianfrancesco had already effectively thrown 
off his tutors. Gaspare's commission had been very carefully thought out 
by Carlo Albertini beforehand. It was part of his plan to proceed by 
gradual stages, and this was designed to keep Gianfrancesco happy as much 
as anything else. What perhaps was more significant about this first 
mission was that Gaspare was instructed to emphasise the continued loyalty 
of the Albertini family to the Imperial cause and to assure Sigismund that 
Carlo would work to bind Mantua more closely than ever to him: It ..... ipse 
dom, Karo1us iuxta suum posse reducebat dominum suum (Gianfrancesco) 
et semper reduceret ad obedentiam imperialemlt.1l~/ This last phase states 
Carlo's intentions unequivocably. From the start Carlo was pushing himself 
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forward as the prime instigator of this policy of friendship with 
Sigismund and he was to continually remind the Emperor of this in the 
subsequent missions. 
Sigismund's reaction to this first mission was such as to encourage 
Carlo's optimism. Hard pressed by the Venetians Sigismund was clearly 
grateful for any friendship, albeit platonic, that was forthcoming. He 
was in no position to dictate terms and was prepared to accept Gaspare's 
protestations at their face value. It was even reported that it might be 
politic to appear to help the Venetians by sending a contingent of men 
in order to dispel any doubts which the Venetians might have concerning 
115/ Gianfrancesco's loyalty. -
Gaspare's first mission had achieved its purpose, but this was 
due partly to the vague commission which he had received and partly due 
to the situation in which Sigismund had found himself at the time. Nevertheless, 
the ground had been prepared; but could Carlo now build upon this with equal 
success? 
Gaspare's second mission in October 1412 was prompted by the 
Emperor's presence in Friuli. It was expressly designed by Carlo to 
116/ impress; . - but on this occasion the instructions were more specific 
and included a request regarding the title of Marquis which had originally 
been conferred upon Francesco Gonzaga by Wenceslaus in 1403. This request 
altered the whole character of the mission. The political situation was 
liable to fluctuate very rapidly in Northern Italy and Sigismund, perennially 
short of money and help, was not in a giving mood. Specific requests like 
this were very different from vague sentiments and consequently the Emperor 
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replied by reminding Gaspare that the promise of personal fealty had not 
been fulfilled. 117/ The political situation was once more rather difficult, -
and what the Emperor was demanding in effect was that Gianfrancesco should 
come out into the open on his side. 
The inconclusive nature of the second mission was distinctly alarming 
and Carlo was more anxious than ever to placate the Emperor. He therefore 
tried to kill two birds with one stone by quickly sending Gaspare to the 
Emperor for the third time promising that he (Carlo) would go personally 
to him in order to swear fealty in Gianfrancesco's name,ll~/ thereby advancing 
his own aspirations while ostensibly acting in Gianfrancesco's interests. 
Tarducci has argued that Carlo's act of swearing allegiance 
to Sigismund at Udine in Gianfrancesco's name was definite proof that he 
had thrown off his tutors. 112/ A more realistic explanation would 
be that Carlo was anxious to save a difficult situation by retaining 
the initiative in his own hends. It was no mere coincidence, furthermore, 
that this act coincided with an improvement in the relations between Sigismund 
and Venice which resulted in the truce of April l4l3.l~2/ 
From this point onwards, however, Carlo found it increasingly 
difficult to advance his own position without seriously compromising Mantua. 
However;secretive Gaspare's missions had been, Carlo, in the eyes of Gianfrancesc( 
was firmly committed to an imperialist policy and as such it became more and more 
difficult to back pedal. Moreover, Sigismund was now becoming more demanding. 
In particular he continued to be evasive over the question of the Marquisate, 
121/ 
something which could be increasingly damaging to Carlo's credibility. -
There were also requests for tribute. In fact, Carlo was obliged to promise 
a sum of five thousand ducats.12~/ 
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Carlo was now virtually forced into a much more definite policy 
whereby Mantua's position, not only in relation to Venice but also to the 
Malatesta family, was jeopardised. It was this last consideration which 
finally forced Paola to make her presence felt. 
The only way in which Carlo could now try to guarantee Mantuan 
security was by strengthening ties with pro-Imperial states. In April 1413 
two important alliances were concluded with Cabrino Fondulo of Cremona 
and with the Austrian princes. On 3 April a mutually defensive league 
was signed with Cabrino Fondulo who was a staunch supporter of the Emperor. 
The league was to last for five years and Mantua was to provide a force 
of five hundred cavalry and a number of armed galleys.l22/ The signing of 
the league was the most definite act to date in placing Mantua irrevocably 
in the Imperialist camp and was clearly a move which could not be made 
without a certain amount of thought. Benvenuto de' Pegorini, implicated 
in the conspiracy, commented in his deposition that there was much discussion 
among the Albertini brothers about this at the time.l2~/ 
Ten days later, on 13 April, a league with the Austrian princes 
125/ 
was Signed. - It is not clear what the purpose of this agreement was, but 
it was certainly designed to show the Emperor how far Mantua was prepared 
to go; a sort of public relations exercise. This last point is emphasised 
by the presence of Sigismund's representative Hugo de Hernoust (or Herforst) 
described in the Cremona treaty as "Consiliarius et procurator dome 
Sigismundi regis Romanorum". It is certainly the case that these two 
agreements were made possible by the impending truce between Sigismund and 
venice. 12§1 
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This point represents the highest water mark in Mantuan/lmperial 
relations during this period. Carlo had been drawn into a much deeper 
commitment. However, Sigismund was not the easiest man to deal with: in 
particular his demands for money were most embarrassing for Carlo to have 
to explain' to Gianfrancesco. Gaspare notes that not long after these 
agreements were signed there was some trouble in that Sigismund was demanding 
more money and yet was not prepared to grant the privileges which he had 
promised. Sigismund was not disposed to have his activities questioned and 
a strong note appears to have been sent to Carlo and Gianfrancesco to this 
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be uneasy. 
At the best of times relations with the Emperor tended to 
Up to this point Carlo Albertini and his brothers had been 
extremely fortunate in that, despite the fact that they appreciated the 
dangers inherent in their policies, Mantua had avoided getting into a 
conflict position with Venice. From now on, however, matters took a turn 
for the worse and when the Malatesta family became directly involved 
Gianfrancesco himself was forced to intervene much more fully in the policy 
making process. 
Until now relations with Pandolfo Malatesta of Brescia had been 
generally harmonious. Pandolfo, as we have seen, had shown a particularly 
high regard for Carlo Albertini. Pandolfo's military reputation was high, 
higher in effect, than that of his brother Carlo. 
Although Carlo Malatesta had distinguished himself in the war 
against Sigismund he had been seriously wounded in 1412 and consequently 
Pandolfo had been asked to replace him as commander of the Venetian 
army, a task which he accomplished admirably.12~/ 
When the truce was signed with Sigismund, Pandolfo, who had 
always coveted Cremona, was now anxious to capitalise upon his success. 
He therefore declared war on Cabrino Fondulo and invaded the Cremonese, 
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barely a month after the defensive treaty between Cabrino and Gianfrancesco 
had been signed. Not surprisingly Cabrino appealed to Mantua for aid. 
At a time when Carlo was already disturbed by a cooling of his relations 
with the Emperor, he was now faced with honouring a treaty which would 
bring upon his head not only the ire of Pandolfo Malatesta, but possibly 
of Venice itself. It was a situation bristling with danger. Above all, 
it involved the obligation of waging war upon Paola's family. 
This was the first really big crisis which Carlo had to face. 
The dilemma was considerable and Carlo chose the lesser of the two evils 
and remained aloof from the war. The possibility of a war with one of 
the foremost generals of the day was much too daunting, especially in view 
129/ 
of the fact that the cost of such a war would be crippling for Mantua. -
It may have been possible to put Cabrino off with vague promises 
but Carlo's biggest problem was in justifying his conduct to the Emperor. 
This was the subject of Gaspare's fourth mission. He left in August 1413 
. 130/ hop1ng to encounter Sigismund as he reached Como. - Carlo must have 
sent Gaspare with some trepidation because his record in practical terms 
had been bad as far as the Emperor was concerned, and this was more than 
justified by Sigismund's response. Whereas he was perfectly prepared to 
accept his excuses regarding Fondulo he nevertheless required a much more 
open commitment from Gianfrancesco. He replied to Gaspare that he would ' 
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be content to take Gianfrancesco into his service with five hundred lances, 
ironically the same commitment as had been prev~sly agreed with Fondulo. 
However, it was not possible for Gianfrancesco to accede to this 
request at that time because he had been persuaded to take service with 
Pope John XXIII in orderto help him in the Romagna. In particular, he was 
to ensure the continued loyalty of Bologna. 
Gianfrancesco had no personal interest in Bologna but this was an 
opportunity for him to gain some military experience in an area which did 
not directly affect the balance of power in Lombardy. There is no real 
indication that Gianfrancesco himself showed any interest in the Great Schism, 
although it may be noted that at the time relations between John XXIII and 
Sigismund were particularly good. 
Baldassare Cossa, described by Platina as "vir quidem ingenio 
. 131/ ferox et pluris audacie, quam pontificialis clementia et pietas requirebat", -
a man of no mean military experience himself, had a special attachment to 
Bologna. He had been Legate in Bologna, having taken a prominent part in 
its recapture from the Visconti in 1403. l3~/ In 1412 after a rebellion in 
which a popular government had been established, it had been restored, largely 
through the efforts of a prominent Bolognese lawyer Jacope Isolani, to John's 
obedience. It was absolutely essential for John, given the nature of his 
conflict with Gregory XII, to maintain his control of the city. Gregory's 
forces, strongly led by Carlo Malatesta, were always a menace. By agreeing 
to help John Gianfrancesco was placing himself against his erstwhile tutor, 
another factor which points to the degree of influence which the Albertini 
had over him. 
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Why did Gianfrancesco depart from Mantua at such a difficult 
stage in relations with Sigismund? The answer to this can only be a tentative 
one, but there is much to point to the conclusion that at this period the 
Albertini brothers were extremely alarmed at the way in which their policies 
were turning out and Carlo was most anxious to get Gianfrancesco away from 
Mantua, and consequently away from the growing influence of his wife. The 
idea of taking service with John was Carlo's and it is clear that in arranging 
this he made full use of Luigi Albertini, his brother, who resided in Bologna 
and who was high in John's favour.13~/ In fact, it is clear from the document 
in which Gianfrancesco's condotta was renewed in 1414 that Luigi was 
instrumental in the negotiations which led to Gianfrancesco's appointment in 
the first place.13~/ 
According to Nerli Gianfrancesco left for Bologna on 19 October 
1413,13~/ and Platina also adds that he was accompanied by Francesco 
Albertini.13§/ Although the reason given for this was that Gianfrancesco 
was young, it was also prudent for him to be consistently under Albertini 
influence at this stage. 
What is more significant, however, is the date of the original 
condotta, There is no copy of this in the Gonzaga Archive, but the renewal 
mentioned above gave the precise date of the previous condotta. It was 
137/ 
signed on 31 August 1413. - Given the fact that Gaspare did not reach 
the Emperor until the beginning of November, it is possible to suggest a 
possible motivation behind this agreement. Gaspare's unnaturally long 
absence from Mantua must have made Carlo more anxious than ever about the 
outcome of his mission. At this stage it would have been disastrous to 
compromise Gianfrancesco and himself even further so soon after the Fondulo 
debacle. By committing Gianfrancesco to John XXIII he was consequently 
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precluded from concluding any other military agreement. In addition to 
this, Gianfrancesco's absence, which left him in complete control in Mantua, 
would give him valuable breathing space to try and resolve these diplomatic 
complications.13~/ It is true that such a move would do very little for his 
standing with Paola but at this time it was yet again a question of choosing 
the lesser of two evils. It was more important at this stage to avoid angering 
Pandolfo than angering Carlo Malatesta. In acting thus Carlo showed 
considerable judgement and fOfesight and it was borne out when Gaspare returned 
with Sigismund's request. 
It is also significant that Carlo delayed sending Gaspare on his 
fifth and final mission until Gianfrancesco had left for Bologna. Gaspare 
on this occasion was once again given a very vague Commission - to reiterate 
Gianfrancesco's loyalty to the Emperor, explain the reasons for his inability 
to serve him for the time being, while holding out the possibility of his 
being able to accommodate him some time in the future. Carlo here was 
conscious of playing a very safe game, because Sigismund, anxious as he 
was to be crowned in Rome, could not risk falling foul of John XXIII, his 
only real hope at that time. Carlo was also confident that John would not 
readily release Gianfrancesco and, by working continuously with Luigi, such 
a situation could be maintained. Sigismund could do none other than accept 
this 'fait accompli' although, according to Gaspare's testimony, he 
showed that he intended to extend an invitation to Luigi himself to come and 
139/ fight on his side if a suitable opportunity presented itself. - For the 
time being, then, Carlo had manoeuvred himself out of a difficult situation. 
Despite his youth and relative inexperience Gianfrancesco, no 
doubt ably assisted by Francesco Albertini, acquitted himself extremely 
well. By the terms of his condotta he was to supply a force of 450 lances 
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d 150 . f t 140/ . an ~n an r.y, - qu~te a considerable force. John XXIII had a high 
141/ 
opinion of his talents - and was more anxious than ever to retain his 
services after he had managed successfully to stave off an attack by 
Carlo Malatesta. This is borne out by the fact that John was unwilling 
. 142/ to release G~anfrancesco for Imperial service in November of the same year. -
John, well qualified in assessing military talent, saw great promise in 
Gianfrancesco14~/ in this, his first real military experience. Gianfrancesco 
was accorded the privilege of accompanying John XXIII on his ceremonial 
144/ 
entry into Bologna on 12 November. - Quite apart from anything else 
this did a great deal for Gianfrancesco's personal prestige. 
The same was true, to a certain extent, of John XXIII's stay 
in Mantua from 16 January to 15 February 1414, together with the papal 
curia and entourage. This occurred after John's meeting with Sigismund 
at Lodi when the Emperor made his unsuccessful attempt to obtain 
145/ Gianfrancesco's services as well as discussing the Council of Constance. -
The visit was an opportunity for considerable festivity and many people 
from the surrounding area came to Mantua to see the spectacle - the city 
146/ 
was overflowing with visitors. - While such a visit of its very nature 
made Mantua the centre of attention, Gianfrancesco also gained materially 
from it. No doubt as a further reward for his military services, he was 
awarded the territories of Villimpenta, Ostiglia and Poletto in his own 
right. 141/ 
However, apart from all this there were sqme rather more serious 
considerations taking place behind the scenes. Gaspare, as usual, was 
to make sure that Mantua was included in the truce between Sigismund 
and Venice. At that time Sigismund was too concerned with the discussions 
149/ 
of the Council of Constance to become too deeply involved in Italian affairs. - . 
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To sum up so far: up to the time of John XXIII's departure from 
Mantua Carlo Albertini, by some skillful manoeuvring, had managed 
to minimise any active pro-imperial commitment for Gianfrancesco. By 
arranging his service with John XXIII, he had given Gianfrancesco his 
first real taste of military success. Furthermore, he had been careful 
to avoid coming openly into conflict with Venice. However, he could not 
avoid Mantua from becoming openly associated with John XXIII and Sigismund, 
and a 'via media' policy could not be continued'indefinitely. Moreover, 
although the tricky question of Pandolfo Malatesta and Cremona had until 
now been Circumvented, 'Mantua's position here would have to be stated 
categorically sooner or later. The very nature of Italian politics 
made Albertini's achievement here extremely transitory because when the 
difficulties of the Council of Constance had been sorted out Sigismund 
was determined once and for all to remove Pandolfo Malatesta from Cremona, 
and he was to be more consistent than ever that Mantua should give material 
guise to its hitherto vague promises. This once again was to resuscitate 
the whole question of Mantua's relationship with Venice but now in the 
context of a much more serious diplomatic framework. Active Imperial 
intervention in such affairs had always aroused the latent anti-Imperial 
tendencies of other states and Pandolfo Malatesta had not been slow to 
exploit this. He had formed a league with Milan, Montferrat and Genoa 
for mutual defence. particularly important here was the support of 
Milan and the consequence of this was that Mantua was virtually forced into 
having to choose between honouring the treaty with Cabrino Fondulo or 
siding with Pandolfo Malatesta, who was still Captain General of Venice 
even though the war with Sigismund had ended. If Sigismund were to fail, 
and his Italian record had not been good, Mantua could easily become isolated. 
All this was tied up with the ambitions of the Albertini. They had gained 
103. 
so much power and influence in Mantua and had become so deeply committed 
to the Imperial cause that in effect they had no alternative but to 
continue to support Sigismund. The prosecution of the war against Pandolfo 
Malatesta had become inextricably linked with Albertini survival. 
According to the deposition of Benvenuto del Pegorini in the trial 
papers Sigismund had issued instructions that Gianfrancesco should assemble 
149/ 
as many men as he could muster at Ostiano in order to begin the hostilities. - I 
Despite frantic attempts by Carlo to get him to act Gianfrancesco refused to 
go to war. In his confess~on of the 13 April 1414 Carlo himself said bluntly 
150/ that "Dominus non erat dispositus rumpere guerram". - Here, at last, 
was an open disagreement between Gianfrancesco and Carlo, but it was not at 
all surprising in the circumstances. This was the firstoccasion in which 
there was the strong possibility of open warfare direatZy against a member 
of his wife's family who was strongly supported by other influential Italian 
states. What Carlo had feared so much was ndW a reality. This was an affair 
totally different from the campaign waged against Carlo Malatesta around 
Bologna where he had been acting in the interests of Gregory XII. Paola's 
influence here was no doubt great in making Gianfrancesco stand firm on 
the side of her family. 
It was this which finally drove the Albertini in their desperation 
to treasonable measures, and the supreme irony is that it was Gianfrancesco 
himself who had given them the wherewithal1 to be successful. It must be 
said, however, that this step was only contemplated when all other attempts 
had failed. ls!/ They hoped that the Emperor himself would make the 
decisive moves to compel Gianfrancesco by force to aid him; but when this 
proved a vain hope the Albertini were driven to planning the imprisonment of 
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Gianfrancesco and his family and to taking power themselves. There is 
even evidence that Pope John XXIII himself, afraid that a rapprochement between 
Gianfrancesco and the Malatesta would drive Mantua into the Gregorian camp, 
152/ tended to favour such a move. - It was support like this which tended 
to make the Albertini mOre and more audacious. 
Increased pressure was placed on Carlo by the fact that 
Gianfrancesco now intended to declare himself openly for Pandolfo and further-
more that he intended to send his emissary Francesco dal Bosco to Venice 
in order to reaffirm his lOyalty.15~/ This extreme divergence of policy 
now dictated swift action by the Albertini. The quicker they could 
imprison Gianfrancesco and take over power the better. They had much in 
their favour. Carlo had considerable power and popularity, Francesco 
154/ had command of the troops who were extremely loyal to him. - Pegorini 
in his deposition stated quite categorically what Carlo intended to do: 
"volo capere dominum et cursitare civitatem cum gentibus com. Francisci et 
facere huc venire imperatorem et cum ipsius auxilio et dictarum gentium 
domini Francisci facere me dominum Mantua" .152/ Furthermore, the brothers 
were already discussing plans for securing the surrounding contrado from 
possible attacks from the Malatesta by installing supporters in prominent 
positions. For instance, the fortress at Ostiglia was to be placed in the 
hands of Guido de Rippa and in the event of its being attacked it was 
decided that Gianfrancesco should be held as a hostage there "quod ipse 
faceret quidquid vellent" l5§/ Similar plans were made for Bozzolo 
and Peschiera. 
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The plan, therefore, was very detailed and far-reaching. It really 
seemed that the events of 1328 were about to repeat themselves: but 
suddenly, on 26 March 1414, the Albertini brothers and their principal 
followers were arrested on charges of treason. The move was dramatic and 
unexpected, but came just in time. 
It is not clear how the plot was discovered, but there are a number 
of factors to be considered in examining this, the first really important 
independent move of Gianfrancesco. First of all, it would be reasonable 
to deduce that for some time the Albertini brothers were alarmed at the 
influence of Paola on her husband. An intelligent and perceptive woman, 
it was not difficult for her to see the threats which surrounded her 
husband and she was quick to oppose an open attack upon her uncle. Moreover, 
157/ the birth of a son, Ludovico, to her on 5 July.l4l2 - made her even more 
anxious to defend the succession. She could see these dangers much more 
Clearly than her husband who until almost the last moment had shown complete 
confidence in the Albertini. 
While the Albertini were very powerful, they nevertheless aroused 
a certain amount of opposition and this was especially true of the pro-
Imperialist aliqnment. In fact the trial papers do show that amongst others 
Francesco dal Bosco and Uberto Strozzi were active opponents of this policy. 
As the ultimate implications of Carlo's policies became more and more 
evident it became easier for such people to make their views felt. However, 
the fact that Gianfrancesco only acted at the last possible moment is an 
indication that he needed some persuading. 
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It was fortunate in addition to this that a number of 
unexpected factors delayed the prospective coup at this crucial stage. 
d " 157/ Tar ucc~ po~nts out - that there was some divergence of opinion among 
the brothers as to the means and methods employed to arrest Gianfrancesco. 
Moreover, at that time Carlo was apparently ill in the Gonzaga palace 
and his brothers were alarmed for his safety. Carlo's illness no doubt 
made Gianfrancesco more confident of striking when he did. 
The dangerous game which the Albertini were playing alarmed 
some of the more irresolute supporters, and it had been suggested that the 
t plot may well have been revealed to Gianfrancesco by Benvenuto de Pegorini, 
whose evidence in the trial papers is easily the most extensive. Indeed, the 
suddenness of the whole affair bears all the marks of such a leak of 
information. Gianfrancesco's behaviour in declaring openly for Venice and 
159/ his desire to send dal Bosco indicated an unprecedented firmness of purpose. -
The only thing that can be said with any certainty is that Carlo seriously 
underestimated Gianfrancesco and that he really was caught unawares; and 
160/ 
also that the part played by Paola in these events must not be underestimated. -
Including the four Albertini brothers there were altogether 
sixteen persons arrested, all of whom had considerable influence in the 
't 161/ c~ y. - They suffered the fate of those who have betrayed their 
positions of high trust. Gianfrancesco was so shattered and disillusioned 
that the only thing he wished to do was to eradicate every sign of 
Albertini influence from Mantua. The brothers were arrested and the 
162/ 
relevant information was tortured from them remorselessly. -
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A grido of 28 March 1414 required anyone, under pain 
of severe punishment, who had in his possession money or anything else 
belonging to or given by those arrested to disclose the details to the 
d 163/ authorities within a period of two ays. - There was also a promise 
that the information would be kept secret to avoid any possible recriminations, 
but there were also rewards given to those who could furnish information 
about persons trying to evade this requirement. There were further 
proclamations in the following month. Those who had been given special 
privileges by the Albertini were to produce the relevant documents to the 
authorities.16~/ . 165/ . The same procedure applied to grants of c~tizenship. -
Nothing granted under Carlo's signature was to remain in existence1 a sure 
indication of the bitterness which Gianfrancesco felt. 
Everything the Albertini brothers owned was confiscated16§/ 
and they vanished for ever from public view. They were either killed off 
or they spent the rest of their days in prison. The trial papers suggest 
that Luigi might have been subsequently set free but there is no concrete 
evidence for this. 
However, the most significant result of the discovery of the 
Albertini conspiracy was the re-affirmation of loyalty to Venice by 
Gianfrancesco's own visit to Venice on 7 May where, if we may infer 
167/ from Sanuto, he was given a rather aloof and chilly reception. -
The important thing is that Gianfrancesco felt the need to go to Venice 
in person to save what he could of a difficult and embarrassing situation. 
His anxiety to establish his position is shown in the gr£db of 2 April 
in which all rebels from Venice or Verona were ordered to depart from 
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168/ the Mantovano immediately. - In terms of protection Gianfrancesco's 
best chance lay in re-establishing good relations with Venice. It had 
become painfully clear to him that this would most certainly not be the 
case with Sigismund. At the best of times the Emperor was only to be a 
makeweight in Italian diplomacy and his importance was linked very 
considerably to the relative power of the states who supported him. 
Venice may have initially played the part of the hurt parent 
towards Gianfrancesco but even here it was ultimately useful for Venice 
to reinforce its ties with Mantua. Anyhow, by the end of 1414 the 
situation seems to have been saved. In the 'Senatus Secreta' documents 
for 27 December 1414 the answer to Gianfrancesco's protestations of 
loyalty towards Venice and his indignation at Sigismund was recorded: 
" ••••• sed dictus dominus Mantue filius noster debet esse certissimus quod 
sicut alias sibi diximus ita replicamus quod in quibuscumque casibus 
169/ 
occurentibus eundem et statum suum habebimus tamquam paterne recomissumll • -
This must have been a considerable relief to Gianfrancesco. 
The crisis over the Albertini was the point at which Gianfrancesco 
emerged as an assertive figure in his own right in Mantuan affairs. It 
was the point at which he reached political maturity. The lesson he had 
learnt was hard but valuable; and what is more, it was to affect his whole 
attitude to the governing of Mantua. In his youthful inexperience he had 
been far too trusting and he had consequently delegated vast powers to a 
single family; powers which had nearly destroyed him. In many ways it 
was fortuitous that the details of the plot were revealed by Pegorini, 
because had the coup been attempted successfully it would most certainly 
have meant a period of severe crisis within Mantua. 
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The very fact that the conspiracy had very nearly been 
successful now made Gianfrancesco much more wary in his choice of 
ministers. It is significant that we never again see another family or 
. Im/ individual rising to supreme ~mportance. - From now on it was 
Gianfrancesco's wish to keep policy making decisions in his own hands. 
This did not mean that he did not take advice from the experienced people 
around him. Indeed, in future crises he was to value very highly the 
opinion of such men as Zenebaldo de Brolio and Matteo Corrado, but 
Gianfrancesco was always to make the really decisive moves himself. 
Furthermore, in alerting her husband to the dangers which 
surrounded him, Paola emerged into the political limelight as an astute 
and forceful character. From now on she was to be no mere cypher in 
Mantuan affairs. In fact, she was to be her husband's best counsellor. 
Gianfrancesco placed a great deal of trust in her and was quite content 
to leave affairs in her hands during his absences. With her help 
Gianfrancesco could now begin to make his own distinctive mark in Mantuan 
political life. 
VI 
Widening Experience 
The period between the fall of the Albertini and the beginning 
of the Lombard Wars is not particularly well documented either in the 
archives or by the chroniclers. As far as Mantua itself was concerned 
it was a period of peace in which good relations with Venice and the Malatesta 
were restored. In a sense, the relative tranquillity of this period is 
one of the more positive results of the success with which the conspiracy 
had been suppressed. The fate which the Albertini brothers suffered was 
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a salutary lesson to anyone else who m~ght have similar aspirations. 
However, there is no evidence that there was anyone within Mantua either 
powerful enough or indeed disposed to take their place. Ever since 
the expulsion of the Bonaccolsi the Gonzaga had taken great care to 
ensure that there was no opportunity for a similar potential opposition 
to form itself. In fact, there is no evidence that the disposal of the 
Albertini aroused any reaction whatsoever. It is highly probable that 
many were relieved at the demise of this upstart family which had sought 
to divert Mantuan affairs into unaccustomed channels. They merely disappeared 
and Gianfrancesco took over the administration himself. There appeared 
to be no interruption in the administrative life-of the city and, apart 
from those directly implicated in the conspiracy itself, there was no 
change of personnel. In fact, from what little evidence there is in the 
archives, it can be deduced that the affairs of the city ran fairly 
smoothly. Gianfrancesco was particularly concerned that standards of 
efficiency should be maintained. On 10 May 1419, for instance, there 
was a grido which tightened up the organisation of the Consiglio Maggiore 
which normally comprised 400 citizens. The Consiglio was the body which 
elected the city officials. Apparently there had been a growing 
apathy among the citizens in attending such meetings and the gridO 
decreed that there should be a fine of two ducats for non-attendance, a 
sum considerable enough for the majority of the members to ensure that 
171/ 
civic duties were performed. -
A factor which had encouraged the Albertini to aspire to 
greater power had been that Gianfrancesco himself had given them a taste 
of viceregal power during his absences from Mantua. The provisions 
which he made for the government of the city during his absence in 1416, 
possibly fighting against Braccio da Montone, indicate very clearly that 
once again Gianfrancesco had learnt his lesson. On 19 March 1416 no one 
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was named as having overall administrative authority; instead those 
in charge of particular departments of the executive were given increased 
authority, being accountable to Gianfrancesco for their respective 
172/ 
actions on his return. - In reality the overall supervision was left 
to Paola, who was even now rarely absent from Mantua and whose role 
in the overthrow of the conspiracy had resulted in a greater share of 
the responsibilities of ruling. Her activities, especially in finding the 
money to finance her husband when he was away from Mantua, were to increase 
dramatically when the war finally broke out.17~/ 
The basic keynote of this period is administrative and territorial 
consolidation and this was bolstered up by the prest~ge which the presence 
of Martin V brought in 1418. Furthermore, the campaign against Braccio da 
Montone, which in itself was a contribution to the normalisation of the 
relations with the Malatesta, gave Gianfrancesco another valuable opportunity 
to widen his military experience. The Albertini crisis had been a shock 
for Gianfrancesco. As well as its administrative implications it may 
have also brought with it an awareness of something he had perhaps not 
fully appreciated before; that the political orientation of Mantua was 
of greater importance to his immediate neighbours than he had previously 
imagined. This was to have the result of making him very much more careful 
in the sphere of diplomacy and this was one of the reasons why, as we have 
seen, he'was so anxious to re-establish good relations with Venice. For 
its part, from now on the Venetian Senate was to keep a closer eye 
on Gianfrancesco and actively encourage the development of a closer 
relationship. Although this was to be more pronounced in the 1420's, 
it would be reasonable to assume that this was also the case ~uring the period 
in question. For instance, Sanuto notes that Gianfrancesco was present in 
Venice at the end of April 1415 at festivities in honour of the new Doge. 
174/ Tomaso Mocenigo. -
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The fall of the Albertini was important in another respect. In 
a way it may have served to restore credibility in the ability of the 
house of Gonzaga to rule in its own right. While it is true that at the 
beginning of his rule Gianfrancesco was too young to govern alone, his 
domination by the Albertini family at a time when he should have been 
emerging as ruler in his own right had augured ill for the future. The 
election of 1407 was very much a matter of faith and it is highly likely 
that the actions of 1414 had served to bolster up a faith which may have 
been flagging in some quarters. It was inevitable that there would be 
those who were ready and willing to draw unfavourable comparisons between 
father and son. An external manifestation of this was the return of Ostiano, 
Isola Dovarese and Rivarolo to Mantuan rule and the acquisition of Viadana. 
The only firm documentary evidence relates to Viadana, however. The other 
175/ three areas are mentioned only by the chroniclers. - They state that these 
areas in the Cremonese went over voluntarily to the Gonzaga. If this was, 
in fact, the case, it would tend to illustrate the advantages which the 
inhabitants hoped would accrue from inclusion in the Mantuan state. 
The acquisition of Viadana, however, is well documented and the 
fact that this, together with the other three territories was under the 
domination of the Cavalcab~ family tends to give credence to the unsupported 
assertions of the chroniclers. 
Viadana had been in the possession of the Cavalcabo since 
the twelfth century but in 1415 the Viadanesi were very discontented with 
the oppressive rule of Andreasio Cavalc~ and it may well have been the 
case that the news of the acquisition of the other areas encouraged them 
to follow suit. It is certainly true that the poSition of Viadana, 
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commanding a bend in the Po, could beof great strategic value to Mantua. 
It is very probable that Gianfrancesco may have been in secret communication 
with Andreasio's enemies in the town. According to Parazzi, the historian 
of Viadana, the campaign of 18 June 1415 was a sudden and well planned 
affair and took the Cavalcab~ completely by surprise. 17§/ Gianfrancesco 
appeared with 400 infantry and a similar number of cavalry and occupied the 
fortress after a brief but fierce struggle. On the next day the citizens 
gathered in the main square to swear allegiance to Gianfrancesco. Although 
there is some controversy among the chroniclers as to whether or not 
the citizens were in favour of this action,17Z/it would appear from the 
official terms of the surrender that it was more of a mutual agreement 
178/ than a conquest in the fullest sense of the word. - Gianfrancesco 
promised to respect the privileges and customs of Viadana; he promised 
not to harm the Calvalcabo and return prisoners of war. In particular, 
he promised to respect the statute of 1350 which had regulated the government 
. 179/ 
of Viadana. - In fact, Viadana was to cause no trouble whatsoever 
to Gianfrancesco and this is the strongest evidence for the acceptability 
of Gonzaga rule in this area which was to prove a most valuable asset to 
the Mantuan state. 
Not only had the Albertini crisis threatened the important 
relationship with Venice, it had also done a considerable amount of damage 
to the close friendship which had previously existed with Paola's family, 
the Malatesta. Gianfrancesco's involvement on the side of his former 
tutor Carlo can consequently be viewed as an attempt to renew that friendship. 
Braccio da Montone himself posed no threat to Mantua 'per se' but it was 
when he threatened Malatesta territory that Gianfrancesco deci.ded to intervene. 
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In 1416 Braccio da Montone, who had been Captain General of 
the Church under John XXIII, taking advantage of the disorder on the Papal 
States, had decided to carve out a state for himself in Umbria. He had 
begun by occupying Orvieto in March, but in the following month he 
directed his attention to besieging his native city of perUgia.18~/ 
The defence of that city had been undertaken by Paolo Orsini and Carlo 
Malatesta, but the superior tactics of Braccio at the battle of S.Egidio 
on 12 July not only resulted in the fall of Perugia, but also in the capture 
of Carlo himself. 1S!/ Among the other prisoners taken was Paola's brother 
Galeazzo. 
This success encouraged Braccio to follow this up during the 
succeeding months by waging a war against the Malatesta.l8~/ This imminent 
peril induced Pandolfo to patch up his quarrel with the Visconti in 
order to stem Braccio's advance. According to Platina, in response to 
his appeals for help, Gianfrancesco appeared personally with a detachment 
183/ 
of men. -
Once again, there is no documentary eVidence to substantiate 
Platina's account, although the details of Gianfrancesco's involvement 
184/ 
are echoed by Equicola. - According to Amadei, Gianfrancesco's force at 
185/ the battle of Roccacontrada consisted of 800 cavalry and 2,000 infranty: -
however, such a figure has to be treated with a certain amount of scepticism. 
The battle was fiercely contested, but it is difficult to ascertain with 
any degree of impartiality the actual part which Gianfrancesco played in the 
fighting. Quite naturally Platina, who tells the story in some detail, 
highlights how bravely he fought despite the injuries he sustained, and how 
he was praised by Pandolfo himself afterwards, a considerable honour coming 
i 
186/ from such a seasoned warrior. -
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However, in this description of the battle which put a stop 
to Braccio's progress it is extremely difficult to separate fact from 
fiction. Indeed, it is very difficult to say with any certainty at all 
whether Gianfrancesco really took any part in the fighting at all and 
even Carlo d'Arco, that eminent historian of Mantua, was disturbed by 
the complete lack of any documentary evidence. 18Z1 
In the final analysis all that can be said is that there was a 
strong possibility that Gianfrancesco was present. If one takes into 
consideration the help he had given to John XXIII at Bologna and the 
subsequent interest he was to take in the affairs of the Malatesta family, 
together with the fact that his own wife's immediate family was seriously 
concerned, it is highly likely that a -degree of involvement would completely 
accord with his aim to rehabilitate himself with his traditional allies. 
It may well be that Platina's eulogies have to be played down somewhat, 
but even if there were some truth in them, it would only be natural 
to suppose that a man like Pandolfo would have some word of praise and 
encouragement for his valiant young kinsman, a man who had already displayed 
considerable military potential, even though perhaps the real part Gianfrancescc 
188/ 
may have played in the battle was not very great. - Anyhow, 1f G1anfrancescc 
did take part in the battle it was an excellent way of proving his gratitude 
to a man who had done so much to establish a strong basis for his rule in 
Mantua. 
Braccio da Montone had been able to pursue such a career of 
independent expansion because of the absence of any real papal control. 
However, the election of Oddo Colonna as Martin V on 11 November 1417 
was to signal a revival of prestige and a reconstruction of temporal 
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control in Italy. When the Council of Constance was dissolved the Pope 
started on what proved to be a triumphal journey to Italy. His presence 
in Mantua from October 1418 to the following February was not only a 
privilege for Gianfrancesco and Mantua, but it also revealed quite a 
lot about how Mantua was regarded at that time by others. 
Two questions spring to mind in the context of the papal visit. 
Why did Martin choose to go to Mantua at all and why did he stay there so 
long when he could have selected from any number of other larger centres 
from which to prepare for his final entry into Rome, 
Even after Martin had entered Italy the disorders in Rome and 
the Papal States was such that it was impossible for Martin to proceed there 
directly. The whole journey was fraught with problems which directly or 
indirectly had been caused by the schism, and the Pope had to make sure of 
his friends and allies. 
It had been decided, apparently, as early as 7 September that 
Martin should establish himself in Mantua for the time being. 182/ The 
reason for this decision was that Mantua was politically and geographically 
ideally placed for Martin's requirements. Not only was it a secure city as 
far as fortifications were concerned, but also its position midway between Milal 
and Venice prevented either of those larger powers from being jealous of the 
other. In the delicate situation that the Papacy found itself in, it was 
an obvious advantage to have the support, or at least not the active 
opposition, of the large territorial states. Furthermore, Mantua was 
sufficiently close to Martin's own territories to enable him to keep an eye 
on developments and to take remedial action wherever necessary. 
. . 
~0~ 
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Although the honour of playing host to the Papal Curia was 
considerable for Gianfrancesco, it also created considerable problems 
for him and it was just as well that nearly two months elapsed between 
the choice of Mantua and the Pope's eventual arrival at the end of 
October. At the end of September arrangements were begun to lodge not 
only the members of the Papal entourage, but also the large numbers of 
visitors who would be coming to the city. At the same time provision was 
also made to import the supplies which would be necessary to feed such 
190/ greater numbers. - It was impossible to tell at the time just how long 
the Pope would remain in the City.19!/ 
The fact that this was a somewhat onerous privilege for Mantua 
is borne out by the actual terms of the agreement between Martin and 
Gianfrancesco which was dated 7 October. Gianfrancesco was to give hospitality 
to the Curia and their servants as long as Martin wished to stay; the Pope 
was to have "plenum, et libentum ac tota1em dominium" and all Gianfrancesco's 
retainers had to swear an oath of allegiance to him.19~/ The Curia was to 
have complete immunity with swift punishment for those who violated it,192/ 
it was to have complete freedom of movement, even at night, as well as 
financial and fiscal immunity. Anyone hostile to Martin was to leave Mantua 
and Gianfrancesco was to ensure the safety of all roads and communications 
and observe any safe-conducts which Martin might concede. Finally, Martin's own 
men-at-arms were to reside within Mantua and were to be accorded complete freedom 
194/ 
of movement. -
. 195/ 
Martin made his solemn entry into Mantua on 24 October. -
The fact that he was the only legitimate pope at the time made his presence 
. 
more significant than that of Mantua's previous pontifical guest. He was to 
stay in Mantua for some three months and during this period he was to size 
. 196/ 
up the magnitude of the problems which faced him in h~s dominions. -
However, what tended to be more important as far as Mantua itself was 
concerned was that the city became very much the centre of attraction 
during this period when there were embassies to the Pope from allover 
Italy. Platina summed up the situation perfectly when he wrote: "Abiens 
Mantua Pontifex, subsequentibus omnibus ferme Italiae principibus, qui 
197/ Mantuam ad salutandum hominemde more convenerant". Never before 
had Mantua been the focal point of such widespread attention and Martin's 
young host had a marvellous opportunity to advertise both himself and his 
state, and the prospect of this no doubt helped to reassure Gianfrancesco 
118. 
that the considerable amount of expense he was put to was indeed worthwhile. 
Furthermore, not only was Mantua the setting for the General Chapter of the 
Franciscan Order during this period, but Martin also took the opportunity to 
198/ 
mediate the much sought peace between the Visconti and Pandolfo Malatesta, -
an action which perfectly complemented Gianfrancesco's own previous 
involvement on the side of his wife's family. 
When Martin left on 2 February 1419 his departure may well 
have been a relief for Gianfrancesco, but although he himself nad not 
gained anything concrete from this visit, it had achieved a great deal in 
projecting a very favouraBle image of Mantua to the rest of Italy as a 
haven of peace and stability. Indeed, it is arguable that the presence 
of Martin in Mantua for such a lengthy period is itself a testament to 
how successfully Gianfrancesco had managed to restore confidence after 
the Albertini crisis. 
119. 
Furthermore, the presence of the Pope must have been a tremendous 
source of satisfaction to Paola, a woman of considerable personal piety. 
Indeed, the religious life of Mantua benefitted immensely by her encouragement 
and patronage. Not only did the Franciscan Chapter set the tone for Mantua's 
future history as a favourable centre for religious gatherings, but Paola 
herself founded and refurbished churches and convents in Mantua during this 
time. Although this activity lies outside the scope of this study, examples 
of the intensity of religious activity can be seen by the invitation to 
199/ S.Bernardino of Siena to preach in Mantua during the Lent of 1420, -
her foundation of the Church of Corpus Domini and the Convent of S.Paola 
in which she and her daughter Cecilia spent their last years, and the enlarging 
of the Convent of S.SPirito. 20Q1 There were numerous other projects, but 
these examples serve as an indication of the way in which Paola by this time 
201/ had deeply involved herself with all aspects of Mantuan life. -
Paola was also behind the invitation extended to Vittorino da Feltre 
to come to Mantua in 1423. Although the formal offer came from Gianfrancesco, 
it is very probable that Paola, whose intellectual ability was Widely 
acknowledged, should have been the guiding light. Vittorino had already 
pursued a distinguished career in Venice and Padua and his willingness 
to come to Mantua, ostensibly to oversee the education of her children at 
the 'Casa Giocosa', is another testimony to the esteem in which Mantua 
was held. The methods he employed were widely admired and attracted many 
people from elsewhere who hoped to benefit from them.20~1 Indeed, by 
1420 it seemed that a number of artists and craftsmen had been attracted 
to Mantua, partly, no doubt, by the promise of work which Paola's patronage 
created, but also because Mantua was a peaceful and attractive place in 
which to settle. 2o~1 It was, in fact, part of a definite policy to 
attract people from all walks of life to Mantua. On 12 October 1420 
there was a grido which offered attractive terms for any artist or 
craftsman by which the city of Mantua was prepared to subsidise the 
rent of either a house or a shop to the extent of balf a ducat per month 
for a maximum period of five years.20~/ 
120. 
By 1420, then, Gianfrancesco had imposed his own style of 
leadership on Mantua, and he was lucky that for the most part these years 
of apprenticeship had been peaceful ones. He had overcome the most serious 
threat to his position from within Mantua and not only had Gonzaga rule 
been successfully rehabilitated within the state, but the all important 
friendship with Venice was re-established. From now on the threats were 
to come from outside. The years after the fall of the Albertini proved to be 
the calm before the storm. From 1420 onwards the clouds of war were to 
gather ominously over Lombardy and the peace and tranquility of Mantua 
was effectively to be shattered for the rest of Gianfrancesco's l1fe. 
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CHAPTER 2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
THE EARLY YEARS (1407-1420) 
Notes 
Aliprandi "Cronaca di Mantova", cit. p.168, 11 12588/9. 
In dividing his inheritance between his two sons Giangaleazzo was 
virtually admitting the difficulties of ruling an over-large state, but 
the division in his will was in itself a fruitful source of potential 
rivalry, not only between his two sons, but also by rival condottieri. 
Giovanni Maria was to have Milan, Brescia,Bergamo, Como, Cremona, Lodi, 
Piacenza, Parma, Reggio and Bobbio,Fi1ippo Maria was to have Pavia, 
NOvara, Vercel1i, A1essandria, Tortona, Verona, Vicenza, Feltre, Be11uno, 
Bassano, Riva di Trento and all lands beyond the Mincio. 
See Treccani, (Mi). pp. 75ff. The main source for this period is this 
volume. "Tutti i Visconti Signori di Milano avavano per il passato saputo 
difendere il loro diritto con Ie armi; era si trattava di due ragazzi i 
cui diritti erano esposti al beneplacite di amici o.emici" (p.76). 
Treccani, (Mi), p.72. 
..... 
others in this group comprised Giovanni Vignati of Lodi, Carlo CavalcabO, 
Cabrino Fondu10 and the Benzoni of Crema. 
Francesco Visconti, a descendant of Matteo, Otto Terzi and Theodore Paleologus 
were also associated with Cane here. 
In a letter from the Carrara of P~dua written to Robert of Bavaria, King of 
the Romans on the 23rd July 1403, there is a very grim ptcture of the 
looting and brutality which seemed to characterise daily life not only in 
Milan itself, but also in Crema, Brescia, Bergamo and Cremona. See 
Deutsche Reichstagsakten (Munich 1867), Vol. IV, p.105, no.loo. See also 
Treccani, op.cit., pp.85ff. 
8. See N. Valeri, L'Italia nell' Eta dei Principati, op.cit. p.334, for a 
summary of this. 
9. For a fuller study of Cane see N.Va1eri, Facino Cane (Turin 1940). 
10. In particular they were both associated with the negotiations leading to the 
peace of Caledio (see. Ch.l, note 65). Valeri has a very high opinion of 
Carlo. In the circumstances he notes that Carlo "dimostre quell'equilibrata 
discrezione che e i1 segrlo dei veri politici" L'Ita1ia nell' Eta, 
op.cit., p.335. 
11. For details see Treccani, op.cit., pp.123ff. 
12. See above p.33. 
13. For a full discussion of this see P.Partner, The Papal State Under Martin 
V. (British School at Rome 1958), pp.16-30. 
122. 
14. She had died on 28 February 1399. See Tarducci, op.cit.,p.311. 
15. He was responsible for restoring the fortifications of Ostiglia and 
supervising the final stages of the construction of the Castle of S.Giorgio. 
16. 1399 Curtatone - Chiesa delle Grazie. Also the building of a new Chapel 
in the Palazzo Vecchio on the sit~ of the old Chapel of Santa Croce. When 
Gianfrancesco was born in 1395 he ordered the repair of the old fa~ade 
of the Cathedral and built a chapel there in 1396 to house the body of 
S.Anselmo, patron of Mantua. There were also other projects: see Arch. 
Gon. B. 3350, and also D. Matteucci, Le Chiese Artistiche del Mantovano 
(Mantua 1902); S.A.Maffei, Gli Annali di Mantova, op.cit.,pp.279ff. 
17. For the reforms themselves see Arch. Gon. B. 2003. For a commentary see 
G.Zucchetti, Gli Statuti di Mantova (Mantua 1857). 
18. See A. Michielotto, "Istituti di Diritte Commerciale nella Legislazione 
Mantovano", Riv. del Diritto Commerciale e del Diritto Generale dello 
Obbligazioni, vol. XXIX nos. 7-8 (Mantua,1931). 
19. See Coniglio, in Storia di Mantova, op.cit.,vol.l, pp.429-432. 
20. Francesco was very concerned about the question of the succession; something 
which Wenceslaus was very sympathetic about. Francesco wanted the title 
to pass, in the absence of any direct male heir, to the children of Guido 
and Giovanni. See Arch. Gon. B. 2, fasc.26 for the documents relating to 
this matter. 
21. See Waller, op.cit.,pp.233ff. 
22. Tarducci, op.cit.,p.3l4. See also C.d'Arco, Dei Dominam.ri Gonzaga e 
del LOJ(): Governo, (Mantua Guastalla 18711, vol. IV , p. 212. 
23. This was to be the last of its kind. For this particular occasion see 
Tonelli, Ricerche Steriche di Mantova, cit.,p.284. 
24. Writers differ in their estimates of Gianfrancesco's age. Platina 
(op.cit.p.293) says "qui vix duedecim annui attigerat". Possevino 
(p.487) says "Johannes Franciscus nondum duedecim annum supergressus". 
Equicola (Bk.3 p.136), Donesmondi (pt.l.p.349) and Agnelli (p.748) all 
agree on eleven years. Simeoni (Bk. 5, p.l06) alone has suggested 14. 
For a discussion of this point see F. Amadei, Cronaca Universale (Mantua, 1955) 
Vol.l. ch.II, p.7l9. See also Tarducci, op.cit.,p.316. 
25. Amadei gives the year 1408 for this, although Arch.Gon.Libr. Decr.p.209 
fixes it in 1413. This was a tremendous loss. See S.Davari, "I Palazzi 
dell'Antico Comune di Mantova e gli Incendi da essi Subiti-, R.A.V.M. 
1887/8, p.37. 
26. Tarducci gives some account of glaring inaccuracies on pp.328-333. ' 
27. See Tarducci, op.cit.p.3l4. 
28. Tarducci, op.cit.,p.3l5. Arch.Gon.D.IV.II. 
29. E.g. Equicola Bk.III,p.137. Se~ also L.Volta, Compendio Cronoloqico-critico 
dellaStoria di Mantova (Mantua, 1807-1827) Bk.7, p.9l. and Tone'.li, Ricerche 
Storiche di Mn. cit, p.254. 
30. Amadei, op.cit.,p.7l8, says "codesto raqionamento fu opera et attenzione 
123. 
politica de Venezia e del Zio Carlo Malatesta ••••• i quali sollecitarono 
una tale acclamazione." Although such an argument is possible, it is 
difficult to prove conclusively. We must not underestimate the personal 
initiative shown by Donato de'Preti in this matter. 
31. All the sources agree on this date. The public act recognising Gianfrancesco 
appears in Arch.Gon. Lib. della Massaria. See Tonelli, op.cit., p.254, 
Volta, op.cit.,p.9l. Also the Gridario for this period, in which a 
special volume was started for Gianfrancesco says of the 20th of March. 
" ••••• qua die prelibatis magn.dominus habuit dominium et capitaneatum 
Mantue" • 
32. Francesco Gonzaga's wife Margherita was Carlo's sister and Elizabetta 
Malatesta was Francesco's sister. 
33. Poggio Bracciolini, "Hist.Lib. V", R.I.S.vol. XX,p.331. 
34. He obtained aid (men and money) for Mantua from Padua, Bologna, Florence 
and Ferrara. His own personal success againstthe besieging Milanese 
troops is also noteworthy. Platina (op.cit.p.772), relates how he took 
some 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry prisoners. See Tarducci,op.cit.,p.312. 
35. Raulich, Caduta dei Carraresi, op.cit.,p.96. 
36. For documents relating to the tutelage of Gianfrancesco see Arch.Gon.B.335. 
37. Sanuto, col.837; Tarducci,p.317. 
38. E.G. see Possevino "Gonzagae", (Mantova, Osanna 1628), p.485. See also 
Amadei,op.cit.p.720. 
39. His tutor was Masio di Malici da Borgo San Sepolcro. There is a reference to 
rewards which he received in Arch.Gon.Lib. Privileg.Com.Mant.no.2 fol.1225. 
See also in the Libro delle Fattorie B.33 (published by Tarducci in 
appendix no.5.). It referred to a grant of land ....... posessionem nostram 
situatam in nostro Castellori Territorio." See also Volta, op.cit.,p.91. 
40. Arch.Gon.B.218S. (10 Sept.1408); pubLTarducci,op.cit.,appendix no.3. 
Although written in Gianfrancesco's name, Carlo Malatesta is its author. 
It is clear from this letter that he is encouraging Gianfrancesco to stand 
up for his rights. 
41. There is, for instance, the celebrated incident of the casting of the 
statue of Virgil into the Mincio. Apparently each year on the 15th 
of October there was a festival to celebrate the birthday of Virgil. 
This took place in what is now the Piazza Erbe, where there had been a 
statue of the poet since l2S0. So the story goes, Carlo Malatesta 
did not approve of such pagan festivities and when the statue disappeared 
he was accused of tampering with it. According to Amadei (op.cit.,val.l. 
pp. 723-724), this made Carlo very unpopular. Equicola (p.60), goes 
into great detail over this episode. See also Vergerio, in R.I.S.,vol.XVI, 
col.21S. and Volta, op.cit.,p.93. See also Maffei, Annali di Mantova, p.749. 
There is nothing to prove (or 'disprove) the authenticity of this story. 
There is today a statue in honour of Virgil in the Piazza Broletto. 
42. Arch.Gon.B.2038 (Gridario) fasc. 3 (1407-1437), for 24 March 1407. 
43. Arch.Gon.B.2038, 26 March 1407. 
124. 
44. Arch.Gon.Libr.Decr.v01.1, fol 23. 
45. Arch.Gon.B.43 (treaties) fol.59, The League, dated 22 February 1407, 
is described as being of 'perpetuo durationem' 
46. After the death of Niccolo's first wife (Gigliola di Francesco da Carrara) 
he married Parisina di Malatesta in 1418. She was beheaded for adultery 
in 1425. His son Leone110 married Margherita Gonzaga. Gianfrancesco's 
daughter. In 1438 Leone110 was a firm supporter of Gianfrancesco even 
though his father was placed in a very ambiguous diplomatic position, 
having been virtually forced into a firm alliance with Venice. 
47. Arch.Gon. B. 43, fol.61. 
48. Arch.Gon.B.43, fo1.62 " 
potestatis Mantu~" 
cum consensu et auctoritate •••• domini 
49. Gianfrancesco's procurators were Giovanni de Mi1is and Bartolomeo de Crema. 
(Arch:Gon. B.43, fol.62). However, there was a proviso for an increase 
in the number of lances if "utrique dictarum partium vtderent necessarius". 
The small numbers were after all only intended for purely defensive purposes. 
50. The discussions on this point are in S.S. reg.3, fol. 70 (26 July 1407) .• 
51. For details see Delay to, "Anna1ese Estenses", R.I.S.vo1.XVIII, co1.l054. 
52. At this time Carlo was gradually stepping into the shoes of Jacopo da1 Verme 
(who later joined the Venetian forces in the campaigns against the Turks). 
In fact, the whole affair of Ottobuono Terzi is more valuable for what it 
indicates of the state of affairs of diplomatic relations between 
Venice and Mantua. 
53. See Tarducci, op.cit.,p.319. The letter, the original of which is in 
Arch.Gon. B.2l85, is printed in the appendix to the article. 
54. "Annales Estenses", coL 1065. The assassins were never really discovered 
There seems to have been very little attempt made to find out who was 
responsible. 
55. Platina, op.cit.,p.796. There appears to have been some debate among the 
chroniclers about the correct date of this acquisition. Nerli, "Cronaca", 
R.I.S. vol. XXIV col.1082, gives the year 1408. Amadei (op.cit.,p.727). 
also mentions 1408 but even if, as Tarducci suggests (p.320), the 
inhabitants of Bozzolo were prepared to go over to Gianfrancesco when they 
heard of the league, the official transfer can only have occurred after 
Terzi's death. There is nothing in the Arch.Gon. for this aoquisition, 
though it is referred to in later documents. 
56. No doubt the influence of Margherita Malatesta was great here. See 
Possevino, op.cit.,p.497. 
57. There were two branches of the Malatesta family at Pesaro and Rimini. 
The prinCipal branch was Rimini to whom Carlo belonged. His two younger 
brothers Pandolfo (Fano and Brescia) and Malatesta (Cesena) were also 
celebrated condottieri. Paola Agnese belonged to the Pesaro branch of 
the family and her mother was Elisabetta Varano of Camerino. See Arch. 
Gon. B.197, fol.126. 
125. 
58. Aliprandi, op.cit.,p.169, 11.12657-9, says "Gran zente avian a lor diffesse,/ 
per capitanio da Peser Malatesta/ sazo e ardito, piacente e cortese." 
59. Arch.Gon.B.197, fols.126-l29, " •••• major quarto decem annorum, minor 
viginti quinque." See also Tarducci,op.cit.,p.322. 
60. See Tarducci.op.cit. ,p.324. and "Diario Ferrarese", R.I.S. vo1.XXIV 
coL 174. 
61. Arch.Gon.B.2185 (Minute della Cancelleria Mantovana) in a copy of Paola's 
letter to her agent Scevo in Pesaro: " ••• Nui Fossemo sposata adl 
XXII de ag(jsto 1409 ••• " 
62. Arch.Gon.B.197 (Affari della Famiglia Gonzaga), fols.126-129. " ••• reco1ende 
memorie Mag.c!. et.Ex.si Dni.Dno.Fr.de Gon." is a reference to the marriage 
having been arranged by him. 
63. Amadei, Cronaca Universale, cit,vo1.1.pp.720-721. 
64. See Tarducci,op.cit.,appendix no.9. Also Arch.Gon.B.197, fol.131,dated 
23 April 1410: " ••• Solutio facta per procuratorem D.Malatesta dei 
Malatesta de ducati 5,000 aur1." 
65. Arch.Gon.B.197, fols.134-140. (See especially fo1.138.) 
66. See Tarducci,op.cit.,pp.322-3. for this point. 
67. There is a small collection of Malatesta's verse in Ateneo Veneto,ser.18. 
vol.l. (Venezia 1894). See in particular the verses entitled "Domine 
exaudi orationem." 
68. For the text see A.S.I. IV,1843,99 p.444. 
69. E.g. Maffei, Annali di Mantova,ci~,p.749. II saggia pudica, litterata, 
religiosissima." This is echoed by Aliprandi, op.cit.,p.170,11.12762-4. 
" "Honesta, gratiosa e cortese,/ da lei zaschun bone risposta avia,/ 1i sue 
virtu a ugnun eran palese." 
70. Arch.Gon.D.XII.6. 
71. Arch.Gon.Libr.Decr.vol.l, fo1.105t. for 6 January 1410: " ••••• propter 
solemnes festivitates nupciarum ce1ebrandum ••• non reddatur ins ••• 
in aliquibus questionibus civilibus criminalibus ••• " 
72. Platina, op.cit.,p.294. "Ad has nuptas, quae regio sumptu ac magno 
apparatu sunt instructae, convenere undique ex F1aminia principes, et 
Civitatum Hetruriae, quae rerum potiebantur, 1egati missi. Affuit et 
Nicolaus Ferrariensis Marchio; affuere Legati Veneti, que comiter et 
benigne hospitio suscepti, ce1ebratis muneribus donati, donos quique 
suas abeuntes, libera1itate clementia, Joannem Franciscum in caelum laudibus 
ferebant, affirmantes, magnae spei adolescentem dignari se ac familia sua 
uxorem duxisse." Equico1a (p.138), indicates that there were representatives 
from all the most powerful states in Italy. See also Aliprandi (op.cit.,p.l70, 
11.12777/8) • "Cum secho (1. e. Malatesta Malatesta) menon s1 bella briqata/ 
de notabeli de gran zentileza/ ugni gran donna ne seria honorata." 
Llb. 
73. See Tarducci, op.cit., appendix no.8. 
74. A.S.V. Sen. Misti vol.48, fol.42. 
75. Aliprandi, op.cit.,p.170, 11 1~795. 
76. There are a number of accounts of this. See Equicola, p.138, Possevino, p.497, 
and Volta, p.94. 
77. E.G. Equicola (p.136) refers to "que11a opu1enza, ~uelle ricchezze da suoi 
maggiori con tanto pericolo acqistate." 
78. For a discussion of this see Chapter 3. 
79. Tarducci,op.cit.,appendix no.8. 
80. See Tarducci,op.cit.,pp.334ff. for the background to this. The original 
family was wealthy and powerful. They were invested with the territories 
of Prato by Lewis of Bavaria on 14 August 1329 in reward for faithful 
services. They were subsequently rewarded by Charles IV and received Prato 
itself from Wenceslaus in 1366. 
81. Arch. Gon. Lib. Decr.vol.l.,fol.121. Carlo Albertini's father Francesco 
is mentioned as having been in the service of Luigi II. 
82. Arch.Gon.Lib. Statuto vol.XIII, fol.217. 
83. Ibid. " ••• idem Mag.us miles dnus Carolus parem nobiscum habeat potestatem 
per totum assentie nostre tempus." 
84. Ibid ....... nostra civitate Mantue onmibusque terris nostro dominio suppositis. ,. 
85. Arch.Gon. Lib. Decr. vol. II, fo1.117: "gn.ali capitan.nro." 
86. Arch.Gon. Lib.Decr.vol.l, fols 128t - l30t. 
87. Arch. Gon.Lib. Deer. vol. 1, fol.128r. He was able to dispose of the property 
as he wished and it could not be interfered with "ullo unque tempore non 
imponere nee in a1ique vio1are." 
88. Arch.Gon.Lib.Decr.vol.II, fo1s.191-191 dated 21 Nov.1412. This is the 
only recorded bequest to Ludovico. 
89. Arch. Gon.Lib.Decr. vo1.I, fo1s 135v-136r concerning: "donationem 1iberam 
et posessione territorio et terris pe11alochi cum pertinentis iuribus et 
iuristictionibus suts omnibus, ac perinde ymunitates, prorogativas 
exemptiones et 1ibertates suis co10nis, et 1aboratoribus concessisse •••• n 
90. Arch.Gon. Lib. Decr. vol I, fo1.131. 
91. Arch.Gon.Lib.Decr. vol. I, fo1.131: ..... attentis quoque servitiis p.q .• 
Magnificum mi1item dnum, genitorum suum reco11ende memorie q.maqnifico 
dno.Ludovico avo nro ...... Reference is also made to the services which 
Carlo himself rendered to Francesco Gonzaga. 
92. Arch.Gon.Lib.Decr.vo1.I, fo1.136r. In 1412 Stefano was made Podesta of 
Mantua. 
93. Very soon the treasurer of Mantua Benvenuto de'Pegorini was associated 
with the Albertini. See Arch.Gon.Lib.Decr.vo1.II, fo1.30, for 30 June 
1411. He was arrested along with the Albertini in 1414. 
127. 
94. Tarducci (p.338) argues that 1411/1412 sees the real beginning of Albertini 
ambitions. It would be more reasonable to assume, in the light of the 
documentary evidence cited above, that the ambitions were there as early 
as 1410. Once there was a territorial basis for power, they were able to 
begin to impose their own policies upon Mantua. 
95. Arch.Gon.Lib. Deer.vol.II, fols.207-208. 
96. Areh.Gon.Lib. Deer.vo1.II, fo1s. 220-221; II damus et coneedimus prefati 
eomiti Stefano potestatem bailium et generalem ac speeialem ac liberam 
faeu1tatem omnis et singulis ape11aeionum declamacionum et supplicacionum 
causas quas ad nos tam de iure civitati quam ex forma statutorum nre. 
civitatis Mantuanus ••••• " 
97. See Tarducci, op.cit.,p.338,note 3. 
98. Arch. Gon.Lib. Decr. vo1.II, fo1s.70-7l. Pandolfo's bequest is described 
as a "1iberam donationem ••••• eum mero et misto imperio ac gladii 
potestatem. II It is also a "donationem irrevocabi1em." 
99. Arch.Gon.Lib. Decr.vol.II, fol. 71. "Abso1vero nos a provsione prefatum 
q. magnificumdominum genitorem nostram facta super demolitionem 
forti1ici predicti cum promissionem eidem dno. Carlo p.nos facta q. si 
p.dicta ipse dns. Carlum et heredes suos de reliqua parte d.cti fortilicii 
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100. Ibid. " •••• et ipm. fortilicium et territorium •••• tota1iter spe.-"avimus 
a civitatem et iuristictionem ••••• nr. Mant." 
101. Arch. Gon. Lib.Statut. Bk.XIII, no.27. There were two further renewals 
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Gianfrancesco in Rimini. See Arch.Gon.Lib.Decr.vo1.II, fols 121 and 151. 
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102. Arch. Gon. Lib. Decr.vol.II, fols. 276-277. 
103. S.S.reg.4, fol.122, 29 May 1410: " •••• nam ad hoc continue vigillavimus et 
vigillamus sincera mente ••• " 
104. Sanuto, op.cit., col.861. 
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intollerante di freno, smanioso di liberta." 
106. See Tarducci, op.cit.,pp.34l-342 & ff. 
107. The title conferred by Wence1aus upon Francesco in 1403 was invalidated 
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CHAPTER 3 
GIANFRANCESCO GONZAGA AND THE FIRST PHASE OF THE LOMBARD 
WARS (1420-1432) 
I 
Introduction 
"Siamo ora ad un gran fuoco, fuoco acceso nel presente anno 
in Lombardia contro di Filippo Maria duca di Milano dai 
Veneziani e Fiorentini collegati ai di lui danno." 
134. 
This is how Muratori introduced the year 1426 in his "Annali.d'Italia". 
The words "gran fuoco" seem to be particularly appropriate in describing 
this first really major conflict between two large territorial states 
in Northern Italy, a conflict which was to dominate the rest of GianfrancescO'S 
life and in which the security and very existence of his state were to be 
bound up. It is all too easy to view the Lombard Wars as a struggle which 
exclusively concerned Milan and Venice, and, to a lesser extent, Savoy and 
Florence 1 and all too easy to play down the role which the smaller states 
such as Mantua and Ferrara played. This omission is particularly serious 
as far as Mantua is concerned, because in a very real sense it was to be 
the focal point of the conflict, at least until the second half of. the 
1430's, and Venetian and Milanese policies were geared very much to the 
particular conditions which operated in Mantua and the Mantovano. Indeed, 
if we view the Lombard Wars in these years from the perspective of Mantua 
it is possible to clarify still further the all-important relationship 
with Venice which was to be the controlling factor until 1438. In 
addition to this it will also serve to offer an interpretation of the 
relationship between the Venetian Senate and carmagnola, a relationship 
which was to have considerable repercussions on Gianfrancesco's own 
military career, and which illustrates very clearly the motiVeS behind 
what the Venetians considered an increasingly crucial relationship between 
---------------------------~ 
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state and military commander. This became of even greater immediate 
relevance when Venetian policy gradually changed from defence to expansion. 
Although Gianfrancesco did not assume overall command of the 
Venetian army until 1432 when Carmagnola was suddenly arrested and executed 
in circumstances which, as we shall see, were profound~ disturbing to 
Gianfrancesco; scholars have tended to underestimate both the esteem in 
which he was held in Venice and the importance of the role in his opening 
phase of the Lombard Wars. This chapter aims, in part, to redress this 
imbalance by examining closely the issues which affected Mantua in the 
period of diplomatic tension which immediately preceded the war, the 
motives which conditioned Gianfrancesco's relations with the Venetian Senate 
and viae ver8a~ and finally to analyse the precise role which Mantua 
and Gianfrancesco were to play in the overall tactics and strategy of this 
period of the war. 
II 
Mantua and the Build-up of Tension in Lombardy 
At the outset it would be useful to reiterate some of the most 
important achievements which resulted from the early years which were 
considered in the previous chapter. They were basically four-fold. The 
first and most obvious result was that Gianfrancesco's authority within 
Mantua itself had a secure basis after the threat of the Albertini 
ascendancy had been overcome. Secondly, his albeit limited military 
experience, first in Bologna fighting for Pope John XXIII and subsequently 
in the Romagna in the wars against Braccio da Montone, had established 
him in the eyes of both Venice and Milan as a soldier of considerable 
merit and potential. Thirdly, the visits of the two Popes John XXIII and 
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Martin V, his patronage of Vittorino da Feltre and his interest in the 
Church had put Mantua on the map as a cultural and diplomatic centre. 
Lastly, perhaps the most important factor had been the very strong relationship 
which had been built up with Venice in the period after the Albertini 
crisis. It was a relationship which, as we have seen, could provide the 
vital protection which a state like Mantua needed and which had a strong 
historical tradition behind it. The Albertini crisis could easily have 
damaged this relationship, but the redeeming factor as far as the circumspect 
Venetian Senate was concerned was the fact that it had occurred at a time 
when Gianfrancesco was not fully in control. On the contrary, the eagerness 
of Gianfrancesco to restore good relations with Venice after the Albertini 
were arrested made the Senate anxious to strengthen its ties with Mantua 
still further if only to prevent a similar situation from occurring again 
in the future. 
Even if there tended to be a strong 'paternalistic' streak in 
this relationship, it also served a very important political purpose. 
The truth of the matter was that even as early as 1421 Venice was coming 
increasingly to see the importance of maintaining satellite states for 
protective purposes. The occupation of Verona and the need to protect 
Friuli now made the Venetians very much more concerned about the Adige 
frontier. It was not until 1425 that we see the first manifestation of 
this vis-a-vis Mantua, but even before the expansion of Milanese power 
under Filippo Maria Visconti was to threaten Venice directly, the Senate 
was clearly anxious to monitor any developments very carefully indeed, and 
Mantua could be very useful as a 'listening post'. For instance, on 
19 April 1422 there is a somewhat enigmatic letter from Niccolo Loredan 
in Verona to Gianfrancesco. Although the exact context of the letter is 
not absolutely clear, it would appear that Niccolo was very anxious for 
Gianfrancesco to relay any important news of developments in Lombardy to him. 2 
-
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Much has been made of the cautious reaction of the Venetian Senate 
and Doge Tomaso Mocenigo to the second wave of Milanese expansion during 
the period 1412-1424, and especially of the repeated requests by Florence 
to Venice to join a league to combat this growing menace. In addition to 
this much has already been written about the change from an isolationist to 
a more active policy on the terraferma. ~/ As far as territorial possessions 
were concerned, this was not an abrupt development. After all, there had 
been attempts to intervene on the mainland as early as 1308 at Ferrara and, 
after the death of Giangaleazzo Visconti, there had been an extension into 
eastern Lombardy. It could be argued that one of the most important 
lessons of the War of Chioggia had been the need for a more secure 
terraferma. 
The crucial change occurred in the way in which such possessions 
were regarded; in other words, the change from a basically retPOterra 
mentality to a more positive, initially defensive but ultimately possessive 
terraferma mentality. The war against Filippo Maria set the seal upon 
this attitude but, despite the traditional attitudes of Mocenigo and 
the Venetian elder statesmen who tried to cling to the isolationist policy 
based on overseas trade, it was only a matter of time before pressure both 
of political events and of internal necessities were to force Venice to 
look alarmingly westwards. ~/ It was a gradual development away from old 
economic attitudes towards an appreciation of stark political realities. 
The change is much more gradual than one might suspect; after all, 
it is arguable that Mocenigo himself had been one of the creators of the 
terraferma state. The caution which the Venetians displayed towards Florentine 
approaches may well have been in large part because of the economic 
advantages of a Milanese alliance at a time when the Turkish threat in 
the east was beginning to cause some concern. It was in the period afte~ 
1421 that we see a more definitive change of attitude as far as Mantua is 
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concerned and this is borne out by Loredan's letter cited above. 
However, even though a concern not to jeopardise acquisitions 
on the mainland made Venice very reluctant about any declaration which 
was overtly against Filippo Maria, this certainly did not mean that the 
Senate was in any way careless of what was going on. It was in effect 
extremely vigilant and, moreover, there were contingency plans in hand 
which could be put into operation should the military situation deteriorate. 
Even though the most evident change of direction came after 1422 it is 
possible to argue that even as early as 1420 it was fully appreciated 
that Mantua's strategic position was going to be critical. It is certain 
that the Venetian treaty with Gianfrancesco which was eventually concluded 
on 14 March 1421 formed part of this plan. ~/ It is interesting and 
significant to note that apart from Andrea Mocenigo, Francesco Foscari 
played a very important part in the negotiations which led up to this 
treaty. On the Mantuan side discussions were conducted by that staunch 
Gonzaga advocate Donato de Preti whose legal reputation and experience 
was very valuable to Gianfrancesco in these years. Ever since 1407 
when he had been largely responsible for securing the acceptance of the 
regency plans had had figured prominently in the government of Mantua. 
In the circumstances it was not surprising that during these years he 
was mainly used in a diplomatic capacity. During the build-up to the 
outbreak of hostilities he occupied the very important post of resident 
ambassador in Venice, a position which he filled with distinction because 
not only was he eminently acceptable personally to the Venetians but also 
because he had worked closely with Foscari himself. 
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The negotiations over the details of the agreement had been 
in progress for some four months, since the preceeding December, and 
the final document gives us an excellent indication of the precise role 
which Mantua was to play in the overall plan of defence. It was basically 
an agreement of mutual defence and reiterated the long tradition of 
friendship between the two states. §/ In return for Gianfrancesco's 
loyalty and support Venice undertook once more, as in the past, to take 
Gianfrancesco and his state sub umbra sua and to protect Mantuan territories 
in every way. In addition to such general promises, however, the treaty 
imposed a definite plan of military reinforcement. The Venetians and 
their allies were to be allowed free access to the Mantovano together 
with supplies and armaments. z/ 
The surviving personal letters of Gianfrancesco leave the distinct 
impression of a nervous and apprehensive character where the interests 
of his state were concerned, and, as we shall see, this was especially 
the case when the Mantovano was likely to be in the forefront of any 
campaign against such a powerful state as Milan. This made the Venetians 
very much aware of the need to tread carefully at this initial stage, 
to proceed by slow but definite stages in obtaining the closest possible 
commitment from Mantua; and this is one of the most consistent themes 
during the period covered by this chapter. What the Venetians were trying 
to do in this treaty was to balance their need for security against the 
dangers which might accrue from over-alarming Gianfrancesco at this point. 
This is borne out by the remaining provisions of the treaty. In particular, 
it was made clear that Gianfrancesco's own personal commitment was to be 
restricted only to the defence of his own territories. ~/ However, it 
was stipulated that in the event of war a sum of two thousand ducats was 
to be set aside every month for military purposes to be used in whichever 
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way Gianfrancesco considered appropriate "Per conservatione status". ~/ 
10/ Any expenditure in excess of this was to be met by Venice. - Finally 
a penalty for non-observance of ten thousand ducats was fixed "que 
pena tociens commitatur". 
There is one overriding conclusion which can be drawn from 
an examination of this alliance. It was of considerable importance at 
this time to identify Mantua's interests with those of Venice, and 
as long as Gianfrancesco could be convinced that this identity existed 
this would go a long way to contributing towards the unostenatious security 
which the Venetians aimed at in the early 1420's. It would, therefore, 
be quite erroneous to conclude that the Venetians were indifferent to 
Lo~b~d affairs during this period. Even the most committed isolationist 
could not view the extraordinary progress made by Filippo Maria Visconti 
at this time with anything other than growing concern. 
In the years immediately preceeding 1402 the most phenomenal 
development had been the-extension of the Milanese state under Giangaleazzo 
Visconti. Imperialistic policies on such a large scale had been 
previously unknown and such a development was a testament as much to 
the dynamism of the Milanese as to the very considerable ability of 
Giangaleazzo himself. It seemed now that Filippo Maria was aiming to 
repeat this success. This enigmatic and complex man who could be so 
unpredictable, l!/was able to recover the momentum which had been lost 
under his elder brother and he almost immediately devoted himself to the 
reconstruction of the Milanese state after he assumed power on 
16 June 1412. l~/ 
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The remarkable success in these years was due in large part to the 
military superiority of the Milanese army and to the lack of a concerted 
effort by those cities facing absorption. The expertise of Carmagnola 
and his skilful military virtuosity was also a dominant factor. It could 
well be argued that his work for Filippo Maria represented the years of 
his most consistent success. l~/ As far as Venice and Florence were 
concerned the earlier part of this process did not unduly arouse suspicion. 
It seemed merely as if Filippo Maria was consolidating his au thority in the 
area immediately around Milan itself. Up to 1417 Filippo Maria concerned 
14/ himself with the absorption of places such as Lodi, Como and Trezzo; -
but by this year the Milanese state had already grown quite considerably, 12/ 
and any further development was liable to have greater repercussions. Any 
further lateral expansion would bring him to the attention of either Savoy 
in the west when Vercelli was threatened, or of Venice and Pandolfo Malatesta 
in the east where Filippo Maria already had designs on Brescia and Bergamo. l §/ 
In fact, the occupation of Lodi, Como and Trezzo had already provoked 
17/ 
a rather half-hearted response from Venice, - but at this stage there 
was really nothing to deflect Filippo Maria from his purpose. On 17 May 
1417 Vercelli was taken and in the same month Carmagnola was launching 
his forces against the Arcelli of Piacenza and thence across the Po into 
the Cremonese. Although carmagnola was not successful at such places 
as Castellone and Pizzighettone, prinCipally because this was subsidiary 
to the main effort at Piacenza,. it can be seen that Filippo Maria was 
not only coming into conflict with Pandolfo Malatesta and his allies, 
Paola's family, but he was getting more and more uncomfortably close 
to the areas bordering on the Mantovano. What is more,. Sigismund's 
diploma of February 1418 confirming Filippo Maria in the possessions 
which he had already acquired and of those remaining territories in the 
Milanese Patrimony which he was yet to acquire, only seemed to give his 
actions an even greater appearance of legality and consequently fired 
his ambitions still further. l~/ 
The years 1419 and 1420 were ones of startling success for 
Milanese fortunes. Despite Martin V's attempts to calm the situation 
during his stay at Mantua the negotiations, which were entrusted to the 
ducal secretary Giovanni Corvino d'Arezzo, seemed in reality only an 
attempt to gain time. 12/ This was definitely proved by Filippo Maria's 
brazen campaigns and conquest of Bergamo and Cremona barely before the 
ink on Martin V's adjudication was dry. 2~/ 
It is clear that Filippo Maria appreciated the dangers inherent 
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in these policies and this was the reasoning behind the treaties with 
Florence on 8 February 1420 and the negotiations with Venice in the following 
June. Filippo Maria was very anxious to underline the basic legitimacy 
of his actions and declared that his sole aim was to keep Milanese 
territories "intra fines Lombardiae, Marchiae Trevisanae, Marchionatus 
Montisferrati, Provinciae Pedemontanae." The occupation of Parma on 
13 November 1420 and Bresc~on 16 March 1421 technically should have brought 
the Milanese state to the limits fixed by the agreements with Florence and 
Venice. However, despite this agreement, the miserable fate of Pandolfo 
Malatesta, even though an indemnity of 34,000 golden florins had been 
paid to him, did affect the official peace between Milan and Venice. 2!/ 
For instance, when Filippo Maria's troops were engaged against Brescia he 
tried to get Venice to impede some troops which Carlo Malatesta had raised 
for his brother in the Romagna from passing through the Veronese. This 
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was a very difficult situation for Venice because, despite the friendship 
with Milan, a friendship which by now was fraught with suspicion, they 
could not seem to be actively working against a family which had served 
them well in the past and who, moreover, were directly related to Paola, 
a woman whose strong family loyalties were apparent on a number of 
occasions. It proved to be more politic to allow these troops, about 
a thousand strong, to pass through·unimpeded. In future it was to become 
increasingly difficult to keep on harmonious terms with everybody at 
once. 
If we correllate the timing of the Venice/Mantua treaty with the 
movements of Filippo Maria the motivation behind it becomes even clearer. 
By the end of 1420 and the beginning of 1421 it was plain to see that 
Filippo Maria's influence was fast approaching the danger zone on the 
borders of the Mantovano. This reinforced the two-sided advantages 
of the relationship between Venice and Mantua. As well as securing the 
services of a promising soldier it was to give them a state which could 
cushion the Veneto against any further development while at the same time 
giving them the possibility of turning Mantua into a strong frontier 
state by giving them an opportunity to move men in as they saw fit. 
But, on the other hand, it is worth nothing that the treaty itself 
did not mention Milan as a possible enemy; in no way did it constitute 
a specifically anti-Viscontean alliance, but it was a good antiCipation 
of what was to follow. In 1421, at least, Venice was trying to keep as 
much control over the situation as was possible while appearing to keep 
all its options open. In doing so, Mantua was the obvious centre of 
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their attention. Had Filippo Maria stopped at this point there was still 
a possibility of a 'modus vivendi', albeit a delicate one, between the major 
states. 
Unfortunately, Filippo Maria had no intention of keeping his 
state within the boundaries set by the agreement with Florence and Venice. 
The recovery of Asti in August l4222~/and the conquest of Genoa in the previous 
March2~/ hinted at much wider reaching plans which, if projected eastwards, 
would soon turn an uncomfortable neighbour into a vassal state. The relative 
ease of Carmagnola's successes fed Filippo Maria's ambitions still further. 
Because Venice had little or no military experience on the mainland, it may 
well be that Filippo Maria underestimated any resistance which Venice could 
put up. It was also true that Florence's military record had not been 
particularly impressive. Nevertheless, Filippo Maria still felt the need 
to be cautious and Uhis is why in-1422 his policy of expansion temporarily 
changed direction. A treaty of February 1422 was intended to keep Venice 
happy while he turned his attention to the Romagna. 2~/ 
It was this phase of expansion which aroused the fears of Florence 
more than ever. During this year Visconti influence had reached Bologna and 
- 25/ 
especially Forll after the death of Giorgio degli Ordelaffi. - Once 
again, Florence felt that its liberty was seriously threatened and it was this 
fear which prompted the Signoria to make its appeals to Venice, the only power 
26 / 
strong enough to provide any sort of sanction. - Milanese activities in the 
Romagna were also an affront to Papal power, but, although Martin V was active 
in promting a Florence/Venice rapprochement, it suited him for the time 
27/ being to remain neutral. -
Up to this point Filippo Maria's activities had one common factor: 
they were almost totally aimed at the elimination of smaller signorie, and 
this was to have important repercussions for Gianfrancesco. While it 
was true that in 1422 Filippo Maria was not directly threatening 
Mantua, Milanese power in the Cremonese, Bresciano and the Bergamasco 
put a great deal of pressure on him. There was after all a concentration 
of Milanese power along almost the whole of his western border. Cognasso 
probably had the measure of Filippo Maria's intentions when he wrote: 
"Occorreva mettere i principi e le communit~ di fronte al fatto 
compiuto •••••••••• I vari Signori limitrofi, i Gonzaga, gli Este, i 
Palaeologi, i tiranelli di Romagna sarebbero stati guadagnati con lusinghe, 
con promesse, con minaccie." Gianfrancesco did not need to be 
a profound student of history to evaluate the significance of what was 
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going on; the dangers were by now too obvious to be ignored. It was impossible 
to predict where Filippo Maria would strike next, and his recent actions 
had patently proved that he did not regard his treaty obligations 
as binding. There was, after all, a limit to his expansion southwards and 
the only other feasible direction was eastwards across the Lombard plain. 
Cremona and Brescia were two centres which could be crucial staging points 
for a subsequent thrust into the Veneto, and the Mantovano was the only 
obstacle to this progress. Unaided, Gianfrancesco was certainly in no 
position to resist the Milanese advance. In particular the area to the 
immediate east of Brescia, around Lonato and Peschiera on the southern 
shores of Lake Garda was probably the most delicate and vulnerable point 
of Mantua's defences. 22/ There was every reason to believe that 
Gianfrancesco could suffer the same fate as Pandolfo Malatesta. It 
was when these prognostications became a reality that this very situation 
dictated the overall strategy of the early phases of the Lombard WarsJ 
and because of the very nature of this strategy Gianfranceso and Mantua 
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were at its very centre. This is the stage when the military implications 
of the buffer state became most evident and the resulting situation 
imposed upon Gianfrancesco decis~ons which were not easy to make. 
By contrast, the decisions facing Venice were altogether much simpler. 
They were interested at first in using Mantua as a shield to deflect 
Milanese threats to the Veneto. Gianfrancesco, on the other hand, had the 
much more immediate problem of the threat to his state's very existence, 
and whereas Venetian and Mantuan interests were generally complimentary, 
at least until the 1430's, i·t was a none too easy task to judge the balance 
between the two necessities correctly. This always tended to be a further 
weight on Gianfrancesco's mind in deciding when, and at what point, 
Venetian 'raison d'etat' compromised those factors which involved his 
personal survival. These considerations, however, were to be more 
pronounced when, in the 30's, there was a gradual change, and a fundamental 
one at that, in Venice's conception of Mantua's position in the strategy 
of the Lombard Wars, when Mantua ceased to be a shield to ward off 
Milanese expansion and Gianfrancesco himself became a spearhead for 
Venetian imperialism. These were the general considerations which were 
to affect Gianfrancesco's attitude to the events of the next eighteen years. 
For the time being, at least, Gianfrancesco had his formal 
agreement with Venice which should have put his mind at rest. However,. 
even a brief survey of his dealings with the Venetian Senate in the 
period between the signing of the treaty and the election of Francesco 
Foscari as Doge in 1423 would indicate that Gianfrancesco was viewing 
Filippo Maria's progress with the utmost apprehension, an apprehension 
which could easily have jeopardised and embarrassed Venetian relations 
with Milan. 
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On 17 August 1421 Donato de Preti was given instructions 
to ask for reinforcements to be sent into the Mantovano because he had 
heard information that the Milanese were intending to turn their attention 
to his territories. 3~/ These were only rumours because there was no 
concrete evidence that such an event was about to take place and the 
Senate was content to play the matter down as much as possible. It 
thanked Donato for relaying the information but asked him to reassure 
his master that it did not consider that Filippo Maria would break 
his agreement with Venice, an agreement which included Mantua. However, 
so as not to give Gianfrancesco the impression that it took its Mantuan 
responsibilities lightly, it gave him an albeit vague assurance that should 
anything untoward occur it would make adequate provision. 
This assurance seems to have kept Gianfrancesco happy only for 
a few months because at the beginning of November he went personally to 
Venice with information he had received from Feltrino da Gonzaga and Andrea 
da Mantova who had reported back from Milan. His fears for the security 
of his state were such that he wanted far more definite proposals from 
Venice and these were matters which could only be sorted out personally. 
The discussions in Venice revolved around two issues - the fortifications 
of the borders of the Mantovano,and the contingency plans which should 
. 31/ 
come into operat10n should Mantua be threatened by the Milanese. -
The Senate considered that a strengthening of fortifications, 
particularly around the river areas, was a very good idea and that an 
increased military presence in the frontier region generally would be 
an advantage if only to put Gianfrancesco's mind at rest. In fact 
the fortifications were in progress during the following May, although 
it is interesting to note that the Venetians insisted that the fortifications 
and manning of these areas was to be carried out by Mantuans and 
not by Venetian troops. 3~/ 
However, as far as contingency plans were concerned, the 
Senate promised that should necessity demand, the rectors of Verona 
would be instructed to send a force of 300 cavalry and infantry, but 
Gianfrancesco was assured that this would not really ever be necessary 
because it still considered that Filippo Maria would keep to his 
33/ 
agreement. - In fact, in the following February it sent word 
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to Gianfrancesco that it had consulted with Visconti over the security of 
Mantuan interests and he had assured it that there was nothing to fear 
on this account. 
Nevertheless, from 1422 onwards we do see the beginnings of 
this gradual change of attitude towards Milan by Venice which was noted 
at the beginning of the chapter and this is extremely well documented in 
the Senate's dealings with Gianfrancesco. From now on Gianfrancesco 
was urged to be extremely vigilant and to report back any developments, 
however small, which would indicate a more aggressive attitude on 
the part of Milan. 3~/ 
What the Venetians wanted was a discreet observation; they had 
no intent~Dn of endangering the agreement with Milan as yet, but at the 
same time there was an appreciation of the need for a greater degree of 
military readiness. This was an important preoccupation during April 
and May of 1422. 
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Yet again Gianfrancesco's fears were aroused. On 16 March 1422 
he had sent a letter to the Senate in which he stated that he was convinced 
35/ that the Mantovano was about to be attacked by Angelo della Pergola. -
On this occasion, while it was still anxious to avoid over-hasty action, the 
Senate was not merely content to give vague assurances that the danger had 
been overestimated. The reply which it gave to Gianfrancesco included a 
36/ promise that ~le Venetian army was about to be increased, - and that 
it intended to consult closely with him over its organisation and also 
oYer who should command it. 32/ In May it was also deciqed to send an 
embassy to Gianfrancesco in order to persuade him to take up official 
service with Venice so that security plans could be more effectively 
38/ 
co-ordinated. - On 16th of the same month Venice decided to send 
Francesco della Siega to Milan to remind him of his treaty obligations 
and to find out precisely what Filippo Maria's intentions 'were. A copy 
of Francesco's commission was sent to Gianfrancesco for reference. 32/ 
All this occurred at the time when Florence was actively soliciting 
Venetian help. Although Filippo Maria's replies were favourable to Venice 
and, for the time being, the Venetians were prepared to accept the 
situation as it stood, 42/ they were gradually becoming more and more 
suspicious of Milanese policies and were consequently becoming more and 
more vigilant even if, for the time being, it was more politic to keep 
this as low key as possible. It is therefore evident that even before 
Foscari's assumption of power the position of Mantua was by no means 
of secondary importance in matters of security. 
During the years which immediately preceeded the outbreak of 
hostilities, it therefore became an important preoccupation to keep 
Gianfrancesco as happy as possible and this was reinforced by his frequent 
visits to Venice. This was even more the case after April 1423 when 
Foscari was elected as Doge in succession to Tomaso Mocengio. 4!/ 
There had always been a much closer connection between Gianfrancesco 
and Foscari than there had been with Mocenigo and the fact that a man 
who had been personally involved with Mantuan affairs now ruled Venice 
must have been very reassuring for him at a time when Filippo Maria's 
activities were continuing to cause considerable concern. At the 
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beginning of this year Gianfrancesco had been given another uncomfortable 
reminder of just how close Milanese power was. The Benzoni of Crema, who 
at the time were coming under increasing pressure from the Milanese, were 
42/ forced to flee to Venice, and they stopped at Mantua en route. - On 
28 January the Milanese took formal possession of crema. All this gave 
added justification of the soundness of Mantuan policy as far as requests 
for Venetian protection were concerned. 
It seems clear that Foscari went to some lengths to reassure 
Gianfrancesco of the high esteem in which he was held in Venice. For 
instance, Sanuto writes: 
"A' 23 a 'aprile (1423) volle far fare il gran 
consigl~o nella Sala Nuova fabbricata. E 
fu il primo Consiglio dopo la sua creazione. 
Venne al consiglio il Marchese di Mantova, e fu 
fatto entrare in elezione, e a requisizione del 
Doge tolse Procuratore in luogo di Sua Serenit~ 
Ser'Albano Badoero." 
Such esteem would obviously tend to have an influence on Mantua's standing 
with other states. In fact, on more than one occasion Gianfrancesco 
was asked to be an intermediary with Venice. This was the case on one 
significant occasion even' before Foscari became Doge. In March 1422, 
-----_ ...... _---------------------- - - ---
even before Milanese successes in the Romagna, the Flor~ntines petitioned 
Gianfrancesco to persuade Mocenigo to break off the alliance with the 
Milanese. 4~/ Such approaches, while illustrating the influence which 
other states believed Gianfrancesco to have with Venice, nevertheless 
tended to place him in rather a compromising position. Until 1426 
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Gianfrancesco was anxious to keep as low a diplomatic profile as possible. 
In other words, while being anxious for protection, it was never his 
intention to draw attention to himself as a war-monger, a fact which 
would unnecessarily exacerbate his own position vis-a-vis Milan. This 
was a position which became increasingly difficult to maintain and this 
whole question of his attitude to the war will be discussed at a later 
point in this chapter. 
The Florentines, however, were very tenacious in their attempts 
to form an anti-Viscontean league because the Milanese occupation of Imola 
... 
and Forli was a direct threat to Florence. By the middle of 1423 the 
prospects of a military campaign against Filippo Maria were gradually 
becoming a reality, 421 and the Florentines were consequently more 
insistent than ever 46/ despite Filippo Maria's constant assurances. -. 
Not only were they directing their attention towards Venice, but also 
towards Savoy. 411 Unfortunately Amedeo VIII was to play an ambiguous 
part in the conflict when it finally came about with his 'slow' 
diplomacy, and however trying this must have been both for Milan and 
Florence, his actions were very astute indeed. Amedeo,realising the 
use he could be to both sides, was always to remain sufficiently detached 
from either side to gain maximum personal benefit from the conflict. 
However, there was no denying that Savoy was alarmed at Milanese power in 
the Piedmontese sector and would have welcomed any diminution of it if it 
were at all possible. 
However, if there was any real turning point in the attitude 
of Venice towards Filippo Maria, it most certainly must have come after 
the Florentine defeats at Ponte a Ronco (6 September 1423) and, more 
especially, Zagonara (28 July, 1424) which was yet further proof of the 
true extent of Milanese policies and also a patent illustration of 
Florentine military insufficiency. 4~/ 
The battle of Zagonara sent shock waves throughout Lombardy 
and increased Gianfrancesco's apprehensions considerably and there 
are a number of indications that as early as this he was beginning 
to worry about the apparent indifference of the Venetians to these 
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events. 49/ Both Pandolfo and Carlo Malatesta had been involved at zagonara -
and Gianfrancesco needed to reassure himself that the Venetians were still 
conscious of his need for security. In November 1424, the same month 
that Palla Strozzi and Giovanni de'Medici were in Venice pursuing their 
unrelenting efforts to gain the Venetian alliance, Gianfrancesco felt 
sufficiently alarmed to go personally to Venice to voice his fears of an 
i~pending Milanese offensive. 5Q/ Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that Gianfrancesco was actively encouraging a warlike attitude from 
the.Venetians, he was definitely in favour of continuing negotiations with 
Milan to see if the danger could be averted in this way. 5!/ In fact, 
during the period from 1423 to 1425 there was a considerable amount of 
diplomatic activity between Venice and Milan and it would be true to 
say that Mantuan interests once again were not neglected. For instance, 
in January 1425 Andrea Mocenigo was sent to Milan to obtain from Filippo 
Maria, among other things, assurances (for what they were worth) that the 
Mantovano would not be threatened. The interests of both Ferrara and 
Pandolfo Malatesta also formed part of this mission. 5~/ 
However, the vigilance which the Venetians had encouraged 
in Gianfrancesco was completely justified by the sudden defection of 
53/ 
carmagnola in February 1425. - This event undeniably played a very 
important part in the eventual conclusion of the league with Florence, 
but the inside information Carmagnola was able to furnish about the true 
extent of Milanese policies only really seemed to confirm intelligence 
received from Mantua and Ferrara. It was from Februa ry onwards that the 
Venetians began to deal more seriously with Florence when they gradually 
became aware of the real and growing threat which was posed to the Veneto 
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should Filippo Maria pursue his policy of aggrandisement in Tuscany and the 
54/ Romagna. - It was true that the presence of Carmagnola in Venice was 
a considerable advantage to them and a considerable embarrassment to Milan. 
However, it is important to note that the significance of this event has 
been somewhat overestimated. Carmagnola's intelligence did not bring about 
an immediate war; in fact the league with Florence was not signed 
until 4 December 1425 and Carmagnola was not formally invested as Captain 
General of the league until 27 January 1426. Throughout the spring and summer 
of 1425 there were still attempts at mediation with Milan and Venetian 
ambassadors were also trying, in vain as it turned out, to conclude successful 
negotiations with the impecunious Sigismund, who in the end found it much 
55/ 
more prudent to side with Milan. -
However big a catch Carmagnola was, the Senate was extremely 
56/ 
circumspect in its dealings with a person who after all was a deserter. -
In fact, as we shall see, the Senate was never to trust Carmagnola as 
completely as Gianfrancesco in this part of the war. He was useful to 
them bec~use of his intimate knowledge of Filippo Maria and his military 
experience and reputation, but very soon after the outbreak of the war 
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the Senate began to doubt the wisdom of their appointment, and this 
caused them to look more and more to Gianfrancesco as being the right 
man to execute their policies. The Senate could never be sure that the wily 
Filippo Maria might not succeed in wooing Carmagnola back again to his 
. 57/ d h· d ub f he f hi 1 1 serV1ce, - an t 1S was no 0 tone 0 t reasons or s very c ose y 
negotiated condotta with Venice. 5~/ 
For the most part, then, the rest of 1425 was a time of growing 
tension in which the main states were jockeying for position. In particular, 
Filippo Maria was busy negotiating with Sigismund and Amedeo at the same 
time in order to enlist their aid: "Nos aut em eis damus bona verba, ut 
melius possumus, tempus protrahere et dilatare usque ad regii succursus 
adventum." Although this remark was written in July 1427 it is 
equally applicable to the events of 1425. 
As far as Gianfrancesco was concerned, this was a period of 
painstaking vigilance. He was urged to observe the slightest movement 
in the Bresciano and Cremonese and report back to Venice, and also to 
ensure the safety of the river communications. For instance, on 
February 1425 the Senate wrote to Gianfrancesco because they were 
concerned over the security of their salt ships and he was requested to 
60/ 
make adequate preparations for such protection at Brescello and Casalmaggio~ -
In fact, one of Gianfrancesco"s constant preoccupations in the war as 
far as his own security was involved, was centred around such areas 'as 
Viadana and Guastalla. Guido Torello, lord of Guastalla, was the commander 
of the Milanese troops in the Romagna. In 1425 he had been involved in 
Arezzo against the Florentines, particularly in the battles of Anghiari 
and Faggiuola. Gianfrancesco was continually trying to obtain Guido's 
services during this period,as we shall see, and in this was to have the I 
active encouragement of the Venetians. 
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By the end of 1425 matters were very delicately poised and, 
ultimately, the final decision rested with Foscari and the Senate. The 
Doge, an ardent supporter of the terraferma policy, certainly had very 
positive views on Filippo Maria, if we are to believe the speech which 
Romanin quotes from the "Cronaca Savina". He is reported to have said 
that "sto furibondo tiran scorrera per tutta,I'Italia, la struggera e 
conquisser~ senza castigo? EI qual non cosl tosto havera sottoposto i 
Fiorentini (come tutto el mondo grida) che imediate prendera l'arme 
contro di noi". 6!/ The same speech goes on to mention the role which 
Carmagnola played: " ••••• EI Carmagnola n'ha mostrado col so parlar el 
poder de Filippo ••••• el qual esperto nella guerra non ha in tutta Italia 
ugual a sti tempi di gagliardia e disciplina delle milizie". 6~/ He 
concluded that the war was to be prosecuted "con forte anemo" because it was a 
"guerra digo necessaria habendo l'inimigo cui potente e viziu, il quale 
aspira all'imperio dell'Italia." 
Despite the fact that the authenticity of the speech is not 
undoubted, its content does have some important implications about the 
nature of the warfare which was to follow. It was the first example of 
a defensive-aggressive politico-military stance from Venice on such a 
large scale. This was primarily a war for the defence of the terraferma 
inspired first and foremost out of a sense of self preservation rather 
than out of any profound sense of political or ideological identification 
with Florence. This is patently borne out by the actual events of the war 
and by the eventual divergence of war aims as well as in the eventual 
terms of the peace treaties. In effect, as early as 1427-8 there was a 
reversal of roles: whereas Florence maintained a defensive attitude, Venice 
took over as the dynamic partner and this set the tone of the struggle 
for hegemony in northern Italy which was to dominate the first half of the 
fifteenth century. This, of necessity, tended to put Mantua at the 
centre of the stage. 
We are now in a better pOSition to assess how important a part 
Gianfrancesco played in the final decision to go to war. There have been 
a number of divergent opinions expressed on this matter ranging from those 
63/ 
who saw him as the prominent member of the war party, - to those who saw 
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him as being much more reluctant.6~/ There is no do ubt that he had every 
reason to be alarmed at Filippo Maria's advances and tha t it was he who 
continually prompted the Venetians to provide him with adequate protection 
both with diplomacy and in more concrete terms. Venice also came increasingly 
to see the strategic value of Mantua's position and there can be little 
doubt that by 1426 it had reached the top of the list of priorities as 
far as defence was concerned. 
However, as vigilant as Gianfrancesco was during this period, it 
was proteation that he wanted, and not war. His deliberately low key 
activities indicate a desire not to draw too much attention to himself 
and this may, in part, account for the fact that he did not mediate on the 
two occasions when he could have. For instance, it will be shown that the 
vast concentrations of troops in the Mantovano in the January of 1426 tended 
to draw unwanted attention to his state and there is evidence to suggest 
that Gianfrancesco was none too happy at the weight of the burden which had 
been placed upon him. 
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In fact, it is very difficult to see Gianfrancesco as a war-
monger during this period. It was in his interests to avoid war for as 
long as possible because he knew full well that the Mantovano would have 
to bear the brunt of it; so did the Venetians. The desire for protection 
and the reluctance to become over-involved was an inevitable dilemma for 
states such as Mantua. However, in reality Gianfrancesco had no real 
choice. The treaty of 1421 bound him closely to Venice, the Venetians had 
already proved their determination to protect Mantuan interests against 
Milan, and when matters escalated during the course of 1425 Gianfrancesco 
could do none other but follow Venice's lead. Once again, as in the past, 
Mantua was being used. Of course there was an identity of interest; but it 
was, to a certain extent, cosmetic, because a situation had been created 
whereby an identity of interest was inevitable. 
Platina attributed to Gianfrancesco a speech to the Senate in 
which he outlined the case for war against the Milanese. From time to 
time outsiders were allowed to make speeches before the Senate and, given 
Gianfrancesco's friendship with Foscari, it is not completely beyond the 
bounds of possibility that he could have done so, although there is no 
documentary evidence in the Venetian archive to substantiate this. 62/ 
platina relates how, although Gianfrancesco could appreciate the prudence 
of the Venetian Senate in not acting over-hastily, he nevertheless felt 
compelled to give his own reading of the situation. "Superatis Florentinis •• 
omnem vim belli in me ac in vos convertet ••••••• Flectent persaepe oculos ad 
ea partem Venetiae, quam nos possidemus ••••• superatis Florentinis, me, 
66/ 
a quo Pischeriam Vitellianum repetit, Potentatu Mantuanospoliaverit ••• " -
Whatever doubt there might be about the authenticity of this speech, it is 
nevertheless true that it summed up perfectly the dangers which Mantua 
faced as well as Filippo Maria's objectives. 
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On 18 September 1425 the Senate decided in favour of the principle 
of a league with Florence and the Pope, but it recommended that an opportunity 
should still be given to Filippo Maria to come to terms if he chose to. 611 
However, the league, which was finally signed with the Florentines in 
December "pro defensione et conservationem statuum nostrorum ac libertatis 
681 
et pacificus totus Italiae" did not inclu8e him. - On the day the league 
was signed Ambrogio Badoer was instructed to inform Gianfrancesco of its 
terms. In addition to this Gianfrancesco was summoned to Venice as quickly 
as possible for urgent discussions regarding their mutual security. It 
is almost certain that this was the origin of the plans for the fortification 
of the Mantovano in the following January. 621 The league included Venice, 
Florence, Ferrara, Gianfrancesco, and, from 11 July 1426, Amedeo of Savoy. 
It is interesting to note, from an examination of the terms of the league, 
which was to last initially for ten years irrespective of the war against 
Milan, that Venice appeared from the start as the dominant partner. 721 
In fact, the Florentines appeared to be somewhat disgruntled at the 
relatively harsh conditions imposed upon them by the Venetians. 7!1 Anyhow, 
I 
the most important part of the agreement was that an ultimatum was imposed 
upon Filippo Maria and if he did not come to terms by the following February, 
the armies of the league would take the field against him. 
Filippo 1-1aria did make desperate attempts to save the situation, 
Franchino da Castiglione was despatched to Venice, but by this time the 
Republic had firmly made up its mind not to give in. There is no need to 
. f h d 721 . go into excessive detail about the diplomacy 0 t is perio, - but as 
far as Mantua was concerned the general trend was favourable to Gianfrancesco, 
Even though at the outset Venice was very cautious about over-hasty action, the 
underlying trend was one of gradual, but inevitable graVitation towards 
Florence and an anti-Viscontean league. 
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While it is true that for the most part Gianfrancesco was not 
involved directly in the actual negotiations, partly because of the 
reasons already mentioned, and partly because he had virtually placed 
himself in the hands of the Venetians, this did not mean that he was kept 
ignorant of the proceedings. Indeed it was an important part of Venetian 
policy to keep Gianfrancesco as fully informed about the state of affairs 
as was commensurate with the role Mantua was to play in the overall plan 
of defence; as they themselves stated "iuxta solitem morem nostrum ea que 
habemus cum filiali mag.cie v.re". 7"2/ 
In the Gonzaga archive a considerable proportion of the documentary 
material consists of copies of ambassadors' despatches sent primarily from 
Ferrara and Venice. Such documentation is especially interesting for the 
end of 1425 and the early months of 1426 when negotiations had reached a 
critical stage. 
A great deal of attention has been paid by scholars to the 
desulto,ry character of the negotiations during this period, particularly 
to the way in which Filippo Maria was using them merely in order to gain 
time. In this respect the negotiations conducted at Ferrara at the end 
of February 1426 between Fantino Michiel and Antonio Contarini on the 
Venetian side, and Franchino da Castiglione on the Milanese Side, are 
typical. Niccolo d'Este had offered himself as mediator and a very full 
74/ 
account of the discussions was s~nt to Gianfrancesco. - The discussions 
seem to have been characterised by a reluctance of both sides to make 
their relative poSitions clear,~dlater on they degenerated into endless 
75/ 
wranglings over points of procedure and conventions. - It would appear 
that Franchino's mission was expressly designed to obstruct proceedings 
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because in the same report information was given which had been received 
from Bologna that plans were in hand for the imminent transfer of Milanese 
troops from the Romagna into Lombardy. The Venetian envoys,who had a 
very high opinion of Niccolo's loyalty to Venice, persuaded him to attempt 
76/ to impede this passage - and were not slow to point out the immense 
dangers which a failure to do so could create. They advised him to make 
reasonable provision quickly in the event that negotiations should break 
down. In addition to this Contarini and Michiel strongly suggested that 
Francesco Sembo should hasten the preparation of the Po fleet. 
How does all this relate to Mantua affairs? The solution to this 
problem is relatively simple in essence even though the details can sometimes 
seem complex and contradictory. The truth of the matter is that the diplomatic 
impasse between Venice and Milan in February 1426 was not due merely to 
Franchino. On closer examination the Venetians could be accused of doing 
precisely the same thing as the Milanese in using negotiations which were 
fraught with semantics in order to gain time in order to consolidate their 
military strength. However, a conclusion of this kind without important 
qualification would be an altogether too simple conclusion. It would, in 
fact, seem that the Venetians themselves were facing a very real dilemma 
during this months of deciding when they should come out into the open. 
It has been generally considered that the defection of Carmagnola 
greatly accellerated the process whereby the Venetians became involved 
in the league. While this is undeniably true, we must not forget that 
contingency plans for defence had already been in existence for some time, 
and this is perfectly in accord with Foscari's own avowed interest in the terra-
ferma. 
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The Venetians may very well have been anxious for Este to 
fortify his frontiers but from January 1426 very important information 
had been gained from Mantua which must carry considerable responsibility 
for conditioning Venice's attitude at Ferrara. At this time the resident 
Venetian ambassador in Mantua~Ambrogio Badoer, had been observing 
developments on the borders very closely. Information which he had 
gathered regarding Milanese military preparations had been such that he 
had decided to report personally to the Senate. It would seem that 
Gianfrancesco's appeal to the Senate mentioned by Sanuto had had some 
effect. In a letter of the 4th January 1426 from the Doge to Gianfrancesco 
after Badoer had made his report there is a definite indication that a 
build-up of Veneitan military power was about to take place in the area. 72/ 
In the same letter Gianfrancesco was requested to use his influence to 
obtain the services of Francesco Bolognini, a close associate of Angelo 
della Pergola, who Este was encouraged to negotiate with in the following 
month. 7~/ Gianfrancesco appears to have been successful here because 
Bolognini appeared in Sanuto's military list of 1426 in command of 30 lances. 72/ 
In fact, the Venetians did place a great deal of confidence in Gianfrancesco's 
military judgement at this time and were continually asking his advice about 
the suitability of men who wished to enrol in their service. 82/ . 
It is from this time that we date Venice's deliberate policy 
of concentrating large numbers of troops in the Mantovanol the crucial 
area as far as they were concerned. The Venetians had evidently decided 
to take Gianfrancesco more closely than ever into their confidence 
and during this morith there was a great deal of secret information exchanged 
81/ 
regarding the movement of troops. - The sort of numbers involved was 
extremely large and is a good indicationof the gravity with which the 
Venetians viewed the situation. For instance, on 12 January, Gianfrancesco 
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was charged with arrangements to provide lodging in Mantua and the 
surrounding area for a total of no less than 810 lances, an operation 
which was to be supervised by Venetian rectors. Although Gianfrancesco 
was to have a certain amount of disCiplinary authority over these troops, 
the movement of the men and their ultimate location was exclusively in 
Venetian hands. Gianfrancesco was required to make sure that the troops 
were adequately provisioned, and this, together with the billetting 8~/ 
was to provide him with considerable organisational problems. 8~/ These 
troops were destined primarily to reinforce the frontier areas, and not 
surprisingly, the areas of Lonato and,Canedolo to the north together with 
Castelgoffredo which was particularly vulnerable at the time. There 
was even a suggestion that these already large numbers would be increased 
84/ in the future. -
All this was happening at the same time as the Venetians were 
also concerned at strengthening the, Po fleet. On 13 January 1426 
Gianfrancesco was informed ot the election of Francesco Bembo as commander 
and that they were quickly fitting out 12 galleys and 20 'barche' in readiness 
for any eventuality. In addition they requested Gianfrancesco to prepare 
his own fleet which apparently consisted of 12 galleys "ut venientibus ipsis 
dictis galeis galeonibus et barchis nostris reperiant vostros in ordine et 
possunt se venire cum vestris". 8~/ In short, it was the Venetian plan 
for both fleets to join together. It had been estimated that the venetian 
fleet consisted of a total of 180 vessels of various sizes. 
We can see, then,even by surveying one month, the ,massive extent 
of Venetian military activity in the Mantovano even before Carmagnola had 
taken effective charge of operations, and, what is more, while active 
negotiations were still in progress with Milan. In next to no time Mantua 
had taken on the appearance of an armed frontier state acting as a front 
line defence between Milan and Venice. It could well have been the case that 
it was hoped that such a strong display of military presence by Venice 
would help the negotiations at Ferrara by showing Filippo Maria that they 
could back up their arguments by military strength if necessary. However, 
in the circumstances,the discussions of February 1426 never ultimately 
had any hope of material success. 
There is one final point to be made in connection wit h the 
Venetian attitude to these negotiations with the Milanese. The fortification 
of the Mantovano in the first instance stemmed basically from the desire 
to negotiate from a position of greater strength. While it was true that 
Venice was becoming more insistent with Milan than they had been in the 
past, it was still not their intention to appear to be the aggressors. 
In a letter dated 18 February 1426 from Foscari to Gianfrancesco, he wrote 
that Venice was still trying to keep an open mind regarding Franchino's 
embassy "per modum per nos propositum quamquam nos perseverantes in 
naturali dispositione nostra pacis". 8§/ In fact the Venetians offered 
87/ to negotiate either through the mediation of Gianfrancesco or Este. -
It is significant that the Milanese chose Estel Filippo Maria clearly 
considered that Gianfrancesco was much too closely involved with Venice 
to perform this office with the degree of neutrality which was required~ 
It could, of course, be argued that Este's own position was not too 
dissimilar. 
Although the Venetians were anxious to emphasise their defensive 
attitude, in the final analysis it is very difficult to believe that such 
massive concentrations of troops were intended specifically as a mere 
deterrent to the Milanese. If Venice's situation seems at times to be 
rather ambiguous and that they were playing fast and loose with Milan 
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in their desire at the same time to negotiate for peace while strengthening 
their fighting power, it is because the Venetians were involved in a situation 
which was basically new to them. What we are witnessing here, in effect, is 
a gradual transformation of policy, and the months of January and February 
1426 are the first manifestation of the change of attitude which had 
theoretically been mooted in 1421; in other words, it was an implementation 
of policy. What is more, the Mantovano was the centre of this change of 
direction and this was partly due to Gianfrancesco's own requests for protection. 
At least on one occasion during the earlier part of 1426. a nasty 
situation looked like developing which gives a clue to the sort of 'cold war' 
which was being waged on the frontiers with the Cremonese. This could have 
been very dangerous for Mantuan security. A letter of 25 February informed 
Gianfrancesco that the Milanese were apparently constructing a bridge over 
the Po just below Cremona and Gianfrancesco was requested to find out what 
8_~ was going on and report back. In fact they were anxious that this bridge 
should not be constructed and, depending upon Gianfrancesco's estimate of the 
situation, they were prepared to take action "cum galeis et galeonis nostris 
et domini Marchionis et vostris obviare provideat, ne dictus pons fiat". 
Although there is no further indication of what happened, possibly because 
work on the bridge was suspended, the whole incident is indicative of the 
extreme tension which existed in this area at the time. 
The terms demanded by the Venetians at Ferrara in 1426 were much 
too harsh for Filippo Maria to accept. These included not merely respecting 
, 
the agreement of 1420 but also involved abandoning lmola, Forli, Genoa and 
the liberation of Carlo Malatesta and carmagnola's family. Agreement on 
these terms was never really a viable possibility. 8~/ These negotiations 
were the last efforts at a peaceful solution and as soon as they had been 
suspended Gianfrancesco wrote to Foscari that Franchino da Castiglione 
had relayed to him on his way back to Milan precisely what had transpired 
in Ferrara. On 20 February he assured the Venetians of his absolute 
89/ 
support. -
To sum up so far. In the period which immediately preceded 
the outbreak of hostilities Gianfrancesco Gonzaga and his state played a 
lb!J. 
more important role than has been hitherto ascribed to them. Although Venice 
was justifiably cautious in aVOiding a complete break with Milan until the 
very last minute, we have seen by the build-up firstly of close ties of 
friendship with Gianfrancesco and, as the war became more and more of a 
possibility, a considerable concentration of troops in the Mantovano, that 
Gianfrancesco figured largely in Venetian policy, and that this became most 
definitely pronounced after Francesco Foscari became Doge. He, more than 
most, was able to appreciate fully the possibilities for defensive and 
offensive action inherent in Mantua's strategic position. It is not 
insignificant that this first manifestation of a new orientation of-Venetian 
policy took place essentially in the Mantovano. 
The same was true of Gianfrancesco. As the Milanese aggression 
became more and more of a reality, he needed Venetian friendship more than anythin~: 
else even though it would be unfair to associate him actively with the 'war 
party'. It was such matters which, to quite a great extent, made for this 
special identity of purpose Qetween Gianfrancesco and Venice which transcended 
their relationship with Carmagnola. It is important to appreciate that the 
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basis of Gianfrancesco's agreement with Venice was not a condottai there 
is no documentary evidence of one at all, only the treaty of 1421, and this 
further underlines the difference between his position .and that of Carmagnola. 
Anyhow, by the end of February 1426 one thing was eminently clear to 
Gianfrancesco. Not only was he fighting for Venice1 but he was also fighting 
for his own personal survival. 
III 
-
The Progress of the War up to the First Peace of Ferrara·· 
This was a war in which big issues were at stake; clearly this 
was gOing to be warfare on a scale, and with implications which were radically 
different from the small-scale sporadic encounters which had preceeded it 
and this is largely why it became endemic as neither side was prepared to 
give way. It was because of this that the wars which ensued necessitated a 
much more fully developed military strategy and technology which in turn 
required a radically altered relationship between state and condottiere. 
This 'decellerated' and fundamentally acquisitive warfare meant 
that it was on a very large scale. It has been estimated that the siz.e of 
the army was around 22,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry. 99/ The terms of the 
league had stipulated that Florence and Venice were each to prOVide at their 
own expense 8,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry. These armies were the largest 
that had ever been seen in living memory in Italy, and this fact was noted 
by many contemporaries. 9!/ In addition to this a large fleet of boats 
was prepared for a river campaign. Bembo commanded the Po fleet of 180 
vessels and Stefano Contarini was to command a fleet of 63 large armed 
ships and 2,000 sailors for service off the Ligurian coast. 
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When the war was finally declared on 3 March 1426 an extraordinary 
council of 100 patricians had been set up to oversee the conduct of the war 
and a special war tax was levied. 9~/ Niccolo Trevisan was sent to proclaim 
the war in the venetian provinces and Marco Dandolo and Gi~9iO Correr were 
assigned to the Captain-General as provveditori. The way in which the war 
machinery was brought smoothly into action would further indicate an 
efficient and well co-ordinated contingency plan. 
There are two important things which emerge from this picture 
and which were to affect Gianfrancesco directly. The strategy of the war 
was to be based implicitly upon a combination of river and land campaigns 
and this factor involved a degree of co-ordination which was as likely to 
condition the relationship between Gianfrancesco and Venice as it concerned 
Carmagnola himself. The resulting relationship consisted basically of two 
elements. Firstly, because of the nature of the war and because the sums 
of money involved were so large, Venice wished to ensure a much closer 
personal supervision of the war and clearly felt a much greater obligation 
to ensure that its wishes and interests were protected, hence the strict 
supervision of the provveditori. The position of the provveditori had not 
changed, but the exigencies of the war highlighted their role more. Secondly, 
as early as the 1420's the condottiere system, which had played such an 
important part in the evolution of the state, was being outgrown with the 
development of the larger territorial states. In effect, established 
attitudes towards the conduct of warfare and the realities of political 
power were beginning to part company. It was one of the consequences of 
territorial aggrandisement that made it of prime importance to establish 
closer and more permanent ties with its military commander. This was 
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potentially an excellent relationship, provided that state policy did not 
become divorced from military feasibility. It will be demonstrated, 
however, that in practice, Venice's record was not particularly good in 
this respect and both Carmagnola and Gianfrancesco became victims of its 
shortcomings. 
The strong Venetian presence in Mantua did provide Gianfrancesco 
with the maximum amount of security possible. This contingency plan proved 
to be one of Venice's most astute moves. Although there was no question of 
surprise tactics at this stage, the Venetians did at least have their forces 
in the right place and were in a position at the outset to take the war right 
into the Milanese camp. In particular, the concentrations around Castelgoffredo 
were ideally placed for an attack upon BreSCia, which was the most important 
objective of the first war. 
However, it would be most inaccurate to attribute all the most 
Significant developments in the Mantovano to the period after Carmagnola's 
arrival in March 1426, as most scholars have hitherto suggested. Once again, 
Gianfrancesco's work in this respect has either been underestimated or 
completely ignored. In fact, the Venetian military machine could not have 
moved into action so swiftly and smoothly had it not been for Gianfrancesco's 
careful preparations throughout the first three months of 1426 after his 
93/ 
active entry into the league. - Not only was Gianfrancesco actively engaged 
in raising men for the army, but he was conducting an active correspondence 
with Venice over crucial questions of security; putting the final touches 
to the overall plan of military defence. 
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For instance, in February he was buying himself with plans for the 
transport of men he had raised to Mantua. He had sent Federigo da Villanova 
one of his secretaries, to Florence in the previous month in order to engage 
the services of Antonello da Siena, together with between 350 and 400 
cavalry. At the beginning of February he was anxious that these troops 
should now come to the Mantovano. On 7 February Federigo was instructed to 
94/ 
request the Governor of Bologna for a safe-conduct for these soldiers. -
In the accompanying letter to Federigo we have an example of the mounting 
seriousness of the military situation in which he considered that speed 
was necessary. 9~/ Gianfrancesco was determined to use this breathing 
space as productively as possible. In fact, Gianfrancesco was not only busy 
raising men on his own account; he was also urging Venice to raise men in Ancona, 
which he highly recommended. 9§/ 
At the end of the previous month Gianfrancesco had been in 
consultation with Foscari over the fortification of weak points in the Mantovano. 
On 18 February he wrote a letter thanking the Doge for keeping him informed 
about the state of negotiations with Filippo Maria in which he raised the 
important question of strengthening the area immediately affected by Brescia. 
He had just received information that Oldrado de Lampugnano had arrived 
97/ in Brescia and was somewhat alarmed by these developments. - Such 
intelligence made him even more anxious that his best men should be 
placed in this area. In the letter he asked specifically for the services 
of Bianchino da Feltre in Castelgoffredo and that more men should be sent 
to Lonato which was still relatively undefended. 9~/ At this time Bianchino 
was at Canedolo, a relatively safe place on the borders with the Veneto. 
Gianfrancesco valued this man highly and suggested that a redistribution of 
such men would be a more productive use of military resources. After all, 
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99/ Canedolo did not really need defending. We can even see thus far that 
Gianfrancesco was no mere cypher in the preparations for the war; on the 
contrary we see him offering intelligent advice as to the best use of resources 
available. 
However, such preparations not only cost him much effort, they 
were also very expensive. This was, in fact, a matter which bothered 
Gianfrancesco very much even before the war broke out. We have already 
noted how much of a strain it was upon Mantuan resources to have to provide 
for so many troops~ Although the terms of his treaty with Venice stipulated 
that 2,000 ducats should be set aside monthly, the preparations in the Mantovano 
had cost considerably more. It is, therefore, not surprising that in January 
Gianfrancesco was asking Donato de'Preti to raise a loan of 5,000 ducats in 
Venice. Part of this sum had been obtained earlier in the month, but by 
100/ the 18th Gianfrancesco was becoming impatient for the rest. - By 22 January 
he was once again writing about this matter, but this time in more urgent 
terms. Apparently by this date the preparations had cost him more than 
15,000 ducats and this was clearly a level of expenditure which a state of 
101/ Mantua's size could not be expected to meet. -
This sort of thing was to set the tone for the rest of the wars. 
Venice was never very prompt in paying Gianfrancesco and on many subsequent 
occaSions, as we shall see, he was driven to raising further loans and Paola 
was even forced to pawning jewellery and plate. Gianfrancesco's letters 
to his wife even during this first war are almost totally concerned with the 
despatch of money to him in the field. 10!/ Although Gianfrancesco was 
fighting this war for his own existence, it is frequently forgotten that 
the financial burden of fighting it was crippling. It is certainly true 
that his lack of success after the peace of Cavriana in 1442 was due in 
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part to the debts which he had contracted during the wars. 
However, despite the frequent difficulties of his financial 
situation, purely military and defence problems were more immediately pressing 
in the early months of 1426, and by the end of January and the beginning of 
February it was the fortification of the border areas which claimed most of 
Gianfrancesco's attention and during the whole of this period he was trying 
to get as much information as possible about the movement of Milanese troops 
so that he could make appropriate adjustments to his plans. 
On 22 January 1426 he relayed with some trepidation the information 
that Francesco Sforza's arrival in the area was imminent and that Milanese 
103/ troops were concentrating in the Bresciano and the Cremonese. - Gianfrancesco 
suggested that because of these developments it was essential that the 
fortification of the corresponding areas of the Mantovano should be completed 
as quickly as possible and that he should be given the authority to move 
h f . h h f' t 104/ t e orces ~nto t ese areas as e saw 1. - This was not an occasion to 
waste time waiting for constant instructions, he remarked, and he was worried 
lest a crisis should occur which could have been otherwise averted had he 
been able to act on his own initiative. 102/ 
There is a very interesting commentary upon this situation in 
a letter which Guido Torello despatched to Filippo Maria on 8 February 1426. 
This letter, a copy of which exists in the Mantuan Archive and must have been 
intercepted, gives a clue as to how feverish the preparations were getting 
on the Milanese side and how badly the war was going in the Romagna. Torello's 
own Guastalla was extremely vulnerable and Gianfrancesco was very angry that 
Guido had thrown in his lot with the Milanese.lO~/ It would seem that 
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arrangements about the raising and billetting of men in Umbria had not gone at all 
107/ 
smoothly. - In fact, Guido mentioned that without the services of Francesco 
Sforza, the Milanese would be hard pressed.10~/ In fact, an absence of effective 
organisation among the Milanese commanders when the war was transferred to 
Lombardy was one of the main reasons for their lack of overall success. 
Gianfrancesco was also attending to the building up of the river 
fleet, following his instructions from Venice. Gianfrancesco was anxious 
to do this correctly because he appreciated the importance of the role which 
river operations would play in this war. A good fleet could not only back 
up the land forces effectively and take the war deep into enemy territory, 
but as far as Gianfrancesco was concerned, it could. primarily provide 
a hopefully adequate defence for the Serraglio, the 'soft underbelly' of the 
Mantovano. Because of these reasons he instructed Donato de'Preti to 
consult closely with Francesco Bembo, whose naval expertise Gianfrancesco 
prized highly,102/ over the question of how effectively each of his ships 
should be armed. 112/ Judging from the details with which he furnished Donato, 
four of his ships were fairly large, powered by 37 oars, four more had 35 
and the remaining four had 25. 111/ 
The Venetians could hardly have failed to be impressed by the 
work of these two months. Mantua was most certainly functioning in the way 
in which Venice intended; but another significant factor was the way in 
which Gianfrancesco himself had acted. He had shown the qualities of 
clear-midedness, forcefulness, together with a considerable ability and 
taste for organisation. It was these very qualities which he was to 
demonstrate in the campaigns of the war and which augured sowell for the 
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future. When Carmagnola arrived in Mantua on 3 March he really had very 
little organising to do because everything had been set up in advance for 
him by Gianfrancesco. 
Moreover, Gianfrancesco was very conscious of the value of his 
work and expected to be rewarded for it. When Carmagnola was given his 
instructions to go to Mantua on 26 February he was specifically requested 
to consult as closely as possible with Gianfrancesco as well as with Ambrogio 
Badoer and the two provveditori over the strategy which was to be employed;l~/ 
The Venetians went to considerable trouble to ensure that from the start 
Gianfrancesco's opinions were taken very carefully into consideration. The 
honour of carrying the standard of St.Mark had been granted to Niccolo d'Este 
and Gianfrancesco had shown a certain amount of annoyance at this. 
Consequently one of the provveditori's first tasks was to calm Gianfrancesco 
down over this matter. It was sometimes very difficult to please everybody 
at once and the management of a large army consisting of a number of prominent 
soldiers presented many problems of 'diplomacy'. It must be emphasised that 
Este was in the service of the Florentines at this time and as such was not 
strictly concerned with Venice. The provveditori were instructed to inform 
Gianfrancesco that in the event of Carmagnola not being able to exercise his 
command because of ill-health the honour of commanding the troops was to be 
113/ given to him. - The appointment of Gianfrancesco as second in command was 
more than adequate compensation for the time being and this was an astute 
move by the Senate in more ways than one. By this time it was reasonably 
well known that Carmagnola was physically past his prime and not in the best 
114/ 
of health due, in part, to injuries sustained after a fall. - The Senate, 
which already had good cause to see Gianfrancesco's prOmising personal qualities, 
was, therefore, virtually ensuring that at some time during the campaigns, 
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he would be able to demonstrate his abilities at overall command, if only 
on a temporary basis. There is much to lead us to believe that Gianfrancesco 
was being groomed to succeed Carmagnola right from the beginning. 
As far as the character of Carmagnola's leadership is concerned, 
he was highly respected, not only by the state, but he also inspired the 
confidence and loyalty of his men. His abilities as a tactician, combined 
with his highly impressive record of success, made for a sense of pride 
and cohesion among his men as well as providing an important incentive 
for a more permanent continuity among the personnel of the army. This sense 
of loyalty was very important in a military organisation in which mutual 
115/ 
respect was the most important cohesive factor. -
It was vitally important for the new Captain General to have 
a harmonious working relationship with Gianfrancesco. This is reiterated 
again and again in the documents of the period. There is no documentary 
evidence to prove that Carmagnola and Gianfrancesco had met before the 
beginning of the year.ll~/ Three days after the outbreak of the war, on 
6 March, Ambrogio Badoer and Constantino de'Constantinis had returned 
to Venice from Mantua to report on the state of readiness in the Mantovano. 111/ 
Venic~ was anxious to keep a very close watch upon these two men from the start. 
In the event, there was little cause for worry because Carmagnola 
and Gianfrancesco seem to have got on extremely well together. It was clear 
that Gianfrancesco had a great deal of respect for the older man and, during 
the course of the first phase of the wars, learnt a great deal from him, so 
much so, in fact, that their military careers pursued roughly parallel 
courses. 50 much depended upon their harmonious co-operation as far as 
the strategy was concerned, because the city of Mantua itself was 
designated by Carmagnola as his military base. Indeed, the prominence 
of Mantua in this war is further illustrated in a number of other ways. 
In the military list which Sanuto documented, it was Gianfrancesco who 
was to provide the largest single contingent of 400 lances. At this stage, 
Carmagnola is recorded as having only provided 230:18_/ 
In direct contrast to the disciplined and cohesive allied army, 
there seem to have been frequent clashes of opinion among the Visconti 
commanders. There were two factions consisting of Sforza and Piccinino on 
the one side, who advocated more active and aggressive measures against the 
enemy, and Della Pergola and Torello on the other side, who were more 
inclined to temporise wherever possible, a factor which Gianfrancesco later 
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capitalised upon. Carlo Malatesta was chosen as commander in chief, a man 
119/ 
of whom Muratori writes "esperto, ma poco fortunato, maestro di guerra". -
Such a state of affairs was a clear disadvantage, especially as the Venetians, 
due to Gianfrancesco's preparations, moved very quickly indeed in the opening 
stages of the war at a time when a large number of Filippo Maria's troops 
were still in the Romagna. 
In the light of the relationships disc us sed above, we are in 
a much better position to assess the nature of Gianfrancesco's contribution 
120/ to the war. - However, before doing so, it would be useful to give some 
idea of the nature of the terrain in which the war was fought and the general 
strategy which it entailed. 
176. 
Most of the war in the years under review was fought in the 
area between the Adige and Adda rivers. The Lombard plain is very open 
country and is consequently suited to large-scale military operations. 
It is divided up very conveniently into a number of smaller compartments 
which are delineated by .the tributaries of the Po, the most important of 
which are the Adige,Mincio, Oglio, Adda, Ticino and the Sesia. The 
suitability of the terrain for large scale campaigning combined with the 
configuation of the rivers meant, especially after the fall of Brescia, 
when the war became for Venice one of territorial acquisition, that the 
rivers could be used most effectively in conjunction with the land forces. 
This is why the fleets were mobilised at the outset. Such a combination 
of forces is most effective for this type of warfare, especially since 
the vertical division by the rivers is most pronounced. The strategy 
which this dictated was very simple; the occupation of the rivers and the 
destruction of fortresses and bridges would impede the movement of the 
enemy and make communications difficult whilst allowing the intervening 
territory to be occupied by the land forces. In a very general 'way the 
war can be seen as a movement from river to river. As far as Venice was 
concerned, the ultimate aim at this stage was to establish its western 
boundary along the banks of the Adda. 
This would in part, for example, explain the reason for Bembo's 
orders to destroy the fortification at Cremona and attack Pizzighettone 
while Niccolo d'Este was to impede the Milanese army in the Romagna from 
1211 
returning to Lombardy. - The fact that in Lombardy itself there were 
122/ 
very few soldiers, commanded at the time by Francesco Sforza, - illustrates 
the very real state of unpreparedness in Milan and Venice's desire to gain 
177. 
maximum benefit from this state of affairs, especially since the Mantovano 
was such a good base for operations. While all this river campaigning 
was going on, the obvious target for the land army would be Brescia, whose 
possession as we have already pointed out, was seen by both sides as one 
of the most crucial factors in the war. We are here seeing an example of 
integrated strategy which aimed at more permanent results which was in direct 
contrast to the sporadic cavalry warfare of the late fourteenth century. 
This is, then, a strategy which was perfectly suited to the aims of the war. 
It was a warfare which, of necessity, moved at a slower pace and this, in 
ifself, was to encourage the greater prominence which was given to infantry 
123/ 
over cavalry. -
This first campagin has generally been seen as a war primarily 
for the defence of the terraferma. In a sense this was true in so far as 
Filippo Maria's presence in the Bresciano and Cremonese was a direct threat. 
However, the fact must not be ignored that the initial aggressive moves 
were made by the forces of the league. These opening moves were the results 
of the joint discussions between Carmagnola, Gianfrancesco, Badoer and the 
two provveditori, despite the fact that the Senate imposed general lines 
of policy. The general aim of the first campaign was to attack where the 
most damage could be inflicted upon Filippo Maria. There were three 
objectives; to take Brescia, destroy the fortifications at Cremona, and to 
cross the Oglio up to Pizzighettone which was regarded as the key to the Adda. 
Of these objectives, Brescia was by far the most important, 
and Gianfrancesco's preparations in the area already represented a 
considerable advantage. Not only has his preliminary work in this area been 
178. 
underestimated, but his actual contribution to the successful outcome of 
the siege as a whole has been undervalued. Up to now the tendency has 
always been to regard these opening campaigns as being almost totally 
the conception of Carmagnola. This judgement, which we have already 
questioned, needs even more qualification when we consider the actual events 
of the war. 
It was nevertheless very fortunate for Venice that Carmagnola 
was directing the siege of Brescia from the outset because, having been 
responsible for capturing it for the Milanese in the first place, he was 
most likely to have firsthand knowledge of the weak points in its defences. 
Moreover, with connections within the city he was able to play upon the 
resentment which was widely felt against the oppressiveness of Visconti 
124/ 
rule as represented by Old rado de Lampugnano and Jacopino da Castiole. -
But not only was carmagnola one of the moving spirits behind the 'congiura 
125/ di Gussago', - he was also encouraging the Avogadro and Nassini to mobilise 
dissidents in the Val Trompia, Val Sabbia and the Val camonical2§/ which 
again emphasised the importance of rivers and river valleys in Venetian 
strategy. Large numbers of disguised soldiers were sent to lead the revolts 
even though in the end the great majority did not participate in the struggle.l2~/ 
As we have seen, this was the policy which Gianfrancesco had been preparing since 
the beginning of the year. 
This, however, was a very large scale campaign and consequently 
128/ 
required large resources to draw upon. - Not only did Carmagnola ask for 
300 'balestrieri' and a large number of bombards from the 'Cento di Guerra' 
to conduct the siege, but he also asked for a sum of 25,000 florins to be 
provided in order to compensate the citizens for any damage done. This was 
essential to gain the goodwill of the citizens and to ensure the permanence of 
Venetian influence in a city which had frequently changed hands. 
--- 179. 
The siege of Brescia also demonstrated an important development 
in the specialisation of warfare which was to become more pronounced as the 
century progressed, and because of the considerable cost of siege artillery, 
this meant that there was an increasing dependence upon, and control by, the 
state. 
Another important aspect of the siege of Brescia is the importance 
of field fortifications and earthworks. For instance, the trench dug around 
the city by Tolentino, an expert in this field, was frequently to be imitated 
later on in the century. This is yet another example of how these wars were an 
important point of departure for new techniques.12~/ 
An advance contingent of 800 infantry was sent into the Bresciano, 
and Carmagnola and the provveditori followed soon afterwards with more 
infantry and cavalry. The main onslaught was to take place on 17 March 
when the sympathisers within Brescia engineered the entry of this force under 
cover of night at the porta dell'Albera in the Canton Bagnolo. The Ducal 
forces were taken unawares and were dispersed throughout the Bresciano and 
there was consequently very little resistence. Carmagnola raised the 
Venetian standard, bridges were thrown over ditches, scaling ladders were 
130/ let down over the walls and popular support was roused. - This support 
was an important part of the plan because the Bresciani had been thinking for a 
long time of going over to Venice. 
On 14 March Carmagnola had briefly returned to Venice in order 
to appraise the Senate of his plans and also to collect together the remaining 
troops in the Trevisano. 13!/ Gianfrancesco was thus left to finalise 
preparations in Mantua and when the siege began it was Gianfrancesco's task, 
to back up Carmagnola's efforts. 
Unfortunately, the plan was not totally successful. Although 
the 'rocca' of S.Nazzaro was occupied the two citadels were in Milanese 
hands. On the following day reinforcements arrived commanded by Antonio 
da Landriano.13~/ A force of 1,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry sent by 
Gianfrancesco was waiting at Mompiano and entered the city by the Porta 
dell'Albera. 131/ However, despite such a massive effort, the arrival 
180. 
of Francesco Sforza on 21 March gave added encouragement to the beleaguered 
134/ 
,ducal forces. - Sforza replaced Landriano as overall commander. Their 
plight was still very serious indeed and Carmagnola and Gianfrancesco exerted 
so much pressure on the Milanese that after the capture of the Citadella 
, I 
Vecchia, and the rocche of Torlonga and S.Alessandro, they were shut up in 
the Citadella Nuova which had been greatly strengthened by Filippo Maria. 
It was protected by strong walls and a large ditch. 
After the dramatic opening the first campaign settled down to a 
long period of siege. In fact, the Citadella Nuova only surrendered on 22 
September 1426. However, in March it did not seem to the Venetians that the 
siege was likely to last long because Sforza's supplies were not particularly 
Plentiful.13~/ Nevertheless, the events of that month were such that there 
were great festivities in Venice. The occupation of Brescia was the prelude 
136/ 
to an extension of Venetian power into the Bresciano. - It was not 
surprising, therefore, that the unexpected resistence of the Citadella 
Vecchia appeared more and more as the running sore of the war and the Senate. 
was anxious to complete the task as quickly as possible. So was Gianfrancesco 
for more immediate reasons. 
181. 
The role which Gianfrancesco played in the siege of Brescia 
has been the subject of some argument among chroniclers and commentators. 
Of course the Mantuan writers Platina and Possevino had argued that his role 
in the affair was instrumental. 132/ While such views tend to overestimate 
Gianfrancesco's part, there is an element of truth in them, however. Just 
as his advice had been extremely important in the preparations for the campaign, 
as we have seen, it was intended by the Venetians that he should play a 
significant role in the events of the siege themselves. There can, of course, 
be no doubt that the overall conception of the siege was Carmagnola'sJ his 
previous experience in this respect made that inevitable; but the known 
facts about the progress of the siege now lead us to reassess Gianfrancesco's 
importance in the light of the remarks we have made above. 
Even though the two men had known each other for a relatively 
short time, it was inescapable that the siege and liberation of Brescia would 
have to be a jOint effort between Venetian and Mantuan troops. There is much 
to indicate that from the very beginning Carmagnola held Gianfrancesco in 
high regard and had been particularly impressed by how well organised the 
preparations in the Mantovano had been. There is every cause to believe 
that he regarded Gianfrancesco as a second in command in the fullest sense 
of the word, and was quite willing to entrust him with tasks commensurate 
with the responsibilities of that office. The siege of Brescia involved 
basically two components; the Citadella Nuova and the Porta delle Pile. 
After the first attempts to take the citadel by storm had failed 
and the prospects of a quite lengthy siege became more and more likely, 
Carmagnola became more interested in taking the Porta delle Pile in order 
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to conquer its adjacent 'borgo' which still held out for the Milanese.13~/ 
This was at the end of March and the very beginning of April 1426. Carmagnola 
even then had sufficient confidence in Gianfrancesco to leave him in charge 
of the main centre of operations. 
His experiences earlier in Bologna must have stood him in good 
stead because he seemed to have conducted himself very well indeed; so well, 
in fact, that when Carmagnola, unable to complete his part of the operations 
because of hLs old war wounds,132/ asked leave of the Venetians to go to Abano 
140/ to take the waters, Gianfrancesco was left in sole command of the siege. -
Before Carmagnola left on 5 April the Senate wrote to Gianfrancesco confirming 
this officially and asked him, in addition to conducting the siege itself, 
to undertake a number of operations in the vicinity where and when the 
141/ 
opportunities should present themselves. - This, apart from presenting an 
ambitious man like Gianfrancesco with a marvellous opportunity to show his 
worth, was also a valuable occasion for the Senate to observe how Gianfrancesco 
could cope with the special problems of overall responsibility. In fact, 
this was to be the first of two occasions when this occurred. Gianfrancesco's 
actions were to be very closely supervised. The senate also approved of 
Gianfrancesco's plan to send Ludovico de Michielotis to protect his southern 
borders in order to prevent any further crossing of Milanese troops from the 
142/ Romagna. -
Raulich, in his account of this first Lombard war, was not 
very complimentary of the way in which Gianfrancesco conducted himself. 
He stated: "La breve assenza del Carmagnola fece indugiare la espugnazione 
della fortezza ••••• se le forze dei viscontei fossero state pur numerose, 
Brescia sarebbe stata perduta per gli alleati".142/ The last point he 
makes is valid enough but he has been unduly harsh on Gianfrancesco. First 
of all Carmagnola's absence was certainly not brief. In fact, he did not 
leave Venice for Brescia until 13 May, over a month later.14~/ There is 
no evidence that the Senate was urging him to hurry back to Brescia. In 
fact, he is reported to have remained in Venice for more than a week before 
183. 
returning to the siege. Had things been going badly the Senate would hardly 
have permitted this. It almost seemed as though it was anxious to give 
Gianfrancesco as much time on his own as possible in order to gain as much 
experience as he could. 
As to the contention that Carmagnola's absence prolonged the sieg~ 
there is no evidence to prove that Gianfrancesco was lax or incompetent 
in carrying out his duties. On the contrary he carried out the Senate's 
instructions to the letter and his enthusiasm and energy in the conduct 
of his duties is attested by Venetian and Milanese writers alike. For 
instance, Sabellico described Gianfrancesco as 'viro impigro' and is very 
complimentary about how effectively he assumed command: "Quo absente (Carmagnola), 
ductu et auspiciis Gonzagae ita impigre omnia administrata dicuntur, ut 
. 145/ Imperatoris in nulla re des~deraretur praesentia". -
Gianfrancesco's own achievement was all the more commendable 
because he was up against a very experienced opponent and Sforza hoped to 
capitalise upon the absence of Carmagnola by redoubling his efforts against 
the besiegers. Even the Milanese chronicler Billia has a word of praise 
for Gianfrancesco's determination in withstanding these forays: "Nec Cotignola 
quietos finebat, nullum omnino diem ab eruptione cessare, mireque illius 
juvenis virtus per omne id tempus eminuit, ut saepe nee dimidio, quem diximus, 
equitatu ad intima quoque castra prodierit, reductis frequento numero ex hoste 
146/ 
captivis, ac plerumque trucidaris, si qua forsan pertinacius accurrissent." -
184. 
Above all, Gianfrancesco could afford to be well pleased with 
his first efforts at Brescia; they certainly gained the admiration of 
Sforza and was the beginning of a relationship of mutual respect between the 
two men even though they were on opposite sides. Far from prolonging the 
siege, Gianfrancesco had succeeded in tightening his grip on the city and the 
whole experience was a great fillip to his self confidence. 
Moreover, he had felt sufficiently secure of his own position 
to conduct a very successful campaign in the area around B~escia. Carmagnola's 
plan had included the conquest of the mountainous regions to the north of 
Brescia, including the Riviera di Salo, an area which especially affected 
one of the most delicate points in the Mantovano. During the month of April 
Gianfrancesco succeeded in strengthening allied presence together with most 
of the important castles in the Riviera del Garda. 1421 This was also very 
welcome for the venetians because it relieved the threat to the Veronese. 
Gianfrancesco was also very active to the south of Brescia. 
Towards the end of April he launched a vigorous attack against Quinzano with 
a force of around three thousand cavalry. Quinzano was situated on the 
Oglio on the border between the Bresciano and the Veronese. Despite 
its relatively small size there was a considerable degree of resistance.14~1 
There were two main reasons for this; Quinzano was not only an important centre 
of communications with Cremona, it was a base for provisioning the ducal 
149/ 150/ troops. - The spoils of this victory, therefore, were considerable, -
and also demonstrated Gianfrancesco's intelligent appreciation of the strategic 
advantages inherent in this success. Apart from interrupting enemy 
communications, control of this area on the borders with the Mantovano gave 
Gianfrancesco added personal security while at the same time pushing ~enetian 
influence forward to the banks of the Oglio, an important staging point 
in the overall strategy of the war. 
When Carmagnola returned to the siege, then, he took over a 
favourable situation15!/ but, although Gianfrancesco had accomplished his 
185. 
tasks admirably, the same could not be said of Niccolo d'Este. He had not 
been successful in preventing the passage of ducal reinforcements under 
the command of Angelo della Pergola from transferring to Lombardy. This 
could certainly have had an adverse effect upon the course of the siege if they 
were able to relieve Sforza. By the beginning of May the army had already 
152/ . 
reached Parma, - and Sforza was ordered to join up with th~s force at 
Montechiari. All these movements are yet another illustration of how well 
Gianfrancesco had anticipated what was going to happen when he planned the 
fortification of the area. 
Carmagnola's encounter with these forces was indecisive but the 
initial effect of the army which had man~ged to bypass Este was negligible., 
The fact that Carmagnola turned to Brescia to continue the siege would 
indicate that to him the Milanese army posed no immediate threat. It is 
evident from Carmagnola's actions that even in his declining years he was 
generally able to maintain a correct sense of military priorities. His 
movements always appear to have been carefully considered even though he was 
increasingly criticised for his slowness of action by the Senate. He clearly 
appreciated the fact that Brescia was the nodal pOint from which he could 
radiate outwards and reinforce his foothold in" the Bresciano, a policy which, 
up to this point, Gianfrancesco had played an important part in accomplishing. 
After Garmagnola's return to the front, Gianfrancesco resumed his supporting 
lH6. 
role. For instance, on 1 June it was reported that Guido Torello with 
a force of 4,000 cavalry and 3,500 infantry together with a large contingent 
of Genoese 'balestrieri' was on his way to Brescia. In order to counteract 
this Carmagnola immediately assembled a force of roughly the same size and left 
Brescia in the hands of the P~ovveditori. Gianfrancesco's task was to 
command a similar force and hold himself in readiness in case he should be 
needed. In the end, such a strong venetian offensive resulted in Torello's 
returning to Montechiari and the danger being temporarily averted.1S~/ 
These land operations were amply complemented by the successes 
of Bembo and the Po fleet which, after destroying bridges and fortifications 
at Cremona, were proceeding to capture the fortresses of Maccastorna and 
Castiglione. This is a~classic example of the art of river warfare at which 
the Venetians excelled, due in no small part, to a long history of naval 
expertise; and was to have the double effect of securing communications 
and providing a natural barrier against the enemy. Although Lombardy is 
practically the only place in Italy where such tactics could be successfully 
applied on such an extensive scale, it is an excellent example of an effective 
and methodical use of terrain. The Milanese could never match the Venetians 
in this respect, even though, a year later, when their forces seem to have 
been more efficiently organised, their fleet was used successfully to capture 
Casalmaggioxe(17 April 1427). The Manutan fleet, armed according to Bembo's 
own instructions, acquitted itself very well indeed despite the fact that 
154/ 
one galley was captured by the ene~. -
However, certainly up to December of 1426, Milanese fortunes 
were definitely on the wane. In a letter to Sigismund dated 8 July Filippo 
Maria stated that unless help was soon forthCOming his position would be 
very precarious indeed.1S~/ He was also appealing to Alfonso of Aragon, the 
187. 
Swiss and the Duke of Teck for help. It was also at this time that Amedeo 
was gravitating towards Venice, anxious that he should expand his boundaries 
156/ 
eastwards. - Although this would have been a valuable alliance for the 
anti-Viscontean league, Savoyard ambitions were always regarded with a considerable 
degree of circumspection, and, as it turned out, with justification. 
Although Gianfrancesco had been espeCially concerned with the 
security of Viadana, Peschiera and Lonato thus far in the war, he had not 
neglected the central portion of his frontiers. For some time now he had 
been very interested in the town of Asola, which lay on the banks of the 
river Chiese roughly midway between Mantua and Milan. 
Asola had long been a disputed area and possession tended to 
oscillate a great deal. As early as 1335 it had been a Gonzaga possession, 
157/ but in 1405 it had been in the possession of Pandolfo Malatesta. - We 
have already had cause to mention the dispute between Pandolfo and Gianfrancesco 
h f 158/ . .. 1 159/ over t e ortress of Piubega; - a similar s~tuation existed V~8-a-V~8 Aso a. -
Pandolfo was now wanting to redeem his pledge but, judging from Gianfrancesco's 
reply six days later, the situation was rather more complex. Gianfrancesco 
insisted that the 'rocca' of Asola had been sold to himl62/and, moreover, 
that he was quite prepared to allow Venice to arbitrate in the matter if 
161/ 
no arrangement could be reached between them privately. -. It may well be the 
case that in so doing Gianfrancesco was conscious of playing safe in the 
light of his efforts on behalf of Venetian interests. 
This dispute looked as if it was going to go on for some time, 
and the whole issue was finally overtaken by the outbreak of hostilities. 
Eventually, the Asolani themselves decided and at the beginning of June 
188. 
they sent Giorgio Dario the 'capitano del popolo' secretly to Gianfrancesco 
to declare to him their wish to put themselves under his jurisdiction.16~/ 
It is not clear whether they were giving themselves to Gianfrancesco in 
his capacity as Lord of Mantua or as a Venetian condottiere, the evidence 
163/ 
seems at times to be contradictory. - In the final analysis it is probably 
the case that they accepted him in both capacities and Gianfrancesco was 
not slow to take up the offer. On Saturday, 15 June his lieutenant Antonio 
Gattego was sent to receive the fealty of Asola while Mantuan troops 
164/ 
occupied the area, - which included the castles of Remedello, Casalmoro, 
Casalpoglio, Casaloldo, Castelnuovo and Volongo. On 23 June the official 
terms were drawn up in which, under Gianfrancesco's ultimate authority, 
the Asolani were to retain most of their privileges and customs and 
guaranteed them special trading rights with Mantua. 162/ This guaranteed 
a period of greater stability forthe area which remained very loyal to 
Gianfrancesco until 1438. At the end of the month Francesco Sforza did 
try to regain Asola. He camped just outside the town at Lavachiello hoping 
that the population would rally to him. In this he was deluded and because 
the relief of Brescia was a more pressing objective, he retreated on 2 July 
166/ 
after having sacked Remedello 'en route' to the Bresciano. - From now 
on the inhabitants were to make a valuable contribution to the Mantuan war 
effort, not only in Gianfrancesco's army, but also in construction work which 
. 167/ 
was in progress 1n the Mantovano. -
The Doge was delighted at Gianfrancesco's acquisition of the area. 
His letter of 16 June reflects this and he also declared his intention to 
. 168/ 
allow Gianfrancesco to keep these territor1es. - In fact, on 16 March 1428 
Gianfrancesco was formally invested with Asola and its adjacent territories 
by Venice as a gesture of gratitude for Gianfrancesco's valuable contribution 
to the war effort. 162/ However, behind the affable sentiments expressed 
189. 
in these documents lay a very real purpose. Such encouragement and 
reward was a deliberate act of policy on Venice's part in order to 
strengthen the relationship with Mantua still further, and in so doing, to 
strengthen Venice's own position in Lombardy. 
Even before the siege of Brescia had been completed, the 
direction of the war was changing for Venice. The relative ease with which 
operations in the Bresciano and Cremonese had been carried out fired Venetian 
ambitions and was transforming what had been intended as a defensive war 
into an aggressive and acquisitive war. Not only did this affect the 
relationship with Carmagnola, and later on with Gianfranceso, but it also 
affected the relationship with Florence. 
Florence had pursued cautiQus and defenSive war aims, the 
elimination of Milanese influence in Tuscany and Romagna and the checking 
of Milanese hegemony in Northern Italy. As these aims were gradually 
achieved the Florentines were beCOming increasingly suspicious that 
Milanese hegemony was beginning to be replaced by a Venetian preponderance 
170/ 
of power. - To Filippo Maria, too, this was an alarming possibility. 
He was threatened on the Sesia as well as the Adda; BeDgamO was endangered 
along with the Ghiaradadda. Moreover Sigismund could offer nothing but 
words because he had troubles of his own in Bohemia. 
Of course, the Florentines still made a valuable contribution 
to the efforts against Brescia. This was especially true of Tolentino, who 
was an expert in field fortifications and earthworks. The double trench 
dug around the city under his direction was designed to completely cut 
off the besieged from outside help. It was a long and difficult task 
and the time taken to complete it has been variously estimated at between 
th 171/ two and four mon s. -
, 
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Tolentino's relationship with Carmagnola, however, was not 
very harmonious. It has been suggested that there was a conflict of 
. 172/ personalit~es between them, - and that Tolentino was not at all pleased 
with the pressure being exerted upon him by Carmagnola to complete the 
fortifications as quickly as possible. Matters were made worse by the 
lack of supplies for the allies. As late as October, Gianfrancesco was 
complaining of this is to his wife. 171/ It was not surprising, therefore, 
that tempers tended to get somewhat frayed and Gianfrancesco spent some 
time trying to compose the- differences between the two men, and seems 
to have achieved some success,17~/ although it could be argued that this 
discord was symptomatic of the disillusionment which the Florentines 
generally were beginning to feel about the way the war was going. 
By this time the Milanese were aware of the formidable nature 
of Carmagnola's partnership with Gianfrancesco. It did become part of 
Milanese policy to try to split them up, and this was attempted in basically 
two ways. In July Filippo Maria ordered Della Pergola, who up to this 
time had been relatively inactive in Lombardy, to launch a raid into the 
Mantovano in order to see whether or not Gianfrancesco could be drawn away 
f B . 175/ rom resc~a. - This tactic was to be employed later on in 1438 by 
the Venetians themselves. The chroniclers agree that the raid was 
176/ particularly vicious and a considerable amount of damage was inflicted. -
Such a campaign would surely indicate Filippo Maria's estimate of 
Gianfrancesco's worth; but it did not succeed. It was very difficult to 
sustain such efforts while the whole major question of Brescia itself had 
not been finally settled. Although Possevino does mention an engagement 
between Gianfrancesco and Della Pergola, there is no evidence that 
177/ Gianfrancesco ever left the siege of Brescia. - platina does mention, 
however, that Carmagnola moved against him, leaving Gianfrancesco 
178/ temporarily in charge of the siege. - A lack of documentary evidence about 
this makes it difficult to reach any definite conclusion. 
Another way was by repeated efforts to win Carmagnola back to 
his old allegiance. In fact, Filippo Maria never slackened in his efforts 
to do this and by so doing Carmagnola's position and credit with the 
Venetian Senate was compromised. There is a very good example of this 
in June 1426 when such an attempt to get Carmagnola to mediate with Venice 
was reported to the senate. 17_9/ Alth h th S tit t d C rma 1 to oug e ena e ns ruc e a gno a 
give no credence to Filippo Maria's words and Carmagnola, for his part, 
was very anxious to affirm his loyalty to Venice, such events only tended 
to make the Senate more suspicious of his motives and this generally resulted 
in even closer supervision by the provveditori which in turn tended to 
anger Carmagnola more and more. He was forbidden to communicate in any way 
with the Milanese. As this phase of the war wore on, Venetian strictures in 
this respect were to become more and more onerous. 
In fact, Filippo Maria was not only trying to get Carmagnola 
to mediate on his behalf, he also tried to work through Niccolo. d 'Este and 
Gianfrancesco. There is even a reference to his making approaches to 
180/ Paola, - a strong indication of how important a role she played in the 
background of these wars. In fact, it was she who generally took charge of 
her husband's affairs during his absences from Mantua, forwarding important 
correspondence and money and, in the later stages of the war, conducting 
a very full correspondence on her own account. Gianfrancesco was never to 
trust anybody else as much as her, and this meant that she had to remain 
. 181/ in the city often for fairly long periods of time. -
192. 
Despite Gianfrancesco's presence in Brescia, this did not 
mean that he neglected the security of other parts of the Mantovano. In 
fact, his ambassadors had been, and were still, very active in conducting 
negotiations with a number of the smaller adjacent lords. Just like 
Filippo Maria, he also, at the behest of Venice, was using diplomatic 
channels even as hostilities were in progress. 
In the previous March Gianfrancesco's secretary Giovanni 
Tomeo Donesmondi had concluded a successful truce with Francesco della 
Mirandula and the Coreggio brothers Gerardo, Galeazzo and Gilberto on 
behalf of the league.18~/ However, one of Gianfrancesco's main objectives 
was Guido Torello. This was to be a continuing theme throughout the 
courseof the war. Because of the strategic advantages of Guastalla, 
Gianfrancesco never gave up attempts to secure the friendship of Guido Torello, 
and the truce of one month concluded with him on 2 July 1426 is the first of 
a long series. Because the proximity of Guastalla to Mantua made him inclined 
totemporise wherever possible, Torello could also be used by Filippo Maria 
as another instrument of appeasement at a time when he was beginning to 
despair at any prospect of help. 
At the beginning of July Gianfrancesco sent instructions from 
Brescia to his two ambassadors Giovanni da Crema and Galeazzo da Gonzaga 
to confer with Bernardo de'Albertanis on Torello's behalf over the prospects 
of a truce. The final agreement included a mutual suspension of hostilities 
for the month of July together with guarantees of freedom of navigation 
183/ 
along the Po. - At the same time another truce was signed which protected 
184/ Feltrino de Gonzaga's interests in Bagnolo and Nuvolera. -
However, the siege of Brescia continued its weary course 
throughout the summer of 1426 and the Senate was getting more and more 
irritated at this seemingly endless position of stalemate. 1821 Although 
matters seemed to move very slowly indeed the Venetians did begin to make 
more progress in August and September when the Rocca di Porta Pile and 
186/ the Porta Garzetta were captured. - By following up these successes 
very rapidly the pressure on the weakened Milanese forces became so great 
193. 
that the old and new citadels surrendered on 14 and 28 September respectively. 
Despite a last ditch attack by Sforza and Piccinino on 16 September, the 
only barrier to total control over Brescia was the castle itself, obstinately 
defended by Antonio de Landriano. 18Z1 
It was at this crucial stage that Carmagnola once again asked 
leave to attend the baths at Abano. The Senate was not surprisingly shocked 
and tried to get Michiel and Pietro Loredano to dissuade him. However, his 
health at this time seems to have taken a turn for the worse, and in the end 
the Senate had reluctantly to agree to his request. Once again Gianfrancesco 
was left in command, but on this occasion the Senate instructed him and the 
provveditori to proceed with extreme caution in such a delicate situation.18~1 
This second absence of Carmagnola's only lasted about 20 days, but 
it occurred at the point when the surrender of the castle was imminent. 
Carmagnola's last operations before his departure on 20 October were the 
capture of Montechiari and Carpendedolo. This was yet another opportunity 
for Gianfrancesco to prove his worth. On this occasion he had one single 
purpose: concentration of every ounce of his military strength on the 
fortress, and once again he addressed himself to the task with characteristic 
energy and determination. By now his grip on the fortress was growing 
unbearable and Landriano had no more resources to draw upon. In fact it 
has been suggested that Landriano had virtually agreed to surrender within 
a stipulated time if help did not arrive. 182/ On 23 October Gianfrancesco 
wrote to his wife that, after a slow start due to the lack of resources, 
the bombardment was going extremely well. 199/ On the previous day Foscari 
had sent him a letter of encouragement emphasising that Venice had every 
confidence in his abilities. 19!/ 
lY4. 
Finally, on 20 November, after what had seemed to be an interminable 
period, Landriano surrendered to Carmagnola. This was justifiably hailed 
as a tremendous breakthrough and there were great festivities in Venice and 
Mantua. However, Gianfrancesco had played a far more important role in the 
final months of the siege than has been credited to him. His tightening 
of control in the end, combined with the weakening of Landriano's resolve had 
finally achieved their purpose.19~/ In effect, it is very difficult to 
credit Carmagnola with the achievement of the surrender of the castle 
because he had only returned to the siege on 19 NOVember.19~/ As in the 
past he arrived to take control of a situation which had largely been 
created by Gianfrancesco. In fact, we have seen that the crucial moments 
in the whole siege of Brescia had been supervised, and supervised very 
effectively, by Gianfrancesco, and it is worth noting that it was a siege 
194/ 
which Machiavelli was to praise highly. - All that Carmagnola had to 
do in effect was to accept the submission of Landriano and disperse his 
troops into winter quarters in the Bresciano as he had been instructed by 
the Senate. 
-
------ .. -.--------.. _-------
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All in all, on the basis of the evidence available, the 
successful outcome of the whole campaign had shown the Senate that 
Carmagnola's failing health would lead them to place a greater degree 
of responsibility upon Gianfrancesco, a responsibility which he had shown 
himself willing and capable of bearing. In addition to this, Gianfrancesco's 
enthusiastic conduct of the war had confirmed how right Venice was in seeking 
to identify its own policy with Mantua's security. 
It was the fall of Brescia which hastened the peace negotiations 
which up to this point had been proceeding in a somewhat desultory fashion. 
The Pope was quite prepared to mediate and his appointment of Cardinal 
Albergati was a wise choice. The agreement which was reached on 30 December 
1426 after some tough bargaining, however, proved to be nothing more than 
195/ 
a breathing space. - Even a cursory glance at the terms eventually 
agreed upon would indicate that this would never provide a permanent 
solution. Florence gained precious little, but to reach agreement they 
were even prepared to sacrifice their interests in Genoa; in fact there 
were frequent brushes between Florence and Venice over the question of 
the Valcamonica. The cost of the war had been crippling for Florence and 
these negotiations demonstrated just how much the two allies were drifting 
apart. The Venetians had been confirmed in all the territories they had 
acquired in the Bresciano with the stipulation that Filippo Maria should 
vacate all fortresses in this area. Gianfrancesco was given possession.of the 
fortress of Isola Dovarese. The border with the Mantovano had therefore 
been made more secure, but Venice had also taken the first steps in 
territorial expansion across the Lombard plain. 
The Milanese, however, could never tolerate a continued 
Venetian presence in the Bresciano and the valcamonica, and to acquiesence 
in such a state of affairs was an affront to Filippo Maria's 'amour-propre' 
as well as to Milanese morale generally. Anyhow, Filippo still hoped for 
aid from sigismund19§/ and was convinced that he could still win back 
Savoy. It was no wonder that the warfare became endemic when such large 
territorial issues were at stake. Filippo Maria needed only the slightest 
pretext on which to renew hostilities and the war was to re-open when he 
repeatedly refused to honour the treaty by ceding to Venice the castles 
which he still held in the Bresciano.192/ Anyhow, on 27 January 1427 the 
Senate sent Tommaso Malipiero to Brescia with instructions to Carmagnola 
to start making military preparations once again.19~/ By the beginning of 
February Albergati, frustrated by the patent insincerity of the signatories 
199/ 
of the peace, returned to Rome. -
The pattern of warfare was basically unaltered, with the same 
emphasis upon the correllation of river and land forces. However, on this 
occasion the Viscontean forces commanded by Piccinino and Della Pergola 
were better prepared and the commanders were in fuller agreement with 
each other. As far as Milan was concerned this war was one for survival, 
196. 
and to this end Filippo Maria issued a number of exhortations to his 
Milanese subjects to do their best to make up for previous humiliations. 209/ 
The euphoria of such prenouncements was in stark contrast to the grim 
201/ penalties for those who were disloyal. -
The initial Milanese successes in Val Caleppio, Toricelle and 
casalmaggiore in March may once again have been helped by Carmagnola's 
absence for a third time at Abano. On this occasion he spent. some 20 days 
taking the waters, returning to Mantua on or around 15 April. As in the 
previous year, Mantua was the centre of operations and Gianfrancesco's own 
interests were very much affected by the opening moves of the ducal forces. 
In fact, Gianfrancesco had never really been impressed with the peace 
treaty of December and had been anticipating an escalation of the situation 
for some time. On 14 March in a letter to his wife, who at that time 
was staying with her father, Gianfrancesco asked her to return to Mantua 
as quickly as possible because of his imminent departure for venice.20~/ 
197. 
He was asked to go to Venice in order to confer over military preparations and 
was impatient to leave because of the seriousness of the situation. 202/ 
Once again, then, Carmagnola had asked for leave of absence at a 
crucial point in the affairs of Venice. Three fairly lengthy visits to Abano 
during a relatively short period caused the Venetians to feel increasingly 
uneasy about their military commander. The date of his departure for Abano 
is not certain, but it must have been during the first two weeks of March. 
204/ Redusio cites the lOth. - It is therefore very interesting to correlate 
this date with that of Gianfrancesco's summons to Venice. It could be 
argued that this is an indication that the Senate was turning increasingly 
to Gianfrancesco for advice on points of military importance. There is 
little doubt that the month of March 1427 was a very important one indeed 
as far as military preparations were concerned, even before the Milanese 
siege of Casalmaggiore began on 28 March. 
Gianfrancesco in particular was continuing to pursue negotiations 
with Guido Torello in order to extend the truce that had already been signed 
in the previous year. On 16 March a further truce was arranged which 
guaranteed a free passage of the Venetian fleet through the territory of 
. . 205/ Guastalla (while negotiations were proCeed1ng).. - On the following day 
Niccolo d'Este ratified an agreement which had been reached by Gianfrancesco, 
on behalf of the league, with Francesco and Giovanni della Mirandula and 
206/ the Coreggio brothers. - Gianfrancesco's faithful secretary Giovanni 
da Crema continued negotiating with Mirandula until well into April at 
the behest of Este, in order to obtain the best possible conditions. 201/ 
Such agreements were of as vital concern to the security of the Mantovano 
as they were to the interests of the league. 
Venice was also trying to use Paola's position to its own 
advantage. On 18 March Gianfrancesco was at,Luzzara, probably supervising 
the military preparations and he had sent a letter to Venice giving up to 
198. 
date information about military and diplomatic developments. But Gianfrancesco 
was also considering another plan at this time, which he suggested to the 
Doge in his letter. His mind had obviously been turning for some time now 
on what he considered to be the anomalous position of Carlo Malatesta 
in Milanese service, and he was considering the feasibility of using his 
father-in-law's influence in orderto try to woo Carlo away from the Milanese 
alliance; a plan which the Venetians heartily approved of in their reply 
208/ 
of 22 March. - Although this plan never achieved any success, the 
suggestion was nevertheless a very politic move by Gianfrancesco. Even 
thus far Venice's relationship with Carmagnola had been somewhat chequered, 
primarily because there were suspicions of him dealing with the enemy. 
Carlo Malatesta's position in Milan must have been a considerable 
embarrassment for Gianfrancesco, and he was frightened lest the least 
taint of suspicion should fallon him. After all in the previous year even 
Filippo Maria himself had made approaches to Paola in his efforts for peace. 
This suggestion, then, could be interpreted as another attempt by Gianfrancesco 
to assure the Venetians of his continuing loyalty. In fact, as far as Venice 
was concerned, there was no doubt of this; but such an interpretation may 
provide some clue as to the way in which Gianfrancesco's mindwas working ~t 
the time. 
199. 
The siege of Casalmaggiore by the Milanese river fleet 
was amply supported by the land forces of Piccinino and Della Pergola, 
and the Venetian forces, largely dispersed throughout the Bresciano, needed 
reorganising. It was, therefore, an especially difficult task for 
Gianfrancesco, and the Venetians recognised this. On 12 April, just 
three days before Carmagnola returned to Mantua from Abano, they wrote 
to Gianfrancesco and urged him to take care not to commit himself unless he 
was sure of success. In particular he was urged not to attempt a river 
engagement with the Milanese fleet which was commanded, despite Gianfrancesco's 
diplomacy, by Torello, unless there was a "magno avantagio et prerogative a~te 
nostre". 2°2/ Gianfrancesco was instructed to liaise with the provveditori2lQ/ 
and provide as much security as was possible. In addition to this the 
Senate elected to send Andrea Donato as a special envoy to consult directly 
211/ 
with Gianfrancesco and to keep it informed of every new development. -
It also promised to send four more galleys as quickly as possible. There 
is also a hint that the Florentines were not quite pulling their weight. 
In fact, it was urging the Florentine ambassador Marcello Strozzi to hurry 
up preparat1o~s. 
In fact, the Venetians were urging Gianfrancesco to hold his 
fire until a proper muster of troops had been organised, and this occurred 
1 i di 1 f C l ' t to the Mantovano.2l~/ The a most mme ate yater armagno a s re urn 
Senate tried to hurry Carmagnola up after an army of 16,000 cavalry and 
6,000 infantry had been gathered together and after plans with Gianfrancesco 
and Michiel had been finalised.2~~/ 
However, while discussions over the feasibility of a land 
rather than a river campaign were under way, the Milanese captured 
Casalmaggiore on 29 April and sailed on towards Brescello. The failure 
to retain Casalmaggiore was a grave blow and Carmagnola was accused of 
acting too slowly, despite his complaints of a shortage of supplies. In 
fact, it could be argued that from this point Carmagnola's relations with 
the Senate began their long period of decline, while Gianfrancesco ever 
seemed to be the star in the ascendant. Certainly there was a stark 
contrast between Casalmaggiore and the surprising success at Brescello 
where Gianfrancesco together with Contarini, Michiel and Bembo defeated 
Pasino Eustachio, the ducal fleet commander even in the face of a land 
attack from Piccinino. 2l!1 This permitted an attack on Cremona and Bembo 
even aimed at Pavia but was later forced to retire to Brescello again. 
However, the banks of the Oglio were now threatened by the Venetians. 
Under the supervision of the two new provveditori Morosini and 
Michiel, the campaigns of May and June were directed towards securing the 
venetian position in the Bresciano. Gianfrancesco was involved in this 
together with Carmagnola and Tolentino. On 19 May they tried in vain to 
recapture Montechiari but succeeded in such places as Calvisano, Quinzano, 
Longhena, Orcivecchi, Codignano, Pompiano, Verola and MaClodio. 2l21 These 
were all areas bordering on the Mantovano. 
200. 
Despite the setback at Gottolengo2l§1 the Venetian forces gradually 
pushed forwards towards the Og1io and Binanova was an important staging point 
for this. Judging from the dates of Gianfrancesco's lette~to Paola, 
mainly requests for money, we can see that his movements follow exactly 
217/ those of Carmagnola. - It would seem that he was present at the recapture 
of Casalmaggiore on 5 July, and was also charged with patrolling and 
protecting the crossing pOints over the Oglio into the Cremonese. 
During these months Gianfrancesco had been involved on his 
own account at Sabbioneta. After the capture of Asola in the previous 
year Gianfrancesco had been anxious to incorporate ,Sabbioneta which had 
been assigned to Giorgio, Giacopino and Rinaldo Persico by Filippo Maria 
on 3 January 1422. It would appear that this had been done deliberately 
to prevent any encroachments by Gianfrancesco. In fact the Persico had 
insisted on the inclusion of Rivarolo Dentro, Commessaggio and San Martino 
218/ delle Argine for this very reason. - In a sense the possession of 
Sabbioneta arose naturally from Asola and Viadana, and was also the logical 
extension of the campaigns against Casalmaggiore and Brescello. 
The campaign to expell the Persico had been going on since April. 
On the 25th there had been an engagement with Mantuan troops near Castel 
Fusano. A Mantuan counter-attack pursued the enemy into the marshy Valle di 
Casalbellotto where many Sabbionettani were killed including Rinaldo and 
Giorgio Persico. However, owing to the exigencies of consolidating gains 
in the Bresciano Sabbioneta itself was not captured until 1 July after 
a short siege. The valour and initiative which Gianfrancesco displayed 
in this campaign was amply recognised by Venice and he was granted immediate 
219/ posseSSion of the area. - In the peace of 7 June 1431 Filippo Maria 
220/ 
recognised Gianfrancesco's rights in Viadana and Sabbioneta. -
These campaigns to the south-west of Mantua were very important 
for Gianfrancesco's security and carmagnola's intention to consolidate his 
gains in the Cremonese was very valid from a military point of view, this 
201. 
was certainly true of the recapture of Casalmaggiore. Unfortunately 
the Venetian Senate did not think that Carmagnola was pressing forward 
with enough determination. 
202. 
The gravity of the Milanese situation in the summer of 1427 was 
such that the Senate wanted a strong onslaught against the fortress of 
Pizzighettone on the Adda. The campaigns in the Cremonese did not satisfy 
the Senate, especially as it considered that the size of the army, which 
consisted at this time of some 22,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry and 6,000 
'cerne' was sufficient for the task. It was also somewhat disturbed by the 
mercy he was showing to prisoners of war which, incidentally, were kept 
initially in Mantua, and this was a point which was to be reiterated 
with even greater persistence after Maclodio. Even Gianfrancesco, a 
faithful supporter of Carmagnola in his military policy, was at odds 
with him over this point. The new provveditori Fantino Michiel and 
Leonardo~ocenigowere given instructions to approach Gianfrancesco in order 
to get him to encourage Carmagnola either to cross the Adda or to strengthen 
his position around Pizzighettone. 2211 It also seemed that his intention 
or ordering troops into winter quarters in early September was cutting the 
campaigning season unnecessarily short, especially since he was in a position 
to make such headway against the enemy. 
It is not easy to explain Carmagnola's actions here, but they 
cannot be wholly attributed to illness or age. It is easy to agree with the 
criticisms of the Senate, especially over the question of winter quarters, 
but there must have been a valid military reason for his.actions. The 
Senate had, as we have seen, been prosecuting the war with increasing 
vigour and it may well be that Carmagnola considered that Venetian 'raison 
d'~tat' was moving too quickly for military prudence. While it was 
important to capture important centres such as Brescia and Pizzighettone, 
it was also important to secure the surrounding territory. This may well 
explain the methodical, but relatively minor military activities in this 
'od 222/ per~ • - Anyhow, Carmagnola tended to move with caution at the best 
223/ 
of times and was unwilling to risk his men unnecessarily. - There was 
about this, as well as about the freeing of prisoners of war, some of the 
old condottiere mentality which accorded ill with the 'imperialistic' 
policies of the state. It has been important to raise these points about 
Carmagnola's relations with Venice because not only was Gianfrancesco's 
immediate position affected by them, but these were precisely the problems 
which he was to face himself later on. 
203. 
In fact, there was a fierce eight hour engagement at Pizzighettone 
on 30 July which ended indecisively although the chronicler Possevino does 
remark that in the dusty' confusion of battle, Carmagnola was thrown from 
224/ his horse and was rescued by Gianfrancesco in the midst of the enemy. -
The outcome of this encounter, perhaps tended to back-up Carmagnola's 
contention that the Venetians were not yet ready for a thrust across the 
Adda. 
As well as supporting Carmagnola's operations in July, Gianfrancesco 
was once again given the task of winning over people who were discontented 
with Viscontean rule. At the end of the month Orlando Pallavicino of 
Busseto had made tentatiVe approaches to Carmagnola about defecting to the 
225/ Venetians. - When Carmagnola relayed this information to the Senate it 
was they who referred the whole matter to Gianfrancesco. The final agreement 
was reached on 23 July whereby Pallavicino promised to declare himself openly 
204. 
for Venice within a month and would give all possible aid to the Venetian 
Po fleet, in return for his aggregation to the Venetian nobility and the 
promise that all his property would be restored to him which had previously 
been confiscated by the Milanese. 22§/ 
Despite Venetian criticisms Carmagnola continued his policy 
of consolidation throughout the month of August, and achieved a considerable 
degree of success. Most of the operations took place betweenB"inanova 
which the ducal forces had re-taken, and Quinzano. At Gottolengo, at the 
end of August, Gianfrancesco managed to revenge the previous defeat there. 
In a fierce battle against the ducal troops, commanded ironically by Ca%1o 
Malatesta, he managed to drive back the enemy and capture the town. On 
. 227/ 27 August the Doge wrote congratulating Gianfrancesco on his efforts. -
It is, perhaps, an interesting comment on the situation that Carmagnola 
was described as Isoci~m laboris tui l • It was clear that the Venetians 
came increasingly to look on Gianfrancesco as the only man who could spur 
Carmagnola on to greater action; hence the obsession with constant 
consultation between the two men over the plans of campaign. 
Even if the Senate was critical of the way in which the war was 
being conducted it was not apparent to Filippo Maria, however, that there 
was any appreciable lessening of effort on the part of the Venetians. 
In his frequent letters to Sigismund he revealed the desperate nature of 
228/ the Milanese situation. - This tended to encourage a more determined 
effort to secure Savoy, which had deliberately abstained from renewing 
hostilities in 1427. However, the terms which the opportunist Amedeo 
imposed for his adherence were very tough indeed, and revealed the full 
205. 
extent of his selfish ambitions. Not only did he want Filippo Maria 
to marry his daughter, but he also wanted possession of Asti and Vercellil 
demands which Filippo only hoped to escape if Sigismund were prepared to 
help. In fact, Amedeo has been courting both sides during this year. For 
instance, on 20 July his envoy Enrico de Colombiers was sent to Carmagnola, 
an occurrence which the Senate was not at all happy about. In fact, his 
subsequent mission to Venice was not a success. Filippo Maria's decision 
on 2 December to accede to Amedeo's requests is a powerful comment on 
how desperately he viewed his position, especially after he had tried 
delaying tactics with Venice by trying to re-open negotiations with them. 222/ 
Filippo Maria's decision to accept the humiliating terms of 
Savoy was prompted by the success of the Venetians in the remaining months 
of this campaigning season. At the beginning of September Gianfrancesco 
was still in Binanova where the reconstruction of the fortifications was 
still in progress. 23Q/ Furthermore, on 9 September, in a letter to his wife, 
we learn that he was also supervising the question of supplies. After the 
recapture of Casalmaggiore and the river campaign of the previous months, 
the venetian fleet was refitting. Francesco Bembo and Marino Contarini had 
written to Gianfrancesco about the necessity for experienced carpenters 
and sufficient supplies of wood to carry this out. He referred the matter 
to Paola, requesting her to appoint a responsible person to oversee these 
231/ preparations. -
Towards the end of Septe~ber, the army moved away from Binanova 
into the Bresciano once again and the object of this expedition was 
the recapture of Montechiari which was so essential to the security both 
232/ 
of Brescia and the northern sector of the Mantovano. - It would seem 
206. 
for once that the Senate approved of the move, probably because the 
campaigning season was nearly over and it would have been imprudent to 
attempt anything more ambitious. However, although the Senate was 
encouraging Carmagnola on 28 September, there was always now an undercurrent 
of suspicion in its attitude to the Captain General, and the tension caused 
by this, most likely through the close supervision of the provveditori, 
frequently demonstrated itself. 
The siege of Montechiari did not go as well as Carmagnola had 
expected and by the beginning of October a number of his men were very 
anxious to retire into winter quarters in the Veronese. The Senate, 
however, did not approve of this move and, through Morosini, communicated 
to Carmagnola that it was anxious that a major offensive should be launched 
against the enemy before this dispersal of men should take place. It is also 
clear that Gianfrancesco felt the same way because he was not at all happy 
about a strong Milanese presence in an area which still constituted a 
relatively weak link in his chain of defences. In fact, relations between 
Gianfrancesco and Carmagnola at the siege of Montechiari were not always 
of the best. It did not require much perception for Carmagnola to see 
that while he had frequently suffered the censure of the Senate for his 
slowness of action, the Venetians had almost gone out of their way to praise 
Gianfrancesco's actions. This undercurrent of jealousy showed itself in 
minor matters. Gianfrancesco became irritated at the fact tha t Carmagnola 
had not consulted him over the question of negotiations with the besieged, 
and moreover that he had imposed restrictions on the movements of his men. 
Matters became so strained that the Senate instructed Morosini to try and 
. 233/ calm th~ngs down, - and persuade Carmagnola that it was not, in fact, 
showing any undue favouritism towards Gianfrancesco. This was very reminiscent 
of Gianfrancesco's relations with Piccinino in 1438. Anyhow, Morosini's 
207. 
mission seems to have worked because Montechiari was finally taken on 8 
October and on the following day the army moved off towards the Oglio 
in the direction of Maclodio; and it was here that one of the major 
. 234/ 
encounters took place between the two opposing arm1es on 11 October. -
This battle demonstrated that, despite his failing health, Carmagnola 
was still capable of the occasional flash of genius. It was a resounding 
testimony to Carmagnola's military expertise and, from a technical point 
of view, it was a classic of its kind. It was certainly significant as 
far as later fifteenth century developments were concerned and it would 
be useful to pause here and consider the reasons why this is the case. 
Maclodio is yet another example in this war of the successful 
use of terrain in which Carmagnola sought out the most advantageous ground 
and drew his enemy in such a way as to force them to fight on disadvantageous 
terms. In fact, this was the very strategy which Diomede Carafa was to 
enlarge upon nearly 200 years later. 232/ Carmagnola had made careful 
preparations and the tactics he employed show this encounter to be, in 
reality, a well-planned ambush. Carmagnola chose the most advantageous 
poSition for himself on otherwise marshy ground and used every inducement 
to draw his enemy onto the marshes. Such swampy conditions and the autumn 
mists would be a decided advantage to troops which had been favourably 
placed before the action began. There were men concealed on all sides 
so that the enemy could be surrounded when it was enticed sufficiently far 
into the swampy terrain. Carmagnola even had raised causeways built to 
tempt the enemy into a poSition where it would be most vulnerable to the 
line of fire, which consisted in large part of crossbows mounted in threes. 
Both ~olentino and Gianfrancesco commanded a reserve army of about 2,000 to 
236/ prevent any retreat. -
208. 
The Milanese commander Carlo Malatesta fell for the trap that 
had been so carefully prepared for him and the battle turned into a rout. 
Surrounded on all sides the ducal troops were thrown into complete disorder 
and many sought refuge in flight. The Venetian army gave chase and pursued 
the defeated army as far as Orcinuovi on the Oglio. 
Once again, the technical expertise of Tolentino contributed a 
great deal to the victory, but so did Gianfrancesco. In charge of a 
detachment of cavalry, his vigorous attacks upon the enemy had been very 
effective indeed. 232/ 
In a letter to Sigismund, Filippo Maria summed the situation 
up perfectly: "in qua confusione plurimis ex nostris remansere captivos 
(around 8,000) 'et una cum eis magnificus locumtenens noster Carolus Malatesta, 
238/ 
sed ceteri onmes capitanei et ductores nostri evaserunt." - However, 
although this battle was a grave setback to Milanese fortunes and was 
significant from a technical point of view, in purely material terms its 
importance has been overestimated. The release of prisoners of war 
either on the same night or on the next day certainly shows the old 
condottiere mentality, and the restitution of the men and their commanders 
could be taken to detract from the ultimate impact of the battle, but 
although there may have been some murmurings by the Ven~tian Senate and the 
Florentines, Carmagnola could hardly have been expected to keep prisoners 
in close captivity for any length of time and the fact that the Mantovano 
was the most convenient place to keep them could not have been gratifying 
to Gianfrancesco. At least arms and ammunition had been captured, even 
though it is surprising how quickly these were refurbished by Milan when 
the liberated troops returned to active service. 
209. 
The fate of Carlo Malatesta was once again an embarrassment 
for Gianfrancesco. The Senate reserved the right to dispose of the 
most important prisoners. His movements after his capture are none too 
clear, although it is highly probable that he was transferred to Venice. 
Platina states that he was then transferred to Mantua due to the 
intercession of Gianfrancesco but was only subsequently released after 
the peace had been concluded in 1428. 232/ There is, however, no documentary 
evidence to bear this out. 
When the news of the victory reached Venice on 15 October there 
were great celebrations, 242/ and two days later Giorgio Cornaro and Sante 
Venier were sent to the army to offer the congratulations of the Senate on 
such a glorious Victory. 241/ This was precisely the sort of achievement 
which Venice wanted to close the campaigning season with. 
As always, the Senate was anxious to show its appreciation in 
material terms, and this victory was to bring its rewards for Carmagnola and 
Gianfrancesco. Carmagnola was granted Pandolfo' Malatesta's former house in 
Venice together with the posseSSion of Castenedolo in the Bresciano. 
Gianfrancesco, too, was rewarded with what was described as a 'beautiful 
and honourable house' on the Grand Canal at S.Pantaleone valued at 
6,500 ducats; a reward which demonstrated how highly his services in the 
242/ 
events of the battle were regarded. - This, as well shall see, was 
supplemented by grants of land in the peace of Ferrara in the following year. 
The Senate, however, soon complained that the battle of Maclodio 
was never effectively followed up before the Milanese could remarshall 
their forces. There was still the possibility of b~ing able to cross the 
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Adda and take the war into the Milanese itself24~1 or at least to 
concentrate on the area around Treviglio and the Ghiaradadda. However, 
Carmagnola was never contemplating an extreme action. In fact, there is 
nothing to suggest that Carmagnola considered Maclodio as being of any 
outstanding significance. As always, he demonstrated a firm grasp of 
realistic military objectives and his actions after Maclodio can be 
seen as a further consolidation of occupied territory before retiring into 
winter quarters. 24!1 
In fact, by December 1427 Filippo Maria was in an almost identical 
position as in the previous year with the Venetians in possession of the 
245/ 
entire Bresciano and considerable portions of the Bergamasco and Cremonese. -
As far as he was concerned the time had come for another truce in which to 
take stock of what had happened and to try again to construct a network 
of alliances. Florence was also tired of wars which did not benefit her 
and Martin V now became increasingly alarmed at the extent of the Venetian 
acquisitions. Only Venice proved rather more reluctant to negotiate; the 
taste for acquisition had turned to greed for more, but even here an interval 
was clearly desirable if only to reassemble and overhaul its forces in 
preparation for the next period of hostilities. After all, the cost of 
such a war had to be considered. In fact, it has been estimated that up 
to the beginning of 1428 the war had cost 2,500,000 ducats. 24§/ 
At the beginning of November Albergati once more mediated in 
discussions between the two sides at Ferrara. The fact that an agreement 
was not reached until the April of the following year is itself an 
indication of the difficult and often frustrating wranglings which took place. 
--
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Although Gianfrancesco was not personally involved in the 
negotiations, he was concerned very much with their results. During 
the course of the lengthy and involved discussions he was kept constantly 
informed by his close friend and colleague Niccolo d'Este of developments. 
In the detailed correspondence which survives for this period, it is 
possible to trace the development of the eventual peace proposals. 
248/ During December of 1427 Gianfrancesco turned back to Mantua, -
but at least on once occasion he was in Venice. Not only would it be 
easier to keep track of events in Ferrara, but the Senate would also be 
able to consult him on matters of common interest. There is every 
indication that Gianfrancesco was very anxious to capitalise upon the 
high esteem in which he was held in Venice. This would partly account 
for Gianfrancesco's plan to discuss the possibilities of his son 
Ludovico joining Uenetian service. 
On 30 December he wrote to Paola to inform her how pleased he 
was that the Venetians had agreed to his proposal. With both father and 
son actively involved in the interests of Venice there could be little 
doubt of the loyalty of Mantua in the years to come. 242/ It is perhaps 
no mere coincidence that this occurred at a time when the Venetians were 
expected to be protecting Mantua interests at Ferrara. 
From the beginning the peace conference was beset with 
difficulties 1 in fact it was an achievement to get the discussions started 
in the first place. On 21 November Este wrote t.o Gianfrancesco complaining 
of the delays and including in his letter copies of the Milanese ambassadors' 
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requests, which at that time were irreconcilable with the demands of 
the allies.25~/ The Milanese had no intention of surrendering their 
possessions in the Bresciano and Bergamasco; in fact they demanded that 
they should be returned "in pristinum statum".25~/ 
On 29 November, the situation remained unchanged, with neither 
side prepared to give way at all, especially the Venetians who were 
252/ 
regarded by the Milanese ambassadors as the real agressors in the war, -
a telling comment on the new orientation of the Lombard wars. 
It was certainly the case that even while the negotiations were 
in progress the Venetians were still holding ~n as strongly as ever to their 
acquisitions in the Bresciano and Bergamasco and were concentrating on 
taking as many small fortresses in the area as possible. 
In February 1428, after a somewhat uncomfortable winter with 
his family in Brescia, Carmagnola for the third time requested leave to 
go to Abano. On 23 February the Senate agreed willingly to his request, 
but on this occasion asked specifically that he should write to Gianfrancesco 
informing him that he was to assume temporary command of the city and of the 
253/ troops in the Bergamasco. - Gianfrancesco was to be assisted in Brescia 
by Pietro Loredan. Carmagnola was not to return to Brescia until 29 April, 
well after the peace was concluded. Nothing of any consequence occurred 
during Gianfrancesco's third tenure of command. Such operations as there 
were, were very small scale with the Venetians trying to prevent Piccinino 
taking small castles in the valleys of the Bergamasco. 
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The period immediately before the signing of the peace was 
an anxious time for Gianfrancesco, but if he had any doubts as to whether 
or not Venice had his interests at heart, these doubts were dispelled by 
the official investiture with all the lands he had captured during the 
course of the war around the area of Asola. 25!/ All this was completed 
. 255/ 
on 16 March and was confirmed in the follow~ng May. -
256/ 
When the agreement at Ferrara was finally reached on 17 April, 
it was clear that this was again not a solution to the war. On 22 April 
Este confidentially sent a copy of the terms to Gianfrancesco and piously 
257/ hoped that this would see an end to the conflict. - Venice kept the 
Bresciano and nearly all the Bergamasco together with important footholds 
in the Cremonese and Filippo Maria was to promise not to interfere in the 
affairs of Tuscany and Romagna again. Visconti could never reconcile 
himself to such heavy losses. In a letter of 30 May 1428 to Sigismund 
he affirmed that an agreement made under such duress could not really 
be binding. Similarly, Venice had not completed her territorial aims; 
there were still gaps along the river Adda - Caravaggio, Lecco, Trevig1io 
and the Ghiaradadda. In these respects the terms of Ferrara contain the 
germs of future conflict. MoreOVer, the Milanese presence in the Cremonese, 
and especially around Toricella, meant that Gianfrancesco could never relax 
his vigilance because this area directly threatened casalmaggiore. 252/ 
In addition to this Filippo Maria's untiring efforts to win over Carmagnola 
continued to be a matter of grave concern to the Venetians, especially as 
policy was now increasingly directed towards an overt expansion into the 
Milanese. 
IV 
The Downfall of Carmagnola 
In the years up to the peace of Ferrara we have seen that 
Gianfrancesco played an important role, not only in ably assisting 
Carmagnola, but also in demonstrating promising qualities of leadership 
and initiative. Over the next three years, however, he maintained a 
much lower profile, although he was not completely inactiVe. 
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Anyhow, the peace of Ferrara was followed by two rather uneasy 
years of armed peace, and it was only a question of time before the war 
started up again. Even as early as October 1428 Venice sent Giorgio Cornaro 
to Milan to complain about Filippo Maria's reinforcing of his frontiers 
and his continually threatening behaviour towards the Pallavicini and Arce11i. 
It may be said, however, that Venice was guilty of similar action, and the 
summer of 1428 saw the fortifications of such centres as Bina, Iseo and 
Montechiari, all areas with which Gianfrancesco was intimately concerned. 
During this period Gianfrancesco's role was what it had been in the early 
twenties, of exercising a considerable amount of vigilance along the border 
areas and reporting the slightest movements to Venice. 
The Venetians were also active on Gianfrancesco's behalf in 
other areas. It is important to remember that one of Gianfrancesco's 
dearest wishes was to obtain an Imperial title which had originally been 
granted to his father (in 1403) by Wenceslaus but which had been invalidated 
by the Emperor's deposition. In the Mantuan Chancery Minutes for 1428 there 
exists a copy of a letter which had originally been sent by Marco Dandolo who 
at that time was Venetian ambassador to Sigismund which deals with this very 
matter. 
On 17 July a truce had been concluded between Sigismund and 
260/ Venice which was to last for two years. - This had largely come about 
owing to the rather unsuccessful war he had been waging against the Turks. 
Clearly Sigismund did not wish to have Venice as his enemy at this time. 
Venice, therefore, was in a position to capitalise upon this position and, 
anxious to show its concern for Gianfrancesco's interests in instructing 
Dandolo to confer with the Emperor over the question of the Marquisate. 26!/ 
Dandolo was urged to press very hard regarding this matter and 
to get Sigismund to agree to the same terms as WenceslausJ and to this 
. 262/ 
effect the Doge included a copy of the priv11ege of 1402. - These, 
therefore, were serious negotiations. The only stumbling block was the 
somewhat excessive price of 20,000 ducats which Sigismund was demanding. 
Dando10 was asked to try to beat the price down as much as possible -
"vos aut em habeatis omnem diligenciam et considerationem possibi1em ac 
263/ faciendum in hac re i11am minorem expensiam quam poteritis". - These 
negotiations were to proceed, on and off, for the next three or four years 
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and, as we shall see in the next Chapter, it was largely due to the untiring 
efforts which Venice made that Gianfrancesco gained his Imperial title. 
It was such efforts which provided a powerful incentive for continued loyalty. 
On Venice's part, as well, it became of paramount importance to 
keep Gianfrancesco as happy as possible when there was a further deteri9ration 
of relations with Carmagno1a. It was in these years that the Senate, after 
showing remarkable patience, gradually came to the conClusion that Carmagnola 
was not the right man for the job of taking the expansion of the terraferma 
to its ultimate conclusion and turned instead to Gianfrancesco, who ironically 
took very little part in active campaigning. 
The disillusionment tend-ed to affect Carmagnola as well. His 
health was failing rather badly now, and this fact combined with the 
criticisms of the Senate, induced him to proffer his resignation in 
January 1429. It may well be that the occasional differences of opinion 
with Gianfrancesco played some part in the decision even though for the 
most part the relationship had been a cordial one. 
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This was a marvellous opportunity for the Senate. Why, then, did 
it refuse to accept his resignation?26~/ The question is not easy to answer 
because the public reasons which the Senate gave did not always reveal its 
true intentions. While it is true that his services had been valued highly, 
they were probably very suspicious of Carmagnola's intentions, after all 
Filippo Maria had been trying to get him back, and they were mindful of how 
valuable an asset a man who had been in command of the Venetian army could be 
to the enemy. In a very real sense Carmagnola was trapped, because the Senate 
could simply not afford to run this danger. This is why they got Gianfrancesco 
to intervene with Carmagnola on their behalf and it is to Gianfrancesco's 
credit that on 15 February Carmagnola agreed to renew his condotta with 
Venice on the same terms as before,26~/ but this time for 500 lances and 
with a provision of 500 ducats per month. In warfare of this nature there 
was a debit as well as a credit side to the job as military commander, and 
the fact that Gianfrancesco was to be very closely involved in Carmagnola's 
downfall, even though it was not through his own volition, was to have 
a profound psychological effect upon him. It may well be the case that 
during this period he began to see himself more and more as the next 
candidate for overall command and became increasingly apprehensive of 
finding himself in the same difficulties a~ Carmagnola. 
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The prominent part which Gianfrancesco had played in the wars 
~ 
up to this point had certainly raised his credit elsewhere in Italy. The 
fact that his standing in Venice was high tended to upgrade the value of 
his support in diplomacy and there were people who were willing to capitalise 
upon this. With negotiations well under way with Sigismund over the 
question of the Imperial title there can be little doubt that as far as 
personal reputation and the standing of his state was concerned, Gianfrancesco 
could afford to be well satisfied with his achievements. Although there 
could be no relaxation of vigilance on the western borders of the Mantovano, 
the more peaceful conditions which prevailed in this area, even when Filippo 
Maria temporarily turned his acquisitive eye on Tuscany in 1430, meant 
that he was more free to pursue the arts of peace and diplomacy. The 
presence of Vittorino da Feltre in Mantua had brought considerable prestige 
to the city and Gianfrancesco had for some time been anxious to develop 
this further by establishing a 'studium' in Mantua. Although documentary 
material on this point is rather sparse, it would seem that negotiations 
with Sigismund over this tended to parallel the discussion over the 
266/ Marquisate. - Anyhow Vittorino's activities at the 'Casa Giocosa' tended 
to attract some of the best teachers of his time in the fields of Grammar, 
Dialectic, Greek and Latin, and there are two references in the Gonzaga 
Archive for this period which deal with the appointment of teachers. 
In 1429 Gianfrancesco awarded Mantuan citizenship to Guglielmo da 
Caravaggio and in November 1431 he did the same for Bartolomeo Alboini della 
267/ Volta, both teachers of Grammar. - Gianfrancesco fully realised the 
importance of the prestige which such matters brought to Mantua not only 
within Italy but also abroad. During this period there were quite a 
number of requests to Gianfrancesco that children should be sent to 
2i8/ Mantua for theiF education, something which he tended to encourage. -
This was important, not only for its intrinsic merit, but 
also because it contributed to the total effect of Mantua's emergence at 
this period as an important nodal point in political terms in northern 
Italy. A very good example of this can be seen in the way in which 
Gianfrancesco's help was enlisted in 1429/30 in the difficulties which 
the Malatesta family was having with Pope Martin V at a time when he 
was actively involved in re-establishing papal power in the Romagna. 
The trouble started with the death of Carlo Malatesta of Rimini 
on 14 September l429.26~/ In the previous year he had reached an 
agreement with Martin over the disposal of his lands because he and his 
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wife Elisabetta Varano were childless. Although it was settled with Martin 
that the inheritance should pass to the three illegitimate sons of Pandolfo 
Malatesta of Fano who had died in 1427, this was challenged both by Martin 
and Paola's father, Malatesta of Pesaro, after Carlo's death. 272/ Far 
from agreeing to the succession of Roberto, Sigismondo and Malatesta 
Novello, Martin declared the vicariates forfeit on the pretext of non-
271/ payment of Census. -
All these people had been at one time or another very closely 
associated with Gianfrancesco and it was not unnatural that he should be 
involved in these affairs. On 28 October 1429 Leonello d'Este, 
Gianfrancesco's prospective son-in-law, wrote to Paola a very affectionate 
letter in which he sympathised with her worries over the situation and 
promised her that both he and his father Niccolo would do anything in their 
272/ power to bring matters to a successful conclusion. - Gianfrancesco was 
in a rather difficult poSition in that not only was there a conflict within 
his wife's family, but he did not want to unduly compromise his hitherto 
harmonious relations with Martin. The situation was partially eased by·the 
death of Paola's father on 19 December 1429. 
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On 16 July 1430 Este wrote to Gianfrancesco about the 
difficulties of Elisabetta Varano's situation, of how the negotiations with 
Martin were beginning to drag and that she was anxious for Niccolo and 
Gianfrancesco to intervene in order to speed things up.27~/ Gianfrancesco's 
ambassador in Rimini at this time was Matteo Corrado, a very experienced man 
who was later to occupy the crucial position of Mantuan envoy to Milan some 
nine years later, and he was urging his master to use his influence.27~/ 
During this period Gianfrancesco's envoy to Rome, Francesco de Catabene, 
was certainly exercising some gentle influence on behalf of Elisabetta but 
it would appear from Gianfrancesco's instructions to him that he was also 
relying on Niccolo to do a great deal of the work, 272/ work which Niccolo 
was apparently most willing to do. 27§/ His instructions to Catabene for 
7 February are more explicit, though. He was asked to argue that the 
Malatesta would always be faithful adherents to the Papacy if the vicariates 
were restored to them. 272/ It is, in the final analysis, difficult to judge 
just how much influence these negotiations had upon Martin. The vicariates 
were returned to the three brothers on 1 July 1430, even if in doing so one 
of Martin's demands was the restoration of a considerable amount of land 
to the papacy. This, however, meant a diminution of Malatesta influence, 
and the hostility between the Pesaro and Rimini branches of the family does 
not seem to have been sett1ed.27~/ Although this matter is not particularly 
relevant to the Lombard Wars 'per set, it does provide us with an indication 
of Gianfrancesco's personal reputation, which his achievements in the war 
279/ 
served to foster. -
It could be argued that Gianfrancesco did not press Martin as 
hard as he might have over the question of the Malatesta inheritance; 
but there was a powerful reason for this. In the same instructions to 
Catabene (7 February) Gianfrancesco was involved in negotiations with the 
Papacy which affected him very much more closely and which he was definitely 
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unwilling to jeopardise by being over-insistent on other matters. This 
concerned the prospective marriage of his daughter Margherita to Leonello 
d'Este. 
It is obvious that a man like Gianfrancesco, who was concerned 
about raising the prestige of his state and family, should spend a considerable 
amount of thought over the question of the marriage of his children. In the 
past the close connections with the house of Malatesta had been of some 
importance; and so it was not surprising that Gianfrancesco saw the great 
benefits which could accrue from an even closer liaison with the house of Este. 
Niccolo, by now an Italian 'elder statesman', had made Ferrara into an 
important state; it had been the city in which the peace negotiations in the 
wars were conducted, and Niccolo himself was acquiring the reputation of 
a skilled arbiter. 
Niccolo, however, had been married three times, although Leonello 
was the eldest son, Gianfrancesco wanted to be absolutely sure that he would 
inherit the Marquisate of Ferrara and that Margherita would consequently 
become Marchesa. To this effect in February 1430 negotiations were already 
under way with Martin V, because Ferrara was a Papal Vicariate. ,A few 
months earlier, at the end of 1429, both Gianfrancesco and Niccolo had agreed 
that the Pope should be approached with a view to his granting a Bull which 
was to guarantee Leonello's succession to the Marquisate of Ferrara, Rovigo 
280/ 
and Commachio. - This concern was most certainly caused by Martin's 
policy of resuming his control of the Papal States. Francesco de Catabene 
was requested to add his voice to those of Niccolo's ambassadors, emphas~ng 
the continual loyalty of the House of Este to the Papacy and that Niccolo 
281 
was always prepared to do his duties as far as paying the census was concerned. _I 
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Gianfrancesco was very concerned that this matter should be 
settled as quickly as possible, and this is borne out by a letter which 
he subsequently sent to Catabene on 10 March in which he was criticised 
for not pressing the matter strongly enough.28~/ In fact, there is 
evidence that would lead us to believe that Gianfrancesco was even more 
insistent over this issue than Niccolo himself was. Judging from a 
letter to Gianfrancesco by Niccolo's secretary Jacopo Zi-liolo on 
25 January 1430 it had been Gianfrancesco who had re-drafted the sort of 
283/ document that he wanted the Pope to grant. - Gianfrancesco would have 
liked the Pope to have granted exclusive rights of succession to Leonello, 
but it was doubtful whether the Pope would accede to these terms. 
In the end it was agreed that Leonello should have precedence over any 
other of Niccolo's chi1dren,28~/ and on the basis of this an agreement 
over the marriage was reached on 4 January 1431. Margherita's dowry was 
fixed at 25,000 golden ducats together with possession of the castle of 
Melara on the Po, east of Ostiglia. 282/ All this would indicate just how 
careful Gianfrancesco was over the question of the marriage of his children 
and how mindful of his personal prestige he was in his anxiety that his 
daughter should only marry Nicco1o's acknowledged successor in Ferrara. 
The same was true of his plan to marry Cecilia to Oddantonio da Montefe1tro, 
a marriage which did not materalise owing to Cecilia's desire to enter a 
convent. There were, as yet, no real plans for the marriage of Gianfrancesco's 
eldest son Ludovico, although the name of a daughter of the Marquis of 
. 286/ Cortona had been ra1sed as early as 1428. - However, Gianfrancesco was 
more careful than ever over the choice of a wife for Ludovico and was, for 
the time being, willing to bide his time until a prospective bride commensurate 
with his dignity should present herself. The fact that Ludovico was a very 
eligible young man is in itself proof of the prestige which Mantua enjoyed. 
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The peace of Ferrara proved only to be yet another breathing 
space because Filippo Maria regarded the terms as too humiliating to 
provide anything other than a temporary solution. In 1429 and 1430 he 
was seeking ways to violate this peace and this meant that Gianfrancesco 
could not afford to relax at all. Not only had the Visconti been menacing 
the Marquis of Monferrat, an ally of the league, but his ambassadors in 
Venice were pushing Milanese claims to those areas of the Cremonese 
which had been awarded to Venice in March 1429. This was a matter of 
great concern to Gianfrancesco and not only was he himself frequently in 
Venice to keep track of developments, but he was also being constantly 
. 287/ kept informed by Jacopo Z~liolo from Ferrara. -
In the previous January Filippo Maria himself, anxious to 
appear as innocent and reasonable as possible, had asked Venice for 
negotiations on this subject.28~/ In reality, however, this was just 
another attempt to gain time, the negotiations were never really to' have 
any success. In fact, it became Milanese policy to split the league up -
in particular to divide Florence and Venice. In fact, it did seem that 
relations between Florence and Venice ware not very harmonious; in particular, 
the Venetians were not at all happy about Florence's commitment to the war 
against Milan. 282/ Albergati had been trying his best to keep the peace 
which he had mediated, but by June he too was preparing to leave for Rome, 
a disillusioned man. 292/ 
The war which took place in TUSCany between Filippo Maria 
and Florence over Lucca in 1430 was symptomatiC of the deliberate lengths 
which Milan was prepared to go to. The war itself does not really concern 
, 291/ 
us heze'per se., - but it did tend to place an undue strain on the 
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already fragile relationship between Florence and Venice. In fact, the 
Florentines were very surprised when the Venetians found excuses not to 
292/ 
send the aid which they requested.. - The Venetians complained that they 
could not spare the men at the time and argued that intervention in Lucca 
did not fall within their league commitments. 
The Florentines were particularly alarmed at the presence 
of Francesco Sforza in Tuscan~ . and, to-wards the beginning of June they 
even offered to bribe him with 5,000 ducats if only he would leave Tuscany. 
At that time Sforza was acting merely as an instrument in Viscontean policy, 
but the Venetians were still anxious to get him into their service. In fact, 
on and off, attempts to do so continued right through 1430 and the Doge 
made a special point of trying to get Gianfrancesco involved in this. Judging 
by their subsequent correspondence with each other, there seems to have been 
a relationship of mutual respect between Gianfrancesco and Sforza, a 
relationship between two professional soldiers. This is why Foscari judged 
Gianfrancesco to be so useful in this respect. The first documentary 
evidence of this occurs in a letter of 19 October 1430.29~/ In effect the 
Venetians were only playing Filippo Maria at his own game; but they were 
not successful. They were still encouraging Gianfrancesco as late as 
6 January 1431, about the time that Sforza returned to Lombardy, and 
294/ Filippo Maria's service. - They had already been consulting with 
Gianfrancesco over the fortification of the Mantuan borders around Guastalla 
in the previous month. 
In reality, behind the scenes, Venice was once more p~eparinq 
for war, but war on a much larger scale than ever before. In the late 
summer of 1430 Carmagnola was busy enrolling men, in particular the Lord 
of Faenza, and on 17 August he was recalled to Venice from Brescia to 
discuss plans. Judging from the deliberations of the Senate, the war 
was going to be taken beyond the Bresciano and Cremonese into the Milanese 
't If 295/ ~ se , - and Carmagnola was promised any city he conquered beyond the 
Adda with the exception of Milan itself. The Senate was most anxious 
at this stage to give Carmagnola every incentive to prosecute a vigorous 
war against Milan. 
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Despite the customary gestures of peace from Milan, an attempted 
raid on the castle of Orcinuovi on 4 January 1431 was the pretext for the 
opening of hostilities. Carmagnola's own personal condotta was increased 
296/ to 625 lances - and, on 3 February, Francesco Barbarigo and Delfino 
Venier were sent with orders from the Senate about the overall tactics of 
the war. 
In Sanuto's military list for this stage of the war, however, 
Gianfrancesco's name does not appear. In fact, from now until 1432 he 
was to have a very secondary role to play. At first it would seem somewhat 
curious that this should have been the case. After all, it could be argued 
that his record of success in the earlier stages of the war had been better 
than Carmagnola's. It would also seem to contradict the contention that 
the Senate was grooming him for eventual command. If the Senate was 
suspicious of Carmagnola's fidelity, moreover, why did it entrust him 
with such a crucial campaign and yet not even attempt to involve Gianfrancesco, 
whose loyalty had never been called into question? These are all very 
difficult questions to answer because the documents which have survived 
give no enlightenment. Nevertheless, it is important at least to propose 
a hypothesis based upon the evidence which is available because this 
period had a very important bearing on Gianfrancesco's relationship with Venice. 
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Platina tries to offer some reason for Gianfrancesco's 
relative inaction by suggesting. that he refused Venetian requests 
because of ill-health and also by hinting that the Senate wanted to 
avoid any potential differences of opinion between the two men by placing 
Carmagnola in sole command. 2921 There may well be a certain amount of 
truth in both these assertions but, in the light of analysis made earlier 
in this chapter,it would appear that some of the central issues have been 
avoided. Can a more logical reason for the Senate's action be proposed? 
In answering this two points are very important. Firstly the 
distinction between military commander and his deputy was important to 
the Venetians. Of course, both were expected to carry out the state's 
policy, but the degree of commitment was different. However effective 
Gianfrancesco's work may have been, there was no escaping from the fact 
that the ultimate responsibility, as far as failure was concerned, was 
Carmagnola's. This was the inevitable price which had to be paid for supreme 
command. 
Secondly, the position between Gianfrancesco and Carmagnola in 
Venice's eyes was different in one important respect. Whereas the basis 
of Venice's relationship with Carmagnola was that of a state to a professional 
soldier of proven ability, their relationship with Gianfrancesco was that 
of a state to the ruler of another state in the first instance. We have 
already seen that this latter relationship had many special implications 
for both parties. Gianfrancesco wanted Venice's protection; he was not 
involved in any vast expansionist policy for Manuta. Initially, Venice 
wanted Gianfrancesco's adherence for the protection of the terraferma and 
consequently had to be very careful about the level of cOmmitment required 
from him. This was inherent in the treaty of l42l,and it was clear that 
I 
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he could not be pushed too far. In effect the motivating force of the 
relationship had been largely b~ilt upon a mutual identity of purpose -
the Venice's policy was commensurate with Mantua's security. As we have 
Seen, this situation operated when the war was concentrated in the Bresciano 
and Cremonese. 
In 1431 this situation no longer existed because the war for 
Venice had changed into a struggle for empire with Milan and it would be 
unrealistic in .the extreme to suggest that Mantua had any interests on the 
left bank of the Adda. Now Mantua was no longer the centre of operations. 
298/ In February the Senate decided to send Carmagnola to live in Bergamo, -
and this move in itself is indicative of a change of military direction. 
A bridge was to be constructed over the Adda and ultimately an advance 
was to be made into the Valle San Martino after having secured the three 
important centres of Treviglio, Caravaggio and Soncino. As before these 
land campaigns were to be supplemented by the Venetian river fleet under 
the command of Niccolo Trevisan. 
Gianfrancesco was not involved personally in these campaigns 
because they did not directly coincide with Mantua's interests. This is 
very well illustrated by a letter which Gianfrancesco wrote to the Doge 
on 20 January 1431 from Marmirolo. Judging from its contents Carmagnola 
had sent a letter to Gianfrancesco asking him to send men to partiCipate 
in his campaign, a copy of which, in his usual punctilious manner, he 
despatched to Venice. Normally as second in command he would be expected 
to comply with the wishes of his superior, but on this occasion Gianfrancesco 
felt that he needed to justify himself in the eyes of Venice. He gave 
two reasonS for acting otherwise; firstly, because Carmagnola's request 
came too late and his men were spread out over the Mantovano in such a 
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way that an immediate muster could not be organised, - and secondly, 
because the presence of Sforza near his territories required their 
remaining where they were. 3OQ/ MoreoVer, because of this, he asked 
Venice to send him reinforcements to protect the area which was most 
immediately threatened, Remedello. 30!/ 
As regards Carmagnola's loyalty to Venice, the Provveditori 
would keep a very close watch upon his every move. In fact, the Senate 
seemed perfectly happy that Carmagnola's actions could be adequately 
supervised, and, judging from the records of the Senate, he still had a 
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number of supporters who were anx~ous to encourage him as much as possible. -
Gianfrancesco's role at this time was concerned very much 
with the protection of his territories and this was a role which, for the 
time being, the Venetian Senate were content for him to play.30~/. In its 
correspondence with him for 1430-1 there are no overt exhortations for 
him to join Carmagnola. In fact, his only direct contribution to the war 
effort was to see that the Po fleet was adequately provisioned and that the 
security of the boats was to be guaranteed during their passage through 
his territory.30~/ He was also asked to make fairly regular consignments of 
grain to the troops and to make sure that it was well guarded from enemy 
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attack. - Apart from these small, but nevertheless important, activities, 
much of Gianfrancesco's time was spent in negotiating periodic truces with 
Guastalla and Mirandula. This not only concerned the security of his 
306 
own territory, but were very important for the safety of river communications. _I 
The negotiations with Guido Torello were in progress once more 
in October 1430 and the Venetians were encouraging them. They urged 
Gianfrancesco to try at least to secure the neutrality of Guastalla and 
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wanted him to press Torello not to build any new fortifications in his 
307/ territories. - The discussions resulted in the agreement of 9 December 
in which Torello 308/ acceded to all Gianfrancesco's requests. - The truce 
was to run for one year and three months of 'contrabando'. The Po around 
Guastalla would become neutral territory and all lands which Gianfrancesco 
possessed "de za da Po" were to be safeguarded. In the document of 
ratification dated 22 December Torello also promised that he would comply 
with the Venetian request concerning the fortifications of Guastalla. 30!/ 
This truce was renewed in the following December on virtually the same 
310/ i terms - which also later included the protection of lands which Feltr no 
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and G~acomo Gonzaga possessed in Nivolari and Roli. - Guido Torello 
was never an easy or trustworthy man to deal with, and, judging from the 
conditions he demanded for the truces, he was a shrewd bargainer. Although 
it never proved possible during this period to win him over from Filippo 
Maria, the vulnerability of his lands to the league was a factor which 
Gianfrancesco could capitalise upon at least to ensure that Guastalla could 
not be used as a base for incursions into his own territories. 
The truce with Mirandula which was concluded on 1 May 1431 
was less important than that with Torello, but it was still necessary to 
protect Gianfrancesco's communications with Ferrara. Once again Badoer was 
keeping his masters as fully informed of developments as possible and was 
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relaying copies of the relevant documents to them. - The final 
agreement was to last for four months and one month of 'contrabando'. The 
negotiations were conducted at fairly frequent intervals during the next 
313/ phase of the war. - In a letter which Gianfrancesco wrote to Venice 
on 22 January 1431 we learn that he was very concerned about convincing 
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the Doge of the necessity of this for the protection of his territories.31~/ 
While he was sounding out the possibilities of a truce with Mirandu1a 
on behalf of Venice it would also appear that Filippo Maria was lending 
his encouragement for this to the Mirandu1a brothers, and this was certainly 
part of his policy to stave off hostilities for as long as possible. However, 
doubtful Visconti's motives may have been, at least Gianfrancesco could 
derive some benefit from it for the time being. 
For the purposes of this chapter it is not necessary to examine 
the events of 1431 in any detail. As far as Gianfrancesco was concerned it 
was probably very fortunate that he did play a secondary role, if only 
because of the fact that he would thereby not be associated with Carmagno1a's 
lack of success. 
The aim of crossing the Adda was not achieved, it was not even 
possible for Carmagnola to consolidate his position between the Oglio and 
Adda. In March he failed to take Soncino, primarily because the ducal forces 
had organised themselves more efficiently. On the contrary, now it was 
Carmagnola who was constrained at the end of the month retreat back across 
the Oglio, much to the intense joy of Filippo Maria;IS_/ 
Although the Senate were ·sti11 encouraging Carmagno1a to 
peEsevere, this must have been very disappointing for them. On 13 April 
Fantino Michiel was sent to Carmagnola to consult over future plans and 
it is certain that an extensive river campaign formed part of their discussions. 
Michiel was urging Carmagnola to move as quickly as possible because there 
was information 
troops who were 
that the ducal army was about to be 
316/ 
on their way from TuscanJ. -
reinforced by Piccinino's 
• 
230. 
Unfortunately the plans for coordinated river/land campaigns 
were not successful. On 6 June another attempt to take Soncino was foiled 
by Sforza, a battle in which the Venetians lost some 500 cavalry. 
Although these operations did not directly concern Gianfrancesco, 
the consequences of defeat did make him feel increasingly uneasy. Any 
further Milanese advance would naturally tend to endanger his frontiers once 
more; and as 1431 wore on his anxieties increased. The Venetians could also 
see what might happen and should the war once more be centred around the 
Mantuan borders it became a matter of prime importance to keep Gianfrancesco 
as highly motivated as ever. This may well be the reasoning behind the 
grants of land to him which were made at this time. On 7 June 1431, in 
recognition of his faithful service to the Venetian Republic, Gianfrancesco 
was formally invested with lands in the Cremonese and Bresciano. In the 
Bresciano he was granted Lonato, Solferino, Castelgoffredo, Redonesco, 
Canedole and Ostianol in the Cremonese he acquired Bozzolo, Riparolo de 
Foro, Viadana, Isola Dovarese, Montesauri, Asola with all its appurtenences 
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and Sabbioneta. - In other words, the Gonzaga family were invested with 
all the gains they had made in the wars against the Visconti in perpetuity. 
Now Gianfrancesco had an even greater interest in the protection of this 
strategically crucial area. There always seemed to be an ulterior motive 
behind such moves by the Venetian Senate. 
As it turned out, this bequest came at the right psychological 
moment because on 21 June the Venetian fleet suffered a crushing defeat 
near Pizzighettone against a very strong Milanese force commanded by 
Pasino Eustachio, amply supported on land by Sforza and Piccinino. In 
many ways this could be argued to be the most momentous engagement of this 
phase of the war. Its strategic consequences were much more significant 
than Maclodio. 
Apart from four or five ships, the whole of the Venetian 
fleet was destroyed and the number of casualties was extremely high. It 
has been estimated that 800 died and 400 were wounded.3l~/ 
What tended to make this more serious was that Carrnagnola 
did not move to help the beleagured Venetian fleet when his forces were 
comparatively near. The news of the defeat produced a considerable 
reaction in Venice, but, curiously enough, Carrnagnola was not held to be 
responsible. 3l2/ Trevisan, the fleet commander, however, was sentenced 
to imprisonment. Although Carmagnola's military career was once again 
reprieved, and although for the time being Venetian policy of pushing 
across the Adda had to be modified, this ultimate objective was still 
held to be a realistic possibility by the Senate. 
Very soon, however, Carrnagnola's caution brought him into 
conflict with the Senate. As the campaigning season wore to its close 
he had made some headway in consolidating Venetian power on the right 
bank of the Adda, but it appeared to be vague and piecemeal as far as the 
Senate was concerned, and the dispute he had with the Senate over the 
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issue of going into winter quarters again as early as August tended to 
320/ 
make matters doubly worse. - Possevino even suggests that Gianfrancesco 
was getting critical over carrnagnola's indecisiveness. 32!/ These 
criticisms gained new urgency from the fact that Sigismund's arrival in 
322/ Italy was imminent, - and the Senate was frightened that they would have 
to protect Friuli. In fact, Carmagnola was active there in November 1431. 
The truth of the matter was that Carmagnola became increasingly 
trapped by Venice's political ambitions. Now that Venice had committed 
itself to a policy of expansion there could be no turning back without a 
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loss of face and the inevitable reaction of a much greater threat to the 
Veneto and consequently the Mantovano. Although there is no direct evidence 
that the Senate were considering punishing Carmagnola, it was debating his 
323/ 
actions more and more actively after October 1431. -
It is not at all clear precisely when the Senate decided to take 
action against Carmagno1a. However, by the beginning of 1432 the situation 
was very bleak indeed. Far from pursuing a glorious campaign to the very. 
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walls of Milan the Venet1ans were sorely pressed financially - and, 
moreover, the successes of Piccinino in the Cremonese threatened to obliterate 
all the work which had been achieved in the previous year. Once again 
Gainfrancesco was directly threatened; one by one such fortresses as 
Toricella, Bordolano and Casalmaggiore fell to piccinino and ducal forces 
were once again making raids into the area around Asola, where a great deal 
of damage was being inflicted. As early as January Gianfrancesco was 
relaying information back to Venice via Badoer; in fact he had been continually 
warning Venice against the dangers of this renewed Milanese advance. In a 
letter of 12 January from Venice to Gianfrancesco the Senate tried to pacify 
his growing fears and his alarm that it was not offering him sufficient 
protection. The letter goes on to assure Gianfrancesco of the 'optima 
dispositione' of the Senate towards him and reassured him that it had his 
325/ interests continually at heart. - It even invited him to Venice to discuss 
these matters. 
There is much to indicate that in January Gianfrancesco was 
beginning to feel that the Venetians were not considering his interests, and 
Venice's elaborate assurances would suggest that they, perhaps, were afraid 
of losing his friendship. On 5 January Orlando Pallavicino of Busseto had 
gone over to Filippo Maria32§/ and this action might have made them more 
alive to the possibilities inherent in neglecting Gianfrancesco's interests 
and requests for help. In fact, Battistella has grossly underestimated 
327/ the importance of Gianfrancesco's feelings. - With Piccinino in the 
curcial area Mantua was once more an important element in Venetian strategy 
and Battistella did not appreciate how dangerous it would be if the 
Mantovano fell into enemy hands. Gianfrancesco's close alliance with Venice 
was, at its roots, based upon protection, and if this is no longer operated, 
there could be no guarantee that Gianfrancesco would not listen to any 
overtures Filippo Maria might make. This was only a fear, because 
Gianfrancesco had always been loyal to Venice, but it was nevertheless fear 
which could not be ignored. 
In short, it could be argued that Carmagnola's inaction 
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created a situation which could very well have jeopardised Venice's relationship 
with its most valuable and faithful supporter. This would have been a very 
powerful reason for dispensing with Carmagnola. There has never really been 
any convincing explanation offered for the Senate's sudden decision in April 
to arrest Carmagnola for treason after it had shown itself so surprisingly 
indulgent over what it had regarded as his previous shortcomings. Commentators 
have neglected to consider Gianfrancesco's role in this matter. At the beginning 
of 1432, with failure staring them in the face, Mantua's friendship must have 
appeared more valuable than ever. The political unacceptability of 
Carmagnola's slow and piecemeal strategy might well be rectified and 
Venice's terraferma might be protected much more surely if the Lord of Mantua 
was also Commander of the Venetian army especially since he had proved 
himself so able and energetic in the first stages of the war. Such a display 
of confidence would certainly make the relationship with Venice more binding 
than ever before. 
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This would account, in part, for the role which Gianfrancesco 
played in the events which immediately preceeded the arrest and trial 
of Carmagnola. Before examining these events, however, one important 
proviso must be made. It must be emphasised that although Gian~rancesco 
had been critical both of Carmagnola and Venice for their slowness of action 
as far as his interests were concerned, there is absolutely no evidence to 
suggest that he had any direct complicity in the Senate's plans. On the 
contrary, Gianfrancesco's initial reactions were of shock and surprise. 
It is arguable that, in a very real sense, Gianfrancesco was 
being used by Venice in order to lure Carmagnola into the net which had been 
prepared to him. According to Carmagnola's biographer, the decision to 
bring him to Venice was taken on 29 March, but forceful means were not to 
328/ be used. - It was decided that Giovanni de Imperiis should be sent to Brescia 
with letters from the Senate requesting Carmagnola's attendance at Venice 
for talks over military policy. In order to make this seem more genuine 
it was emphasized that Gianfrancesco would also be present and letters 
were also sent to Gianfrancesco to this effect. Gianfrancesco would have 
seen nothing unusual in this because he had frequently been summoned 
to Venice in the past. Arrangements had, in fact, been made for Carmagnola 
to be arrested and held in Brescia if he failed to comply with the Senate·\s 
request. At the same time letters were sent to such condottieri as Luigi 
dal Verme and Luigi di San Severino who were in Venice's service to continue 
the war against Milan as energetically as possible. Marco Dandolo was 
to preside in Brescia during Carmagnola's absence. 
Carmagnola, obedient to the Senate's request, left Brescia on 
6 April and arrived in Venice on the following day. According to the 
chroniclers he was immediately escorted to the Ducal palace where he 
discovered that the Doge was unable to speak with him that night. When 
329/ he made to leave the palace he was instead escorted to the prisons. -
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On that very same day Gianfrancesco sent a letter to Paola which consisted 
of the following shocked sentence: "lsta hore, primam horam noctis, 
Serenissimum Ducale Dom. detinuit Comitem Carmagnolam." 332/ 
While Gianfrancesco's presence in Venice was part of the 
plan to take Carmagnola unawares, this is not the complete story. If 
the chroniclers are correct Carmagnola hardly had time to see anyone before 
he was arrested. If this was the only reason for Gianfrancesco's presence 
there was no real necessity for it. There were two other reasons for making 
sure of Gianfrancesco's attendance. In the eyes of the Senate the arrest of 
Carmagnola was palpable proof of their desire to punish a man who had not 
carried out their policy and had consequently endangered Gianfrancesco's 
position; in other words, it was designed to show just how solicitous they 
were for Gianfrancesco's safety.· Perhaps more important, or possibly 
as a consequence of thiS, they wished to show immediately what faith they 
had in Gianfrancesco by offering him the supreme command. On 10 April 
he wrote once more to his wife informing her of his unanimous election 
as Captain General of the Venetian army and that, in the company of Marco 
Dandolo and Giorgio Cornaro as provveditori, he was going immediat~Jto 
Brescia to take over where Carmagnola had left Off33!/ Ludovico, his eldest 
son, was to join him with fifty lances. 
The cool and dispassionate way in which Carmagnola.was tortured, 
tried and executed on 23 April 1432 must have had a profound effect upon 
Gianfrancesco, The lesson of what could befall those who were weighed in 
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the balance and were found wanting was one which he never forgot - it 
most certainly lay heavily upon his mind in 1438. 
There can be no doubt that all this was premeditated, and that 
in a sense Gianfrancesco had been presented with as much of a 'fait accompli' 
as Carmagnola. He had been manoeuvred into a position in which ultimately 
he had no choice other than to accept the offer because it would be dangerous 
to refuse. 
On the day following Carmagnola's execution the Doge wrote 
two letters to Gianfrancesco, who by this time had just reached Brescia.33~/ 
Both letters refer to the continuing negotiations with Sigismund over the 
Marquisate. Gianfrancesco's secretary Giovanni Tomei Donesmondi had already 
been negotiating with one of the Imperial secretaries but the Venetians 
now informed Gianfrancesco that they intended to press much harder for a 
successful conclusion. Through Donesmondi they relayed to Sigismund that 
his friendship with Venice revolved very much around the granting of the 
Imperial title and they warned Sigismund that if he should ever withold 
any privileges which he conferred upon Gianfrancesco Venice would never 
reach any agreement with him until those privileges had been restored.33~/ 
In addition to this subtle blackmail, the letters also show 
how pleased they were with Gianfrancesco's presence in Brescia and how 
confident they were that now the outcome of operations would be successful. 
Finally they approved the arrangements which Gianfrancesco had made for 
. 334/ the security of his own territories at this time. -
The timing of these lettelScould not have been better from a 
psychological point of view and they completely bear out the hypothesis 
regarding Venice's motives which was postulated above. Gianfrancesco, 
unwittingly, had not only played an important part in Carmagnola's 
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downfall, but he was also gently but inevitably pushed into a position where 
he was forced to take upon himself the mantle of his fallen colleague and 
hero. 
With the downfall of Carmagnola we have come to the end of the 
first phase of the Lombard Wars. It can be seen that the part which 
Gianfrancesco Gonzaga played in it was indispensable. Not only was his 
state of crucial strategic importance to Venice, but the part which he had 
played in the wars as soldier, diplomat and organiser showed him to be a man 
with flair and determination. In his relations with Venice we have seen 
in operation a classic example of the buffer state mentality which was 
proposed at the beginning of this study and, moreover, in comparing his 
career with that of Carmagnola it had been possible to observe Venice's 
attitude to military relationships in close juxtaposition with st~t'e policy 
at a fascinating period of transition from defence to aggression. In 
viewing the war from this perspective it has been possible to throw into 
even greater relief the motives which dictated the conduct of both parties 
in this dialogue between opportunism on Venice's part, and sheer necessity 
on that of Gianfrancesco. 
By April 1432 Venice was convinced that Gianf.rancesco was the man 
to lead their army across the Adda. However, Gianfrancesco was not so sure 
of this. An opportunist would not have hesitated at the alluring prospect of 
fam~ and power, but Gianfrancesco had his own state to think about and the 
fate of Carmagnola was already beginning to cast its long shadow over his 
life. There was all the difference in the world between second-in-command and 
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the Captain General of the Venetian army and, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, Gianfrancesco was to prove a very reluctant commander. He was 
indeed poised on the brink of a career which any aspiring soldier would have 
envied; but because he was such an astute man and because he had been 
involved intimately in the fate of Carmagnola, Gianfrancesco realised that 
the exigencies of Mantua's security dictated that he really had no choice 
in the matter. He already appreciated that supreme command had an increasingly 
sour taste about it. 
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Florence 1867-73). Vol 1. pp.327ff. 
28. Treccani, (Mi)., p.197. 
29. The Venetians were also concerned about the security of these areas 
because they could provide Filippo Maria with bases from which Verona 
and Vicenza could be threatened. See Pla~ina, Ope cit., p.303: 
"Tulere id aegre Veneti quod habita Pischeria, occupari facile ab 
eadem Verona ac Vincentia posset." 
30. " ••• volendum facere impresam contra civitatem Mantue ••• " 5.5. reg. 8, 
fol. 27t, 17 Aug. 1421. This was apparently relayed by ambassadors 
who were on their way to Milan sent by Pandolfo Malatesta and Este. 
31. 5.5. reg. a, fol. 37t, 6 Nov. 1421. 
32. ibid. reg. a, fol. s3t, 17 May 1422: " •••• hortando ob id Mag. m. suam 
ipse providere dictam locam fulcire se gent1bus et rebus necessarias 
etc •• " 
33. ibid. reg. a, fol. 37t: " ••• et tenemus firmiter quod mag. sua dictam 
requisitionem non faciet nisi in casu ardue necessitas •• " 
242. 
34. ibid. reg. 8, fol. 43, 28 Feb 1422: " ••• Sm. quia consideratis est 
penitus necessaria terrarum et loco rum suorum, pro bona conservatione 
sui status •• " 
35. ibid. reg. 8, fol. 45t. 19 March 1422. 
36. ibid: "deliberavimus fortificare nos aliquibus gentibus equestribus 
et pedestribus ultra illas quas habemus." See also fol. 46. The 
details of these additions were published on 19 May 1422 (S.S. reg. 8, 
fol.5St. It involved an additional 99 lances and a firma of 6 months 
with another 6 'di rispetto'. 
37. S.S. reg. 8, fol. 47, 1 April 1422. The shortlist included Braccio 
da Montone and Francesco Sforza, both of whom were not available. It 
was decided in the end to ask Pandolfo Malatesta (fol. 47 et t.) 
38. ibid. reg. 8, fol. SSt, 17 May 1422. This was an almost unanimous 
decision by the Senate; there was only one vote against it. 
39. ibid. reg. 8, fol. 56t & 57, 16 May 1422. 
40. ibid. reg. 8,fol. 99, 28 March 1423. Ambrogio Badoer was also given 
strict instructions as far as the gathering of information was concerned. 
41. Sanuto gives lS April. For details of the election see cols. 966-968. 
The date of the election is important in relation to the activities of 
Filippo Maria. 
42. For the circumstances of this See A. Fino, Storia di Crema (Crema 
1711), Vol. 1 and Treccani, (Mi) p.189. 
43. Sanuto, col. 968. 
44. Italo Raulich, Ope cit., p.443. Also S.S. reg. 8, fol.56. This 
was part of an almost continual effort by the Florentines durinq these 
years. In 1423 Florence offered to mediate between Venice -and 
Sigismund in order to obviate the need for an alliance with Milan 
(Raulich p. 433 note 2). See also o. Schiff, Kaiser Sigismunds 
Italienische Politik (Frankfurt 1910) pp. 82ff. Unfortunately, this 
did not work. On 31 March 1423 Rinaldo degli Albizzi reported back 
to the 'Dieci di Balia'. Venice's reply was: " ••• ma solo avendo pill 
volte- cerco la pace collo 'mperadore, e rinucisi dl lui, disse feceno 
lega col Duca di Milano, per la quale non possono trattare alcuno 
accordo, senza lui." COllll1issioni, Vol. 1, comm XXXVI, p.384. See 
also S.S. req. 8, fol. 6lt. 23 June 1422. In this month there were 
fairly active approaches from the Florentines. It is siqnificant 
to note that although the Senate replied to Gianfrancesco that it was 
not yet prepared to sign any agreement, it thought that it was useful 
in principle. A second approach to Venice via Gianfrancesco in 
September 1423 was likewise rejected (S.S. req. 8 fol. l26t. 26 Sept. 
1423) • 
45 ......... necessario iudicant pro salute nostra, non solum ad defensione 
esse permanendum, nam in processu non longo temporis nostra destrUxio 
sequeretur, que vitanda est. Et propterea Domini hortentur Decem balie 
ad procedendum viriliter at exequendum sibi commissa; offen.ione Ducis 
Meq1olan1 procurando I' Ccmmiu.1oni, Vol. 2, COUlD XL:I, p. 3. 
46. In May 1423 Filippo Maria sent Federico castiglione to Florence 
... 
specifically in order to explain his reasons for occupying Forli. 
The rather fatuous reasons for occupying it which were given at the 
time were that he wanted to secure the passage through the Romagna 
in order to help the Pope against Braccio da Montone. See Treccani, 
(Mi)., p. 206. Also Commissioni, Vol. 1, pp. 439ff. Filippo Maria's 
dealings with Condulmer over the question of Bologna in October 1423 
show the nature of his feelings towards Florence. 
243. 
47. See C. Lupi, "Delle relazioni tra la repubblica di Firenze e i conti e i 
duchi di Savoia", Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani Vol. VII (1863) 
and Gabotto, OPe cit. Also Raulich, Ope cit., p.443. 
48. See Treccani, (Mi)., p. 212. 
49. Pandolfo managed to escape but Carlo was taken prisoner and was taken 
back to Milan where he was apparently well-treated in view of his past 
service to the Visconti. Carlo was later to fight for Filippo Maria 
in the Lombard Wars. 
SO. Sanuto writes: "In questo tempo venne a Venezia il Marchese di Mantova 
a raccomandarsi alla Signoria, imperroch~ il Duca di Milano molto 10 
minacciava e si preparava a fargli danno. E per la Signoria gli fu 
risposto che non dubitasse, perche' chi battesse il figluolo batterebbe 
il padre e la madre. Onde il detto Signore si partl molto contento." 
(col. 976) See also Battistella, Ope cit., p.99: " ••• nei suo 
segreto bramava riaquistare quelle terre che ••• il Sjq~or di Mantova 
aveva ottenuto dopo la morte di Giangaleazzo diventavano sempre pi~ 
man~feste e pericolose." 
51. See Platina, p.304. Gianfrancesco had been anxious for this to continue 
at least since 1422: " ••••• quare, Gonziaco admonito, ne mandata 
faceret, oratores ad Philippum mittunt (qui ethominem e Sententia 
dimoverunt et pacem in annos decem retulere •••• " This did result in 
Paolo Correr being sent to Milan. 
52. Sanuto, col. 977: "Riferl la sua mtasciata, come avea fatta con quel 
Duca, e avea ottenuto il tutto, cioe, ch'egli non facesse guerra al 
Signore di Manto~a, n~ a quello di Ferrara, ne al Signor Pandolfo 
Malatesta; e cosi il Duca fu contento, dicendo ch'ogni preghiera della 
Signoria gli era commandamento". 
53. Battistella, Ope cit., p.100ff., Sanuto, col. 978, Platina, p.3l0. 
54. See Raulich, Ope cit., pp.45l-2; Billia, Ope cit., col. 83 and 
especially Sanuto, col. 978: "A 23 del detto mese giunse in questa 
terra il Conte Francesco Carmagnola travvestito con 20 famigli. Si 
dice essere partito dal Duca di Milano in discordia, e pare ch'abbia 
molti danari con lui. E subito fu colla Signoria, e avvisal1a di 
mo1te cose segrete." See also S.S. reg. 8, £01. 51 which mentions 
80 followers. See also Cronaca Savina in the Biblioteca Marciana 
cod. 135 c1. VII col. 259ff., And Osio, Ope cit., Vol 11, p. 109: 
...... per personas mihi idoneas re1atum est Carmagno1em ore proprio 
exposuisse non semel sed pluries in Venetorum consilio, ac se 
obtu1isse, quod in omni casu discordie et guerre assumando per eadem 
Venetos simu1 cum F10rentinis contra vestre i1lustrissime dominationis 
statum." See also Battistel1a pp.1OO-101. See also C~ioni di 
Rinaldo deg1i Albizzi Vol. 1, CODD. XLVii. It is doubtful that he 
addressed the Senate. 
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55. One of the main reasons for this was the prospect of his being crowned 
Emperor. See Osio, Vol. II, p.320 dox. CLII (July 31, 1427). 
56. See Battistella, p. 105: " •••••• infatti il governo veneto era troppo 
circospetto da lasciarsi smuovere dalle parole dlun forestiero quando 
ci fosse di mezzo la salute dell stato." This is confirmed by S.S. 
reg. 9, fols. 8 & 9. 
57. Even though he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Carmagnola in 
the ,late summer of 1425 through the services of Gerardo di Ruberia. 
See Battistella Ope cit., pp.llO-lllff. 
58. For the complete text see Raulich, pp. 464-8. Also Sanuto, col. 978: 
" •••• di condurlo con 300 lancie, e per la sua provisione della sua 
persona dargli all'anno ducati 6,000, dovendo egli tenere in casa 
sua cavalli 100 a sue spese, e stia nel Friuli 0 in Trivigliana 0 
deve piacer~ alla Signoria." See also Battistella, pp.102-4. 
59. Osio, Vol. II, p.310, doc. CXCI. 
60. Arch. Gon. B 1419, fols. 18 and 25. The Venetians were frightened 
"ob quod posset accidere naves que pro eo veneretur velle redire 
vacuas. II 
61. Romanin, op, cit., Vol. IV, pp.81-2. 
62. cf. Platina, p. 310; "viro bellica laude insigna." 
63. Platina, p. 307. 
64. Volta OPe cit. p.103. 
65. Although Platina's history of the Gonzaga is heavily biased in their 
favour, he did use documentary material fairly extensively. For 
instance, on page 311 he confirms that a build-up of Venetian power 
in the Mantovano and Veronese had been in progress for some time: 
" •••• COnvenerant jam onmes copiae in Veronensem ac Mantuanam agrum. 1I 
66. Platina, pp.308-3.0. Platina also ascribes similar statements to 
Niccolo dlEste. for example on p.306:" •••••• Moti his precibus atque 
admonitionibus Veneti maxime vero, quod in etiam sententiam ne 
Gonziacum et .Estensem Principes videbant, et operam in bello suam 
renovarunt •••• II 
67. S.S. reg. 9,fol.40. 
68. See J.C. Lunig Codex Italiae Diplomaticus OPe cit., Vol. II, sect. VI, 
no. XXI, cols. 1979-1986. See also Romanin, OPe cit., p.82 and 
Raulich, p.457. 
69. S.S. reg. 9, fols. 55-58t. 3 Dec. 1425: " ••• Illam attente hortamur 
ut celeriter ad presentiam nostram veniatis ut nobiscum habito coloquio, 
possumus providere ad ea que fuerunt necessaria pro securitate status 
vri.1I 
70. For details see Raulich, p.467. 
71. Raulich, p.458. 
72. e.g. see Raulich, pp. 661ff. 
73. Arch. Gon. B1419, fol. 10 15 Jan. 1425. 
74. Arch. Gon. B.1228 (Ferrara) 23 Feb, Fo1s. 4 & 5. This is a copy of 
the despatch sent by Michiel and Contarini to Foscari. In connection 
with this document see also Arch. Gon. B.1419, fo1s. 21-3. 
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75. ibid. e.g. Castiglione: " •••••• primo etiam ante quam venietur ad 
a1iam praticam dec1arantur et nominantur partes, co1ligati, adherentes 
et reccomendati primo ad principium huius tractus nominentur in dLcta 
pace et gaudeant beneficio pacis." The Venetians, on the other haud 
find it impossible to acceed to this: II •••• nec est conveniens q. 
primo nominantur col1igati et reccomendati •••• q. talis nominacio 
semper reservatur in fine quando partes de re1iquis capitulis sunt 
concordes." See also Raulich, pp. 449-452. 
76. Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fo1s.22-3. 1I •••• est Paratus ponere vitam, statum 
et quicquid habere ad mandata et unicum verbum celsitudinis vre." 
They suggested that 800 of the best Florentine cavalry should be 
selected for the job in hand. Nicco10 did make an attempt to detach 
Angelo della Pergola from the Milanese alliance (Battistella, OPe cit., 
p.120) . 
77. Arch. Gob. B. 1419, fo1. 3: " •••• Gentes nostri.celeriter ad loca nostra 
se conferrent." A secret message was also included in this letter which 
has not, unfortunately, survived. 
78. ibid. " •••• quia scimus dictum Bolgnini esse amicum carum Angeli a 
Pergola. II 
79. Sanuto, col. 991. In the letter quoted in 77 & 78 the Venetians 
suggest that Bolognini 'should be persuaded to bring 40 lances. 
80. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 13, 16 Jan.: " •• Nam infiniti erant quia 
conductoribus nostris cassari expecabant •••• Placuit mu1tum nobis audi~e 
dispositionem vre. Mag.e. circum id." The Venetians were very guarded 
about the advisability of taking too many deserters from Viscontean 
service. There was an incident regarding this over two constables who 
had deserted on 1 February 1425(6). Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fo1. 15. 
81. ego Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fo1.4, 12 Jan. 
82. ego Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fol.9, 13 Jan. in a letter to the Venetian 
"conductores equestribus" Petro Gian Paolo, count of Manuppelo, 
Ludovice Cane and Abbati de Petramo1a, they were instructed to consult 
with Gianfrancesco re. the bil1etting of soldiers. The Venetian 
intention to send these men is confirmed by another letter written by 
the Doge on the same day Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fol. 4: " ••••• alias nostras 
pani facimus in ordine pro mittendo ad loca vostra. 1I The Venetians were 
also raising men in Ravenna at this time. The Venetians did not 
quibble over Gianfrancesco's requests for men and protection: " 
dicimus q. bene intelleximus requisitionem v.ram. super qua non fecimus 
deliberationem. Sed mag. Vra. debet esse certissima q.m. occurente 
casu provisionis in vestram complacentiam faciemus debitum provisionem." 
83. Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fol. 6. '!'he details are as follows: Taddeo Marchese 
(100 lances), Folco and Antonello (63 lances), Giovanni ~ini (50 
lances), Giugliano da Siena (50 lances), Giovanni de 8anguinacis (63 
lances), Bianchino da Feltre (50 lances), Bussino de Urbino (40 lances)," 
Scar iota de Faventia (40 lances), Stranqelinum de Moreobieto (SO lances), 
246. 
Pietro Giampaolo Orsini (186 lances), Ludovico Cane (88 lances), Abbatem 
de Petramala (31 lances). fol. 16 (23rd Feb.) in the same busta refers 
to a complaint by Gianfrancesco that he is unable to accomodate so many 
men. On 9 February Lorentinode Valus, captain of Turricelli, had 
complained to Veriice of a considerable shortage of grain for his troops 
('Maximum penuriam') and Gianfrancesco was instructed to send 1,000 
'stariis' of grain (B.1419, fol. 19). 
84. Arch. Gon. B1419, fol. 7,13 .. lan.: " •••••• et mitteremus aliis nostris 
gentibus quas habemus et de t~mpore in tempus habemus ad front eras • II 
Troops were not to be moved without previous authorisation from Venice. 
B.1419, fol. 14, 23 Jan.: the Venetians were frightened that Carmagnola 
"in ipso castro ponere volebat" and decided to send Battista Bevilaqua 
there together with 50 lances. 
85. Arch. Gon. B.1419, fol. 8, 13 Jan: " •••• faciemus presto armare et poni 
in ordine et galeonos 12 ac barchos 20." 
86. Arch. Gon. B1419, fol. 22, 18 Feb. 
87. ibid. " ••• nullam facuimus differentia ••• " 
87a Arch. Gon. B14l9, fol. 24: " ••••• nos advisare de promissionibus que 
viderent mag. vre ••••• ut dictus pons minime fiat ••• " 
88. The details of these negotiations, where the Venetian envoys were 
Fantino Michiel and Antonio Contarini, are reported in 5.5. reg.9, 
fols. 76-87. 
89. Arch. Gon. B.2l85. There are two letters dated 20 and 22 Feb. 1426 
which relate to this information. 
90. For a discussion of numbers see Romanin, OPe cit., pp.85/6. 
91. Sanuto gives detailed lists for 1426/7 (col.990). See also Ricotti, 
Ope cit. p.445 note xvi. Such detailed lists do not appear for Milan 
during this period but Romanin suggests that the Milanese army was 
comparable in size. Fazio in his "De Viris Illustribus" (p.63) says 
about the armies: "quia major memoria mea exercitus in Italia non 
erat visus". 
92. For details of this see 5.5. reg. 9, fol. 65. 
93. On 23 January 1426 Gianfrancesco wrote to Francesco de Catabene, the 
Mantuan ambassador in Ferrara, in which he requested him to seek advice 
from Este about the timing of the publication of the league in his 
territories. Gianfrancesco was unsure because negotations were still 
going on with Filippo Maria. at this time: " •••••• non comprehendimus 
attenti tenor em predictorum quod habuerimus publicationem ip. us lige 
fieri facere et (quantus) habuerimus ipsam publicatam facere in terris 
Serenissimi ducalis dni. Venetiarum. Multam fecimus cogitamini super 
hoc. II This further illustrates how cautious he was even at the last 
moment. In the end he preferred to wait for information from Donato 
de'Preti. See Arch. Gon. B.2l85 (Chancery Minutes.) • 
94. A copy of this is in Arch. Gon. B.2l94, fol. 71, 7 Fe~. 1426. 
Gianfrancesco requested this of til€; 1J0vernor as a personal favou.r 
("mihi grandem faciet canplacentiam"). Even after the outbreak e>f 
hostilities Gianfrance~co was still consulted over the engaging of 
men. For instance, on 12 March 1246 Foscari sent a certain Jacopo de 
Quistella to Mantua " .••• quoni~ misit ad presentiam nostram cancel-
larium suam petientes cassari a soldo n.ro". They did not know very 
much about him and they requested Gianfrancesco's opinion. (Arch. 
Gon. B.14l9, fol. 27,12 March). 
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95. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 7 Feb. 1426: " ••• vogliamo che cum la dicta littera 
nostra tu vadi dal prefato Gubernatore e tu solliciti cum la paternitate 
sua de haver el dicto salvoconducto, el qual obtenudo tu habi voqliamo 
che presto tu vadi a Fiorenza e che tu tegni ogni modo de venir cum 
quelli nostri che tu hai a condure, insieme cum quel1e altre gente che 
hano a venir in questa parte, cio e Nicolo da Tolentino e quelle altre 
gente de la quale el Signor Messer 10 Marchese (Este) te ha parlato." 
He wished to be informed immediately if there was any delay. In case 
the safe-conduct was not granted there were plans to move the troops' 
via'Frignano. Federigo was asked to take advice from Este in these 
circumstances. 
96. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 18 January 1426, in a letter of Instructions to 
Donato de'Preti: " ••.••• super facto armigerorum qd.Tarctalie que 
est in Anchona et comitatem suam esse debeatis cum illo Serenissimo 
Ducali Dominio, et sibi exponere q. parere n.ri esset q. ex.a sua 
procuraret habere comitivam ipsam, que ut habemus a fidedignum 
relatibus est comitiva optima bonorum et proborum hominum, cum nos non 
habemus nec videamus modum posse eam procurare." 
97. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 18 Jan. 1426 (Gianfrancesco to Venice). He had 
been advised "a potestate meo Lonadi quam-Oldratus de Lampugnano venit 
Brixiam, et ut dicitur venit pro gubernatore ipsius civitate". 
98. ibid: " ••• cum omni reverencia celsitudinem ipam. advise q. terra Lonadi 
non esset ullo imo. armigeris ibi deputatis defulcienda, sed si esset 
de vra. beneplacito posset ad ipam. terram Castrizufredi mitti 
Bianchinum de Feltro ••••• qui est Canedi." 
99. ibid. Gianfrancesco suggested that others could be safely left in 
charge of Canedolo: " •••• remaneret ali is conductoribus 1m. fulcita et 
ad supplementum fulcimenti ipius. Castri Castrizufredi posset 
conservari modi illi de quib. advisari excellentium vram. in quantum 
(lacuna)ipi. sibi placeri sitlt. In Sanuto's military list (col.990) 
Bianchino da Feltre provided 50 lances. 
100. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 18 Jan. 1426 (Instructions to Donato de'Preti) : 
"circa sollicitationem denariorum prestancie, et de illis 5,000 
ducatis quos dixeratis nobis missise vos per multum commendamus. 
Vo~entes quats. cum omnia sollicitudine intendere debeatis ad habendum 
restum ipsius prestancie." 
101. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 22 Jan. 1426. (Instructions to Donato de Preti.) : 
It •••• restum prestancie nre._ vobis sollicitetis, vos advisantes ••••• de 
nostris propriis denariis exbursamus ultra ducatorum XVm." 
102. ego Arch. Gon. B.2099, fols. 77-85. 
103. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 22 Jan. 1426. (Gianfrancesco to Donato de Preti) : 
" •••• vos advisamus qm. Comes Franciscus de Codegnola transitum fecit 
citra Padum et 01ium cum comitiva ad numerum equestrium DOC ••••• vos 
advisantes qm. interritoriis Brixie et Cremone facta est et sit reductio 
generalis ad fortilicia." In the same letter he advised the Venetians 
that the podesta of Lonato had informed him that Marsilio de Gambara 
and Bartolomeo da Martinengo IIcum pedestribus CC" had been sent to 
Salb. During the war Gianfrancesco himself was to be heavily involved 
in the Gardesana and especially the Riviera di Salo. 
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104. ibid: " ••• cum Dno. volumus etiam dicatis ipm. rogitano. qm. gentes 
illas quas, sua gra., dix.t mittere et dignetur, ut loca nra. 
frontariarum fulciri possunt, que fulcita qm. sunt, et esse veniant erit 
conservationem salvationem·et augmentation em sua status, eum advisando 
q. si sibi placeret, posset in nobis remittere auctoritatem deputandi 
genLes ipsas ad fortilicia qm ••••••••••••• videremus magis opportere, 
mitteremus et deputaremus ad loca necessaria. 
105. ibid: " ••• propter dillationem tempus in vollen.o. nos esse advisati 
a d.mo ipso de locis et gentes, ipse stare h.rent, et in expectando 
declarationem suam, qm. in hoc intervallo posset sinistra aliquid 
occurrere." 
106. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 8 Feb. l426~ "Aviso la vostra Signoria che.lo 
Signore di Mantova me ha tolto i. pe, credo che sapiadi la casione. 
Za ha messo in cassa nostra in Mantova Francesco Ursino, se dole de 
mi tropo, perche ho voudo dare Guastalla ala Signori a vostra, ma credo 
chel ge sia magor casion cha questa fazo pocha extima de queste cosse, 
e prima me mangerave le mao che assentire al suo volere." 
107. ibid: " ••• e non solamente una volta, ma piu volte ho scrito al dito 
Mess. Racello che voglia solicitare nostro Signore, e pregallo chel 
ne voglia far dare logiamento per 400 cavalli in quel de Peroxa, che 
mai non ho habuda risposta nisuna se non si habiano qualdo che aloqiare 
11, in tel quale ho poca sper~lza •••• II 
108. ibid: " •••• Sara mal forte a questro, senlZ:a 10 Conte Francesco." 
109. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 18 Jan. 1426, (Gianfrancesco to Donato): "De 
ellectionem dni. spectabiles militis Francesco Berobo que nobis sincere 
placuit, et placet vobis de congratulationem qua. fecistis secum." 
In B. 2185, 22 Jan., Bembo was described as a man with "maturi consilii 
et prudentia II • 
110. Arch. Gon. B.2185, .22 Jan, 1426, (to Donato): " ••• et eum consuletis de 
balistariis ••••• qui stare debebitur super galeoibus ul quot per 
galeono." 
111. ibid: "Eam advisando qm. in galeonibus ipe. quatuor magnis erunt Cum 
una bataiera per medium, et cum una gabia in summitate trasti, super 
qua stabunt homines tres, que una gabia veniet super are et abatere 
bataieram et totum ga1eonum et erunt pulera navigia, et certi ••••• sibi 
mu1tum placebit. Qui galeoni navigabuntur a remis XXXVII per qua1ibs •• 
Alii vero quatuor erunt cum bataieris sine gabia, et his navigabuntur 
a remis XXXV per qualibs •• Reliqui vero quatuor erunt sine bataieris 
et gabis et his navigabuntur a remis XXV per qualibs •• " On 12 Jan. 
they were in consultation with Gianfrancesco over the size of the 
Mantuan river fleet. They had been finding out information concerning 
this from Badoer and Donato de'Preti. On 8 Jan. Gianfrancesco had 
asked the Senate whether his fleet should consist of 10 or 12 ships. 
The Venetians advised him to prepare 12: nut potentiore sumus in 
Pado". Arch. Gon. B.1419, fol.4. 
112. 5.5. reg. 9, fol. 81i Arch. Gon. B.1419, fol. 26 which was dated 6 
March. Gianfrancesco was personally requested to liase very closely 
with Carmagnola. See also 5.5. reg. 9, fol. 79: " ••• et ultra hoc ut 
onmia reguluntur et bono ordine fieri possent, detur libertas dicto 
Comiti et Mag. Dni. Mantue et duobus nostris de collegio mittendos 
Mantuam et per Ambrogio Badoero ••••• faciendiequitare gentes nras. 
contra ducem Mli. et loca sua." 
113. 5.5. reg. 9, fol. 82. See also Battistella, pp.120-l. 
114. For the illness of Carmagnola see A. Batistella "Alcuni documenti 
inediti suI Conte di Carmagnola." A.S.L. XXX (1903), II, pp.77-9. 
115. There has not been very much written about the internal structure of 
armies in this period. One good account is by 14. del Treppo. "Gli 
aspetti organizzativi, economici & sociali di una campagnia di Ventura 
italiana" (R.S.I., 85, iii, 1973). This was concerned with the 
company of Michelotto Attendolo. 
249. 
116. The author of the chapter on Gianfrancesco in the "Storia di ~1antova" 
ed. Coniglio, Ope cit. says: "Nel 1421 Gianfrancesco accettO di 
militare a favore di Filippo Maria Visconti, ma nel 1425 se ne allontano, 
sia per l'andamento della guerra tra il Visconti e Firenze, sia per la 
tensione venutas~ determinare tra Venezia e Milano, in seguito alIa 
defezione del Carmagnola, che dal servizio del Visconti era passato 
a quello dei Veneziani." (p.449). This wild suggestion, for which he 
brings forward no documentary proof, is erroneous and is in conflict 
with the material discussed earlier on in the chapter. This account 
is a considerable distortion of Man~ua's position at the period. 
117. Arch. Gon. B.1419, fol. 26, 6 March 1426. 
118. Sanuto, col. 990. Carmagnola's contribution was subsequently raised. 
119. Mtiratori, Annali d'Italia, Vol. 22, p.lOl. Of the division he writes: 
"Non volendo i capitani cedere l'uno all'altro". 
120. There have been a number of detailed factual accounts of the war 
itself. A very good account of this period is in Battistella's life 
of Carmagnola quoted above. Also, Treccani, OPe cit., chps. IV,V,VI. 
These accounts, however, contain little or no evaluation of the role 
Gianfrancesco played in the war. 
121. S.S. reg. 9, fols. 82-3. This is a very good example of the co-opera-
tion between river and land forces. 
122. See - G. Simonetta "Rerum Gestarum francisci Sfortiae Mediolaneusium 
Ducis Commentarii," (ed. G. Soranzo) R.I.S. n.s. Vol. XXI Pt.l. p.24. 
123. Pieri suggested that the infantry in Italy developed "per l'esigenza 
di superare la fortificazione campale" (Crisi Militare cit. p.275). 
See also P. Pieri, "La Scienza Militare Italiana nel Rinascimento", 
R.S.1. 50, ii 1933. 
124. They govemed "con liberta di apichare e desapichare senza far processo 
ne scrittura." F. Oldorici Chronaca Veneta (Mss. in the Queriniana in 
Brescia C.l.13). In particular, there were heavy taxes on bread. See 
also Battistella, Ope cit., p.122; Treccani, (Br.), pp.4ff.. The 
250. 
posession of this city was jealously guarded by Filippo Maria. In 
particular fortifications were much improved, especially the strength-
ening of the two city walls. He restored the 'rocchette' of Torlonga, 
55. Lorenzo, Alessandro and Nazzario. Communications with the Mantovano 
were heavily guarded. On the character of Milanese rule in Brescia see 
Zanelli, "Brescia sotto Filippo Maria Visconti", cit. pp.16-7,40,5lff. 
Also F. Oldorici Le Storie Bresciane (Brescia 1858), Vol. VII, p.327. 
125. Even as early as the end of 1425 Carmagnola had been in touch with 
Brescian dissidents; in particular Lorenzo Boni and Galeazzo Porcellaga, 
together with some of the most eminent among the local nobility ego 
Pietro Avogadro. At the beginning of 1426 the Reccagni and Domenico del 
Porro were collecting sufficient wood for the building of ladders etc •• 
Antonio del Blonda was charged with obtaining exact measurements of the 
walls. Treccani (Br.) p.6. 
126. The Masperani and Tommaso Pulusella were also raising men in Francia-
corta and Piedmont. See Battistella, Ope cit. p. 127 & 5.5. reg.9, 
fol. 120. 
127. Carmagnola sent some veterans to coach these men. The numbers in the 
final analysis amounted to less than 800 men. Apparently they took 
advantage of a weekly fair in Brescia to introduce small numbers of 
picked men. See Treccani (Br.), p.7. 
128. Raulich, OPe cit., p.663 & below note 130. 
129. Of this Raulich says (p.667): "Era un opera ardita per le proporzioni 
gigantesche e per le continue molestie dei ducali; pure fu compiuta in 
quattro mesi." These earthworks cut off supplies from the Milanese. 
130. See Raulich, op., cit.p.662, Treccani (Br.), p.7, Sanuto, col. 983: 
"Nota che a' 17 di Marzo s'ebbe la Citta di Brescia a ore 14 in questo 
modo. Fu mandato a dire al Conte Francesco Carmagnola, Capitano 
Generale nostro, che presto egli andasse verso Brescia con genti, che 
si volevano dare alla Signoria liberamente. E subito gli furono 
mandati 8,000 fanti molto bene in puncto. Erano nostri provveditori in 
campo Marco Dandolo e Giorgio Cornaro. I quali andarono ed entrarono 
in Brescia solum con cavalli 50 e non pib. E questo fecero, accioche 
avessero l' usci ta in loro liberta. " 
131. Sanuto,col. 983 (3 March). 
132. Platina describes the difficulties of the siege in the following terms: 
"Est namque Brixia tres in partes divisa: monti adjacet ad meridiam, 
conversa in cacumine montis arx est, aspero ascensu et opere munitissima, 
a qua duo latissimi muri crebris turribus muniti, parum inter se et aeque 
fere distantes, per Urbem ducuntur. Descententi ab Arce per has 
munitiones, quas accolae Garzetam appellant, partem illam urbis, quae 
ad sinistrum relinquitur, Gibellini incolunt, quae vero ad dexteram, 
quaeque major et populosior est, tota Gulephorum factione referta 
habetur." (pp.3l1-2). 
133. The massive nature of the campaign is once more attested by Sanuto in 
col. 984: " ••• e tutti i balestrieri erano sulle fuste e qaleoni, 
ch'erano nel Po, e di Mantova, di Vicenza, e di Verona, e d'altri nostri 
luoghi furono mandati, e assaissimi banbarde grosse alla volta del ; 
campo, sicch~ quello (i.e. the 'citadel) fu fatto farle molto, acciocch' 
non temesse de' nimici, e fatto che le genti tutte andassero verso Brescia.-
134. See Treccani (Br.), p.8 Also Simonetta. 
135. Sanuto, col. 983: Sforza "si ridussero nella Citadella Nuova, che 
vi avea fatto fare il Duca diMilano, nella.quale era il Conte 
Francesco Sforza pel Duca di Milano con cavalli 300 con poche biade, 
vettovaglie, e strami." 
136. ibid: " ••• e tutto il Bresciano si venne ad inclinare a darsi. saputa 
questa nuova a Venezia il Lunedi Santo fu fatta grande alegrezza e 
fuochi e campano •.• " The Venetian governors in Brescia were Vittore 
Bragadino and Silvestro Morosini. 
137. Possevino even attests that the Senate had expressly charged Gian-
francesco with the taking of Brescia whereas Carmagnola was entrusted 
with "aperta camporum et aggregatas auxiliares copias ab ipso retineri," 
(p.522). See Battistella, pp~123-4. 
138. Raulich, p.664. See also Bill1a in R.I.S. vol. XIX, col. 87 "Jubet 
Franciscum Mantuanum (nam in quoque in Venetianus caotris militabat) 
eum locum datis praesidiis custodire. Ipse (i.e. Carmagnola) ad 
expugnandum Portam Pilarum tendit." 
139. The Senate, having consulted a number of doctors, including Guffalo, 
NiccolO, Gig1ielmo and Pietro da Venezia, Bartolomeo da Montagnara 
and Galeazzo da S. Sofia di Padova, agreed to such a cure "quod dictus 
Carmagno1a, propter inconvalescentiam suam, non posset exercere 
gubernationem gentium nostrarum". S.S. reg. 9, fo1.97. 
140. S.S. reg. 9, fol. 97t. 
141. S.S. reg. 9, fol. 95t., 5 April 2426: "qua. ob rem vo1entes ad 
gubernationem Brixie et gentium nostrarum providere tenentes indubie 
Mag.m. vram. semper reppire. prompte dispositam atque paratur ad 
cuncta nobis beneplacita ac quod omnia sincera fide, et diligenti cura 
solerte ac sapienter gubernabit. II On the operations: " ••• sui 
laudaremus attente qd. applicatis bombardis ante quam equitaretur in 
quantum vadit per transversum illius civitatis et claudere citadellam. 
Nichilominus relinquimus hac terminandum. M. vre. q. pns. est factis 
et omniam sapienter videt et considerat." 
142. S.S. reg. IX, fol. 98, 9 April 1426. 
143. Raulich, p.664. 
144. Battistella, p.125. 
145. M.A. Sabellico, Historia Rerum Venetiarum (Venice, 1718), p.492. 
146. Billia, col. 87. 
147. See Raulich, p.665. Since 1425 the Riveraschi had contemplated turning 
for help to Venice against the onerous .rule of the Visconti. When 
the war broke out ambassadors from most of the important commUnities 
were sent to Venice (from Maderrio, Gargnano, Gardone, Portese, 
Bedizzole). In fact, on 23 March Andrea Marcello had claimed posession 
of SaH) in the name of Ven'ice. What Gianfrancesco did was to complete 
the process of subduing the surrounding area. See F~ Bettoni Stori~ 
della Riviera di Salo (Brescia 1880). Vol. 2, p.88~ Also Raulich,p.665. 
251. 
148. See Sanuto, col. 985; "A 30 d'Aprile s'ebbe notizia come il Signore di 
Mantova con circa cavalli 3,000 ha cavalcato verso Quinzano, mig1ia 
dieci appresso Brescia, e tredici appresso Cremona, e gli diede 
battaglia, e per que' di dentro fu fatta grandissima difesa. Ma pure 
alla fine ebbe il Borgo." 
149. See Cronaca Veneta dalla Braidense, fol. 520t. 
150. Sanuto, col. 985: liE per paura d'essere saccomannati s'accordarono, e 
patteggiarono di dargli frumento staja 2,000, biada da cavallo staja 
8,000 e molto vettovaglia." 
151. Platina (p.3l3) suggests that Carmagno1a was well pleased with 
Gianfrancesco's performance: "Brixiam rediens, co11audata Mantuani 
virtute et solertia totus ad expugnandum partem urbis convertitur, 
Francesco Sfortia, qui tum in praesidio erat, acriter defendente." 
152. There was one advantage from this situation. This did remove 
Vis conte an influence in Forli and Forlimpopoli and this consequently 
left Florence free to aid the Venetians in Lombardy. Este's failure 
was regarded as negligence by the Venetians (Cron. Ven. della Braidense 
fo1. 520), but there was also a suggestion that the Florentines did 
not provide them with sufficient recources to do the job properly. 
See Battistella, p.126. The Florentines did, however, send Tolentino 
and Ludovico dal Verme to Brescia. 
153. Sanuto, col. 986. 
" 154. Sanuto, col. 985. "A 13 (May) venue nuova, come la nostra armata di 
Po, Capitano Francesco Bembo il Cavaliere, avea dato un gran rotta 
alle genti del Duca di Milano per mezzo di Cremona, e rotto loro la 
. sua catena,che aveano messa per mezzo il Po acciocch& l'armata non 
potesse passare all' insu. E furonne morti assaissimi. Ma fu preso 
un galeone di que' del Marchese di Mantova. perch'egli non volle andar 
su, cio~ il padrone con alcuni nostri in campagnia." For a more 
detailed consideration see Raulich, Ope cit., pp667-8. 
155. Osio, vol. ii, p.234 no. CXXXIII: " ••• omnia denique sunt adversa, nec 
ulla sublevationis est spes •• " 
156. There were even suggestions that Amedeo was interested in Milan itself, 
but Venice would never have agreed to this. There was plan for Milan 
to become a free commune, but it was never settled what was to happen 
to the Visconti. Savoy was to have Crema, Lodi, Trezzo and all 
territories to the left of the Adda exclusive of Milan and Pavia. 
Amedeo also wanted Asti, Vercelli, Novara and even Genoa. There could 
be no permanent understanding along such lines. 
157. For the earlier history of Asola see D. Bemoni, Le Vicende.di Asola 
(Rome 1876) pp.109ff. 
158. See above p.~ (1408). 
159. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 18 Jan 1426. (Pandolfo Malatesta to Gianfrancesco) : 
" •••••• et p. argentarium et iocaliorum ipsarum pignere at securitate 
prefate mag. cie vre. tradidi rocham Asule •••••• et vra. mag. cia 
dictam rocham Asule per dictis pigneribus continuo retinuit atque 
retinet •••••• dixi eandem praesentibus advisandam et accuratissime 
exorandum, quod se preparet ad dicte roche Asule restitutionem ut 
tenetur et me de mOOis tam circa dictam rocham accipiendam, quam circa 
252. 
253. 
res et pecunias suas reddendas, servandis faciat particulariter advisatum. 1I 
160. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 24 Jan. 1426 (Gianfrancesco to Pandolfo): 1I ••• cui 
vobis vendere Hbuit ••• 11 Apparently Gianfrancesco had spent a lot of 
money on the restoration of the fortress and he felt he was being 
cheated by Pandolfo. 
161. ibid: 1I ••••• q . pdi. vri. et mei. haberent recurere ad prefatum 
Serenissimum ducale Dominium, et ipsum rogitare parte vra. et mea 
•••.•• iuxta parere suum et voluntatem •••••• debeamus aquescere, et 
tacitos et contentes remanere." 
162. A. Benitti, Storia di Asola (Mantua 1952) gives as a reason for this: 
"la sua forma di govemo repubblicana megl:io si attagliava alle nostre 
costumanze." (p.295) It was more a question of fear of the Visconti 
than any political preference. 
163. L. Mangini "Storia di Asola ll (MSS, in the Queriniana H.IV.2), Bk. IV 
says: "fu si grande l'alegrezza del popolo, che per ogni via si 
sentiva gridare 'viva S. Marco, Viva!". Quoted in Benitti Ope cit. 
p.296. 
164. "Diae sabbati 15 zugno el Sig. Johan Francesco Gonzaga, Signor di 
Mantova lebe la terra de Asula. 1I (MSS in the collection in the 
Municipio di Asola). See also D. Bemoni Le Vicende di Asola cit. 
p.109. 
165. Arch. Gon. B.3369 (Affari di Asola), 23 June 1426. See also Libr. 
Decr. (1416-1435) fol. 304. Gianfrancesco signed this document in 
Brescia. See also Lib. Decr. (1429-1434) fol. 21 "Immunitates ad 
libitum communi et hominibus castri et terre Isolella, terras et 
posessiones habentibus super terr. Remedelli sup. et inf.squadra 
terr. Asule". The privileges were reconfirmed on the 5th of June 
1436 (Lib. Decr. (1436-1446) fol. 1St.) On 8 July 1426 Fili~po Maria 
protested to Sigismund about the progress which the enemy had made. 
"Augentur continuo vires hostiles et multiplicatur inimicorum exercitus: 
dominantur Brixie obsident citadellas quas tenemus, repagulis eas 
cingunt studentque recludere, ne amplius eis prestemus ul1a presidia, 
et ud ad manus perveniant tandem suas. Occupaverunt Asu1am que nobis 
rebellavit; recuperarunt Castrum novum et Maccastumum cum 'eorum 
armata que ausa est Placentinam et Papiam usque navigare, predans, 
rapiens et incendens quicquid potest. 1I Osio, Vol. II, no.XXXIII. 
166. The inscription on the Rocca Magna of Asola is a further testament 
to the feelings of the Asolani: "Tandem a Tirranide Vicecomitorum 
Asula cum hominibus suis liberata est 1426 P.S." 
167. The rocche of Asola were being restored, a new moat was geing constructed. 
Also there was continuing work on the fortifications of Castiglione 
delleStiviere, Peschiera and Marmirolo. See Benitti, Ope cit., p.298. 
168. Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fol. 28, 16 June 1426: " ••• quod ex illius adeptione 
magna comoditas et securitas terrae et 10cis vre. Magnificentie 
circumstantibus •••••• contenti sumus et vo1umus quod ipsam terram 
Asulam cum eius forti1icious quamquam per gentes nros. adepte sit Mag. 
vre. remaneat et illam nobis libere relaxamus." 
169. Arch. Gon. B.ls (Investitures from Venice), fol. 21, 16 March 1428. 
170. It is interestinq to note that the 'balance of power'attitude by 
Florence is characteristic of her position throughout the 15th 
century. Venice was involved in secret negotiations at this time 
encouraging other areas to rebell against Milan, especially Cremona. 
They were continually urging the Florentines and Este to rearm. 
There were 'gride' against the Malatesta and other ducal allies and 
commercial embargoes. 
171. See Battistella, p. 128; Raulich, p.667. 
172. Comparoni, quoted by Battistella (p.128) states of Tolentino: "non , 
sofferendo questo di sottostare all'altro perche era nato d'ignobile 
sangue e non era senza una disdicevole alterigia." 
173. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 72, 23 Oct. 1426. (Gianfrancesco to Paola) : 
"Questo castello"'e bombardado e fino aqui asai lentamente per rispecto 
de manchamento de prede e polvere e zeneralmente de zaschuna cosa ••• " 
174. Batistella, p.128: "A tali gare aHa fine posa termine il Gonzaga che 
con efficaci regioni pot~ indurre costui a deporrere quei vani 
cavilli e tenere uniti gli animi." 
175. Platina, pp.3l3-3l4: "Philippi copiae ex Hetruria ac Flaminia excitae, 
agrum Mantuanum ingressae, hue atque illuc discurrentes tempestarunt 
•••••••• Angelus Pargulanus, Philippi jussu, longe ac late omnia 
populatur, quo Principem Mantuanum ad sua tuenda abstraheret." See 
also Treccani (Br.), p.ls. 
176. eg. Billia, col. 88: " ••• motis ad agros Mantuanos castris feruntur, 
quequa incedunt, omnia igni pervastantes. Tum vero i1li aerius instant 
diurnisque et nocturnis cert~~ibus obsessos fatigant vias impediunt, 
ne qua commeatus possint inferri." Possevino (p. 525) says "Ionnem 
de la Pergola, cum octingenti equitibus, tote Mantuano agro, rapinas 
agro, rapinas agere, et incendia miscere ••• " 
177. Possevino, p.525: 
178. Platina, p.314. 
179. 5.5. reg.9, fols. 129-131, 9 June 1426. This happened again in August 
and September (fols. 170-1). 
254. 
180. 5.5. reg.9, fol. 130. Filippo Maria's terms at this stage were the cession 
of Brescia and province to Venice and the restoration of Genoa. 
181. For instance, there is a lette~ dated 14 March 1427 in which he 
requests her to return from a visit to her father because of his 
imminent departure to Venice to discuss the peace negotations at Ferrara. 
Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 75. 
182. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol.93, 10 March 1426. 
183. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol. 80,2 July 1426: "Dicti homines possunt se 
reducere •••••• secure ad et in terra Guasta1la ••• " In addition, any 
Mantuans who owned property in Guasta11a were guaranteed immunity by 
Guido. 
184. Arch. Gon. B.43, fo1. 83, 3 July 1426: "Et si pur contingeret a1iquas i 
ex dictis gentubus prefati ducis Mediolani veniet de dicto territorio ••• 
ad offensionem predicatasterras •••• q. dicte gentes •••• p. eorum facta 
non receptabuntur in terris ••• nec eis aliqualiter dabitur auxilium ••• 
tam eundo q. redundo." This was to last for the month of July. 
185. They were urging Carmagnola to be as energetic as possible and promised 
reinforcements to try and finish the job off quickly. 5.5. reg.9, fol. 
172, 28 sept. 
186. On the 12 Aug. and 6 sept. respectively. See Raulich, p.163 and 
Battistella, p.136. 
187. Batistel1a (p.136) suggests that Carmagnola was trying to bribe 
Landriano, a former comrade in arms, to surrender. But Landriano must 
have realised by now that it was only a matter of time. See Sanuto, 
col. 988. 
188. 5.5. reg.9, fol. 174. 
189. Battiste1la, p.140. Also Sanuto, col. 988: "A 10 di Novembre s'ebbero 
1ettere del nostri Provveditori a Brescia, cio~ Fantino Michiel e 
Pietro Loredano procuratori, come col nome di Dio e di Messere San 
Marco aveano fatto accordo con que' del castello di Brescia di dar 
loro il detto Castello liberamente a ore 20. E aveano avuto gli 
ostaggi, cio' il fratello del Castellano, e i sei figuoli d'altri 
migliori di loro, con questa condizione, che Ie munizioni ed arme che 
ivi dentro sono, sieno dati a que soldati che sono ivi dentro, e cltre 
cio debbon.o rendere loro 11 fratello bastardo del Signor di Mantova a 
altri prigioni." 
190. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 72. Gianfrancesco writes of his efforts with 
modesty: " ••• bench~ llonor e Ie laude diano esser dade aquelli da che 
prezedo zaschuna bene, e zerto non soy cosl ingrate che nol conoscha, 
e che no ma riordi del salmista che dixie "non nobis domine, non nobis 
per nomini tuo da gloriam" ••••• al presente asai eben previsto e 
melio paro soligitar quello bixogna bench~ domani se fa una scorta 
zenerale dove bixognara che sia ••• de la parte ve asai bona speranza 
e quaxi certeza." 
191. Arch. Gon. B.14l9, fo1. 30, 22 Oct. The Doge urges Gianfrancesco to 
,persist in re-negotiating a treaty with Mirandula and appreciates how 
anxious he was to keep the Venetians as well informed as possible: 
"quemquam non intendit vre. mag. facere absque voluntade et scientia 
nri. dom.!." It was clear that Venice appreciated the strategic 
significance of this treaty, but they make it plain that this is to 
be a personal treaty: "Verum. dominium, nec ligam quod solum treguam 
predictam faciat m. vre. suo nomine proprio." Venice did not want its 
hands tied too much. 
192. Platina (p.315) says of the ferocity of the Siege: 
"Bombardis dies ac noctu pulsati ••• ". 
193. For confirmation see Commissioni, vol. 1, no. 49. 
194. In the "Istorie Fiorentine", IV, 13. 
195. For details of the controversies see Battistella, pp.l41-4. In fact, 
the peace was not finally ratified by Milan until 12 Feb. 1427. one of 
the major stumbling blocks was Carmagnolals property. See 5.5. reg.9, 
fol. 188-90. It was eventually agreed that his family should be 
returned to him together with all his property in the dutchy (S.S. reg. 
10 fol.l) • 
255. 
196. At this time he was urging Sigismund to send a force of 5,000 cavalry 
into Friuli. 
197. Sigismund had advised him not to give anything to the Venetians, whom 
he regarded as rebels. 
198. S.S. reg.lO, fol. 12. 
199. Andrea Morosini was sent by the Senate to Rome in order to explain that 
it was Filippo Maria's fault that the peace had been violated, not 
Venice's. See Battistella, p.149. 
200. See Osio, Vol. II, p.3l4, no. CXCIV: "Deponite togas et libros et arma 
capessite." 
201. Osio, Vol. II., p.3l5, no. CCIX. 
202. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 75,14 March 1427 (Gianfrancesco to Paola): 
"De la paxe che ql. fine a qui habia abudo da Ferrara non e stado de 
troppo importantia." 
203. ibid: "A Venexia mess. Donado (de'Preti) e Francesco (de'Catabene) e 
dolor aspecto lavixo del mio andar perch~ alcune faxende che alor 
stanero a pratichar che no. faria a mi voria che fosseno spazato 
innanziche Ie andare, e questa e la caxo della tardeza delmio andar 
de la qual voio che vavixate el S. nostro padre (Maletesta Malatesta) , 
e credo questa induxia non poder resulatar se non bene perch~ pur se 
'veder'a 0 parose comprender el fine della pace 0 guerra." 
204. See Battistella, p.15l, note 5. 
205. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol. 98, 16 March 1427: " ••• anzi sera 1asado pass are 
Ie dita Armada suxo e zoxo como se fusse larmade propria del mio 
Illustrissimo Signore Duca de Milano." "According to Sanuto (col.992) 
the Venetian river fleet had been reinforced in the previous February: 
"A 26 di Febbraio fu preso ne1 consiglio de Cento di far 1000 lance di 
nuovo, oltre a quelle che si faranno per la lega, e etiam di fare un 
Capitano ne1 Po, e d'armare subito 30 ga1eoni. E fu eletto Stefano 
Contarini, che fu di Ser Niccolo capitano." 
206. Arch. Gon. B.43, fo1s. 100 & 103, 17 March 1427. 
207. Arch. Gon. B.43, fo1. 112, 17 Apr. 1427. There had also been consult-
ations with Edoardo del Fante, the Podesta of Mirandula: "Volens qm. 
fidem habeant plene qs. ferventer ut reliqua in dictis capitulis 
contenta servari debent." 
208. Arch. GOn. B.14l9, fol. 31, 22nd March 1427 (Venice to Gianfrancesco) • 
The plan was to send "cancellarium Mag. Dom. Malateste •••••• ad 
removendum Carolum cognatum vrm. a serviciis ducis Mediolani." They 
even went as far as to guarantee Carlo and his men free passage through 
the Mantovano and Veneto. 
209. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 33. This was repeated on 30 April in almost 
identical terms in fol. 32. The Venetians were also keeping Gian-
francesco informed of the state of negotiations with the Lord of Faenza. 
210. ibid: " ••• qui habeat bonam vigilantiam et diligentem advertentiam ad 
securitatem et conservationem dicte nostre armate per modum q. a1iquid 
sinistrum sibi non aecidi." 
256. 
211. 5.5. reg. 10, fol. 45t, 12 April 1427: " ••• cum utile sit providere 
de habendo pro agendis occurentibus apud magnif. dnum. Mantue unum 
nrum. nobilem qui provideat ad occurentia, et nos·continue adviset 
et informet de omnibus." 
212. Pietro Loredano and Fantino Michiel were instructed to gather all men 
in the Vicentino and Veronese and send them to the Mantovano (5.5. 
reg. 10, fol. 43). 
213. 5.5. reg.lO, fol.44. 
214. Sanuto, col. 994-6. 
215. See Battistella, p.lS8. 
216. ibid: pp.159-60. 
217. Arch. Gon. B. 2094, fols. 77-86 incl. 
218. For the background to this, see A. Parazzi, Origini e Vicende. di 
Viadana (Viadana Remigi 1893), Vol. II, p.3. 
219. Arch. Gon. B.15, fo1.l7, 4 July 1427: "Intellectis lite rerum vre. 
mag. datis in campo apud Sablonetam die primis presentis quibus nobis 
indicastis obtentione terre et loci Sablonetae etc. Respondemus vobis 
q. illari animo et iocunde audivimus litteris vestras p.dctis." 
257. 
220. Arch. Gon. B.15, fols 40-1. In 1432 Sigismund declared that these terri-
tories were to belong perpetually to the house of Gonzaga. Gianfrancesco 
was infeudated with them by Sigismund when he joined Milan in 1438. In 
1437 this was completed by the incorporation of Oosolo on the 24 July. 
Gianfrancesco was allowed to keep Sabbioneta by the terms of the Peace 
of Cavriana in 1442. See also Platina, p. 320. 
221. 5.5. reg.lO, fol. 76. 
222. Battistella suggests that Carmagnola was intending to isolate Cremona 
as much as possible (p.162). 
223. cf. P. Pieri "Scienza Militare" cit. p. 273: " ••• innegabile e la 
tenenza aIle guerre lente, aIle mosse studiate, sia per il prevale.re 
della fortificazione campale, sia anche per il timore di sacrificare 
tutto in un giorno." 
224 •. For more details of the battle see Battistella, pp.164-5. 
22S. He complained that Filippo Maria had taken Borgo S. Oonnino away from 
him. 
226. Arch. Gon. B.43, fo1. 115 & 118. One of Gianfrancesco's secretaries 
Petro de Arrivabene was the intermediary with Pal1avicino. Sanuto 
notes (col. 996) of Pallavicino: "il quale e Signore di mo1ti castelli, 
e gli fu promesso di dargli ogni anno provigione per la sua persona 
Lire 1500 di grossi, e di dargli lancie 100 di condotta sino a 120." 
227. Quoted in Possevino, p.526: "Magna animi nostri laetitia et totus 
Senatus nostri accepimus virtutis ac vigilantiae tuae fructum." 
228. Osio, Vol. II, pt. 2, no. CCXXVIII" Hostes enim sunt potentes tam per 
terram. quam per aquam, et dietim aliqua mihi surripiunt." 
229. Around the beginning of July (5.5. reg.10, fol.61.). At the very same 
time Milanese envoys were active in negotiations with Sigismund and 
Alfonso of Aragon. The Senate saw the real motives behind Filippo 
Maria's moves. 
230. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fols. 84, 85. 
231. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 86: "ad videndum et examinandum lignarium 
ipsam et ipsarum quantitatem et talem volumus mittatis Casalemajus q. 
ibi stet et expectet donec illuc venerit aliqua novis armata ••• " 
232. On the way a number of smaller castles were captured including Urago 
d'Oglio and Iseo, both of considerable strategic importance. 
233. 5.5. reg.10, fols. 89-90, 94t (6 Oct 1427). There is another similar 
complaint in 1429 (reg. XI, fol.10). 
234. According to a letter of Filippo Maria (Osio, vol. II, p.340, no. CCXXI) 
this is the most likely date, although other sources indicate otherwise. 
The 15, 16 and 28 Oct. have been put forward, but the 11 is supported 
by Camhi, Buonaccorso Pitti and the Cronaca di Cremona. See Battistella, 
pp.l90ff for a discussion of this point. 
235. D. Carafa, Gli Ammaestramenti Militari (Naples, Campanile 1608) • 
236. Numbers involved in Maclodio: Venice - 18,000 cavalry and 8000 
infantry: Milan. 12000 cavalry and 6000 infantry. 
237. Possevino and Equicola once again overemphasised the part Gianfrancesco 
played but Platina's assessment is a much more credible one: 
"Transierant jamjam aliquot equ'itum turmae, cum sub ito Mantuanus 
Princeps, Carmignola signumpugnae proponente, in confertissimae 
hostium acies sese cum suis infert" (p.32l). 
238. Osio, vol. II, p.340, no. CCXXI. 
239. Batistella, p.199. 
240. Sanuto, col. 997. 
241. 5.5. reg. 10, fol. 97, 17 Oct, 1421: " ••••• una puleram et honorabi1em 
domum in Venetiis, quam volumus don are sibi ac filii et heredibus suis 
legittimis". 
242. See also ibid. fol. 239, 15 Feb, 1428. The value of the house quoted 
here is 5,800 ducats. 
243. ibid. 
244. Campaigns in late October around Orcinuovi (Pontoglio, Castzezzato, 
Roccafranca, Chiari) and small gains in the Bergamasco. 
245. Sanuto, col. 998: liE infino a qui nostri ebbero circa 80 fortezze tra 
il Bresciano e i1 Berqamasco". 
246. Sanuto, col. 1000. 
247. For confirmation of this date see Arch. Gon. B.118l, letter of 17 
April 1428 from Este to Gianfrancesco. 
248. According to Arch. Gon. B.118l (4 Dec. 1427) Gianfrancesco was still 
at Casalmaggiore. 
258. 
249. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 93, 30 Dec. 1427 (Gianfrancesco to Paola.) : 
" •••. e per 10 dicto nostro figluolo interamente sera observato tutto 
quello se permette." Also B. 1419, fol. 36. Gianfrancesco was also 
in Venice at the end of January 1428. According to instructions 
issued to Azzone Trevisan, ambassador to Carmagnola, recorded in 
259. 
S.S. reg. 10, fol. l17t, 30 Dec. 1427, Gianfrancesco had been consulted 
while he was in Venice about the future strategy in the ValcaJOOnica, 
Valle S. Martino, and the Valle Biombana. Carmagnola was given strict 
instructions to spend the winter in Brescia. 
250. Arch. Gon. B. 1181, 21 Nov. 1427. Este's position in these discussions, 
in his own words, is "come mediatore e non come judice". Even 
Albergati was getting impatient "perch~ lui non vede che cum suo 
honore e prima per 10 honore del papa lui possa piu stare in questi 
longore" • 
Albergati was vaiting for the final replies from the ambassadors. It 
is interesting to note that Este had a very low opinion of the Savoyard 
ambassadors ("pure deshoneste") • 
251. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol. 121, item no. 2. Also fol. 124 which contains 
a detailed list of their replies to the demands of the league. 
252. i. Arch. Gon. B.43, 29 Nov. 1427 (Este to Gianfrancesco). Apparently 
the Florentines were backing the Venetians over this at the time. 
ii. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol. 124, item 5: "cum ipse dominus Dux 
Mediolani non fuit priaus controfactor pacis ut clarissime ostendetur." 
253. S.S. reg 10, fols. 129-30, 140. 
254. Arch. Gon. B.15, fol. 21. 
255. Arch. Gon. B.15, fols. 25-6 (15 & 18 May 1428). 
256. Sanuto gives 18 April but Este's letters in Arch.Gon. B.1181 for 
17 April suggest otherwise, although the formal announcement was not 
made until the following day. 
257. See LUnig, OPe cit., Vol. IV, col. 1686. Also Osio, Vol. II, p.367. 
258. Osio, Vol. II, p. 373. Arch. Gon. B.43, fols. 133-8. 
259. In Arch.Gon. B.1181, 22 April 1428 (Este to Gianfrancesco) Niccol~ 
comments on this point. 
260. Sanuto, col. 1002 and Battistella, p.221. 
261. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 20 Sept. 1428 (Foscari to Marco Dandolo): "Nosque 
per inde stricterogavit ut si possibile sit ab ipso S. Rege, in casu 
quo ad trenguas ul. concordia cum sua Serenitate Veniamus istud 
obtinere curem'ls". 
262. ibid: "In hoc casu procuretis ••••• omnibus vris. ingeniis et •••• 
studeatis obtinere ab ipso S. Rege in solemnis et valida forma qm. 
M.D .. prefuatus Mantue creatur Marchio Mantue, et q. ad ipsum titulum 
et dignitatem Marchionatus Mantue permoveatur, et perpetuo in suis 
heredibus insiqnatur et decoretur." 
263. ibid. 
264. S.S. reg.10, fol. 221. 
265. Sanuto, col. 1003: mentions slightly different numbers. "In questo 
tempo il conte di Carmagnola per mezanita del Marchese di Mantova, fu 
fatto capitano general de terra e dell'armada del Po, con provision 
de ducati 1000 al mese per guerra e 6,000 per pace all'anno, et 
condutta de cavalli 2,000 et fanti 200." Arch. Gon. B.1228, fol. 9, 
9 January 1429. (Jacopo Ziliolo in Ferrara to Gianfrancesco) : 
"Habuit dominus meus a Comite Carmagnola qm. petiit licentiam ipe. a 
Loysius del Verme a dno. Venetorum. Et q. nullo pacto vult amplius 
stare ad stipendia sua. Et q. sperat obtinere istam licentiam." 
266. See S. Davari, Notizio Storiche intorno allo Studio Pubblico (Mantua 
1903) p.4. 
267. Arch. Go~. Lib. Decr., 9 Nov 1429 and 9 Nov 1431 respectively. 
260. 
268. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fol. 98, 22 Aug. 1429 (Gianfrancesco to Paola from 
Fossadalberi): "Un famulo de Messer Ronaldo da Preti pregandome che 
fosse contento tolesti apresso di voi una fiola del fiolo suo Bonifacio 
•••••• azo che havesse la canmodita del studio." She was 11 years. old. 
All of Gianfrancesco's own children, especially Cecilia, were models 
of what a high standard of education could achieve. 
269. See Muratori, vol. 22, p.109; "Cronaca di Rimini" R.I.S.Vol. 5; 
Buonincontrus "Annali" R.I.S.Vol. 21. 
270. See Partner, liThe Papal State under Martin V" cit., pp.93-4 for the 
background to this. 
271. Muratori, Vol. 22, p.llO: "Avea questi (Malatesta di Pesaro) dopo la 
morte di Carlo preteso, siccome legittimo,d'escludere i nipoti bastardi 
alla di lui eredita con fare anche ricorso per questo a Papa Martino. 
In sua parte nulla ottenne, e solamente servivano le instanze sue a 
fare che il papa inviate cola l'armi sue, s'impadronisse d'alcune 
terre." 
272. Arch. Gon. B.118l, 28 Oct. 1429 (Leonello to Paola:) " ••• volle havere 
le rasone sue raccomandate come proprie, a tanto piu cordialmente quando 
li intervene le vre. preghiere e la interpositione de la M.V. per la 
quale faria ogni cosa a lui possibile." 
273. Arch. Gon. B. 1181, 16 Jan 1431 (Este to Gianfrancesco:) " •••• et 
postea lente multum processum fuerat in causa illa. Et q. timebant 
(i.e. Elizabetta and Roberto) q. res ista traheretur in longum, nisi 
aliter debeat terminari, provideremus cum amicis mostris qm. causa 
ista cito termineretur." There are copies of the letters of Astorre 
Buzolini to Elizabetta in the Arch. Gon. which give an excellent 
indication of how difficult Martin was over this. (B.2l85, 4, 6, 
9 Jan 1430). Elizabetta had great confidence in Este and Gianfrancesco: 
"Quia indubie sperabant q. per manus nras. concordia ista fieret ••• " 
274. ~ch. Gon. B.2l85, 16 Feb. 1430 (Corrado to Gianfrancesco:) " •.•• cum 
reverenza me pare che la vostra S. ha bisogna havere grandissima 
consideratione" • 
275. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 16 Feb, 1430 (Instructions to Francesco de Catabene) : 
"Cum 10 dicto Iuliano (famulo del Signor misser 10 Marchese) 
riguardate etiam de li Signora Malatesti, e fare cum luy mancho 
rasonamento che tu poi, demonstrandogie tu non sapere cosa alcuna." 
276. Niccolo was very anxious to consult personally with Gianfrancesco over 
this matter. See Arch. Gon. B.1228, fol. 15,25 Jan. 1430. (Jacopo 
Ziliolo to Gianfrancesco): "Luy ha grandissimo desiderio de abochare 
cum vuy per questi facti de Romagna, e per li soi da Roma." This last 
refers to the question of Leonello's recognition in the succession 
discussed below. 
277. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 7 Feb. 1430 (Instructions to Catabene): " ••• 
considerando la parentade che sono stati da1 Signor Carlo a 1a casa 
nostra, de mia sorore del qua1e nuy siamo desesi e etiam 1a prefata 
madonna nostra madre che era consorte del prefato signore Carlo fu 
sorella del Signor nostro padre, pregamolo che Ii dicti Signori gie 
sia recomendati digiandoli che se rendiamo certi che a la Sanctitade Sua 
e a Sancta Chiesa seranno fideli." 
278. See Billia. col. 116. Senigaglia (previously belonging to Carlo 
Malatesta) granted to Malatesta of Pesaro. Martin recovered Cervia, 
Osimo, Fano, La Pergola, Borgo San Sepolcro and many minor castles. 
See Partner, p. 94 and Muratori, p. 112. See Uberto Strozzi's letter 
in Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fol. 17, 13 May 1431. See also Arch. Gon. 
B. 1081, 12 July 1431; Galeazzo and Carlo Malatesta was still asking 
Gianfrancesco to intercede on their behalf over Pesaro. 
279. There is a very interesting letter from Elisabetta Varano to 
Gianfrancesco dated 24 Aug. 1430 (Arch. Gon. B.l08l) in which she 
writes of a marriage which Gianfrancesco had arranged between Gismondo 
Pandolfo Malatesta and a daughter of Carmagnola. Despite the 
disagreements which had taken place between-the two men, this would 
indicate that their relationship was still fairly close • 
.280. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 7 Feb. 1430 (Instructions to Francesco Catabene): 
" ••• venessero al rasonamento circa 10 facto de la Bolla de Leonello. 
Et breviter foe terminato e concluso tra nuy chel prefato Signore 
dovesse mandar aRoma messer Ziliolo fi6lo de Jacome Ziliolo e 
Zuliano del Munaro cum li quali tu te dovesse ritrovar a la presentia 
del Papa circa la impetrazione de la dicta Bolla per la quale 10 
prelibato Signore venga ad esser investito, e manchando luy, che 
Leonello solo vegna ad esser unico e legittimo successore •••• e per 
suoi fio11 1egittimi." 
... 
281. ibid. " ••• narrando1gi per parte nostra quando redundara a1 contenta-
mento a honor nostro la concessione de la dicta Bolla, che quando 
... 
cusi non have sse luogo se poe pensare 10 mal contentamento e la 
vergogna vignassemo ad havere, demostrandogie ~'tiam dio quando questo 
vene ad esser confirmatione del parentado et amicitia che sono stati 
longo tempo tra la I11ustre casa de Este, e la nostra, e conservatione 
de li stati de luna parte e de laltra ••••• E per tanto supplica 
strettamente a 1a Sanctitade Sua per nostra parte se digni condescendere 
a questo, e che non voglia che a1cnuna indignatione 1a qua1a havesse 
contra 10 pre1ibato Signore, se a1chuna se ne ritrovasse havere, in 
specia1itade per non haver 10 debito suo del Censo •••• advisando10 che 
10 prefato Signore trovamo ben disposto a far 10 10 dovere suo como 
S!empre havemo trovato •• " 
261. 
282. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 10 March 1430: (Instructions to Catabene) : 
"Se maravejamo molto che tu non habi scrito de la principal nostra 
fazenda de la quala desideravamo sopre ogni altra cossa de sentir 
••••••• molto ne recresse tanta dilatatione." 
283. Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fol.15, 25 Jan.1430 (Ziliolo to Gianfrancesco) : 
"10 ho visto la copia de la Bolla la quale haviti facto reformare. 
Et e vero Signor mio che tante facte nove che non sege podesse 
202. 
trovare exceptione. Et anche se Papa non la faria mai ad quel modo perche 
non obbligaria mai prima lui poi li soi successori ad dovere fare 
la investixione. Et per tore via ogni dubieza, e picolo, 
considerato quello e facto ad quelli di Arimino, me pareva, chel se 
havesse ad cercare chel papa innovasse e investisse el Signore e dope 
luy Leonello, e manchando senza fioli, fosse investato li fradelli 
quali elegesse el Signor. Et facesse el Papa la investixione, al modo 
de tute le altre del Signore. Et non li volesse innovare nove obligatione 
" , -
e graveze p~u de l'usato. Et questo bastara e se~mo fora de ogni 
pericolo, e sera la cossa valida." 
284. Arch. Gon. B.217, fol.15, 5 Jan.1431: "Effecto che el dicto Magnifico 
et Inclito Leonello suo figluolo e immediate successore et Signor et 
Vicario Generale de Sancta Chiesa in la cit~ de Ferrara etin tuto 
quello che de la prefata Sancta Chiesa el Prefato Illustre et excelso 
Sig. Mess. 10 Machexe tene al presente e tenesse per 10 advenir." 
There was the provision that no other child "should supplant Leonello 
in order of succession "senza alchuna exceptione". The contract 
itself is dated the same day in B.217 fol.18 in which Leonello is 
named as "Primo genito et unico successore". See also fol.19. 
285. In fact, on the 2 July 1428 the castle of Melaria had been pledged 
by Gianfran~esco as security for a loan which he had raised from 
Niccolo. See Arch. Gon. B. 1181, 2 July 1428 (Este to Gianfrancesco) 
286. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 19 March 1428: letter to Baptista Malatesta from 
her sister in Rome. There was also a suggestion that Carlo Gonzaga should 
marry into the same family. 
287. "Li ambassadori del duca sum anchora a Vinexia e la principale caxone, 
" e la causa del Marchexe de Monfera, e questa differentia del Cremonexe •••• 
In March 1430 Gianfrancesco was very concerned about the security of the 
river areas and was clearly disturbed at the excessive expense which 
its protection involved. There were discussions over the nature of 
Venice's contribution in S.S. reg.ll., fol. 83t, 1 March 1430. On 
24 April 1430 both Gianfrancesco and Este were summoned to Venice 
for discussions of war preparations. (ibid., fol.10lt). 
288. 5.5. 11, fol.68-71. On 5 Feb. Andrea Contarini had left for Milan 
with Lorenzo de'Medici to discuss this matter. 
289. On 20 April 1429 NiccolO d'Este had returned to Ferrara from Venice. 
This was at the time he was angry with the Florentines at the 
difficulties over the renewal of his condotta. On the 21 April Ziliolo 
wrote to Gianfrancesco: " ••• E parso ela Signoria che luy se toglia 
dali Fiorentini come da cativi homeni, e mali pagaturi tute quallo 
chel ne puo havere. Et de loro tiorentini quella Signoria ha dicto 
male asay. Et de loro facti se sum molto doluti e lamentati, digando 
brutte parole da loro." Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fol.ll. 
290. Arch. Gon. B. 1228, 6 June 1429 (Zilio10 go Gianfrancesco): "E1 
... 
Rev. mo. Cardinale de Sancta Croce parti questa matina de qui, e va 
per andare ad Imo1a dove se debe retrovare el Governadore. Et dove sia 
1e cosse disposte ala pace remanera li tanto che 1a pace sia conc1usa, 
e poi subito vole ritornare a Rama ••••• Lui non ha speranza gia che 
1a possa haver loco." See also S.S. reg. 11, fo1s. 107-8. 
291. See Battiste11a, pp. 252ff. 
292. 5.5. reg. 11, fo1s. 112-4. 
293. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 40, 19 Oct, 1430. Information had been relayed 
to them by Jacopo Michiel, their special envoy to Mantua. For the 
Guasta11a fortress see Arch. Vz. 5.5. vol. 11, 138t., 25 Sept. 1430. 
294. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 38. Este was much more cynical about the whole 
business. See also fol. 39, 8 Jan. 1430. 
295. s.s. reg. 11, fo1. 131. 
296. Sanuto, col. 1015. 
297. Platina, p. 324. 
298. 5.5. reg. 11, fols. 163-4. 
263. 
299. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 20 Jan. 1431 (Gianfrancesco to Venice from Marmiro10) : 
"CUm reverentia advisatis et fi1ia1iter loquar vel filius ad patrem. Qm. 
advisamentum ipm. fuit multum tarde •••• qm. homines mei multum sparsi 
sunt per villas et talem reductionem celerem non nisi cum maximo da:mno 
facere eis possibile est ...... The Venetians were also involved in these 
negotiations. ego on 6 Aug. 1430 they were adding their support to 
Nicco10 and Gianfrancesco via their ambassador in Rome. 5.5. reg. 11, 
fo1.127, 6 Aug. 
300. ibid: " •••• maxime attento qm. Comes Franciscus est multum propinquas 
ad terras meas ultra Padum qui posset prorumpere in ipm. meum 
territorium et damnum non parvum inferre ••• " 
301. ibid. "ad ipm. Cel. vrm. filia1iter p. pdcto. recurre, speravi et 
dertum me reddens non aliam faciet provisionem circa p. dicta qm. in , 
propiis factis et terris suis." 
302. ego 5.5. reg. 11, fols. 174-5. 
303. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fo1. 43, 8 Apr. 1431. Regarding the monthly 
expenditure of 2,000 ducats they advise he should spend it on 
"gentibus equestribus et pedestribus pro bono status vre. et nostri. •• 
sicut melius M.V. videtur." 
304. ego Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 42;letter of 7 April 1431 provisioning 
"cum huiusmodi rebus et victualibus trans territoria libere transire." 
305. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fol. 44, 30 April 1432. The supplies were to be 
consigned to the Captain of the Po fleet. cf. B.1419, fo1. 45, 1 Dec. 
1431. 
306. Arch. Gon. B.2l8S, 20 Jan. 1431 (Gianfrancesco to Venice from Marmiro1o) : 
This explains Gianfrancesco's motives very well indeed. 
307. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fo1. 40, 19 Oct.1430: "Ita tamen quod tempore 
ipsarum trenguarum ipse Guido 'super Padum non facit nec fieri permittat 
aliquam bastitam seu aliquid hedificii de novo in et super territorium 
suum." 
308. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fol.151. 
309. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fo1.154: II non saria fati alchuno hedificio, 
ne bastida suvra el Po, in suxo el territorio de Guastalla ••• " Torello 
signed this document personally "a mazore fermeza de Ie soprascripte 
cose". His envoys to Mantua for these negotiations had been Giovanni 
Boniano and Bernardo de'Albertani. 
310. Arch. Gon. B.43, fo1s. 171-2, 31 Dec.1431. Gianfrancesco's secretary 
entrusted with this was Venturino de Arrivabene. 
311. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fo1s, 179-81. The Mantuan representative was 
Antonio Belliardo. 
312. Arch. Gon. B. 1419. fo1s. 42-3. 7 And 8 April 1431. The Venetians 
264. 
had every confidence in Gianfrancesco. "sumus certissimi quod non facietis 
nisi aliud quod possit redundare ad eadem honore et utili tate status Vri. 
et nostra." It would seem that Gianfrancesco's representative 
was Feltrino de Gonzaga. Both he and Galeazzo were used from time to 
time. It is not clear what their precise relationship to Gianfrancesco 
was. Fe1trino de Gonzaga, probably belonged to the Reggio Branch of 
the family and Galeazzo is described by Sanuto as a "fratello bastardo" of 
Gianfrancesco. 
313. Details of the negotiations are in Arch. Gon. B.43, fols. 157-60. This 
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and Francesco della Mirandula had sent Edoardo del Fante, the 
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321. Possevino, Bk. V, p.532. 
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322. His intention was to be crowned Emperor, but Filippo Maria was hoping 
to get his active help against the Venetians. 
323. For example see S.S. reg. 12, vol X. fo1s 27ff. 
324. 5.5. reg.12, fol.52. 
325. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, f01.46, 12 Jan~1432. (Venice to Gianfrancesco). 
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On 19 Jan. (fol.47) Badoer was once again sent to confer with 
Gianfrancesco. 
326. Osio, vol. III, p.62. at the end of the month the Senate sent Taddeo 
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64t, 31 Jan.1432. A letter was written to Gianfrancesco requesting 
his help. It could be argued that this was an attempt to convince him 
that they had his interests at heart. 
327. Battistel1a, p.341: "Ma le 1agnanze del Gonzaga, an co se vere,·non 
erano ne 1e prime che egli faceva ne gran fatto importanti." 
328. Most of the events which follow are reproduced from Battistella, 
pp.345ff. and Romanin, vol. IV. pp. 
329. Battistella, p.35l. 
330. Arch. Gon. B. 2094, fo1.l15. 
331. Arch. Gon. B. 2094, fo1.l16: "Advisimus quod 1stud Serenissimus Ducale 
Dnum. una cum suo consilio nemine discrepante, nos in suum generale 
capitaneum ellegerat ••• " 
332. Gianfrancesco can not, therefore, have been present at Carmagno1a's 
execution as most commentators suggest. 
333. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fols 48-9, especially 49: ..... nos non veniemus ad 
pacem sive concordiam cum sua Serenitate nis M. vra. restituatur et 
reintegretur in eius iuribus et honorificent1is consuetis." 
334. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fo1.48: "Provisionem quoque qua Vra. M. fecit in 
dimittendo D. Guidonem de Bagno cum nonullis ex vris. pro securitate 
territori vri. plurimum laudamus." 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RELUCTANT COMMANDER (1432-1438) 
I 
Introduction 
"Fu gran nimico di questo stato nostro." !/ 
This was Sanuto's final judgement on Gianfrancesco's career. It is 
not surprising that Sanuto, a loyal Venetian, should have added these 
words when he reported his death in 1444. In Sanuto's eyes Gianfrancesco 
appeared as a man in whom the Venetian state had placed a great deal of 
trust, a trust which he had betrayed at a crucial moment in 1438 when he 
went over to the camp of Filippo Maria Visconti. 
Later commentators have echoed this judgement and have 
contributed to the view that Gianfrancesco's career is a typical example 
of that of a faithless commander. !/ It would seem on the surface rather 
paradoxical that for the greater part of his active life Gianfrancesco had 
been one of Venice's staunchest supporters, first as second-in-command to 
Carmagnola, and, after 1432, as Captain General of the Venetian army. 
Once again his reputation has suffered unjustly at the hands 
of historians, and it is the aim of this chapter to re-examine the 
period of Gianfrancesco's Captain Generalship in an attempt to assess more 
critically the value of Sanuto's judgement. In examining rather more 
closely than hitherto Gianfrancesco's relationship with Venice in his 
new capacity it will be seen that Sanuto's assessment is an unfair one. 
While it is undeniably true that he changed sides in 1438, how justified, 
in fact, was he in doing so? Is it as sudden or as capricious as scholars 
would have us believe, or is it the culmination of a fairly logical process? 
It would appear that the latter is nearer the truth. 
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Within the general framework the chapter will concern itself 
with four interrelated themes •. Firstly it will examine the circumstances 
surrounding Gianfrancesco's appointment as Captain General of the Venetian 
army. Secondly, the nature of his role as military commander will be 
considered, especially the degree of autonomy which he had, and the nature 
of his working relationship both with the Senate and the Provveditori. 
In this respect it is also important to relate this to Mantuan policies 
and interests and to Mantua's relationships with other states. Thirdly, 
the part which Gianfrancesco played in the war when it was finally renewed 
in 1437 will be discussed; how faithful he was as an instrument of Venetian 
policy and how this coincided with military feasibility. Finally, and 
perhaps most crucial, there will be a detailed re-examination of the 
circumstances which surrounded the dramatic events of 1438 up to the time of 
his declaration for Filippo Maria. Up to now the various interpretations 
of these events have not been fully understood or properly evaluated; in 
particular the attitudes and motives'of the three principal participants. 
There was as always a very powerful reason governing Gianfrancesco's actions. 
In fact, from the very beginning he was reluctant to accept the supreme 
command because the direction of the Lombard wars had changed. The conflict 
was now even less compatible with Mantuan interests than its first phase. 
Now there were real fears of Mantua's absorption. In fact, the parallelism 
with Carmagnola's career in this period becomes even more marked. In the 
end there were disagreements with Venice, the Provveditori and also a 
growing antagonism with Gattamelata, his second-in-command. There was no 
chance of complete independence or neutrality for Mantua given the nature 
of the conflict between Milan and Venice. Moreover, mindful of the 
suddenness of Carmagnola's fall from power, Gianfrancesco was not gOing to 
allow a similar fate to befall him. In other words, the decisions of 1438 
were not the result of any whim; they involved, as always, the best 
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interests of Mantua as Gianfrancesco saw them and, furthermore, the 
true significance of these events can only be fully appreciated as a 
direct continuation of the arguments put forward in the previous chapter. 
II 
The Captain-Generalship and the Imperial Title 
In many respects the execution of Carmagnola was a bold move 
on the part of Venice. However, as far as the Senate was concerned, the 
possible dangers which could ensue from this were mitigated by its 
suddenness and also by the fact that they were certain that Gianfrancesco 
would fill the gap. The Senate moved very quickly in offering the Captain 
Generalship to him, as we have seen, and there was nothing to indicate that 
he would have any qualms in accepting it. 
Because the war against Milan was still in progress, continuity 
was of paramount importance. The Venetians wanted a man in whom they could 
place an absolute trust, a man who had already had some measure of experience 
and responsibility in the war, and a man who would have the drive and 
determination to exert as much pressure as possible on the enemy. Gianfrancesco 
qualified eminently on all these counts and, furthermore, the Venetians had 
every reason to hope for a lengthy period of continued service from him. 
Although Carmagnola had scored some notable successes over the 
Milanese, an opponent like Filippo Maria Visconti would allow no room for 
complacency. In the latter stages of Carmagnola's rather low-key 
direction of the war, the Milanese had begun to make a comeback and the 
Venetians could simply not afford to allow them to capitalise upon the 
inevitable weakness which would obviousjresult from an interregnum of 
mili tary command. 
As we have seen from the previous chapter, Gianfrancesco was 
alarmingly aware of the threats posed by a possible Milanese resurgence, 
and the way in which this could affect his relationship with Venice could 
have played a significant part in the ultimate decision to dispose of 
Carmagnola. 
Given all these reasons the Venetian Senate could hardly be 
blamed for gambling upon Gianfrancesco's acceptance of their offer; apart 
from anything else it could be argued very forcefully that at least at 
269. 
this stage in the development of the war, his interests were more immediately 
threatened than theirs. ~/ 
The Venetians, however, could never have foretold the 
surprising difficulty they were to experience in getting Gianfrancesco to 
take on the responsibilities of supreme command. In examining the whole 
issue it can be seen that the situation confronting Gianfrancesco was a 
great deal more complex than the Venetians had imagined. 
Much of 1432 was taken up with negotiations over the Captain 
Generalship as well as continuing the war with Milan. It must be emphasised 
at the outset that there was no incompatibility between these two things. 
The issue essentially was not whether or not Gianfrancesco was going to 
continue in their service, but in what capacity. Although Gianfrancesco 
never wavered in his fidelity to Venice, this was. not good enough. The 
Venetians had committed themselves to crossing the Adda and there could 
be no ambiguity as to Gianfrancesco's position in their eyes. 
In April 1432 there were many pressures on Gianfrancesco. 
As well as the tensions resulting from the traumatic experience of 
Carmagnola's execution, the whole question of military command must be 
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set against the background of two other important issues. For personal 
reasons there was an immediate need to alleviate pressures on the Mantovano 
which had resulted from the Milanese successes earlier in the year and this, 
at least, would guarantee some military action by Gianfrancesco. In addition, 
to this he was more anxious than ever to bring negotiations with Sigismund 
to a successful conclusion over the question of the Imperial title, a 
matter which had become something of an obsession with Gianfrancesco. 
As we have seen, the Venetians were to continue to press very hard for this 
on his behalf through their ambassador Marco DandoJQ. These two issues 
were very much more closely connected than has previously been acknowledged 
and had a very important bearing on the whole question of military command. 
It must be remembered that Filippo Maria had as much interest in what 
Gianfrancesco would do as the Venetians, and there is a certain amount of 
evidence which would lead us to believe that he was actively engaged in 
trying to prevent Gianfrancesco from being appointed by Venice. 
The Venetians moved very swiftly after Carmagnola's arrest 
on 7 April. Although they had made temporary arrangements for the governing 
of the army it is clear that they hoped Gianfrancesco to succeed to command 
within a, matter of days. On 8 April the Senate decided to appoint Leonardo 
Mocenigo, Antonio Contarini and Giorgio Cornaro to negotiate with Gianfrancesco 
over the Generalship and it seems clear from their instructions that they were 
allowed a certain degree of latitude concerning Gianfrancesco's own personal 
wishes. At such a delicate stage it was necessary for the Venetians to 
tread as warily as possible. ~/ 
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On the same day they also reminded Gianfrancesco of the 
continuing efforts to reach a reasonable financial settlement with 
Sigismund over the Marquisate. It seems that Sigismund was still insisting on 
the 12,000 ducats but the Venetians hoped that they would be able to reduce 
this to eight or even seven thousand. 2/ This tends to confirm the fact 
that even in Venetian eyes the Imperial title could be used as an inducement 
to persuade Gianfrancesco to accept. 
As far as Venice was concerned things seemed to be going so 
well that the formal offer of the Captain Generalship was made to him on 
10 April, long before Carmagnola's trial and execution. While it seems 
to be the case that Gianfrancesco had been a little more reticent in his 
attitude than they had otherwise expected, §/ and they consequently had to 
proceed very carefully indeed, Z/ they nevertheless had every confidence 
that their three envoys had performed their task successfully. 
In a sense it was incumbant on the Senate to force Gianfrancesco 
into the open about this appointment as quickly as possible and this tended 
to make a direct refusal by Gianfrancesco all the more difficult. It 
was quite a surprise to the Venetians that for the time being GLanfrancesco 
declined to accept their offer, excusing himself on account of ill-health. 
However, he did offer to go to Brescia at the earliest opportunity and 
do everything in his power to continue the war until a successor for 
Carmagnola could be found. He did, however, make it clear that he did 
not want to remain in Brescia for any longer than was necessary. ~/ 
The illness was a somewhat lame excuse in the circumstances. 
There is no documentary evidence relating to any serious ailment and it 
~/ 
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did not prevent him from going to Brescia and pursuing, as it turned out, 
quite an energetic campaign. It is clear that Gianfrancesco realised 
the implications of declining this appointment and this was why he was 
so anxious to display his continuing loyalty to Venice by agreeing to go to 
Brescia and, moreover, by offering his son Ludovico for military service. 12/ 
In the circumstances Gianfrancesco's reply was the most 
diplomatic he could offer and it is clear that the Venetians were not at 
all convinced that his decision was final. Although they were prepared for 
the time being not to press him unduly on this because of his offer to take 
over on a temporary basis, they were not going to wait too long before 
pressing him once again. 
It is, furthermore, important to note that Gianfrancesco had 
agreed to serve in Brescia without any official payment. l!/ Consequently 
the situation which existed between him and Venice was a very vague one. It 
was precisely this that the Venetians were not fond of and it was in order 
to rectify this that they chose to opt for a policy of gradual, but persistent, 
persuasion; but it was used only after Gianfrancesco had gone to Brescia. 
Hence, in their instructions to Marco Dandolo and Giorgio Cornaro, they 
stipulated that Gianfrancesco was to have the same powers and was to be 
treated as though he was Captain General, possibly in the hope that familiarity 
would breed acceptance rather than contempt. l~/ Their main worry now was 
to make sure that there would beno trouble from Carmagno1a's men in the 
13/ light of the way in which their master had been treated. - Such delicate 
matters might well be solved more readily if Gianfrancesco were there. 
Because he had been closely associated with Carmagnola they considered that 
he might be more readily accepted. 
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On the surface this sequence of events would appear to be most 
uncharacteristic of Gianfrancesco. Why would he not accept the prestigious 
position which Venice offered him, a post which seemed to be the logical 
culmination of all he had done in the first phase of the war, rather than a 
caretaker's job in Brescia in which he had severely circumscribed his level 
of commitment? This is an extremely difficult question to answer, but it is 
essential to pose a possible solution to this problem because it could throw 
invaluable light upon the importance which it was Gianfrancesco's duty 
to attach to the balancing out of his obligations to Venice with his 
responsibilities to Mantua. 
It had already been observed that Gianfrancesco's active part 
in the latter stages of Carmagnola's campaigns was minimal. In fact, it 
would be a fair assessment to conclude that he had been at his most active 
when Venetian military policy coincided with Mantuan security. This 
was partly why, in April 1432, he was prepared to go to Brescia at a 
time when the Milanese threatened the Mantovano and the fact that the 
position was a temporary one would leave him with the sort of flexibility 
which he needed. There seems to be no doubt that Gianfrancesco was 
capable of permanent command, but the direction of Venetian military policy 
could leave him in a situation where he was going to have a commitment 
which would lead him progressively further away from the Mantovano. At 
that time it did not seem practical for Gianfrancesco to assume command, 
quite apart from the reservations which may have been induced in him by 
Carmagnola's fate. 
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This, however, was only one side of the situation. Gianfrancesco 
could not only concern himself with Venice's reactions, he also had to 
consider Milan and Sigismund and the effect which his acceptance was 
likely to have on them. In April both Sigismund and Filippo Maria 
were intimately concerned with what Gianfrancesco might do and the former's 
opinions could have a very important role to play in Gianfrancesco's 
decisions. On 14 April Sigismund wrote to Gianfrancesco from Parma 
that he had heard of the Venetian offer and he strongly impressed upon him 
that to accept was against his wishes. He called the Venetians 'hostes nostril 
who had always been anti-Imperialist in sentiment and concluded that he 
hoped that Gianfrancesco would be as faithful a servant of the Imperial 
cause as his father had been. l~/ In pursuance of this Sigismund sent 
15/ his secretary Herman Hecht to consult with Gianfrancesco personally. -
Sigismund had been in close communication with Filippo Maria 
over this and it seemed, judging from what correspondence survives in the 
Visconti Archive, that they were working very closely together. Through 
his ambassador Corrado de Carreto the Duke was constantly encouraging 
16/ Sigismund to persevere in this approach. - Filippo Maria, anxious to 
press home his advantage overthe hiatus in Venice's military command, 
17/ had everything to gain and nothing to lose by pursuing such a policy. -
In fact, in a letter to Sigismund written on 29 April, Filippo Maria 
enumerated Gianfrancesco's good qualities and suggested to him that he 
should actively try to separate him from the Venetians by offering him 
the appointment of Imperial Captain General in Italy as well as investing 
18/ him with the title of Marquis for the lands he already possessed. -
In fact, he seems to have been ,fully informed about the state of negotiations 
between Sigismund and Gianfrancesco over the title. 12/ 
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This correspondence now places the whole situation in a 
different light. The wily Duke, anxious to bolster up his friendship with 
Sigismund and serve his own interests at the same time was virtually suggesting, 
by playing on the bad relations between Venice and Sigismund, that the Imperial 
title was, at the very least, to be made conditional upon Gianfrancesco 
not accepting Venetian command, and, if possible, trying to seek revenge 
for his loss of Carmagnola by inducing Gianfrancesco to leave Venetian 
service altogether. It was this added complication which tended to put 
an unbearable pressure upon Gianfrancesco on top of all his other misgivings. 
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that he was reluctant to 
accept the Senate's offer. 
Filippo Maria's actions here are very similar to his previous 
attempts to woo Carmagnola away from Venetian service and it could be 
argued that there was also a secondary intention to discredit Gianfrancesco 
20/ deliberately in the eyes of the Senate. - However, whether or not this 
was Filippo Maria's intention, Gianfrancesco felt not only that his chances 
of successfully negotiating with Sigismund might be lessened, he was also 
anxious not to compromise his position unduly with Venice. 
By the end of April Gianfrancesco was under a great deal of 
pressure from both sides, but it was very much to his credit that he 
appraised Venice of Sigismund's intentions. Clearly, at this time 
Gianfrancesco could not afford to run the risk of being accused of any 
clandestine relations with the enemy. By 23 April Gianfrancesco had asked 
Venice to intervene with Sigismund over the negotiations because once 
again he was making more difficulties over the amount of money to be 
paid. 2!/ It is interesting and significant to note that the Senate 
voted unanimously in favour of this and on 26 April they sent instructions 
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22/ to their ambassador in Florence, Ermolao Donato, to set this in motion. -
There was thus quite a powerful. reason for Venice to take up negotiations 
with Sigismund. 
In fact, this very issue may well have played an important 
part in Venice's desire for a rapprochement with Sigismund in more general 
terms. From a diplomatic point of view one of the most interesting trends 
of 1432 and the beginning of 1433 is the way in which Sigismund left 
Milan for Venice, and this was closely bound up with Gianfrancesco's 
fortunes. In fact, even before April Sigismund's relations with Filippo 
Maria had not been of the best. The Duke had always placed an inordinate 
amount of confidence in Sigismund's friendship, despite the fact that the 
impecunious King of the Romans had never really lived up to expectations 
and there had been many disagreements over men and money. 22/ 
At the beginning of 1432 Filippo Maria was genuinely alarmed 
at losing Sigismund's friendship and,given the latter's overriding desire 
to be crowned Emperor by the Pope, who happened to be the Venetian Eugenius IV 
at this time, it is hardly surprising that Filippo Maria was trying to 
dissuade him from going to Rome and was encouraging him instead to go to 
Basle to negotiate with the Council.Sigismund, however, ignored Filippo 
Maria's advice, and it became clear to him by the beginning of 1432 that 
even though he and the Venetians were enemies his interests would be 
much better served if he were to cultivate their friendship. It was the 
beginning of a long and gradual process which was not to be complete until 
the following year and was seen in one of its most tangible forms in the 
formal ceremony of Gianfrancesco's investiture as Marquis at the end of 
September 1433. The process began at the end of April 1432 and coinCided 
almost exactly with Gianfrancesco's request for Venice to help. In a 
letter to the Cardinal of Santa Croce dated 30 April 1432 Gianfrancesco 
24/ 
tells him of the Venetian approaches to Sigismund for a league. -
In the same letter he also alludes to pluribus legittimis causisque 
longum est narrare' why he was unable to accept the Captain Generalship, 
but adds that he is nevertheless very anxious to demonstrate his sincere 
affection towards Venice. 
It was a great source of relief to him that there may be 
less incompatibility between the interests of Venice and Sigismund, 
but this did not lead Gianfrancesco to be over optimistic about the way 
in which matters would eventually turn out. It was virtually impossible 
to estimate which direction Filippo Maria's policy would take and 
consequently it paid him to continue adopting a cautious attitude. 
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As far asSigismund was concerned, he was ina rather favourable 
diplomatic position for the time being with both Milan and Venice vying with 
each other for his friendship. The one thing they had in common, though 
for different reasons, was that they supported Gianfrancesco's investiture. 
In the ciroumstances the grant of an Imperial title was sufficiently 
ambiguous not to jeopardise Sigismund's position, in fact, it would tend 
to raise his credit in the eyes of Eugenius IV as well. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the negotiations over 
this came to a swift conclusion. On 6 May 1432 at Parma the formal grant 
of a Marquisate was made to Gianfrancesco. It is significant to note 
that the final fee was 12,000 ducats; Sigismund characteristically seemed 
to be much less flexible over the question of hard cash. It is also 
important that the definition of the territorial limits of his Marquisate 
did not conflict with Filippo Maria's interests. They were defined 
as "Sermide, Revero, Quiste110,Luzzara, Suzzara et Marcha regio cum 
omnibus earum turris, vi11is etpertinentibus ac cum f1um1nis Situ1e, 
01eii, Padi et Mincii cum omnibus suis ultra citraque Ripis, castris, 
forti1iciis et locis". 2~/ He was also given the faculty of coining 
money and quartering his coat of arms with the Imperial eagles. On the 
following day Sigismund sent Hecht with a copy of this document for 
Gianfrancesco's approval. All this was done with the explicit approval 
of Venice because on the very day that the grant was made Foscari wrote 
to Gianfrancesco congratulating him on the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations. 2§/ On 7 May Gianfrancesco signed a formal oath of 
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'27/ loyalty to Sigismund - and in return was granted the "facu1tatem relinquendi 
cui1ibet ex duobus aliis fi1iis suis legittimis usque ad numerum castrorum 4 
de castris Marchionatus Mantue, cum hoc tamen quod pre1ibati duo filii 
teneatur i11a recognoscere per investituram a primogenito, et confirmantis 
eidem marchioni iurisdictiones infrascriptorum castrorum". 2§/ These 
negotiations were concluded by 14 May and at this point the matter rested 
for the time being. 2..4i / 
There was a considerable gap between the drawing up of the 
various papers connected with the Imperial title and the actual ceremony of 
investiture whioh took place more than a year later, on 22 September 1433. 
There were some very good diplomatic reasons for this, which will be 
discussed at greater length below. For obvious reasons a ceremony 
of this sort would not be in Sigismund's interests at a time when his 
diplomatic situation was so ambiguous. Sigismund was probably more aware 
than most princes of the subtle but crucial distinction between the formal 
grant of a title on paper and the actual ceremony of inVestiture. This 
was evidently also realised by Gianfrancesco and tended to reinforce 
his natural caution over the question of the Venetian command. Both 
these problems were only to be finally solved when there was no longer 
any ambiguity in Sigismund's position; that is, when his political 
alignment became much more definitely pro-Venetian. This alignment would 
obviously be affected by the progress of the conflict between Venice and 
Milan. 
The Venetians, for their part, were pleased at the outcome 
of this affair because by May they were most anxious for Gianfrancesco 
to resume military operations if only to display to Milan that the 
Carmagnola episode had not thrown them off their stride. 
By the end of April Gianfrancesco had taken charge of affairs 
in Brescia, and despite his reluctance, soon displayed those powers of 
organisation which had been shown to such great effect in the first phase 
30/ 
of the war. - He was to work harmoniously with Giorgio Cornaro in 
reorganising the Venetian forces in preparation for the campaign, which 
had not made any significant progress since Carmagnola's recall. 
According to Sanuto, the military strength at Gianfrancesco's 
disposal consisted of 9,600 cavalry, 8,000 infantry, 6,000 'cernide' 
lie infiniti partigiani". 3!/ The official estimate sent by Gianfrancesco 
to the Senate stated 10,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry. 3~/ In fact, 
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judging from this first extant report he made to the Senate, Gianfrancesco 
does not appear to have been very satisfied either with the number of men 
or the arrangements over supplies and munitions. This complaint was to 
be made time and time again to the Senate when the war re-started in 1437. 
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However, on this occasion they were very anxious indeed that operations 
should get under way by the end of the month at the very latest. The 
Senate replied to him that they feared that things would get worse if 
there were any further delay, and they promised their best to satisfy 
Gianfrancesco's demands over men and supplies, not only for the army 
itself, but also to protect the areas they still held which were threatened 
by the Milanese. Furthermore, they despatched a sum of 20,000 ducats 
for immediate expenses. 3~/ In short, even though the Venetians were 
experiencing some difficulty as far as men and money were concerned, they 
were very conscious of the need to be as accommodating to Gianfrancesco in 
giving him as much help as possible given the nature of his position in 
Brescia. 3~/ At the same time Venice was still continuing active 
discussions with Sigismund and Eugenius IV and Montferrat in order to isolate 
Milan still further. 3~/ 
Initially the Venetian plan was to cross the Oglio and recover 
some of the crossing places which had been occupied by Piccinino, but 
ultimately Venetian aims of crossing the Adda had not changed. 
Although the organisation of troops and supplies took the 
better part of a month to accomplish, the Senate was beginning to get 
impatient by June. They were very concerned lest Piccinino's forces would 
get so entrenched that they would become very difficult to move. Their 
long-term plans for the campaigning season were quite ambitious - they wanted 
to reach the Adda and consequently a quick thrust across the Oglio was 
essential. 
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Suddenly, at the end of May, Gianfrancesco wrote to the 
Senate complaining of ill-health. He reported that he was not well 
enough to serve them as he would wish to, but nevertheless, conscious 
of the difficulties which this might create, he would try his best to stay 
on at least until the end of the month. 3§/ At the very time that operations 
were due to commence, this request was a grievious blow to the Senate. 
At first it was rejected outright by a majority of 34, but on further 
discussion with the 'sapientiae terrarum' the Senate replied that they were 
37/ prepared to allow him leave of absence at the end of June. -
This sudden cloud overhanging the campaign brought home once 
again the drawbacks of Gianfrancesco's vague status as 'locumtenens'. 
However we interpret this illness; whether it was as bad as Gianfrancesco 
claimed it to be, or whether it was a last minute reticence on his part in 
committing himself to long-term operations, it certainly provoked a renewed 
discussion in the Senate over the whole question of the military command. 
On 7 June the Senate wrote to the authorities in Brescia 
voicing their extreme concern at what was to be done in Gianfrancesco's 
absence. They confessed that they had been unable to reach any satisfactory 
conclusion over this. They were worried about Gianfrancesco's continual 
refusals to take overall command, but could not think of anyone more 
suitable than he to carry out the task. They once more asked the 
authorities to try and gently persuade him to take this on, reminding him 
of his past successes in their service. However, they also asked them in 
. 3~ 
confidence whether they had any suggestions as to who could succeed him. -
It appeared that Sanseverino was very high on the list as a possible 
candidate3~/ although this was to be very much as a last resort after 
exhaustive attempts "circa suum (Gianfrancesco) remanere et persequi ad 
40/ gubernationem nostrorum gentium". - Naturally such a contingency 
plan was to remain strictly secret. 
Anyhow, while these discussions were proceeding behind the 
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scenes, military operations to cross the Oglio had begun in order to drive 
the enemy back towards the Adda. Although the details of the campaign 
itself need not concern us here, its outcome was bound to have a significant 
effect upon Gianfrancesco's standing with the Venetians •. 
In general the operations of the period from June to August 
were successful. In the first instance it was Gianfrancesco's task to 
take the war directly into the Cremasco and Cremonese and he took the 
nearest crossing point over the Oglio which was roughly equidistant between 
the two, Bordolano. Once this had been captured and reinforced it could 
be used as a base for supplies and also as a basiS for capturing the surrounding 
area. The operations of this month were particularly successful. 
After the securing of Bordolano, Casalbuttano, Sores ina and other small 
areas around Crema were captured. Piccinino seemed quite unable to contain 
this advance and it appeared very likely that the Venetians would consolidate 
their position by pushing northwards towards Romanengo and Soncino before 
proceeding to the Adda. 
In fact the Venetians were so delighted with Gianfrancesco's 
efforts that as early as 14 June they were consulting both him and Giorgio 
Cornaro as to the feasibility of reaching, and perhaps crossing the Adda 
before the present campaigning season was over1 "Cum ibi consistat victoria 
nostra et excidium hostis nostri et status sui". 4~/ The campaign in the 
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Cremonese was only to be a prelude to a major onslaught into the 
Milanese itself. In the same letter Gianfrancesco was assured of 
constant supplies, men and money, even though .they admitted that it 
43/ 
was frequently difficult to satisfy all his requests. - While it was 
one of Gianfrancesco's tasks not to alienate the local population by 
pillaging the countryside the Senate clearly intended to hit the enemy 
as hard as possible. 4~/ Gianfrancesco's initial success made his 
impending absence at the end of the month a matter of even more immediate 
concern, especially as the army was about to move northwards at the beginning 
of July. It now became an important objective to persuade Gianfrancesco 
to stay on at least until this phase of the campaign was completed, even 
though there was still active discussion in the Senate about arrangements 
during Gianfrancesco's absence. It was even suggested at one point that 
temporary command should rotate between Guidantonio Manfredi, Sanseverino and 
Pietrogianpaolo Orsini. 42/ 
At the beginning of July there was a concerted effort to 
persuade Gianfrancesco to stay on. Letters were sent praising his 
leadership, his harmonious relationship with the provveditori and his 
prestige not only in the Venetian army, but also how his presence struck 
46/ . fear into the hearts of the enemy. - If only he would condescend to stay 
on a little longer his achievement would bring him and his state perpetual 
fame and they would moreover guarantee him proper and efficient financial 
support. In addition to this Sante Venier and Giorgio Cornaro were 
fu~nished with specific instructions to back up this approach. 
The question of permanent command is not at all raised here. 
It is fairly clear that the Venetians were not at all pleased with the 
J 
J 
I 
alternative they had been discussing, certainly not while the campaign 
was in such a delicate initial stage. 
All this was even more pressing because there is evidence to 
prove that at this time Gianfrancesco was not actually with the army. 
However, it is evident from subsequent letters to Venier and Cornaro 
that Gianfrancesco was by no means easy to persuade, and by the end of 
July, when the Venetian army was ready to make a decisive move towards 
Romanengo and Soncino, the matter became so urgent that Ambrogio Badoer, 
Gianfrancesco's old fiend, was sent to negotiate with him. In fact, 
Badoer's mission was to continue into August and his successful record 
caused him to be used on a number of subsequent occasions when all else 
'seemed to have failed. 
The pressures on Gianfrancesco were so great that by 16 July he 
promised to help at least until Romanengo fell, 4Z1 much to the relief 
of the Senate, which was no quietly confident of being able to persuade 
him to stay on even longer "cognoscentes praesentiam sue esse utilem 
et necessaria in agendis nostri exercitui". 48_1 Even so, even after the 
siege of Soncino had started on 4 August Badoer was still trying to 
persuade Gianfrancesco to join the army; he was even instructed to offer 
him a share of the spoils. 421 However, it seemed very unlikely that the 
Venetians would get his active service even by the end of the month, in 
fact, all that Gianfrancesco seemed to do was to give them rather vague 
promises. 
The campaign to capture Soncino was to be a long and drawn out 
affair, lasting. almost the whole of the month of August •. This is why the 
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Venetians were so insistent in their efforts to get Gianfrancesco to 
supervise this personally. They felt he might well be able to quicken 
things up. The campaigning season was drawing on and they did not seem 
to be anywhere near their objective. 
Meanwhile Filippo Maria was beginning to despair of ever having 
any effective help from Sigismund. On 4 August he wrote him a desperate 
letter informing him of the progress made by the enemy, how they had 
taken all the areas mentioned above, together with Paderno Cremonese, 
50/ La Capella and Fontanella "quarum perditio est maximi detrimenti rebus meis". --. 
51 / He complained that his forces had not been strong enough to resist -
and that the Venetian army was better prepared than his. Sigismund had 
promised to send Hungarian troops into Friuli and Filippo Maria was 
trying to get him to take action as quickly as possible seeing that the 
Venetians were without an effective commander owing to Gianfrancesco's 
absence from the army. 52_I This is yet another reference to how important 
the Duke judged Gianfrancesco's contribution to the Venetian war effort to be. 
Filippo Maria, clutching at straws, seemed incapable of realising 
how his Imperial ally was playing him false, and on 24 August, with the 
fall of Soncino imminent, he renewed his appeal for help. 52/ He was 
quite right in fearing that the fall of Soncino would signal a Venetian 
thrust towards the Adda and into the Ghiaradadda. 5~1 On 27 August 
. d 55 / Sonc~no surren ered - and the Venetians felt that they had Filippo 
Maria where they wanted him. 
Gianfrancesco's continued absence must have been very frustrating 
indeed to the Venetians, and although a campaign was launched into the 
Ghiaradadda, the Valtelline and Valcamonica under the direction of 
56/ . Giorgio Cornaro - very little was done to follow up the fall of 
Soncino by an advance westwards. 
On 9 September the Senate wrote to Sante Venier and Andrea 
Giuliano complaining that little progress had been made and that the 
57 / 
army was to be kept in the field as long as possible. - However, 
it soon became obvious that no real progress could be made during the 
present campaigning season and the thrust towards the Adda eventually 
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became a mere 'holding' campaign. By the end of September arrangements 
were already in hand for the men to be lodged in winter quarters, if not 
beyond the ·Oglio, at least as close to the frontiers as possible. 
A campaign which had started off in a very promising fashion had 
ended rather disappointingly. Even though by November the Venetian position 
immediately across the Oglio was very strong Milanese resistance had begun 
to strengthen. However, Filippo Maria, bereft of Imperial aid and very short 
of money, was anxious to reopen peace negotiations through the mediation 
of Gianfrancesco. 
In fact, negotiations were well under way by November and the 
Venetians sent Fantino Michiel as their principal negotiator. Palla 
Strozzi was sent by Florence-and, if we are to believe Sanuto, Gianfrancesco 
58/ himself was also present at Ferrara at this time. 
On the surface it would seem rather curious that Gianfrancesco who 
had played no part in the major Venetian campaigns should have been present 
at the time. However, the correspondence with Venice would indicate a very 
good reason for this. 
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In surveying the achievements of 1432 the Senate could only 
conclude that the failure in the long term had been almost entirely 
due to lack of stable military leadership. In particular, events in the 
Valtelline in November made it even more pressing for a definite move 
to be made on this front. The Milanese capture of Giorgio Cornaro must 
have been exceedingly galling for the venetians:9-/ consequently, in 
November new and more energetic approaches were made to Gianfrancesco 
to persuade him to accept the Captain Generalship. 
By 13 November the negotiations in Ferrara were going through 
a difficult phase. Filippo Maria was proving particularly intransigent 
over the Valcamonica and Ghiaradadda, and the prospect of a renewal of the 
war induced the Senate to send Ermolao Donato and Badoer to Mantua to' 
. f W/ press G1an rancesco to accept. -
These efforts, in stark contrast to their previous attempts, 
were remarkably successful. A mere eleven days later, on 24 November 1432, 
Donato and Badoer were able to report back to the Senate that Gianfrancesco 
had been content to accept the appointment as Captain General of the 
venetian forces "cum provisione ducati 1,000 auri in ms. et ratione men&is, 
et cum conducta lancearum quingentarum computata conducta Ludovici." 6!/ 
The formalities were gone through very quickly and Badoer was instructed 
to give Gianfrancesco every assurance of protection from Venice as well 
as their absolute trust in him. 
According to Sanuto the ceremony of formal investiture took place 
i . 28 62/ d . d f hi 1 n Ven1ce on November, - an preparat10ns were ma e or s remova 
to Brescia at the earliest opportunity. Belpetro Manelmi was despatched 
as 'colaterale' and Badoer was also re'quired to accompany him to Brescia .. 
63/ 
and to keep the Senate informed of daily developments. -
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On 3 December Badoer was instructed to discuss with Gianfrancesco 
any issues arising out of his new appointment, but in general there seemed 
to be no major problems as far as his office was concerned. In return for 
hi.$' undertaking to accept office "in perminentiam" the Senate agreed to a 
personal condotta of 600 lances (including Ludovico), 200 'lancie spezzate' 
and 300 infantry with the promise of an increase in numbers in the following 
year. Initially his 'fermat was to be for one year and six months 'di 
rispetto'. In addition to this the Venetians undertook to include him in 
any agreement made with Sigismund. This last point was a significant 
inclusion. 6~/ 
The only problem which arose over these negotiations was over 
the territories which Gianfrancesco wanted as a reward for his services. 
In particular he was interested in getting possession of Parma. This 
had been raised with Badoer on 8 December and the Senate quickly replied 
to him that this was impossible because, as part of the agreement with 
Florence, Parma had been promised to Niccolo d'Este. The Venetians promised 
Gianfrancesco Cremona instead, provided it was captured from the Visconti.6~/ 
Badoer was asked to request Gianfrancesco's personal attendance at Venice 
should any further difficulties arise over this "pro cel'iori conclusione et 
expeditione istarum rerum". It was clearly in Venice's interests to clear 
up any misunderstanding with the least amount of fuss. This should not be 
66/ 
allowed to jeopardise their position with Eugenius IV over this area. -
In fact, even by the end of the month matters had not been effectively 
resolved and it was consequently necessary for Gianfrancesco to go personally 
to Venice. 
He proved to be very obstinate over this matter and at one point 
the Venetians even had to consult a number of eminent Pa~uan lawyers and, 
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get them to explain the legal intricacies of their position to him. 611 
In fact, the Venetians had to wOrk very hard to dissuade Gianfrancesco 
and a final settlement was not reached until 19 January 1433. By it he 
agreed to content himself with the lands of Guastalla, Mirandula, Crema 
and its surrounding area, Caravaggio, Treviglio, Ripalta, Vailate and 
Brignano Ii' I 681 s acqu~rentur. - The formal documents regarding these-lands 
were drawn up on 13 March. 6~1 Even though the negotiations over this 
last problem had been rather fraught, the Venetians could now rest a little 
more easily in that one of their most pressing military problems had 
been solved. 
However, it is very important to investigate more fully at this 
point Gianfrancesco's change of heart over the matter of the Venetian 
command as well as trying to explain why it was that he made such difficulties 
over the territorial part of the agreement. 
It is true that one of Gianfrancesco's motives for hesitating 
to accept Venice's offer during the campaigning season was that the area 
across the Oglio,Ghiaradadda and the Valtelline did not immediately concern 
him. After all, this was only part of the area which had been occupied 
by the Milanese. The area east of Cremona around Casalmaggiore interested 
Gianfrancesco much more closely because it was the area which could 
threaten the Serraglio. For the time being Venetian priorities did not 
include this area really and it may well be that Gianfrancesco felt it 
his duty to devote his energies to protecting the southern part of the 
Mantovano during this period. In fact, on 11 July 1432 Niccolo d'Este hinted 
in a letter to Gianfrancesco that he had heard that Filippo Maria. wanted to 
send an army to Casalmaggiore and warned him to be on his guard. 721 
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In fact, there were subsidiary operations conducted around Brescello 
and Casalmaggiore during the latter part of 1432 and Gianfrancesco was 
very concerned about security in this area. In October 1432 both Gianfrancesco 
and Ludovico were active in fortifying this area and were trying to restrict 
71/ the movementsof the enemy here. - The Venetians were not able to offer 
him much practical help but they did point out the importance of cooperation 
with Este over this. Clearly in such circumstances the defence of his 
own territories had to come first. 
However, there were other motives which affected his actions 
as well. In particular Gianfrancesco was watching the movements of 
Sigismund very closely. Although he was gravitating increasingly towards 
Venice, Gianfrancesco needed concrete proof of how he stood. Sigismund's 
unwillingness to help Filippo Maria during the summer of 1432 must have 
been gratifying to him, especially as he had still to be formally invested 
with the Marquisate. However, there was more to it even than that. As 
early as July 1432 there were negotiations under way between Gianfrancesco 
and Sigismund over the possibility of a prestigious marriage between Ludovico 
and Barbara, the daughter of the Elector of Brandenburg, an occurrence which, 
if successful, couldhave enhanced Mantuan prestige immeasurably. Simone 
da Crema had been Gianfrancesco's ambassador, a man of considerable 
experience in dealing with such people, having been present at the Council 
of Basle. In a letter dated 8 July 1432 Herman Hecht wrote to GianfrancescO 
informing him that there had already been much discussion over the match 
72/ 
and that Sigismund was inclined to give it his firm backing. - Consequently, 
Gianfrancesco could ill afford not to stand well with him at this stage. 
This may well have been a very powerful reason for his holding back until 
he could see more clearly in which direction relations between Venice and 
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Sigismund were moving. This was the reason why, in the final agreement 
with Venice, there was a very firm stipulation that Gianfrancesco's 
Imperial interests should be protected. 7~/ 
Indeed, by the very end of 1432 it seemed once again that 
Venice would not only help protect him, but would also be very necessary 
to fulfil his dynastic ambitions. By this time he had realised not only 
that there was no need to continue adopting this ambiguous position, but 
that it could be positively detrimental to his own interests. The 
proximity of the Milanese around Casalmaggiore frightened him; perhaps as 
Captain General he might be in a pOSition of greater strength to protect 
himself. This was why there was a definite undertaking by Venice to 
74/ protect all Mantuan territories in the agreement. - Furthermore, the 
fact that Gianfrancesco accepted at a time when active peace negotiations 
were proceeding perhaps tended to suggest that in real terms the burden 
of military responsibility for operations might not last long while at 
the same time making the Senate even more eager, in their gratitude, to 
help him. 
This is yet another instance of Gianfrancesco having to balance 
the interests of his state against those of Venice; and this is also the 
reason for the controversy over Parma. Traditionally one of the weakest 
parts of Mantuan defences was the border facing Parma and possession of 
that city would strengthen his position immeasurably. This was why he put 
up a fight to get it. His failure was a great disappointment to him. 
The alternative areas he was offered by Venice were very much a second best. 
Gianfrancesco was forced to accept them in the end because he could not 
afford to compromise the larger benefits which Venice could furnish him 
with, but their position, far away from the Mantovano, did not make their 
292. 
possession an attractive possibility in the long run though, as far as 
Venice was concerned, they were intended to serve as a bait to lure 
Gianfrancesco towards the Adda. These lands clearly contained the 
seeds of future trouble. 
We have given a great deal of attention to these months 
because they serve to reinforce a very important point about Gianfrancesco's 
motives. The period has served to illustrate once again tha t the reasoning 
which governed his actions is a great deal more complex and involved 
than one might think initially. The fact that he became Captain General of 
Venice only after a great deal of deliberation does not indicate any sense 
of ingratitude towards the Senate, but it demonstrates the very difficult 
dilemma which often confronted the ruler of a small state which was unwittingly 
caught up in power politics. There were very cogent reasons for Gianfrancesco 
being a reluctant commander. 
Whatever reservations Gianfrancesco may have had about accepting 
the Captain Generalship, it was at least very beneficial to the Venetians 
at a time when the negotiations at Ferrara were beginning to drag. As in 
the previous peace, this agreement, eventually reached in April 1433, was a 
very complex business. There is no need to go into the discussions here- 72/ 
but, in general, the impasse was the result of differences over boundaries, 
and even before it was signed, it became very evident that it could be none 
other than a temporary stopgap. The territories over which controversy 
raged were the Valcamonica, Ghiaradadda, regarded as the "chiave della 
stessa Milano", and the Milanese wish to keep its boundaries at the Oglio. 
However, it is important to realise that there was no real 
suspension of hostilities while these negotiations were proceeding, and the 
,,",,.,.' "".','~= .. "'------
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fact that the Venetians now had someone in overall charge of military 
operations led them to hope that they would be able to negotiate from 
a position of greater strength. 
Even so, not much had been accomplished by the time the peace 
was signed. Gianfrancesco did go to Brescia on 18 December 1432 to try to 
salvage the rather difficult situation in the Valcamonica and, under the 
able direction of Sanseverino, some progress was made in recapturing territory 
76/ from the Milanese. It was, however, very difficult work. - There is 
evidence of Gianfrancesco spending two further periods of residence in 
Brescia in January and March 1433, and in his 'refirma' with Venice of 
12 March he was awarded an official house in the city. 72/ 
The campaigns in February and March were relatively minor ones 
in the Bergamasco, capturing small castles. This was under the direction of 
Sanseverino although the overall supervision was Gianfrancesco's. 7§/ 
It seemed that lack of funds played an important part in dictating the 
smaller scale of operations. 
Although this was frustrating for the Venetians, they were 
always thinking in terms of stepping up operations as the peace negotiations 
were reaching their conclusion. On 2 April the Senate instructed the 
Captain of Brescia Geronimo Contarini to liaise with Gianfrancesco about 
the possibility of a push towards the Adda by the end of the month because 
their intelligence had indicated that the area would be relatively 
79/ 
undefended owing to larger concentrations of Milanese troops in Genoa. -
There were plans for a mobilisation of all troops in the Bresciano with 
the promise of reinforcements and additional 'guastatori' from Venice. 
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This may well have been a last effort to use force in order to change 
the somewhat unfavourable direction in which the negotiations at Ferrara were 
moving; but nothing came of it because the final details of this uneasy 
compromise, reached on 26 April, involved substantial concessions by Venice 
which virtually amounted to giving up all the lands which had been conquered 
80/ between the Adda and the Oglio. - It was not surprising that Filippo Maria 
ordered festivities to celebrate a peace which was so substantially favourable 
to him. 81/ Although this could be no real solution to the problem it did 
ueher in an albeit uneasy and fragile peace in Lombardy until 1437. 
As far as Filippo Maria was concerned the Venetian advance had 
been checked for the time being, but the second Peace of Ferrara indicated 
that it was now Venice, rather than Milan, which was beginning to be regarded 
as the dangerous power in Northern Italy. It was eVident, judging from the 
documentary evidence, that the Senate would not rest until its western 
boundary had reached the Adda at the very least, and this was made very 
pointedly in the lands which had been promised to Gianfrancesco. 
Gianfrancesco's reactions to the peace are not recorded, although 
he was kept very closely informed about the state of negotiations by Este. 
However, it is logical to assume that he was greatly relieved. We have 
seen how reluctantly he accepted command and, granted that one of his 
motives for reluctance was the incompatibility of Venetian war aims with 
Mantua's interests, it was much less difficult.to be Captain General in 
time of peace than in time of war. Although, as we shall see in the next 
section of the chapter, there was still quite a lot for him to do, the 
period after the Peace was a welcome breathing space for him. 
Furthermore, there was another reason why the Peace of Ferrara 
was favourable to Gianfrancesco~ It signalled the beginning of a much 
stronger gravitation by Sigismund towards Venice and such a situation 
could only serve to make his formal investiture with the Marquisate a 
much more immediate proposition. 
Negotiations between Venice and Sigismund became even more 
active after the Peace and by this time he had openly broken off relations 
with Filippo Maria. 8~/ In short, Venice proposed a truce of five years 
to Sigismund which also included substantial financial concessions which 
83/ 
were bound to carry great weight. -
Having thus settled matters, Sigismund made his long awaited 
entry into Rome on 21 May 1433. Ten days later he was crowned in a 
magnificent ceremony in St. Peter's. On 4 June the Venetian truce was 
published and Sigismund was given a free passage through Venetian territories 
on his way back to Germany. 
The newly crowned Emperor left Rome on 13 August for Bas1e. 
He went first of all to Ferrara and then, in September, arrived at Mantua. 
A Venetian ambassador was to accompany Sigismund while he-was in their 
territory, and part of his instructions,issued on 1 September, involved 
84/ 
arrangements for Gianfrancesco's own investiture. -
5igismund arrived in Mantua on 20 September and stayed for 
eight days. It was during this period that one of Gianfrancesco's dearest 
85/ 
ambitions was finally achieved. 
Amid great festivities the ceremony of investiture took place 
on 22 September when, according to Amadei, "il Serenissimo Imperadore 
Sigismundo IV con le soe mane e bocca creo e fece Marchese di Mantova 
sopra una trionfante tribunale su la Piazza di S.Pietro di Mantova". 8~/ 
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Ephemeral though Sigismund's real power in Italy was, this was a prestigious 
moment for Mantua as well as a personal triumph for Gianfrancesco. Moreover, 
we can see how closely it was linked to the now open friendship between 
Sigismund and Venice. It was yet another manifestation of the benefits 
accruing from a close aSSOciation between Gianfrancesco and his protector. 
It was also during this visit that the final touches were put to 
the project of Ludovico's marriage to Barbara of Brandenburg, another event 
which, on the surface at least, was to put Mantua on a par with the princes 
of Germany. This, however, was only a theoretical status because as it 
turned out in practice the honour was all Mantua's. It was an honour which, 
like the Marquisate, also had its price. In fact, negotiations had been 
proceeding on and off for over a year by this time. On 6 July 1433 the 
Cardinal of S.Angelo had confirmed in a letter to Gianfrancesco that the 
actual marriage agreement had been signed by Frederick at Basle on the 
87/ previous day. - Characteristically, matters were greatly accelerated 
by Sigismund's rapprochement with Venice. The .details of the settlement 
were quickly agreed upon and the Cardinal, moreover, assured Gianfrancesco 
that he had received reports that she was a good looking girl. 8~/ 
The prospect of such an advantageous match for the Gonzaga 
resulted in a settlement in which the obligations were all on the side of 
Gianfrancesco. The extant copy of the marriage contract in the Mantuan 
A~chive includes no requirements from the bride. In fact, it explicitly 
states that Gianfrancesco, on his son's behalf, expressly asked for no 
., 
297. 
dowry from Barbara. On the contrary it was Gianfrancesco which contracted 
to pay the sum of 25,000 florins for the honour of a Hohenzollern bride, 8~/ 
in addition to all the expenses incurred by her for her journey to Mantua. 92/ 
Because most of the documents relating to the marriage are 
undated, it is not possible to pinpoint exactly the date of the actual 
wedding; but it seems likely that it occurred at the end of November. 
Barbara arrived at Mantua on 21 or 22 November and elaborate preparations 
had been made for her reception and the wedding celebrations. 9!/ 
The list of guests was quite impressive. Amongst others were 
to be representatives from Venice, Florence, Ferrara, Urbino, Ravenna, Faenza 
and Rimini. The Imperial Ambassador also attended along with pandolfo, 
Galeazzo and Carlo Malatesta of Pesaro. 9~/ There were no fewer than twenty 
Venetian noblemen as well as smaller signori from Mirandula, Coreggio and 
Guastalla. It was estimated that there would be some 405 guests in all 
and this presented considerable accommodation problems which required skilful 
handling. 92/ Gianfrancesco was very concerned to show Mantua at its 
best on this auspicious occasion. If we are to believe the Chroniclers, 
this was certainly the case. For instance, the young bride waswelcomed 
to the city with a sumptuous and colourful ceremony: 
"No si potria contar l'honore grande che fu fatto 
alIa sposa nel' intrar dentro da Mantoa. Fra Ie 
altre nottabili case fu elletto 20 damigelle vergine, 
tutte vestite di damasco bianco suso carretti indorate 
quale andorno contro alIa sposa fin alIa chiesa delli 
Angoli aci~ che quelle done Angeliche recevescero la 
sposa Angelicha, Ie quali dove su carretta el gio.rno 
seguente e 10 speso a cavallo acompagnorono detta spesa 
co' molti Signori, baroni e cavalieri dento da Mantoa. 
No' fu mai veduto tanti triomphi e nole sontuose". 
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The investiture of Gianfrancesco and the marriage of his son 
are two high points in his career and they certainly did bring added lustre to 
the Mantuan state as well. However, it would be unwise to overestimate these 
events in real political terms. They were directly the result of a diplomatic 
gravitation by the Emperor towards Venice, but Gianfrancesco had to pay 
a great deal of money for them as well. In real terms the favour of Sigismund 
did not count for much, it most certainly did not guarantee Mantua protection 
in the power politics of Lombardy. There may have been a temporary lull in 
the war, but the problems of constant vigilance and military preparedness 
were as crucial as ever. It is to these matters that we must now turn. 
III 
Uneasy Peace in Lombardy (1433-1437) 
The period between the second Peace of Ferrara and the end 
of 1436 was not one of open war on the Lombard front; but although the 
hostilities were transferred to Tuscany and Romagna, this did not mean 
that Gianfrancesco was completely inactive. Even though his activities 
were more low-key during this time, this provides an interesting opportunity 
to see what was expected of a commander in peace time. 
In many ways this period very much resembles the early l420·s. 
It was a time of continual tension between Venice and Milan in which both sides 
were seeking the slightest opportunity to take the advantage. This meant 
that Gianfrancesco was kept reasonably busy ensuring the security of the 
border areas as well as concerning himself with more purely organisational 
problems. However, while this took up a considerable amount of his time, 
it was essential to balance this by keeping himself as fully informed 
as possible about the diplomatiC state of play because of the repercussions 
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this could have on Mantua's position. This involved not only Milan 
and Venice, but also Ferrara, the Papacy, Sigismund and Francesco Sforza. 
Most of the remaining part of 1433 was concerned with t~ing up 
and running down military operations. For instance, at the end of August 
Gianfrancesco was involved in securing the release of prisoners taken 
during the campaig.n in the Valtelline. Many had fought bravely and Venice 
95/ 
was most concerned to keep them in its service. -
Even though there was peace there was much mutual recrimination 
between Milan and Venice and there were continual fears that the Milanese 
might still try to take aavantage of the relatively favourable position which 
the Peace had created for them. This was why, in its instructions to 
Gianfrancesco, the Senate urged him to make absolutely sure that the 
frontier areas were securely fortified. This was certainly the case in 
September when the Senate was worried at what might happen during 
Gianfrancesco's absence owing to Sigismund's visit to Mantua. Not only 
were the castles of the Bresciano and Brescia itself to be provided with 
96/ 
a sufficient number of men, - but it was frightened at news of concentrations 
of Milanese troops in the Cremonese, and consequently ordered Gianfrancesco 
97/ to make sure that all the crossing points over the Oglio were well guarded. -
The Senate was more than satisfied at the way in which he carried this out. 
In this delicate period immediately after the peace it was essential for the 
Venetian army to be in such a position as to be able to go into action 
should any crisis occur. 
In June and July the Senate had ordered a check on the 
numbers of men in Venetian service. The size of the army amounted to 
98_1' 5,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry, 200 archers and 200 'balestrieri'. 
An army of this size wa~ not always easy to manage and in time of peace 
problems sometimes seemed to get worse. For quite a lot of the time 
Gianfrancesco was concerned with the sometimes difficult problems 
300. 
of keeping the condottieri happy and also keeping them in Venetian service. 
The Venetians always realised the advantages of a more permanent military 
personnel and Gianfrancesco's diplomatic skills in this respect were to 
be continually tested. 
For instance, in September Gianfrancesco reported to the 
Senate that there were differences of opinion among the captains. They 
are not specified, but the matter was considered serious enough for the 
Senate to send some of the 'savi del consiglio' in order to give Gianfrancesco 
more time for purely military matters. 9~1 
Judging from the problems which occurred later in the year 
it is highly likely that they related to the question of peacetime 
reductions in numbers. Even while military operations were in progress 
Venice frequently had considerable difficulty in finding the requisite 
sums of money and it was clearly impracticable that such a level. of 
expenditure could be continued in time of peace. Consequently, Gianfrancesco 
was actively engaged on a number of occasions in haggling with his captains 
over the size of their condotte. The Senate had always shown a great deal 
of confidence in Gianfrancesco's harmonious relationships with his men. 
Afairly typical example can be seen in December when he was successful in 
retaining the services of sanseverino. logl These negotiations were 
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frequently difficult and not always successful. For instance, in November 
1433 Gianfrancesco was actively trying to keep Antonello Petrucci da 
Siena whom he himself had originally engaged. The Venetians were prepared 
to offer him a condotta of 40 cavalrY°!/ as an inducement, but unfortunately 
he took active service with Milan once again in l434.l0~/ 
Such difficulties do not seem to have been resolved by the 
end of 1433 and the Senate was worried about these differences of oPinionl 02/ 
which constituted what they regarded as a serious weakness in the army. This 
was why three provveditori were elected go to to Brescia to confer with 
Gianfrancesco in order to settle the details of the 'firme' and 
refirme' once and for all.l0~/ 
In addition to trying to resolve their own problems the 
Venetians were also on the lookout for new men. They were actively engaged 
105/ in trying to get the services of Gattamelata during this period. -
In such matters the Venetians could be very persistent. They displayed 
it in great measure over negotiations with Francesco Sforza, finally 
106/ 
succeeding in the following April. - The Senate also wanted Gianfrancesco 
107/ to lure as many men away from Milanese service as possible. -
These were fairly typical examples of the organisational 
problems which Gianfrancesco faced as Captain General, but even in this 
first year of his tenure of command it can be seen that the Senate never 
left him to solve these problems on his own. Although there is no 
documentary evidence to suggest that Gianfrancesco felt that the provveditori 
were restricting his authority during this period, it can already be, seen 
that the foundations to the disputes similar to those which Carmagnola 
experienced were being laid. 
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While up to this point there had been no unduly severe 
military pressures exerted upon Gianfrancesco in his new office, as 
Marquis of Mantua he can only have viewed the development of Milanese 
policy after Ferrara with increasing concern. 
Filippo Maria Visconti could never forgive Eugenius IV for 
having deprived him of Sigismund whom he had considered his closest ally, 
and this had made him an even more fervant supporter of the Council of Bas1e. 
Consequently, there is much to lead us to believe that the Council regarded 
Filippo Maria as the most important executor of its wishes in Italy.10~/ 
This provided him with more than ample justification to take his revenge on 
both SigismUnd and the Pope. As early as 27 October 1433 he sent order 
to his lieutenant Giacomo d~ Lonato to take under this protection all 
those lands of the Papal States which were disposed to oppose Eugenius. This 
was the signal for the beginning of an active Milanese involvement in Romagna 
109/ 
and the Marches. -
These events to the south of the Mantovano could still be a 
threat to Gianfrancesco and there was a very uncomfortable parallel between 
this and the Milanese activities of the 1420's which he could not fail to 
notice. A Milanese success here would eventually encourage them to pursue 
the Lombard war with renewed vigour and from a position of even greater 
strength. These fears were indeed justified. In September 1433, in his 
instructions to Jacobino de Iseo, Filippo Maria alluded to the possibility 
of his persuading both Este and Gianfrancesco to throw in their lot with 
Milan. It is true that he considered it very unlikely that Gianfrancesco 
would respond favourably, but it nevertheless formed part of a continuing 
policy of persuasion coupled with the possible result of making the Venetians 
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cast doubts on his ultimate fidelity. 112/ These instructions illustrate 
the Duke's intentions towards Mantua very clearly indeed. He stated openly 
that he would have no peace until he had beaten Venice and was waiting 
for the slightest pretext to start the war once again. 11!/ It is also 
patently clear that he was ultimately determined to get Gianfrancesco onto 
his side,ll~/and he suggested to Jacobino that there were two powerful 
arguments he could use. Firstly, that the Venetians would ultimately 
absorb the Mantuan state, and secondly that Filippo Maria could offer 
him the albeit vague possibility of enlarging the Mantovano instead of it 
merely being the executor of Venetian policy.ll~/ Although on this 
occasion, as before, Gianfrancesco was not disposed to oblige the 
Duke, these arguments nevertheless touched upon the core of Gianfrancesco's 
constant preoccupation. There is no doubt that they remained very firmly 
in his subconscious only to surface again some three years later. 
In short, Filippo Maria's activities against Eugenius IV and 
the Papal States were very successful, firstly by encouraging Francesco 
Sforza's territorial ambitions in the Abruzzi and the Marche, and then 
more directly in sending Piccinio against Rome itself which ended in Eugenius's 
flight to Florence in June l434.ll~/ This was supplemented by diplomatic 
115/ 
moves for an alliance with Savoy which finally concluded in October 1434, -
and attempts to capitalise on the rather cool relations between Venice and 
Florence. 
Although the details of the campaign do not concern us, their 
possible consequences certainly do. It was part of an attempt to isolate 
Venice, to surround it gradually. ThiS, of necessity, involved Gianfrancesco 
as well, and all this had the consequence of putting him on his guard more 
than ever, and also of trying to find any possible way of minimising the 
risk to Mantua's security. 
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It may have well been for the last reason that in 1434 
Gianfrancesco was very anxious to keep up a fairly active relationship 
with Sigismund after he left Italy, through his ambassador Simone da Crema. 
Simone was also responsible for relaying messages to and from Frederick of 
d nb . 116/ Bran e urg. - It may well be that Gianfrancesco was merely basking 
in his new Imperial status, but he also looked to Sigismund's support as well. 
Of greater significance, perhaps, was the position of Francesco 
Sforza, whose shadow over Lombard affairs was to grow greater from now on. 
One of Filippo Maria's reasons for a more open strategy against Eugenius was 
because Sforza was characteristically pursuing his own ends and had opened 
negotiations with Eugenius. The Venetians were encouraging the Pope to be 
as accommodating as possible. Although the Senate had at fir-st been rather 
worried about such a slippery customer as Sforza,112/ it subsequently became one 
of Venice's major objectives to obtain his services; a policy which at 
first Gianfrancesco approved of but later seemed increasingly suspicious to 
him.ll~/ However, for the time being he was following the pr-ogress of the 
negotiations with the greatest interest. 
Sforza, a supreme example of how spectacularly successful a 
policy of sheer opportunism can sometimes be, was always difficult to pin 
down. Although he was openly fighting on the side of the anti-Viscontean 
league by the end of 1434, it was ultimately his policy to adopt as ambiguous 
. 119/ 
a policy as possible. -
With such disturbing events going on in the Papal States the 
utmost vigilance was required of Gianfrancesco to the west and the south. 
The extreme tension which existed sometimes found an outlet in border 
incidents. For example in May 1434 there were some unpleasant encounters 
between Milanese and Venetian troops in the area around Soncino which 
Gianfrancesco had to deal with. 122/ Later on in the same month Pietro 
Quirino, the Podesta of Casalmaggiore, complained to the Senate that the 
area was being molested by ducal troops.12!/ 
These encounters were relatively insignificant in themselves, 
but they serve to illustrate how uneasy the situation in Lombardy was. 
The tension in May tended to be increased because the Venetians, viewing 
Milanese actions in Bologna, were becoming more alarmed than ever, fearing 
122/ that the Viscontean net was being gradually tightened. - In fact, by 
the 19th May the position was such that the Senate ordered Gianfrancesco 
to mobilise the troops on the frontier area on a much larger scale than 
hitherto.12~/ 
3~. 
Although nothing came of this mobilisation, it was at least useful 
as a show of strength because although during July and August Bologna 
was the focal point of Milanese/Venetian confrontation, Milanese interference 
with the Oglio frontier, in flagrant defiance of the Peace of Ferrara, became 
more and more insistent, so much so that Niccol~ d'Este once more had to bring 
the two sides together to sort out these problems, and these discussions 
continued, albeit in a somewhat desultory fashion, until well into the 
following January. As on previous occasions, these discussions were not 
intended to have any long term peaceful results. Under the guise of 
negotiations both sides were trying to manoeuvre themselves into a position 
which would give them added striking power when open hostilities were finally 
resumed.l2~/ In fact, neither side doubted that this would be the case. 
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~fuile these neogitations were proceeding Filippo Maria once 
more tried his luck with Gianfrancesco. At the beginning of September 1434 
Gianfrancesco had sent on to Venice two letters he had received from 
Filippo Maria. This was precisely what he had done on the previous occasions. 
Although the Senate replied to his letter by emphasising the duplicity of 
the Visconti,12~/ it is clear that these approaches worried them and this 
may have partly been the reasoning behind Badoer's mission to Gianfrancesco. 
He was instructed to commend him for his fidelity and devotion to duty as well 
126/ 
as to inform him of their renewed attempts to sort out matters in the Romagna,-
in furtherance of which they had decided to appoint Guidantonio Manfredi as 
commander of the army in that area, a move which met with Gianfrancesco's 
approval. Furthermore, Gianfrancesco was given permission to augment his 
condotta by 45 'lancie spezzate'. 
, 
The war raged between Bologna and Forli until well into 
December, when Filippo Maria recalled Piccinino to Lombardy because he was 
by this time preparing to send him on an expedition to Naples against 
the Aragonese. The war itself was not to end officially until the end 
of September when Milanese troops were to remove all the men he had in 
127/ Romagna, leaving Bologna to make what peace it could with the Pope. -
From now until the rebellion of Genoa the Duke of Milan interested himself 
with the problem of the Neapolitan succession. 
Developments 'in Lombardy always seemed to echo what the 
Milanese were doing elsewhere in Italy. While there were active campaigns 
south of the Po, we have seen that Gianfrancesco was_concerned with holding 
his forces in readiness to counteract any offensive from Milan, but when 
the events to the south seemed to be resolving themselves favourably, 
the Venetians once again began to think about lateral expansion and 
consequently the years of 1435 and 1436 see a gradual but inevitable 
gravitation towards taking up where matters had been left at the second 
Peace of Ferrara. The consistent quarrel over the Adda boundary was also 
frequently punctuated by a desire to make inroads into the Milanese state 
when a suitable opportunity should present itself. This, in turn, meant 
that the pressures on Gianfrancesco tended to increase as well, and it 
is interesting to observe that as the prospect of a renewal of a Venetian 
war of expansion became more and more imminent, the doubts which had caused 
Gianfrancesco to be a reluctant commander revived. This occurred even 
before the outbreak of war in 1437. 
The resurgence of Venetian interest in expansion showed itself 
as early as January 1435 in the instructions to Geronimo Contarini, Venetian 
ambassador to Sigismund. The negotiations turned once again on the Adda 
frontier. Contarini was to try and discover if Sigismund would actively 
support their claims to the land between the Adda and Oglio and he was to 
stress the fact that part of the territory had been formally promised to 
Gianfrancesco in 1433:2~/ How mUCh. weight this promise had with Sigismund 
is not evident, but by 20 April 1435 a tentative agreement had been reached 
with Sigismund in which he promised to invest Venice with all the lands on 
the right bank of the Adda while he would have the lands to the left.12~1 
This virtually amounted to an agreement to divide the Milanese up between 
them. At the same time ~ere was a renewal of the league with Florence 
on 19 April which included Ferrara, Ravenna, Rimini ana pesaro. 132/ All 
this gives added credence to the idea that from now on Venice was the real 
aggressor in the Lombard wars. 
The most important development in Lombardy in this year 
was the concentration of Venetian troops after their recall from Bologna. 
Preliminary arrangements were made at the end of March but the movement 
of troops was to begin soon after April. On the 29th of that month 
Zaccario Bembo was instructed to inform the Pope of the recall "per 
131/ 
securitate status nostri ad partes nostras Lombardie". -
By June most of the troops had been transferred to Lombardy 
and thus came under Gianfrancesco's jurisdiction. On 1 June he was 
summoned to Venice in order to discuss plans for security and also long 
132/ term prospects. - At that time no imminent action was possible; after 
all a great deal of time had been spent in protesting about Filippo Maria's 
violation of his treaty obligations and any offensive by Venice would 
have been difficult to explain. The thinking behind the recall of the 
troops shows a great similarity to the situation which existed in 1425. 
Although the concentrations of troops on the frontiers were to be continued 
and in certain strategic areas, stepped up, the Venetians wanted to have 
the whole army reasonably accessible at a time when.things were definitely 
moving towards a conflict with Milan in Lombardy. 
This is precisely what was done when Gianfrancesco returned 
to Brescia.13~/ It seems that throughout the rest of the year what amounted 
to a cold war was being waged. Despite all warnings, there continued to 
134/ be border disputes around Bordolano - and restrictions on the movement of 
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civilians were tightened up in the border areas. - The threats of military 
action were beginning to loom very large by this time. 
After most of the year had been taken up with increasing 
military resources in Lombardy it seems rather odd that the end of the 
year should have been occupied with an argument with Gianfrancesco over 
a reduction of his condotta. This is obviously how Gianfrancesco saw 
the situation himself; but once again the Venetians were hampered by 
lack of money to sustain such numbers over a lengthy period of time. 
On 1 October, instructions were issued to the 'collaterale' Belpetro 
Manelmi to reduce Gianfrancesco's condotta to 500 lances. 13§/ When he 
had complained about this Belpetro was asked by the Senate to explain 
the financial reasoning behind this. 13Z/ In the end Paolo Tron had to be 
sent to calm Gianfrancesco's injured feelings.13~/ There is no record of 
any other dealings over this matter, and the next 'refirma' of 26 November 
139/ 1436 indicated 600 lances and 300 infantry, - so it must be concluded that 
Gianfrancesco had been prepared to accept a temporary reduction in his 
condotta. Although in the particular circumstances no immediate damage 
was done to Venice's relations with Gianfrancesco over this, it is yet 
another occasion when he was prepared to challenge the Senate where his 
own interests were concerned. 
During 1436 Gianfrancesco was very much busier than he had been 
in the previous two years because it is in this year that the renewal of the 
war between Venice and Milan became much more of a reality. It was also 
a year in which family problems added yet another complication to Gianfrancesco's 
relationship with Venice. 
The acceleration of the drift towards open war started with the 
rebellion of Genoa against Filippo Maria which was partly the result of the 
Milanese alliance with the Aragonese. However, there had for some time 
been a growing antipathy to the Viscontean presence in Genoa which finally 
140/ 
erupted in the revolt of 27 December 1435 led by Francesco Spinola. -
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Although Filippo Maria had been aware for some time that 
there had been disaffection in Genoa he appears to have done very little 
to counteract it. Faced with the opposition of Piccinino and a huge 
army the rebels appealed for help to Eugenius, Venice and Florence. The 
Geonese rebellion had all the signs of becoming a grim and drawn out 
struggle for liberation and this was a marvellous pretext for the Venetians 
to take up arms against Milan while seeming at the same time to be one of 
the defenders of Genoese liberty. 
This would certainly seem to be the case judging from the 
Venetian instructions to Gianfrancesco on 2 January 1436. Gianfrancesco 
had spent the winter months in Mantua and the Senate, informing him of 
the developments in Genoa, now ordered once again a mobilisation of troops 
along the frontiers; but on this occasion it was to be for a longer period. 14!/ 
Furthermore, a member of the Senate was to consult personally with him in 
order to find out what action he considered feasible over the Genoese 
question. It was clearthat Gianfrancesco had to go to Brescia immediately 
to supervise these preparations and to make sure that nothing was done 
. 142/ 
without express instruct10ns from the Senate. -
At the same time instructions were sent to the podesta of Brescia 
requiring him to consult with the Cavalcabo - "et nobis placet ll , the 
instructions read, lIut cum amicis suis cremonenses et per omnem modum 
possibilem procuret praticare et instar ut civitas Cremone se subtrahat 
ad obedientie ducis, dando amicis suis".14~/ He was ordered to consult 
Gianfrancesco over this but was asked not to interfere if Gianfrancesco 
wished to do this nimself.14~/ The Milanese possession of Cremona had 
always been one of the major bugbears of Venetian policy in Lombardy and 
these initiatives show their intentions were clear indeed. This was part 
of the preparation for aggression. 
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Judging from the subsequent correspondence, Gianfrancesco 
was in touch with the Cavalcabo'and consequently there was a stepping up 
of vigilance in the area around Casalmaggiore which was most vulnerable 
to any variations in the Cremonese. In February and March Gianfrancesco 
was in constant touch with the podesta of Casalmaggiore over fortifications 
and any movements of Milanese troops in the area were to be carefully 
145/ 
monitored, - although at this stage the Senate was most anxious that there 
should be no overt provocative action by its troops. Venice was clearly 
not interested in skirmishings, it was planning a large scale campaign 
which could not be jeopardised by any impulsive action. 
The inevitability of an open war was by now patently obvious and, 
with the renewal of Venice's amoitiousterritorial policies, Gianfrancesco's 
apprehensions revived once more and this showed itself in February and March 
when he had been angered and alarmed at news of criticisms which had been 
levelled against him in Venice and Brescia, and this occurred at a time when 
his own relations with Ludovico were undergoing a marked decline. 
Gianfrancesco was so angered at these (unspecified) criticisms that 
Frederico Contarini was sent to him with assurances of the Senate's continued 
146/ ' goodwill and approval. - By the beginning of March Contarini was able to 
147/ 
report back that Gianfrancesco's mind had been put at rest over this matter. -
The Venetians acted quickly over this because they could not afford to have 
the sort of trouble which they had had with Gianfrancesco in 1433. This 
became quite. urgent as Gianfrancesco's 'firma' expired in the following May 
and Venice wanted the customary renewal of one year with six months 
'di rispetto' and evidently the Senate was worried that he might not agree 
to their terms; they hinted as much to contarini.14~/ The Venetians were 
prepared to modify his terms provided he would stay on. On 9 March 
the Senate mentioned to Contarirti that it would be prepared to accept 
a 'refirma' of only six months with a further six 'di rispetto' should 
149/ this be at all necessary. -
The 'refirma' of 19 March was only for eight month$SO/ and even 
then it was not without some qualification. First of all he insisted that 
his wartime condotta should not consist of less than 600 lances, and 
he now informed Venice that it was not his intention to stay as Captain 
General indefinitely; he wished to be released from his obligation after 
the planned war was over. 1S!/ Although the Senate sympathised with this 
wish it did not regard it as being very serious at the time. At least 
he had decided to give his support in wartime and there were plenty of 
opportunities to induce him to change his mind. 
There are a number of reasons which would explain this behaviour, 
some identical to the previous occasion. However, now there is the definite 
impression that ~ianfrancesco felt that the Senate did not have complete 
confidence in him. This may have been a subjective feeling, but the 
criticisms, vague though they were, tended to bite deep. Moreover, the 
Venetians were actively involved in trying to get Francesco Sforza to 
fight with them and he feared that the other man might be a rival 
for command and that it might be consequently more politic to bow out 
before the indignity of being ousted. It is certainly true that the 
Venetians sensed that this is what Gianfrancesco might have been thinking 
because it was part of Contarini's commission to assure him that if they 
did succeed in getting Sforza there would be no question of depriving him 
of the supreme command.l5~/ However, Gianfrancesco's suspicions had been 
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aroused and it is probable that Contarini did not completely allay them. -
For their part it is difficult to believe that their contingency plans 
did not include possible alternatives or substitutes for the Captain 
Generalship. 
At this time Gianfrancesco was planning to go to Marmirolo for 
a period of cure with Venice's consent~ but there were other matters on his 
mind. His relations with Ludovico had been none too harmonious and this 
ultimately resulted in his son's defection to Milan in April. The documentation 
behind this issue is very thin indeed and has led to a numberof speculations. 
It has been suggested that Gianfrancesco tended to favour Carlo whose 
interests were much more akin to his own and that this had aroused his 
elder brother's mistrust and resentment; and it is certainly true that 
their relations even after Gianfrancesco's death were not of the best. 
Furthermore it has also been suggested that his marriage to Barbara of 
Brandenburg was not a happy one. There were as yet no children and 
Gianfrancesco was beginning to be apprehensive about the succession. 
Another, more political interpretation of this quarrel is that 
the defection of Ludovico was an astute move by Gianfrancesco to ensure 
that there would be a Gonzaga on whichever side would win in the war and 
that his indignant reaction in favouring Carlo as his heir was an elaborate 
154/ 
move to assure the Venetians of his continued fidelity. - This would 
tend to fit in quite well with Gianfrancesco's growing reluctance to 
retain the Venetian command, but it does not adequately explain why the 
final reconciliation did not take place until 13 April 1440. 
..~ 
The only document relating to this in the Mantuan Archive is 
a letter written by Ludovico to.Chierighino Chierigati on 20 April 1436, 
a week or so after his defection.15~/ In it he tried to justify his 
action and the bulk of the letter explains his utter exasperation of the 
insults and innuendoes he had had to suffer at the hands of his father 
wAich had made it impossible for him to remain in Mantua: 
"Tu say anchora le vilani e false e deshoneste parole 
che sono state usate de 11 ••••• E perc mi pare strano 
che tu te meravegli che io sia partito de 11 che 
tu poi ben credere che homo che habia qualche animo in corpo 
odendo dir ogni dl de suo padre e specia1mente de cossi-fato 
padre quel10 che tu say quel10 che io udiva del mio non pria 
patire simele lesione ale oreche. Sich~ io ho piu tosto 
314. 
deliberato habandonar tutto zio che io ho habandonato che 152/ sofrire simele cosse." 
However much credence oremay give to the political interpretation 
of Ludovico's action this letter does display that there were open 
differences between father and son at the time. 
On 21 April Ludovico was awarded a condotta of 300 cavalry by 
Filippo Maria in which he undertook to serve him against any enemy with 
the exception of his father and the Mantuan state. 152/ 
Whatever Gianfrancesco's motives may have been, it was essential 
for him to take some action against Ludovico, coming as it did at a time 
when he himself had made such difficulties over his 'refirma'. On 15 
April he informed the Senate that he intended to disinherit Ludovico in 
favour of Carlo and that he was going to petition Sigismund to make the 
158/ 
necessary alterations in the Imperial diploma. - On the following day 
Venice replied that it would protect anyone Gianfrancesco named as his 
legitimate successor152/and by 3 November he had in his hands a privilege 
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from Sigismund allowing him to leave the Marquisate to any other 
legitimate son he wished. Although the Emperor readily granted Gianfrancesco 
the privilege, he wrote a letter to Paola on 9 June expressing his concern 
at what Simone da Crema had told him. He sympathised with Gianfrancesco's 
request, but he also applied the parable of the Prodigal Son to Ludovico's 
case. Although, he said, Ludovico, in his youthful passion, has succumbed 
to the serpentine advances of the Visconti, he nevertheless hoped that a 
reconciliation might still be possible. However, this attempt to get 
Gianfrancesco to think again by working on Paola's maternal susceptibilities 
did not prove successful. l62/ Gianfrancesco's quick reaction in disinheriting 
Ludovico is yet another indication of how nervous he was at this time. 
It is possible to sense that in many ways he was beginning to feel trapped 
by Venice at the very time when his suspicions were being aroused. Furthermore, 
as will be indicated below, Gianfrancesco was by no means sure that Carlo 
was completely devoted to the Venetian cause. 
By May events seemed to quicken even further. On the 29th Genoa 
finally signed a treaty with Florence and the League, a defensive alliance 
against Milan and its allies. 16!/ Earlier in this month Geronimo Contar1n1 
had been sent to the Pope to induce him to consent to Sforza's jOining the 
162/ League. - Florence tended to support these measures because a major war 
in Lombardy would relieve pressures in Tuscany. It seemed, therefore, that 
everything was poised for an ultimatum to be issued to the Milanese. 
While this was going on Gianfrancesco was concerned with building 
up resources and finishing contingency plans for war. For instance, on 
13 May he was suggesting that 1,000 more infantry should be raised to 
reinforce the army.16~/ This was accomplished by the beginning of June. 
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In addition to this he was constantly impressing the need for sufficient 
funds to be available to pay the men and, at least for this period, they 
seemed to be forthcoming, although the Senate was very anxious that the 
164/ 
money should not be squandered in any way. -
Furthermore, at Gianfrancesco's suggestion, Ugutione de Canarini 
was sent to Niccolo d'Este in order to make sure of his support. Gianfrancesco 
himself was preparing to strengt~his already strong matrimonial ties 
with the house of Este by a marriage between Carlo, his heir, and Lucia, 
. 165/ 
and he hoped that Venice would help in the negotiat10ns. -
By June the military and diplomatic preparations of the League 
were complete and an ultimatum was issued to Filippo Maria. The rather 
lame pretext for doing so was that interfering in the Papal States and in the 
Regno had been a violation of the Treaty of 1435. Filippo Maria tried to 
argue that he had no warlike intentions towards the League and proposed 
discussions at Bologna through the mediation of the pope. These discussions, 
which did take place in August, had no hope of resolving the situation because 
by now Venice wanted war with Milan at all costs. 
By the end of the year everything was poised for war. Despite 
his 'peaceful' intentions Filippo Maria had sent Piccinino into Lucca and 
subsequently to Sarzana. 166 / This was a flagrant flouting of the ultimatum. -
In November 1436 Sforza had finally agreed to serve the League with a 
condotta of 1,000 lances and 1,000 infantry for a period of 5 years in 
return for 14,000 florins a month. 162/ Furthermore he was to have the ,title 
of Captain General of the League "et habia tuti quelli honori, dignitl e 
.. 168/ preheminentia che altro Capitan Generale ••• potesse havere. - While this 
did not affect Gianfrancesco's position as Captain General of the Venetian, 
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army which was something quite separate, this appointment nevertheless 
tended to increase his suspicions rather than to allay his fears, particularly 
as the venetians were constantly trying to get Sforza to come to Lombardy. 
In the end it was just as well that Sforza, who even now had not decided 
to break definitively with Filippo Maria, behaved so ambiguously that 
the possible complications resulting from his crossing the Po were for the 
time being avoided. 1621 
For the third successive time in Gianfrancesco's life war was 
about to engulf Lombardy, but this time the new year was to bring. even 
greater responsibilities and pressures for him. Although he had been 
Captain General for the past four years there had been nothing of note 
against which he could prove his worth apart from the brief period up to 
the second Peace of Ferrara in which his actual involvement had been small. 
Although the situation during these years in Lombardy had by no 
means been easy, he had carried out his duties to the best of his ability 
and to the evident satisfaction of the Venetian Senate which had been tireless 
in its attempts to keep him happy and giving him the support he required. 
Nevertheless all was not really well with Gianfrancesco on the 
eve of 1437. In the first place he had only taken on the job in response 
to a considerable amount of Venetian and diplomatic pressure, and an 
examination of the material available for these years does not indicate that 
Gianfrancesco felt any happier about his position; on the contrary new 
doubts were beginning to assail him, as we have seen. These involved the 
circumstances surrounding the Venetian approaches to Sforza and the possible 
repercussions from the defection of his son Ludovico. Furthermore, during 
the previous two years it had been Venice above all which had become 
the prime mover in the revival of the Lombard wars. 
In 1436 Gianfrancesco had contracted to remain in his position 
as commander primarily because he was becoming alarmed at what could 
happen to Mantua if he now refused. He may well have called to mind 
Jacobino de Iseo's warnings from Filippo Maria about Venice's ultimate 
intentions. 
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This, however, did not mean that Gianfrancesco intended to carry 
out his duties in a halfhearted fashion~ that could have been even more 
dangerous. There was only one direction in which a Captain General could 
travel. He clearly appreciated that a successful Venetian war could bring 
him considerable advantages. All Gianfrancesco could now do was to wait 
and see how things would eventually turn out. 
The most important point which emerges from a study of the years 
from 1433 to 1436 is that even.before the war was resumed the seeds of the 
crisis of 1438 had already been planted. As he surveyed the political scene 
Gianfrancesco must surely have sensed that the next few years were going 
to be among the most critical ones he would ever have to face. 
IV 
War and Disillusionment 
In a letter dated 18 January 1437 Filippo Maria asked Piccinino 
bluntly his opinion as to whether there should be war or peace. Four 
days later he replied in the following manner: 
"el parire mio 'e che quando la excellentia 
vostra potesse havere bona pace e firma, et 
non de Ie usate, sia molto mehlio la pace 
che la guerra; rna quando questa dove sse 
essere de la pace usate Ie quale non mi pare che Ii 
vostri inimici habiano mai facto ad altro fine, 
, 
se non per potervi piu gravemente offendere; 
laudaria pi~ tosto la guerra chela signoria 
vostra po fare che tale pace ••• " 
Given the preparations which had already been put in motion 
in the previous year by the Venetians, this was really the only rational 
reaction which was possible. Already the cold war with Venice was being 
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stepped up. Gianfrancesco was charged with making sure that all passes were 
171/ 
closed with Milan both for trading and for any other purpose. - Furthermore, 
all Milanese were cleared away from the border areas. In order that the 
preparations and surveillance should be properly supervised the Senate 
172/ 
urged Gianfrancesco to go to Brescia as early as possible. - He was 
there by the end of the month actively concerting security plans with 
, 173/ 
such people as the Podesta of Casalmaggiore, Leonardo Mocenigo, -
all of which the Senate heartily approved of, although Gianfrancesco was 
still pressing for more money from Venice to finalise plans.17~/ At this 
stage the Senate wanted everything to be directly co-ordinated by Gianfrancesco 
and, by 22 January, was promising him faithfully that it would send him at 
least another 4,000 ducats to keep him happy for the time being. 172/ It 
was clear from the tone of the letter that Gianfrancesco was getting more 
and more insistent with the Senate over the question of money. This did not 
only mean money for arms and supplies, but also to pay his soldiers. In 
this respect the Venetians were not at all efficient during this part of the 
war. Even before the campaign star.ted in March Venetian officials were 
finding it more and more difficult to meet Gianfrancesco's requests and 
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pay was often many months in arrears. For instance, on 31 January the 
Senate agreed to disburse the double pay which Gianfrancesco had requested;7§/ 
but by 6 February they had only sufficient funds to send him one pay because 
they were having difficulty in calling in their debts. 171/ In fact, in a 
number of cases some pay was still outstanding from the previous October.17~/ 
It was this sort of thing which was to make Gianfrancesco continually 
frustrated as the war started; not only did it tend to hamper preparations, 
but the frustration which it caused among the army could so easily lead to 
indiscipline. This put increased pressure on Gianfrancesco at a time when 
there were other pressing calls upon his time. It may well have been as 
a result of such matters that he had to deal with an outbreak of indiscipline 
at Bergamo at the beginning of March, just when the campaign was beginning 
to get under way. The strictures of the Senate for a situation which it 
179/ had helped to cause itself frequently made Gianfrancesco very angy. -
The opening months of 1437 saw new concentrations of troops in 
the Bresciano, and an intense watchfulness in the Po area, while the 
Venetians were trying their utmost to whip up enthusiasm for the impending 
struggle among the Genoese, the Florentines, the Pope, and, above all, 
Francesco Sforza. The "Lettere Segrete del Collegio" in the Venetian 
Archive contains literally hundreds of entries relating to such matters. 
In particular, during 1437 the Senate was to devote an ever increasing 
amount of energy in trying to get Sforza to cross the Po in order to help 
in the Lombard offensive, an action which Sforza'S ambiguous attitude 
would not permit. This was why he contented himself with beSieging such 
places as Lucca for the Florentines during a good part of this period, a 
matter which in itself tended to increase Venetian frustration at what it 
came to regard as the Florentines' apathy in not giving them the tools to 
pursue the war as vigorously as they wished. 
In addition to this the Venetians had secured the services 
of Guidantonio Manfredi (Faenza) and were urging Gianfrancesco to probe 
the possibilities of using the Cavalcabo to infiltrate Cremona. This 
was a plan which the venetians had had for some time but could not 
180/ implement because there had been too much else to do. -
The mobilisation was complete by the middle of February and, 
on the 15th of the month, the Venetians ordered Gianfrancesco to go and 
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occupy Bordolano because this was the most convenient point, and strategically 
181/ 
one of the most advantageous ones at which to begin operations. -
On 18 February in a strong letter to their ambassador in Florence, Matteo 
Vitturi, he was instructed to inform them "quod faciamus magnam subventionem 
gentibus nostras" and that they hoped that Florence would do the same in 
182/ pursuance of such an honourable cause. -
On the following day the Senate received information of the 
Battle of the Barga in which Sforza had defeated Piccinino. This was yet 
another stage in the war around Lucca which had tended to swing violently 
from side to side.l8~/ This victory for Sforza and, consequently, for the 
League, was very gratifying to Venice, but there was also another aspect 
of the battle which closely concerned them. Among the prisoners taken 
during the fighting was none other than Gianfrancesco's renegade son 
Ludovico.18~/ On 20 February Vitturi was sent to Sforza in.order to start 
negotiations about Ludovico being transferred to their custody. l82/ 
~e fact that Sforza had possession of Ludovico tended to 
increase Venetian anxiety over his participation in the forthCOming war and 
their continual interest in Ludovico's welfare for the rest of the year 
could be seen in terms of the Senate acting in Gianfrancesco's interests ... 
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There are no surviving letters from Gianfrancesco to Venice over this 
matter. His attitude can only be glea~ed from the Venetian side of the 
correspondence. Although he was naturally anxious to be fully informed 
about his son, there is no indication that he wanted to be reconciled to him 
at that time. If, as has been suggested above, it is arguable that Ludovico 
went over to Milan with his father's complicity, it would have been extremely 
embarrassing for a potential ally of Venice to have possession of him. 
In fact, Gianfrancesco appears to have been very non-committal over the 
custody of his son. In their correspondence with Gianfrancesco over this 
the Venetians were always anxious to give him the impression that they were 
concerned about his welfare,18§/ but their policy in the end was to be as 
vague as that of Gianfrancesco because they did not want to annoy or upset 
him on this delicate matter. 
However, behind any elaborate assurances, the possibility of 
getting Ludovico had advantages in that it could act as an additional lever 
on Gianfrancesco. While it is true that Gianfrancesco had disinherited 
Ludovico by this time, the Venetians evidently still considered that 
the bond was strong enough to try their best to get hold of him. As it 
turned out, though, Sforza's own position vis-a-vis Venice and Milan made 
Ludovico a very valuable possession and, much to the disappointment of the 
Senate, was not at all disposed to part with him. The whole question of 
Ludovico was yet another weight on his father's mind and it came at the 
worst psychological moment. 
However, on the surface, Gianfrancesco's subsequent behaviour 
does not indicate that these events had any significantly adverse effect 
in purely material terms. On 23 February the Senate had been informed 
that Gianfrancesco was on the point of moving against the enemy.181/ 
In fact, the Venetian army left 'Brescia two days later, and a pretty 
impressive sight it must have been. It was ~eported that Gianfrancesco 
marched " ••• cum equis 6,000 utilibus, absquecariagiis, gentium nostrorum 
armigerorum ac peditibus forenses 4,000, 500 cernedis, 2,000 vastatoribus, 
3,000 carribus, 650 variis munitionibus bombardis, lignaminibus aliisqui 
multis rebus et instrumentis bellicis oneratus, et cum aliis notabilibus 
provisionibus".18~/ 
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Amongst many other condottieri there were Gattamelata as his 
second-in-command, Brandolini, Pietro Navarino, Guidantonio and Astorre 
Manfredi, Sigismondo Pandolfo M~latesta, Bartolomeo Colleoni, Guido Rangone, 
Guerriero Marsiano and Antonio Martinasco.18~/ At last the decisive move had 
been made and the size of the army left no doubt as to the size and scope 
of operations. Moreover, this is reinforced by the initial tactics 
which were employed in this war. The army marched, not into the Cremonese, 
but towards Bergamo, arriving there at three o'clock in the morning on 
26 February;9Q/ which shows in itself how anxious the Venetians were that 
no time should be lost. While the Senate continued to hope and beg, with 
increasing insistence, that the Pope would allow Sforza to back up these 
operations further south, the march towards Bergamo was the quickest way 
of crossing the Adda and taking the war immediately into the Milanese. 
After the lack of success further south it was to be hoped that these more 
decisive tactics would achieve the required effect. Furthermore, they 
were reasonably content that the area around Brescia was sufficiently 
well fortified. 
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By 27 February the Venetian army was encamped at Mapello, some 
five kilometres from the Adda and, in their instructions to the provveditoze 
Stefano Contarini, the Senate was urging a crossing of the Adda at Medolago 
or any other suitable point in the vicinity. Contarini was urged to employ 
all his powers of persuasion with Gianfrancesco to wage a vigorous 
campaign, not only for the honour of Venice, but also for that of Mantua. 19!/ 
The tactics were daring and important headway had to be made before the enemy 
had time to organise themselves. 
There were, however, a number of problems which a crossing at 
this point could present. The Adda in this area flows very swiftly and 
the construction of a bridge was consequently more arduous. In February 
and March the water level was even higher than usual, but the bridge had to 
go ahead and Gianfrancesco in particular had to consult very closely with 
192/ Gattamelata and the other captains over the details of this project. -
The difficulties in the way of building the bridge proved to be 
much more formidable than had been expected. Not only was the plan 
discovered by the enemy, but also the bridge was impossible to construct 
because of the height of the waters and the ferocious current. l92/ 
Furthermore, part of the army, some 500 infantry including Gattamelatal9~/ 
had forded the river with great difficulty but had been trapped on the 
opposite side. Many men had panicked and drowned in their attempts to 
rejoin the rest of the army. In fact even Gattamelata only barely 
escaped with his life. 
The failure to cross the Adda yet again was a grave disappointment 
to the Senate, but this had hardly been Gianfrancesco's fault and, in a 
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letter of 4 March to him, the Senate was trying to be as sympathetic and as 
encouraging as possible. It reiterated its confidence in his abilities and 
urged him to make the best out of this situation. It wanted him as far as 
possible to remain in Ghi~radadda, preferably in the area around Mozzanica, 
and wanted him to strike "quanto acerius possibile Sit".19~/ 
However, the element of surprise intended by the Venetians had 
now been dissipated and it was hard to imagine that the Milanese would 
not react fairly quickly. The news of this attempt so close to Milan had 
shaken Filippo Maria and in order to counteract the Venetian offensive 
he decided to recall Piccinino from the Lunigiana as well as calling upon 
196/ Savoy for help. - This now placed even more pressure on the Venetians to 
take the initiative before he should arrive. It is clear, even at this 
pOint, that the Senate was afra±d that the campaign would degenerate into 
the sort of dilatoriness which had preceeded the second Peace of Ferrara. 
This was why it was watching Piccinino's movements very closely indeed at 
197/ the same time as urging Gianfrancesco forward. - It was not surprising in 
the circumstances that tempers were frequently frayed. This was occurring 
at the same time as the outbreak of indiscipline in Bergamo and Gianfrancesco's 
own disapPointment at the inauspicious beginning of the campaign turned to 
i ' .. 198/ anger at Ven ce s over-~ns~stance, - and this was certainly not the last 
time this was to occur. It was not simply that Gianfrancesco had to wage an 
offensive against the Milanese; at the same time, he also had to make sure 
that the remaining occupied territory was well fortified, especially the 
area around Crerna and Bordolano. 192/ This was even more pressing since 
information had reached them that Piccinino was already on his way to 
Lombardy by 4 March. 202/ However, he was not to take any active part in 
operations until the following June. 
326. 
Despite constant encouragement from the Senate, the momentum of 
the campaign seems to have been·lost after the unsuccessful attempt to 
cross the Adda. Already by the end of March the Milanese were strengthening 
their positions in the Ghiaradadda while no significant advance had been 
made by the venetians. 20!/ Furthermore, information had reached Casalmaggiore 
that a ducal river fleet was preparing to sail down the Po towards Brescello, 
thus threatening the Mantovan020~/ It was developments such as these which 
tended to make the dilemma facing Gianfrancesco even more acute. It was 
very difficult for him to keep his mind on what was going on in the 
Ghiaradadda when his own territories were being endangered even though the 
Senate acted quickly in raiSing a fleet of 20 galleys to counteract this 
threat.20~/ 
Not only had the momentum been lost, there was also the beginning 
of a divergence of aims between the Senate and its military commander. As 
with Carmagnola's direction of the first phase of th e war, the overall 
strategy did not always correspond with military feasibility. It was far 
too easy to formulate grand designs in Venice but rather a different proposition 
making them a reality. Even if the Venetian army had crossed the Adda at 
Medolago, this did not solve the problem of subdUing the intervening 
territory between that river and the Oglio further south. From a purely 
military and territorial point of view this was the thorn which had to be 
grasped in order to make a reality of Venetian expanSionist aims. It was 
a fundamental weakness in Venetian policy to place too much reliance 
on Francesco Sforza covering the area. The Senate, so astute in many 
respects, failed to see the import behind Sforza's unwillingness to move. 
There was no point in specacular military moves if the intervening territory 
could not be subdued. This is yet another example of this Venetian obsession 
with moving too fast for its own good. This time Gianfrancesco, instead 
. I 
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of Carmagnola, was to be the victim and with monetary problems, and 
differences with both the provveditori and Gattamelata, Gianfrancesco 
cannot be blamed in thinking that history was beginning to repeat itself. 
In fact, the whole configuration of the rest of the campaign 
for the year does bear a remarkable resemblance to the last stage in 
carmagnola's career. After beginning optimistically at Medolago, it 
continued in a rather lower key in the Cremasco, and after the decisive 
intervention of Piccinino from June onwards, ended with the Venetians being 
pushed back across the Oglio. It is now important to document the salient 
features of these remaining months as far as they reveal and develop 
this parallelism. 
On 4 April the Venetians sent Paolo Tron to Gianfrancesco with 
a special commission to get him to move against the enemy before the arrival 
of Piccinino made matters more difficult. 201/ In order to quicken things 
up still further Pietro Loredan was elected as provveditore in order to 
supervise activities. 
However, and possibly more Significantly, Tron was also specially 
asked to consult with Gattamelata over this matter and he was substantially 
in agreement with Venice's policy. The Venetians had already a high 
opinion of Gattamelata's ability; they considered him "in exercicio 
205/ 
armorum expertissimo •••• propter longam practicam quem habuit". -
They had already been impressed by his valour at Medolago and, as an 
ambitious man with no territorial responsibilities, it was very much in 
. 206/ his interests to raise his credit with his employers. - It may well be 
that Gianfrancesco was beginning to feel that the Venetians were courting 
his second-in-command very much .in the same way as he himself had been 
. courted in the past. In fact, Gianfrancesco was once again disturbed 
. 207/ 
at the end of April by evil rumours circulating about him in Venice. -
At a time when the area to the south was being threatened 
there seemed to be no pOint in keeping the army in Bergamo. It was 
important especially to take remedial action in and around Brignano and 
Tron seems to have been successful in getting some action here and the 
208/ Senate were quick to promise money and supplies to back this up. -
The question of money was a very pertinent one because the war 
was beginning to have an adverse effect upon Gianfrancesco's own personal 
financial situation by this time. We have already had cause to mention 
the stream of demands for money to be sent to him from Mantua during the 
previous stage of the war. 209/ The same was true during this period. -
However, on this occasion the demands were much more onerous and not only 
was Paola forced to sell valuables in Venice to meet these demands., but 
Gianfrancesco was forced to call in old debts. One particularly difficult 
and embarrassing example of this concerned the Malatesta of Pesaro. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, Gianfrancesco had concerned himself 
with the succession problems and family rivalries of the Malatesta family. 
The details of such problems and rivalries which largely lie outside 
the scope of the present discussion are extremely well documented in -the 
Gonzaga Archive. 2l2/ In brief, the Malatesta of Pesaro, financially weak, 
and threatened by Rimini, the Pope, and frightened of Francesco Sforza, were 
trying during this period to get Gianfrancesco and Este to intervene on 
their behalf, largely through the intercession of Paola. During the period 
immediately preceding the renewal of the war bOth Gianfrancesco and Este 
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had been fairly active on their.behalf, not only through the normal diplomatic 
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channels, but also financially. In 1435, a number of fortresses had 
211/ been pledged to Gianfrancesco for a sum of money. - ~ow that the 
war had increased the financial pressures upon Gianfrancesco, he 
wanted the pledge to be redeemed. This was made very clear in his 
correspondence both with Paola and with Giovanni Tomeo Donesmondi, the 
Mantuan ambassador to Pesaro. Clearly Gianfrancesco was no longer in a 
212/ position to help Paola's relations. - Moreover, he was aware of the 
complications which his continued help might have vis-a-vis Sforza, whom 
the Venetians were actively trying to engage and who, moreover, had possession 
f d . 213/ o Lu OV1CO. - This affair is indicative of the other smaller problems 
which concerned Gianfrancesco at this time. This constant worry over money 
in particular tended to add considerably to his preoccupations. It is, 
therefore, hardly surprising that he frequently found it difficult to give 
his wholehearted attention to purely military matters. 
However, by 30 April Tron could report success at Brignano to 
214/ the Senate, - and it was hoped now that this would inspire the army 
to even greater things. Gianfrancesco went on to Treviglio to follow up 
this victory and a number of smaller castles in the surrounding area were 
captured. 
But this activity was not maintained. Once again the campaign 
ground to a standstill. Gianfrancesco was reluctant to continue westwards 
because he considered he had insuffiCient men and supplies to do so. On 
30 April, in his report to the Senate giving his proposals for the 
fortification of Brignano, he had requested reinforcements which the 
Senate considered unnecessary. It replied to him on 5 May reminding him 
that he himself had told Tron that he had sufficient men provided that 
Piccinino could be kept away from Lombardy and advised him to attack 
at the first opportunity either "in the Ghiaradadda or the Cremonese, 
certainly not later than the middle of May,21~/ while at the same time 
keeping occupied areas well fortified. Pietro Loredan arrived on 6 May 
216/ 
with these instructions. - Two days later in an attempt to spur 
Gianfrancesco to action the"'Senate told him that it had been rumoured that 
Piccinino had come to Lombardy with only 1,500 cavalry "male in ordino" 
217/ 
and that consequently an immediate offensive was necessary. -
In fact the danger from Piccinino was not at all immediate, but 
"even these rumours did not have the required effect on Gianfrancesco. 
It is clear that he did not feel secure enough to launch a new attack 
and, moreover, matters were not helped by the fact that Gianfrancesco was 
once again annoyed that his pay was months behind. This was not cleared up 
until 23 May when he agreed to "exire in campo cum paga mensis Martii sic 
fecit Gattamelata". 2l§/ The Senate clearly felt that Gianfrancesco was 
making unnecessary delays and that relations with Gattamelata were not 
nearly as problematical. 
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It was not until 6 June that the Venetian army marched and this 
time the action was to be in the Cremonese, initially around Binanova. 2l2/ 
220/ Once again the Senate hoped that a significant advance could be reported. -
Unfortunately it was once again to be disappointed. This time the 
situation was even more difficult than before because Piccinino's arrival 
in the Cremonese was imminent. Far from taking the offensive, Gianfrancesco 
221/ 
was forced to fortify himself at Casalbuttano, a secure place. -" Even 
the Senate itself warned that to be safety conscious in these circumstances 
was of paramount importance ; "in salute exercitum et gentium nostrarum 
222/ 
consistat salus status nostri ••• ". -
With matters moving from bad to worse as Piccinino pushed the 
Venetians back on all fronts, not only in the Cremonese, but also in the 
223/ Bergamasco, - the Venetians renewed their frantic appeals to Sforza to 
help them, but to no avail. Reluctant to break completely with Filippo 
Maria, he ultimately moved as far as Reggio, but was unwilling to cross 
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the Po using the excuse of lack of military strength and his anxiety over 
his lands in the March. Moreover, the Venetian demands caused friction with 
Florence, who were less anxious than ever to lose Sforza's help over Lucca. 
It looked very much as though serious splits were becoming apparent in the 
224/ League at the worst possible time for Venice. -
The arrival of Piccinino in Lombardy was the signal for the collapse 
of the Venetian war effort for the time being. For the rest of the campaigning 
season there was no positive result from Venice. Gianfrancesco seemed to 
have lost the initiative completely and a campaign in which Piccinino ended 
up calling the tune meant that it proved almost impossible to consolidate 
his position anywhere. 
Not only was Gianfrancesco's own morale 10w,22~/ SO was that among 
the army. In July there was further trOuble over money and he was told to 
. 226/ keep a tighter hold on discipline. - Furthermore there were differences of 
opinion between some of the captains and although Gianfrancesco managed to 
patch matters up to a certain extent this was to occur even more frequently 
in the following 227/ months. - In fact the strain on Loredan was also beginning 
to tell because during July; owing to illness and exhaustion, he .was 
temporarily replaced by Francesco Barbaro. 
In fact, Gianfrancesco was so disheartened at the beginning of 
this month that he thought of withdrawing back across the O9lio, a move 
228/ 
which was expressly forbidden by the Senate. - However, even though 
it was perhaps only natural for him to have these feelings, it was 
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most unfortunate that at this very time Filippo Maria was trying to re-open 
his approaches to him. On 7 July he had sent a letter to Venice from 
Fontanelle inthe Bergamasco reporting that Filippo Maria, through Guido 
Torello, had proposed that there might be the possibility of a marriage between 
his daughter Bianca and Carlo Gonzaga, whose wife Lucia d'Este had recently 
died.22~/ Bianca had already been promised to Sforza and Gianfrancesco, 
suspicious of the Duke's motives, felt that the best thing to do was to 
relay the information to the 
treat this with the contempt 
Senate,which p~ptlY told Gianfrancesco to 
230/ it deserved, - while reassuring him at the 
same time that this Milanese approach cast no shadow over his own fidelity 
to Venice. It nevertheless informed Loredan, recuperating in Brescia, 
and asked him to keep an eye on any subsequent developments. This was 
neither the first nor the last time in which Filippo Maria tried to 
compromise Gianfrancesco's position in this way. Visconti was a past 
master at choosing the most opportune moment. 
The miserable canon of failure continued through the months of 
July and August, and Marco Dandolo, the ambassador to Sigismund, in a 
resume of the progress of the army, could only report that the Milanese were 
too deeply entrenched in the Cremonese, Ghiaradadda and the Bergamasco 
231/ for any advance to be made. - No amount of persuasion by Loredan could 
alter this unhappy situation, not even assurances of a Venetian intention 
to send a fleet up the Po to protect Mantua against any Milanese operations 
232/ . in this area. - This was not merely the result of any reticence on 
Gianfrancesco's part. The truth of the matter was tha t the front along 
which the Venetian army was fighting was much too wide to succeed without a 
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more efficient deployment of troops and the Senate was completely against 
any division of forces. Time and time again during August it wrote to 
Gianfrancesco warning him of the importance of keeping the army intact 
and united.23~/ Given the fact that Sforza was never in evidence to come 
to his aid and also that the onus of advance was on the Venetian army, this 
attitude was ultimately a recipe for failure. Once again there is this 
divergence between what the Senate wanted and what was militarily desirable. 
By the beginning of September it was the Milanese who were making 
all the headway. Bergamo was threatened and reinforcements were called from 
Brescia and Verona while even more urgent pleas were sent to the Florentines 
for help. In fact the situation was so bad that Gianfrancesco felt that 
the time had come to cut his losses and advised that it would be more 
politic to retire beyond the Oglio because he feared that a major engagement 
with Piccinino would prove an unqualified disaster.23~/ The Senate, however, 
urged him to hold on as long as possible while it made a last attempt to 
235/ persuade Sforza to help. - This did not prove possible; Piccinino's 
advance was irresistible and with the successive occupation of Trescore, 
Sarnica, Predore, Vignano, Cologne, Brignano, Caprino as well as the 
valleys of the Bergamasco by the end of September the Venetian achievement 
236/ had evaporated before their very eyes, - and it seemed to many that 
Gianfrancesco had not really made the slightest effort to stop this. This 
was certainly the judgement of the chronicler Cristoforo da Soldo. Not 
only did he accuse him of being afraid of the Milanese in his review of 
the events of 1437, 232/ but he also suggested incompetence at the battle 
of the Monte della Costa in the Bergamasco on 10 sePtember.23~/ 
Gianfrancesco's inactivity made Paolo Tron increasingly apprehensive, 
especially as the fall of Caleppio, which was being besieged by Piccinino 
at this time, would put the Veneto itself at risk. On 22 September, 
Tron sent a critical report regarding Gianfrancesco's actions to the 
239/ Senate. - By the same token very favourable reports had been reaching 
Venice about Gattamelat~. For instance, on 15 September Chier4hino 
Chierigati wrote very highly about his powers of leadership. 242/ 
Indeed, Gattamelata did play an important part in the siege of Caleppio. 
The news of its capture on 25 September was very upsetting to 
the Senate, but it also realised that it was important to keep calm 
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in order to make sure that the Bresciano was safe. In their letter to Tron 
of 29 September there were no open or covert criticisms of Gianfrancesco's 
behaviour. The Senate promised merely that men and money wo uld be sent 
immediately to defend the crossings of the o91io. 24!/ In fact the Senate 
wrote a similar letter to Gianfrancesco on 3 October urging him to give special 
attention to this "ardua re" as well as calming down any misgivings he might 
have about its attitude to him.24!/ It may have occurred to him that 
Carmagnola had also received such assurances from the Senate right up to 
the time of his arrest. 
Judging purely from the results, the events of 1437 could indicate 
that Gianfrancesco had not lived up to the expectations of the Venetians. 
After an encouraging start the war had degenerated into piecemeal and 
directionless engagements which had given the Milanese a valuable opportunity 
not only to take back the territory which the Venetians had captured, but 
also to threaten the Oglio boundary. Up to the time when he decided not 
to renew his condotta in November, Gianfrancesco was to concentrate merely 
upon defence. 
All this was a serious blow to the imperial ambitions of 
Venice and also a matter of increasing concern for Gianfrancesco himself. 
Of course, it is not possible to exonerate him totally from blame. On 
a number of occasions he could have acted more promptly; he could have 
capitalised rather more upon Piccinino's absence from the scene before 
June. But it is also the case that the Senate expected rather too much 
of Gianfrancesco in a relatively short time and that the sometimes bullying 
insistence of the provveditori was not always backed up by the men, money 
and supplies which Gianfrancesco judged to be necessary. The Milanese 
power had been underestimated; Piccinino's army in the Bergamasco was 
much larger than that of the Venetians. Da Soldo estimated it as 
"ben 12 millia cavalli e granda fantaria, di quali gli ne era ben quattro 
243/ 
millia Savoini a cavallo", - whereas the Venetian army only numbered 
8,000 cavalry and a similar number of infantry. Moreover, their reliance 
upon the participation of Francesco Sforza had been somewhat naive. There 
were a number of occasions when the policy of the Senate was not feasible 
in military terms, in particular the question of the deployment of the 
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troops. It could be argued in the circumstances that the complete fulfilment 
of the Senate's war policy was impossible for anyone in the time, especially 
when such a great deal of effort was expended on things like haggling over 
payment. 
It is possible that an awareness of this did not make it as 
critical of Gianfrancesco's lack of success as it otherwise might have 
been but this certainly did not have the effect of putting his mind at 
rest. In almost every respect the parallels between his fortunes and those 
of Carmagnola had been most marked. Like him Gianfrancesco was increasingly 
annoyed at the way.in which h~s authority was circumscribed, and the way 
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in which the Senate seemed to show its favour to Gattamelata perhaps 
made Venetian assurances even more suspect, he may well have considered that the 
ingratiating Gattamelata and the Provveditori were beginning to turn 
244/ 
against him. - Throughout the war it had seemed that Gattamelata 
had been going out of his way to play the part of the aggressive warrior, 
daring, willing to take risks, whereas Gianfrancesco increasingly seemed 
to adopt a.more conservative defensive attitude. Once again we see the 
inherent differences between a commander and his deputy. It was easy for 
Gattamelata to suggest more daring projects or to echo the wishes of the 
Senate or the Provveditori because he did not have the responsibilities 
of supreme command or ultimate accountability for his actions. Thus he 
could emerge even from the failure to cross the Adda with increased credit. 
Judging from the declining relations between Gianfrancesco's aims and 
those of the Provveditori, it would be reasonable to deduce that Gianfrancesco 
feared that the Senate was paying more attention to Gattamelata than himself, 
a point which is substantiated by the impartial Gubbio Chronicler242/ 
who mentions disagreements with the Provveditori as the most significant 
reason for Gianfrancesco leaving Venetian service. 
As the campaigning season drew to its close all these things 
must have been weighing heavily upon his mind. MoreOVer, from the very 
outset of the military operations, this desire to thrust across the 
Adda so close to Milan itself had indicated a degree of aggression which 
tended to add to his worries. In the first phase of the Lombard Wars 
the Mantovano had been important not only as a buffer against Milanese 
expansion but had also been the essential lynchpin in Venice's poliCY 
of retaliation. Now the war had developed far beyond this stage. The 
territorial grants to Gianfrancesco of 1433 reinforced the fact that the 
Mantovano no longer really fulfilled this role in Venice's eyes. 
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Gianfrancesco had every right to be worried about what might happen to his state 
in the event of this policy being successful. Could he possibly suffer the 
same fate as the Carraresi or the Scaligeri, a fate which his own family 
had been instrumental in bringing about? 
There was one respect in which Gianfrancesco was determined that 
his career should not parallel that of Carmagnola. It is highly probable 
that long before the end of October he had resolved thatit would be 
better for him to end his engagement with Venice than have Venice truncate 
his career in an arbitrary fashion. Even though Platina and Poggio 
Bracciolini have suggested that the venetians had hatched a plan to 
246/ 
apprehend Gianfrancesco at Brescia at this time, - there is nothing to 
suggest that Venice ever contemplated treating him in exactly the same way 
as they had treated Carmagnola. After all there was an essential difference 
in the fact that Gianfrancesco was a ruler in his own right. Nevertheless, 
by the end of October he had decided that he no longer wished to continue 
as Captain General of the Venetian army. After all, not even the Venetians 
could agree that Gianfrancesco had ever been totally happy in this capacity, 
he had on a number of occasions gone out of his way to demonstrate this. 
Gianfrancesco's subsequent defection to the Milanese has often 
unjustly colouredthe way in which he left Venetian service. Historians 
have tended to telescope events here in an attempt to accuse him of duplicity. 
In fact, it is essential to keep these two events as separate as possible 
even though they are closely related. The one was the inevitable consequence 
of the other. 
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The truth of the matter is that Gianfrancesco gave the Venetians 
plenty of notice of his intention to leave command and in no way is it probable 
to accuse him of breaking his condotta. It is frequently glossed over that 
although Gianfrancesco decided not to renew his condotta with Venice when 
it expired in November 1437 it was not until the following July that he 
definitively threw in his lot with the Visconti. On the contrary it is 
arguable that if there was any duplicity, it was rather practised by Venice. 
It is to a consideration of these matters that the concluding section of 
this chapter is deveted. 
V 
The Drift towards Milan 
By the beginning of October the strain was beginning to tell on 
Gianfrancesco. Apparently his health once more was none too good and 
in a letter to the Provveditori the Senate expressed its concern at the 
way in which his hard work was beginning to affect his physical well-being, 
hoping that he might be able to moderate his personal activities somewhat 
provided that adequate provision for security could be made. 241/ This 
is precisely what Frederico Contarini was doing for the rest of the month 
as far as Bergamo and the Valcamonica were concerned.24~/ Meanwhile 
Gianfrancesco himself was involved in renewing defensive truces with 
. 249/ Coreggio. - In short, it seemed that the Venetians were managing to hold 
their own against the Milanese at this time and this was presumably why 
the Senate could afford to allow Gianfrancesco to relax his efforts. 
However about 20 October he broke the news that he was not 
intending to renew his contract. 2521 This was not totally an unexpected 
move even as far as Venice was concerned. It had, of course, happened 
before, and the Senate hoped to be able, as in the past, to persuade 
him to re-think his decision; but not this occasion Gianfrancesco would 
not be moqed. It could also be argued that although the Senate did make 
an effort to persuade him to stay on, it was not quite as insistent as 
it had been previously. 
On 27 October the Senate wrote to Gianfrancesco about his 
decision. Although there is no copy of his original letter it is clear 
that he was very upset at the way in which he felt that the provveditori 
were keeping essential information from him. The Senate tried to allay 
his fears over this25!/ and assured him of it's continuing goodwill, 
reminding him how difficult it would be for their army to be left without 
leadership at this crucial time.25~/ On the same day the. Senate instructed 
Contarini to go and talk to Gianfrancesco about this and copies of his 
253/ 
original letters were sent so that he could be more fully informed. -
However, it could be argued that the venetians were also playing 
Gianfrancesco false on this occasion. On 4 November the Senate instructed 
Andrea Morosini, it s ambassador to Francesco Sforza, to broach the 
subject of offering him the supreme command.25~/ It is important to 
appreciate that the Senate dangled this bait before Sforza almost at the 
same time that discussions with Gianfrancesco were being conducted and 
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even before Contarini had had much of a chance to use his powers of persuasion. 
As early as 6 November Contarini was informed in strict confidence of their 
approaches to Sforza and the Senate promised to keep him fully informed 
of all developments in this matter. Meanwhile, Contarini was urged to try 
his utmost to get Gianfrancesco to reconsider for the time being; but 
on this occasion there was no instruction to persuade him to stay on 
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indefinitely. All the Senate now wished to do was to get Contarini to 
keep Gianfrancesco on until his successor had been appointed. In fact, it 
said that it was prepared to absolve Gianfrancesco from his responsibilities 
without any further question and Contarini could assure him that'it would 
be quite content to allow his men to continue in Venetian service even 
after his departure. 252/ At the same time the Senate was making approaches 
256/ to Sanseverino. - Meanwhile, arrangements were made for Gattamelata to take 
257/ 
over command on a temporary basis. - All this does not indicate that the 
Venetians were prepared to be as insistent as they had been before. Indeed, 
there are some definite grounds for Gianfrancesco's·suspicions. 
In a sense, the very fact that the Senate had not gone out of 
its way to persuade Gianfrancesco to renew his contract, but was only 
interested in his staying on until the end of December at the very latest, 
primarily because negotiations with Sforza ran into the inevitable 
difficulties, tended to make him even more adamant than ever to go at the 
258/ 
end of November and increased his apprehensions. - It seemed to him 
that the Senate was making things too easy for him and that some devious plan 
was afoot. Indeed, the Senate was going ahead with provisional arrangements 
for the splitting up of Gianfrancesco's company as early as 16 November and 
Contarini was instructed to sort out the men he did not consider to be 
259/ totally faithful to the Venetian cause. - At the same time Gianfrancesco 
was once more extremely disturbed about dishonourable rumours which were 
circulating about him in Venice which did nothing to put his mind at rest 
260/ in spite of the paternal assurances of the Senate. -
~ I 
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It is not, therefore, surprising that no amount of persuasion 
by Contarini would move Gianfrancesco and as the end of November was 
approaching without the question of the Captain Generalship having been 
settled the Senate, by now thoroughly exasperated and not a little annoyed, 
decided to send Pietro Loredan to make a final appeal to him.2El!1 
They were also apprehensive because at this very time there were grave 
differences of opinion between Gattemelata and Brandolini, his closest 
associate, which could be dangerous at a time when Gattamelata was 
emerging as their only hope in maintaining the last vestiges of a continuity 
of command.26~1 
If we are to believe the story of D.a Soldo, not even Loredan could 
have any effect on Gianfrancesco's decision. At the end of November he went 
back to MantUa. He left Quinzano lie non volse a10zare in terra nessuna 
. , ..... 
ne bevere ne manzare salvo a Prolaino ch'el fece co11atione cossi a 
'-
cavallo ••••• E in que11i giorni arivo in fina a Sta. Euphemia 10 Mag. 0 
messer piero Loredano credendose trovar e1 ditto Marchese a Bressa. Udito 
che no'l ge era, subito ritorno in drieto et and~ a Asu1a e tro~ a 
poneto che l'Marchese era montato a cavallo per andar a Mantua, e ge 
favelo. Que110 dicesse non SBZO, ma el ditto Marchese gli rispose: "Tornate 
I 
a casa, messer Piero, perche mi son volto per que11a via donde vo1io andare". 
E partito da lui, ando a Mantua, e messer Piero ritorno a Venesia,, 262/ 
Gianfrancesco had carried out his promise, and his contract with Venice, to 
the last letter. 
Because of this the Senate had no option but to give the command 
to Gattame1ata because Sforza showed no signs of crossing the Po •. Although 
even now the Venetians had not completely given up the idea of engaging Sforza, 
.j 
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the Senate appointed Gattamelata as 'gubernator' of the army, if only 
264/ initially on a temporary basis,· on 5 December - with a condotta of 
400 lances with the addition of those men who had served with Gianfrancesco 
265 / 
as 'lancie spezzate'. - In fact, preparations had already been 
finalised for the splitting up of Gianfrancesco's lances, a process 
which was to be completed, with the cooperation of Matteo Corrado over 
the next few months. 
The Venetians were rather nervous about keeping Gianfrancesco's 
company together after his departure. Worried about indiscipline, and 
possible mutiny, they were most anxious that it should be rapidly split 
266/ 
up. - While Contarini was in charge of these operations, the Senate wanted 
to show its goodwill by consulting fairly closely with Gianfrancesco over 
this. 261/ In addition to this it was careful to appear to be as 
generous as possible to certain key men in Gianfrancesco's company, men 
such as Pietro de Lucca, by offering them condottas in.their own right. 
The process of dividing the men up into 'lancie spezzate' seemed to go quite 
smoothly and all the essential arrangements had been made by the beginning 
of February. Most of the men were to go to Gattamelata and the rest were 
to be divided fairly equally between Sancto Carilia, Pietro de Lucca, 
Scaramuccio de Lucera, Donino da Parma and Antonio di Martinasco.26~/ 
This was a matter which naturally interested Gianfrancesco deeply and it 
is to his credit that he was anxious to make sure that these men were 
well treated and, moreover, that they should be promptly paid. The whole 
question of money, particularly the money which the Venetians still owed 
Gianfrancesco personally, was an equally delicate question because the 
Senate was not able to afford to pay in full the 10,000 ducats which 
he was owed. This was a particularly sensitive issue and negotiations 
were protracted, lasting well into March 1438. Ambrogio Badoer was 
entrusted with this difficult matter262/ but, although the Senate put 
Gianfrancesco off with assurances of ultimate payment in full, there 
is no record of anything more than half this sum being paid to him. 
As Gianfrancesco was riding back to Mantua after having left 
the service of Venice he cannot have deluded himself in thinking that 
his problems were over. He may have been relieved at casting off the 
heavy burden of command; without that supreme responsibility he could 
devote himself once more to Mantua. This, however, is where the 
difficulty lay - how would he protect Mantua? There were only two 
possibilities open to him and even one of these was by now not really 
viable. He could try to steer an independent course and maintain himself 
neutral; but the fact that the Mantovano straggled the focal point of the 
struggle made this a ludicrous impracticability. The uncomfortable 
fact of life for Mantua still remained as unchanging as ever and no 
Imperial title could alter it - the only alternative to accepting the 
protection of a stronger state was absorption. 
Up to now the answer to the question 'which state?' had been 
easy. There had been a tradition of friendship with Venice which had 
remained largely unbroken. During his own minority the continuance of 
Gonzaga rule in Mantua was intimately bound up with acceptance and 
protection by Venice. On the surface this friendship was still as strong 
as ever at the end of 1437, but, as we have seen thus far in this chapter, 
in reality it was becoming increasingly fraught with suspicion and what 
started off as a protective cloak was fast becoming an ominous shadow, 
a shadow which was to deepen considerably over the next few months. 
Gianfrancesco had never really been able to shake off the reluctance 
with which he had taken up his Venetian appointment and he may well have 
343. 
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thought that this was reflected in the results he had achieved in that 
position. In effect, Gianfrancesco had almost checkmated himself in 
resigning his command; he felt himself in a position in which to continue 
or to resign was equally perilous. To continue exposed him to the 
possibility of Carmagnola's fate, but having resigned and, moreover, 
having given in to Venice's request that his company should be split up 
and reallocated, he increasingly came to feel that he was isolated and 
defenceless. Assailed by such doubts and fears, Gianfrancesco was easy 
prey to the blandishments of the Visconti. Filippo Maria knew only too 
well that if Gianfrancesco had really rejected Venice, he co uld only choose 
Milan. 
"Ello e spietato da Venetiani". This is how Filippo Maria 
summed up Gianfrancesco's position in a letter which he wrote to Giovanni and 
Francesco de la Mirandula on 15 December 1437. 272/ It is not clear 
whether the Duke was referring to the Senate or to public opinion, but 
however exaggerated this claim might have been, he was confident that he 
would be able to lure Gianfrancesco to him now. From now on the Visconti 
was going to make a much more concerted attempt to achieve this. The 
same letter mentioned that Milanese envoys had already been sent to Mantua 
in order to probe Gianfrancesco's intentions. These first moves were 
clearly tentative, but the difficult position in which Gianfrancesco 
found himself was encouraging to Filippo Maria. He seemed to be fully 
informed about what had been happening between Gianfrancesco and the 
Senate. Although Gianfrancesco's reactions were very guarded, he did, 
however, listen to the envoy. He was also able to report back to his 
master that from what he had gathered the Mantuan population was very 
; I 
271/ pleased that Gianfrancesco had given up the Venetian command. -
Furthermore he reported that an ambassador from Venice had a short 
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time before been turned away from Mantua without receiving an audience.27~/ 
Filippo Maria clearly felt that this was a promising basis upon which to 
work. 
The whole period between December and the following July does 
show an inevitable gravitation towards Milan although there is little 
indication that Gianfrancesco was very enthusiastic about what he had 
to do. It was rather the case that, faced with possibly the greatest 
dilemma of his career, he tried to put off a final decision until 
the last possible moment. If anything, Gianfrancesco found the Visconti 
much more difficult to fathom than the Venetian Senate. Even though he 
was now listening more attentively to Milanese overtures, he fully 
appreciated that to make the Venetians suspicious at this stage could be 
supremely dangerous. 
For their part, the Venetians continued throughout the winter 
to reaffirm their friendship with Mantua and to reassure Gianfrancesco 
that they still held the security of his sta~e very dearly. It was 
during this period that the Senate used Ambrogio Badoer extensively because it 
considered that he was the best person to put Gianfrancesco at his ease. 
Nevertheless he had his work cut out for him on a number of occasions 
when Gianfrancesco got rather alarmed at the way in which some of the 
Venetian fortresses in the Bresciano, those along the Mantuan border, 
. 273/ 
were be~ng reinforced. - Badoer constantly urged him to continue 
in his efforts to secure the Mantovano against enemy incursions and 
supplied him with up to date information about the protracted negotiations 
with Sforza whom they still believed was favourable to their cause.27~/ 
While all these assurances were being made by Venice, the 
Milanese tried to exploit the opening they had made in the previous 
December. In January and February of 1438 secret negotiations were in 
progress with Gianfrancesco over the possibility of Bianca Visconti 
marrying Carlo instead of Sforza. The correspondence which survives 
for this is not easy to interpret. It had been suggested that this 
was part of Piccinino's plan to rid himself of a possible rival at the 
275/ Milanese court - and that it was part of a bluff by Filippo Maria to 
. 276/ induce Sforza to join him more quickly, - a theory which seems to be 
borne out by the fact that Sforza and Visconti signed an agreement less 
than a month later reconfirming the original marriage agreement. 
This was no doubt partly the case, but if it was intended as' 
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a ruse, it was a very elaborate one. The negotiations in Mantua conducted 
by Matteo Corrado and an unnamed 'amico' were taken seriously by Gianfrancesco, 
especially as Filippo Maria had gone to the trouble of consulting theologians 
and jurists over the feasibility of absolving him of promises which he 
had made to Sforza. 272/ Although Gianfrancesco was not interested in these 
proposals which to him seemed to create rather than solve problems, it 
could be argued that Filippo Maria intended it as a double-edged ruse 
to bolster up Gianfrancesco's expectations of the benefits which could 
accrue from a closer alliance with Milan. 
The discussions not only concerned the marriage, but also 'altre 
cosse' which not only included territories, but also the question of 
Milanese protection of the Mantovano even if the marriage negotiations 
278/ did not prove fruitful. - The Duke was, therefore, keeping all 
his options open in an attempt to get both Gianfrancesco and Sforza 
onto his side. 
This move seemed, anyhow, to bear some fruit because on 
8 March Filippo Maria instructed his councillor Urbano de Iacoppi to 
open formal, though secret, negotiations with Gianfrancesco for an 
alliance. These talks were to be exploratory at first but even at 
this stage Filippo Maria was concerned primarily with his own interests 
rather than with Gianfrancesco's. In particular he was anxious that 
these discussions should not compromise his relationship with Piccinino. 
Filippo Maria was confident of being able to finalise the agreement 
279/ 
within the next four months. - Although Este was included in this 
commission it is clear that it was Gianfrancesco in whom Visconti 
was most interested. 
Although there are no entries in the Ducal registers for this 
over the next two months, negotiations were taken up again in earnest 
at the beginning of the following June. It is, however, reasonable to 
suppose that some discussion was proceeding in the intervening months. 
Matters were made somewhat easier for Gianfrancesco by the 
fact that until the end of May there were no large-scale military 
operations in Lombardy. The war was going through one of its periodic 
lulls largely due to the absence of Piccinino, first in Bologna in 
, 
March 1438, and subsequently in Romagna between Forli and Ravenna. 
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Piccinino's relationship with the Duke was going through a rather difficult 
h b f i f d hi i I Sforza. 28Q/ p ase ecause 0 the way in which the Viscont. avoure s r va 
This was presumably why Filippo Maria was not anxious to jeopardise 
his relations with Piccinino in the March negotiations. Gianfrancesco 
realised that he would eventually have to commit himself categorically 
to one side when the war was to resume and consequently these months 
of relative peace meant that he could put off the evil moment for a 
little longer. 
The Venetians were using this time to reassemble their forces 
and in making provisional plans for the renewal of the war. At the 
beginning of April Gianfrancesco had deliberately asked the Senate 
what its intentions were and Badoer had been instructed to reply by 
assuring him that these plans were intended as much for his safety as 
for theirs. 28!/ At the same time Paolo Trevisan was instructed to 
collect all the Po fleet together at Borgoforte to prevent the enemy 
282/ from crossing the Po. - It was this particular development which 
made Gianfrancesco rather nervous because it involved concentrations 
of Venetian men in the Mantovano itself and they could become a possible 
danger if he were to go over to Milan. In addition to this he was also 
worried about the Senate's motives in making these preparations. 
Preparations were being stepped up throughout the month of 
May and Badoer was consequently heavily involved, not only in reiterating 
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the friendly intentions of the Senate, but also in encouraging Gianfrancesco 
to make some preparations of his own. He was gradually being forced into 
the open and from now on the moment of decision was to loom increasingly 
larger over the horizon. 
On 3 May the preparations of the Venetian river fleet were 
well under way and Gianfrancesco was asked to contribute towards this 
by arming and refurbishing his own galleys. Moreover, they stated 
that they were anxious to concentrate some troops on the southern 
frontiers of the Mantovano to back up the river fleet. In order to 
convince Gianfrancesco of their goodwill they instructed Badoer to 
offer a condotta to Carlo Gonzaga, a move which itself could be 
interpreted in a more sinister way by Gianfrancesco. 28~/ 
It seemed that the more insistent Venetian assurances became 
the more concerned Gianfrancesco became and by the beginning of May his 
apprehension at the possible presence of large numbers of Venetian 
soldiers in the Mantovano finally prompted him to make the first gesture 
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of protest. There are two significant entries in the Gridario on the 6 and 
7 May which were expressly designed to restrict and even prohibit Venetian 
movements in his territories.28~/ 
However, the Venetians were not deterred even by this and they 
continued to negotiate with Gianfrancesco over military preparations. 
However, from now on they were more demanding and increasingly insistent 
on a much more definite commitment from Gianfrancesco. This was especially 
the case at the end of the month when tensions in Lombardy were once more 
beginning to mount and Piccinino's arrival was imminent. 
The Senate, despite a constant stream of advice through Badoer, 
could not get any definite statement of intent from Gianfrancesco. On 
285/ 20 May it made an abortive attempt to induce him to sign another condotta -
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but was forced in the end to raise Gattamelata's condotta to 500 lances 
286/ 
and discussed formally investing him with the title of Captain General -
a proposal which, at this stage, was defeated. 
By 26 May the level of diplomatic and military activity was 
reaching fever pitch. The Senate had heard that a large Milanese 
fleet was being prepared and, hearing that Piccinino was now on the move, 
began to express not only anger, but surprise at the way in which Gianfrancesco 
was refusing to act. The Senate begged him to close all passes to 
,Piccinino 281/ and three days later it warned him how crucial his 
state could be to Venice's success, painting in no uncertain terms the 
grave danger in which he could .find himself. 28§/ 
Gianfrancesco needed no reminding that the game he was playing 
was very dangerous indeed. he realised full well the dangers he could face 
if the insistence and anger which was beginning to build up in Venice 
was not matched by more concrete assurances from Milan. The crucial 
month in this respect was June when Gianfrancesco was faced with the 
unenviable task of remaining non-committal with Venice at the same time 
as Milanese negotiations were clarifying themselves into definite proposals. 
On 8 June Filippo Maria issued instructions to his secretary 
Maffeo de Muzano to obtain Gianfrancesco's military services as quickly 
as possible and he was authorised to negotiate with him over the 
territories which he might want in return for his services. The Duke 
was very astute in pinpointing the core of the problem. Provided that 
the territorial inducements were sufficiently attractive he was convinced 
that this would finally clinch matters. 282/ It was plainly apparent to 
him that Gianfrancesco was getting frightened of the Venetians by this time. 
This was clear from the actual negotiations themselves. 
Apart from the territorial discussions the question of Milanese protection 
was very high on the agenda. On 26 June Muzano was given specific 
instructions that Filippo Maria would guarantee not only the safety of 
Gianfrancesco and his family, but also the absolute integrity of his 
state, particular emphasis being given to those areas which had been the 
subject of controversy with Milan and which would be secured by a formal 
ducal investiture.29~1 
The Visconti also undertook to reward Gianfrancesco with other 
territories which he either possessed or was to acquire in Milanese service 
in Verona and Vicenza. 29_l1 Th i lth h t thi t ese prom ses, a oug vague ass age, 
were very agreeable inducements to obtain the military services of 
Gianfrancesco and Carlo, and formed a useful basis upon which the final 
agreement of 4 July could be built. The main details were as follows. 
If Gianfrancesco should conquer Verona or Vicenza or both he would be 
awarded them with the exception of certain territories which had belonged 
to Alvise dal Verme and were to be returned to him. Furthermore, if 
Gianfrancesco were to acquire either Brescia or Bergamo, he was to retain 
whichever was captured first until he had received Verona, after which 
the city would be res~ored to Filippo Maria. If none of these cities had 
been conquered by the end of the war, Filippo Maria promised to invest 
Gianfrancesco with Cremona and the Cremonese, with the exception of 
Pizzighettone. 
As soon as Gianfrancesco definitely entered the war against 
the Venetians, the Duke undertook to send Alvise dal Verme and his 
company into the Mantovano in order to guarantee further protection and 
he would be under Gianfrancesco's command in the absence of Piccinino. 
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Both Gianfrancesco and Carlo were assigned troops by Filippo Maria under the 
same conditions as the other ducal condottieri. Finally, this treaty, 
which was to last ten years, was to guarantee the security 6f Gianfrancesco's 
territories and those of his named allies, but Filippo Maria also promised 
not to sign a peace with any power which had in its possession any territory 
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captured from Mantua. - The terms of the agreement seemed on the surface 
to be much more generous than the Venetians had ever offered. The four 
cities mentioned in the negotiations were indeed great prizes and Verona 
or Vicenza certainly seemed to point towards a considerable enlargement 
of the Mantuan state. In reality, however, this agreement was to cause a 
number of complications which became apparent only after Gianfrancesco had 
openly thrown in his lot with the Visconti. As he was to find out, Filippo 
Maria was very good at promises. This will become strikingly apparent in 
the next chapter. 
Gianfrancesco appreciated the great gamble he was taking in 
accepting this agreement, but by now his fears of Venice ran deep. He 
must have realised that now Mantua would not merely be in the front line 
of warfare again, but in a sense it would be the focal point of the 
conflict once the Venetians discovered his intentions. The promise of 
Verona or Vicenza was very alluring, but the prize would only be won 
with the utmost difficulty. 
The later part of June, therefore, was a period of almost 
unbearable stress for Gianfrancesco. The negotiations with Milan had 
been very secret indeed, but the growing anger and frustration of the 
Venetian Senate as this crucial month drew to its close may well have 
led him to believe that they had some inkling of what was afoot. 
During this time both Ambrogio Badoer and Andrea Morosini 
were pressing him to declare his intentions. It was becoming clearer 
that Piccinino was aiming at Casalmaggiore and Gianfrancesco was warned 
time and time again of the havoc that the Viscontean army could cause to 
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corn and other crops in the Serraglio. - He was urged to cooperate 
with Gattamelata and give every support to the river fleet which was 
ready to sail in defence of the Mantovano. By 21 and 22 June there 
are not only hints of desperation in the instructions to the Venetian 
envoys, there is now a greater degree of impatience. Gianfrancesco was 
warned that his dilatoriness could work to the detriment of Mantua. and 
the Venetian cause,29~/ but their assurances of the greater strength 
of the Venetian army and their assurances that they would fight to 
their utmost to defend the Mantovano had absolutely no effect. 
Gianfrancesco by now had passed the point of no return. Even 
if he were to break his silence and declare himself for Venice he could 
not undo the damage which he had now felt to be done to the Venetian 
alliance. After all the rumours that had been spreading about him in 
Venice and the growing distrust with Gattamelata and the provveditori, 
he could never again trust their intentions. In fact, there is a hint 
that the Senate itself was beginning more openly to doUbt Gianfrancesco's 
fidelity at this time. 
After literally months of agonising, the arrival of Piccinino 
signalled that the moment of decision had finally come. It was obvious, 
nevertheless, that Gianfrancesco was not going to make any decisive move 
until he could be sure of adequate protection by the Milanese. 
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By the end of June Piccinino finally arrived at Casalmaggiore 
with a large army. The actual number of men is unspecified but Da Soldo 
indicated that it was larger than the Venetian force. 292/ On 29 June 
Casalmaggiore fell and the Oglio border was in grave danger.29§/ The 
Senate considered that Piccinino would attempt to cross the river somewhere 
between Marcaria and Bocca d'Oglio and moreover concluded that unless 
some resistance was put up by Gianfrancesco, it would be a very easy 
thing to accomplish with the backing of a river fleet. 29Z/ 
On 1 July Piccinino started building a bridge across the Oglio. 
The Senate was untiring in its efforts but was, by now accusing Gianfrancesco 
of causing confusion among the friends of Venice, and of giving the enemy 
a valuable opportunity to take the initiative.29~/ They wanted to send 
Gattamelata personally to consult and act in concert with Gianfrancesco at 
this moment of crisis. Badoer was in constant attendance in Mantua to 
relay the slightest change in the situation. 
However, on 2 July Gianfrancesco allowed Piccinino to cross. 
This is how Da Soldo described the events: 
"El mercoledi, che fu adl 2 de luio, in nostro mal 
poncto de noi Bressani, 10 ditto Marchese dete 10 
passo a Niccolo Picenino in tre logi perche piu 
tosto passasse: in bocca d'Ollio passorno com 
ponte de navi; a Marcharia passorno per il ponte 
proprio, e passorno a Canedo. Ma Dio volse che 
in quello puncto che i deseva passare fu preso 
de la de Ollio per i nostri fanti uno traditore 
de la Signoria, chiamato el Bereta, el qual per 
scampar la forca aviso Gattamelata che se non si 
levava da 11 che lui era preso com tutta la gente, 
avisandolo che 10 Marchese ge dava.lo passo. E 
ditte le parolle, li messi furno 11 digando: "Ogni 
homo cammini che li inimici sonno passati"." 
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Gattamelata and his army managed to retire to Brescia although they 
r 1 d b th i Milanese force. 300_/ we e sore y presse y e pursu ng 
Even though this action,or lack of it, by Gianfrancesco gave 
a clear indication of the way in which he was moving, the Venetians were 
still unwilling to accept this. Up to the point when he openly joined 
Piccinino on 13 July they still persisted. On 7 for instance, Badoer 
was instructed to offer Gianfrancesco Cremona and Crema if he would only 
publicly show himself well disposed to them. 30!/ Even as late as 9 July 
the Senate was writing to Gattamelata in Brescia that it could not believe 
ill of Gianfrancesco. 30~/ 
However, on that very day Maffeo de Muzano was instructed to 
~ut the final touches to the terms of the agreement and to invest 
Gianfrancesco with the territories as specified in the agreement of 26 
June.30~/ There was no holding back now because Filippo Maria expected 
Gianfrancesco to join Piccinino at the earliest opportunity. 
In a letter to Niccolo d'Este on 14 July the Senate wrote 
very bitterly of Gianfrancesco's unexpected defection. After everything 
the Venetian state had done for him his perfidy was unforgiVable. 3O~/ 
On the same day they sent a similar letter to Ermolao Donato to inform 
Eugenius IV of what had happened indicating that they were preparing 
a strong river fleet in order to take the offensive against the enemy in 
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a very short time. - Venetian anger and surprise at Gianfrancesco's 
actions was quickly turned to thoughts of revenge, but even now they 
still wished to keep the door open to further negotiations, perhaps through 
306/ the mediation of Leonello d'Este, Gianfrancesco's son-in-law. -
I 
"E ben detto quel proverb~ 0 anti co '. Di i .... sapp cca307/ l'appicato, ch'egli appicchera poi te." -
Sanuto applied this proverb to Gianfrancesco's actions. In a violent 
denunciation he reviewed all the benefits which Venti an protection had 
obtained for Mantua and especially the opportunities which they had 
given to Gianfrancesco himself: 
" fu cercato d'esaltarlo dopo la morte del 
Conte Carmagnuola, quando il fece Capitan Generale, 
come buon figlio nostro, dandogli ogni plenaria 
liberta. Nel quale ufizio e stato molti anni, e 
ha imborsato grandissima quan~ita di danari, e poco 
utile ci fece." 
These charges, however, are far too extreme. In surveying 
the years in which Gianfrancesco· Gonzaga was Captain General of Venice 
it can be argued that he was a victim as well as a beneficiary in his 
relationship with Venice. In almost every respect it was Venice that 
sought to mould Gianfrancesco to its wishes, capitalising upon the 
knowledge that Mantua needed a protector. Taking on command very much 
against his better judgement, he had assumed responsibilities which had 
proved increasingly incompatible with what he had felt to be in Mantua's 
best interests. Nevertheless in trying to carry out Venice's policy he 
felt he had been restricted by those very problems which had caused the 
eventual downfall of Carmagnola. As the war began to go badly for 
Venice Gianfrancesco's suspicions and apprehensions about his own fate 
finally convinced him that to resign would be the best possible course 
to take. 
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Gianfrancesco's handling of his resignation was perfectly proper, 
in no respect did he break the articles of his agreement. On the contrary" 
he had done his utmost to be as open with the Senate as possible; but 
it refused to accept this and excessive insistence in the final months 
of this period only served to exacerbate the intense dilemma which 
Gianfrancesco had to face at this time. 
After he had resigned Gianfrancesco had technically become 
a free agent, but because of the political conditions which existed 
in Lombardy at this time, in reality hewas.only free to choose which 
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state would protect Mantua. In a sense it did not matter whether Venice 
intended to dispose of Gianfrancesco or not; the crucial question was that 
Gianfrancesco felt himself to be threatened. It is probably true that the 
Venetians genuinely wanted to keep Gianfrancesco and was convinced that 
he would remain faithful to them, but the reasons were largely selfish 
now. In their policy of expansion across the Lombard plain the Mantovano 
was just as important as ever, but the extent of Venetian ambitions had now 
become much more alarming and they had not appreciated what an effect 
this could have on the ruler of a state of Mantua's size. 
The result of this was that he was virtually forced to listen 
more attentively to the Milanese and even here Gianfrancesco could not 
be sure. The territorial promises were attractive and Piccinino's record 
in Visconti service had been good. Moreover the fortunes of war in 1438 
seemed to rest with the Milanese side. However, Filippo Maria himself was 
an unknown quantity and Gianfrancesco had to be sure that the aid which 
he had promised materialised before he made any definite move; hence the 
tension of the final months. It was PiccinLno's presence on the banks 
of the Oglio which swing the balance in favour of Milan. 
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The decision to join Milan was, therefore, not reached without 
an immense amount of deliberation and, as always, the first priority 
was Mantua and its protection. Consequently, Gianfrancesco's act 
cannot go down as one of perfidy. Many condottieri had done much worse 
than he. On the contrary it must be argued that he was true to his 
state, which was the higher loyalty. Such decisions were inevitable 
if Mantua was "un vaso di terracotta costretto a viaggiare con vasi di 
ferro". In making the decision, the best that can be said is that he 
acted with the highest principles in mind. He fully appreciated that the 
risks were high and, with the wrath of Venice about to fall upon his 
head, he could only hope and pray that he had made the right decision. 
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q. si locas Guastalle et la Mirandule pervenit ad manus nr. Dni., 
ea cum teritoriis et d.i:strictibus suis illustri Mag.cie. sue libere 
dabimus". 
62. Sanuto, col.1032: "In questo giorno giunse in questa terra i1 Signore 
Marchese di Mantova Capitano Generale nostro, e gli fu fatto grande onore, 
e fatt1gli pre senti di vino, di cere, e di confezioni. E poi gli fu 
dato il bastone di Capitano Generale cIa Messer 10 Doge." 
63. 5.5. rcg.12, fo1.140t. As far as money for the raising of men was concerned, 
the Senate was particularly obliging: "Et si ipse dns. Marchio aliquid 
tibi (Badoer) diceret de facto pres-tancie per gentibus quas de noVO 
conducere debet, debeas sibi dicere q. provedebimus sibi dari facere per 
cameram nram. Verone singul0 mensis, usque ad menses tres, ducat. 5,000 
ei procurabis qm. de hoc cententus sit ••• " 
64. S.S. reg. 12, fo1. 144t, 3 December 1432. Foscari to Badoer. 
65. Ibid., fo1. 146t. 11 December 1432. 
66. Ibid. fo1 153, 29 December 1432. 
67. S.S. reg.12, fol. 155, 13 Jan.1433: "ut Melius dicti doctores nobis 
consulere possint circa materiam predictam." 
364. 
68.. S.S. reg.12, fo1.156, 19 Jan.1433: "Qm. ultra Padum non requirit nec 
vult aliud qm. Guastallam et Mirandulam si aquirentur ••• et citra 
Padum vult habere Caravagium, Trivulium, Vallate Rivoltam et Bregnanum 
si aquirentur." 
69. S.S. reg.12, fo1.l62t. 13 Jan.1433 and Arch. Gon. B. 43 (Treaties), 
fol.188t. 
70. Arch. Gon. B.1l81 (Ferrara), 11 Feb.1432. (Este to Gianfrancesco): 
" •••• dux Mediolani vult mittere exercitum suum contra Casalmaiori •• " In 
fact, from March 1432 Gianfrancesco was beginning to concentrate once 
again on the security of the Serraglio. On 18 March there was a 'grido' 
forbidding "ponte alcuno atraverso del Seraglio de Mantoa" without 
express permission (Arch. Gon. B.2038, fasc.3). 
71. Arch. Gon. B.1419, fo1.53,30 Oct.1432. This document is very muti1iated 
indeed. In fact there was a very active correspondence between Este 
and Gianfrancesco at the time. e.g. B.1228, 6 & a Oct.1432. 
72. Arch. Gon. B. 2390 (Lettere dai Paesi), fo1. 41, 8 July 1432 (Hermann 
Hecht to Gianfrancesco): " ••• super hac re mu1tu. grosse 10cutus est •••• 
nobis placet in hac •••• 1ibenter 1aborare et partes sue interponere ad 
honorem, exa1tationem et utilitatem domus vre ••• " Sigismund had also 
instructed Hecht to convey his regrets that Gianfrancesco's in~vestiture 
had not taken place yet. 
73. Also in February 1433 (S.S. reg.12, fo1.163, 5 Feb.1433). This promise 
was reiterated at a point when Sigismund was much more openly gravitating 
towards Venice and the Pope. 
74. In fact, on 6 December 1432 the Senate decided to show its goodwill 
by sending more 'balestrieri' to Casa1maggiore (S.S.reg.12,fo1.l45t) 
75. e.g. see Treccani (Mi), pp.29l-294. 
76. See Treccani (Br.) pp.37ff. 
77. See Treccani (Br.) p.37. Gianfrancesco had stayed at the Convents. 
of S.Francesco and S. Giovanni before the award. For the referma see 
Arch.Gon. B.43, fols.189-190: ....... item, q. in Brixia dentur et . 
assignatur domus ubi habi1iter possit habitare idem capitaneus cum 
tota eius familia •••• " His condotta was for 600 lances, 300 infantry, 
a provision of 2,000 ducats per month as before. See also Predelli, 
to"II~""tI"".·de1»'Repubb1ica di Venezia, in Monumenti storici pubblicatt della 
R. deputazlone Veneta di storia patria, ser.l (Venice,1876). 
vol. 4. for 12 March and 7 July 1433. 
78. E.g. see S.S. reg.12, fol.169t. 28 Feb.1433. San Severino was 
consulting with Gianfran·cesco "pro provisionibus fiendis circa 
recuperationem locorum planiter pergamensis ammissorum." 
365. 
79. S.S. reg. 12, fol.179t. 2. April 1433: "ita quod cirta Abduam paucissime 
gentes remanserunt." 
80. The details were solemnly published on 10 May. See Osio, vol.iii, pt.l. 
No.CXXII. The other provisions of the peace may be summarised as follows: 
1. Milan was to return Monferrat, including Casole. 
2. Independence of Lucca, Siena, Piombino, Campofregoso. 
3. Florence no longer to interfere in Lombardy, Genoa or any 
other Viscontean property. 
81. Osio, vol.iii, pt .• l., no. CXXIII. 
82. See Laurentii Buorlincontri, "Annales", in R.I.S. vol. xxi, co •• 140. 
83. For details see Deutsche Reichstagakten, op.cit., vol. X, p.802. no.481. 
The financial details were that the Pope and Florence would furnish him 
with 100 florins per day plus a loan of 10,000 florins. There was some 
haggling over the final amount but in the end Eugenius IV bou~t Sigismund 
off by a monthly payment of 5,000 florins. See also Deutsche 
Reich~stagakten, vol. X, p. 822, nos.487-488. 
84. S.S. reg.13, fol. It, 1 Sept.1433: "pro dando biretum Marchionatus." 
85. There are many chronicle sources describing this. One of the less well 
known describes the visit in the following terms~ "1433, Nel detto 
millesimo del mese d'Agosto l'Imperatore si parti da Roma e venne a 
Ravenna, a Ferrara °et da Ferrara a Mantova entro a di 20 di Setembre e 
fuli fatto grandissimo honore e detto imperatore donb le insegne del 
Marchesato al signore Giovanni Francesco e fece cavaliere tri sui figl01i, 
cio~ Ludovico, Carrolo et Allessandro e stete a Mantova 8 giorni ••• " 
From an anonymous chronicle of Mantua from its origins to 1495. This 
is an unpublished Mss. in the Biblioteca Comunale in Mantua, ref.no.1022. 
See also Platina, pp.328-329. Equicola, p.150, Possevino, pp.539-541. 
86. Amadei, Cronaca Universale, op.cit., vol. 2, p.8. See also Archivio de • 
Stato, Mantua. D'Arco collection no. 96; Paolo Fioretta, Vita dei primi 
13 Gonzaga che tennero dominio in Mantova (MSS.) fols.49-50. 
87. Arch. Gon. B.197 (Marriages. and Inheritances), fol.179. 
88. Ibid.,I1 ••• audio a fidedignus predicta puella esse formossissiman 
et optimorum mororum etatis XIII annorum. II Apparently Coniglio (I Gonzaga 
p.52) suggested that Barbara was rather u9lY1 though there is no 
evidence to suggest this was so. There are two very sound studies of 
Barbara: Paul Kristeller, "Barbara von Brandenburg, Markgr!fin von 
Mantua", Hohenzo11ern Jahrbuch, III (1899); see especially p.66. 
Also Bernard Hofmann, "Barbara von Hohensollerm, Markgr!fin von Mantua. 
Ein Lebensbi1d aus dem XV Jahrhundert", Jahresbericht des Historische 
Vereins fUr Mittelfranken XLI (188l.). There is also a discussion of. 
this point in a thesis by E.W.Mahnke, The Political Career of a 
Condottiere Prince Ludovico Gonzaga 1444-1466. (Cambridge, Massachussetts 
1974), p.36. She states "German historians are eloquent in describing 
the gulf Barbara had to cross in passing from the culture of the Empire 
to that of an Italian Renaissance state ••• " 
366. 
89. Arch. Gon. B.197. fo1s.190-191 (An undated copy of the marriage 
settlement). The signatories were the Cardinal of S.Angelo, the Bishop 
of Mantua and Frederick of Brandenburg: " •••• q. prefatus dns. Marchio 
Mantuam et dns. Ludovicus euis fi11ius, non desiderantes ex causa dicti 
matrimonii bona a1iqua tempora1ia aut dotam seu donationem, sed potius 
amicitia benevolentiam et affinitatem dictam dominam Barbaram dotare 
volunt, et eidem domine Barbarae ratione dotis donare et 1argiri 
25,000 flo ••• " Furthermore the money was to be deposited in Venice 
before the feat of All Saints (lstNovember). See also Sanuto (co1.1033), 
who states 3,000 ducats." 
90. Arch. Gon. B.197, fo1.l79, 6 July 1433. Frederick also required an 
interpreter to be provided for Barbara. The Cardinal respectfully 
suggested that Ludovico should take great pains to appear at this 
best in going to meet his prospective bride. On 29 November he also 
gave Ludovico and Barbara the castles of Ostiglia and Peschiera (Arch. 
Gon. B.197, fols. 180 and l8lt). 
91. Sanuto (col. 1033) merely states the month of November. Other chroniclers 
mention dates between 12 and 22 November (See Amadei Cronaca Uni"versa1e 
vol.2, p.16.) 
92. Arch. Gon. B.197, fol.176. 
93. Arch. Gon. B.197, fo1s.l77-178. 
94. Anonymous chron. in the Bibl.Com. in Mantua, op.cit., fo1.16. 
95. S.S. reg.l2, fo1.203t, 21 Aug.1433: "sunt homines probissimi et magni 
pretii ••• " 
96. S.S. " reg. fol.3, 11 Sept.1433. 
97. Ibid., fol. 6t, 18 Sept.1433. 
98. S.S. reg.12. fol.188, 4 June 1433. On 29 July the S.S. records of a 
breakdown of the army among the various condottieri: Gianfrancesco 1200, 
Guidantonio Manfredi, 800, San Severino 800, Petrogianpaolo Orsini 600, 
da1 Verme 600, Taliano Furlano 400, Taddeo Marchese 200, Martinengo 200. 
(vol.12, fol.197t). 
99. S.S. reg.13, fols. 6t & 8 18 and 26 Sept.1433. 
100. Ibid., fols. 28t and 29, 3 and 7 December 1433. San Severino wanted 
50 more lances and on this occasion the Senate had to agree. 
101. S.S. reg.13, fol.18t, 2 Nov.1433. 
102. Antonello had been a troublesomacondottiere and seemed to oscillate 
between Milan and Venice. See Smith, op.cit., p.77 & Osio, vol.iii,pt.l, 
pp.65-6. 
103. S.S. reg.13, fol.33, 8 Dec.1433: "sumus male in concordio cum 
conductoribus nostris et nisi pr~sto provideatur fortasse eveniat, quod Deus 
avertat, de rebus non placandis nr. Onio ••• ". 
367. 
104. S.S. reg.13, fol.33: "super negotiis dictorum conductorum et 
providere in omnibus et singulis rebus qm. ipse conductores remaneant 
contenti ipsorum conductorum de ipsis firmis et refirmis ••• " The 
people most closely concerned here were Martinengo, Taddeo Marchese 
and Pietro Navarino. The Senate wanted Gianfrancesco to reconfirm 
Taliano Furlano in their service (fol.32t. 8Dec.1433). 
105. In December 1433 they sent Jeron~mo di Nichuola to him at Ravenna 
(S.S. reg.13, fol.34t, 28 Dec.1433). 
106. S.S. reg.13, fol.64t, 17 Apr.1433. See also Eroli,G,Erasimo 
Gattamelata de Narni, suo; monumenti e sua famiglia (Rome 1876), 
pp. 50-62 , for a detailed appraisal of the negotiations, whiCh proved 
very difficult. 
107. S.S. reg.13, fo1.32t. 8 Dec.1433: "Volumus q. esse debeatis 
cum nostris conductoribus ••• qm. mittant eorum nuntios ubique loco rum 
et in Romandiola et Marchia et alio, ubi sunt gentes duci. Mli., et 
procurent habere de illis." The Senate promised to make sure that 
there were sufficient quantities of money in Ravenna for this purpose. 
108. See N. Valois, Le Pape et Ie Concile (Paris 1909), vol.l. p.298 and 
Monumenta Concil. General. Saeculi, (Vienna 1857), XV, pt.2, p.659. 
109. For a more detailed description of these events see Treccani (Mi), 
pp.299ff. and Jones, The Malatesta of Rimini op.cit., p.l80: "The 
Duke of Milan, no friend of a Venetian Pope, and resolute ally of no 
power, chose to adopt the council and use it to justify a covert 
offensive on the dominions of the Pope." 
110. A.S.M. Carteggio Visco Extra Dominium, cart.13, fol.80, 25 September 1433. 
(Instructions to Jacobino de Iseo). 
Ill. A.S.M. Carteggio Visco Extra Dominium, cart.13, fols. 82, 82t. 
"Bisogna habiamo qualche honesta e iusta excusatione per la quale 
vegniamo a nuova guerra." 
112. Ibid. " •••• facesse opera cum effecto presso al Marchese di Mantova 
chel fosse cum nuy a tale impresa ••• e principale ancora luy a metterla 
a bono effecto ••• " 
113. Ibid ...... advisandote Jacomino, che nuy speremo chel Marchese de 
Mantova consentira voluntera a questa practica per duy rispeti. La primo e 
principale sie chel cognosse, che la debilitatione de Ii signori e 10 
augmento de Ii civitade vera anchora ad essere totale destruzione del ,. 
stato suo, e dl floli. L'altro respecto sl e che essendo luy Segnore de 
auctorltade e cum moltl flaIl, veresimelmente deverla desiderare 
; , de accresscere el state suo perche possa lassare di terre, e in piu fermo 
, 
et saldo stati che non hano, maxime perche el stato non e grande per uno, 
molto meno per molti ..... 
114. There is no room here to document these campaigns in detail, only their 
consequences will be examined. See Treccani (Mi) , pp.300ff. 
115. This was, as usual, fraught with difficulties because of Amedeo's 
opportunism. Filippo Maria had to promise to adopt a Savoyard 
prince as his son, promising substantial territorial concessions in 
the event of his dying without a legitimate heir. (Genoa, Asti, Parma, 
Piacenza and Tortona). See F. Cognasso, Amedeo VIII (Turin 1913), 
vol.l, p.68, and vol.2, pp.158ff •• One of the first victims of this 
368. 
new alliance was Gian Giancomo Paleo10go of Monferrat. See F. Cognasso, 
"L'Alleanza Sabaudo-Milanese contro Venezia ne1 1434", A.S.L. ser.5,ii, 1918. 
116. Arch.Gon. B.2185, 14 March 1434, 22 and 23 May (Report of Simone da Crema 
to Gianfrancesco). Most of them deal with the disputes within the 
Council of Basle. There is one entry in the reports which would 
indicate that Venice and Milan were being discussed between Simone and 
Sigismund: " •••• 10 S. Imperatore si me ha domandato a grande secreto se 
la Signoria di Venesia poria far un ponte sopra Adda contra •• la voluntade 
del duca de Milano al quale non sepe dar ferma resposta, rna che io credevo 
di sl ... II 
117. S.S. reg.13, fol.2, 6 Sept.1433. 
118. Gianfrancesco was receiving news about the progress of these negotiations 
from Zenebaldo de Brolio who at that time was Man.tuan ambassador in 
Ferrara. e.g. See Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fo1.30, 26 Feb.1434. 
119. Smith, op.cit.,p.97: "Of the 22 years between his first employment and 
the end of the reign in 1447 Sforza was in direct Viscontean employment 
for only about 7 years (1425-30, 1431-3), in a state of friendly 
independence for about 6 years (1433-4,1438-9, 1441-2, 1443-5, 1447) 
and in hostile employment for 9 years (1430-1, 1434-8, 1439, 1441, 1442-3, 
1445-7)." 
120. 5.5. reg.13, fol.67, 7 May 1434. 
121. Ibid., fol.71t. 21 May 1434. On the same day the Senate sent a 
severe letter of complaint to Filippo Maria. 
122. See Treccani (Mi). p.308, and ff. Also M. Longhi "Niccol'O Piccinino 
in Bologna", Atti e merneris della R Deput, di S.P. di Romagna, 
3rd sere XXIV. (1906). 
123. S.S. reg.13, fo1.70t. "cum propter suspitiones q. dietim resurgunt 
de factis Bononie et de hiis qui sentiuntur de motibus gentium dUcis 
M1i •• " Gianfrancesco was to examine and prepare all munitions "pro 
faciendo qua1iter se in ordine reperiunt ut ea omnia possint optari 
et operari si opportuerit ••• " 
124. e.g. See S.S. reg.13, fo1s. 82, 86, 88t., lOOt., 106.114. 
125. Ibid., fol. 105, 11Sept.1434. 
126. Ibid., fol. 108t. "instamus et attendimus ac faciendam redrigere 
gentes nostras, et facemus omnis possibilis provisiones ad fortificandum 
exercitum nostrum in i1lis partibus, et ab hoc conducere intendimus 
gentes novas, et in bono numero ••• " They were anxious that Florence 
should pull its weight. 
127. The remainder of the war is described in Treccani (Mi.) p.3l0 and 
Eroli, pp.76ff. 
128. 5.5. reg.13, fol.135, 27 Jan.1435. 
369. 
129. Ibid., fo1. 150t. 20 Apr. 1435. 
130. Ibid., fo1. 161, 28 May 1435. 
131. Ibid., fo1. 154, 29 April 1435. 
132. Ibid., fo1. 163. 1 June 1435. Gianfrancesco was to discuss 
"qua1iter providere possit in omni casu opportunitatis, considerantes 
condicionibus temporum et rerum presentialiter." 
133. S.S. reg.13, fo1.169t, 1 July 1435. The number of troops available, 
according to fo1.164 was 7,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. 
134. S.S. reg.13, fo1. 171, 21 July 1435. 
135. Ibid., fo1.175, 11 Aug.1435. No subjeet of Milan was to enter 
the Bresciano or Bergamasco and no Venetian was to enter Milanese 
territory under pain of severe punishment. 
136. S.S. reg. 13, fo1.183, 10ct.1435. " ••• qm. societas I.d. Marchione 
reduceatur ad num. 1ancearum 500 et procuretur cum i11is honestis 
modis qui videbuntur quamquam provisione sua ducat. 1,000 ten eat equites 
100 in dcto. numero lance arum 500 ••••• ' 
137. S.S. reg. 13, fo1.184t, 14 Oct.1435. 
138. Ibid., fo1. 187t. 3 Nov.1435. 
139. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fo1.191t. 
140. For details of the Milanese in Geno .. see A.Pesce, Su11e re1azioni tra 1a 
Repubblica di Genova e Filippo Maria Visconti. (Torino 1921). 
141. S.S. reg.13, fo1.193t. 2 Jan.1436. 
142. Ibid., fo1.194, 4 Jan.1436. "Procurando qm. se reduceat in Brixiensi 
teneatque gentes nostras in ordine ••• " See also fo1.195, 10 Jan.1436. 
143. S.S. 13, reg. 196, 12 Jan.1436. 
144. Ibid.~ ••• verum Sentietis qm. I. ds. March. Mant. missiset per dicto 
Cavalcabove ••• his praticis et de causis vos bone materiam immiscere non 
debeatis." 
145. S.S. reg.13, fols. 202t. & 209. (Instructions from the Senate to 
Gianfrancesco) • 
146. S.S. reg.13, fol.201t. 19 Feb.1436. (Instructions to Contarini): 
.. et hortare debeas Ill. m. suam ut dignere veli t conceptum et iudicium 
suum ad sinceram affectionem paternam quam caritatem et omnem quem 
ad Ill. m. suam gerimus ••• procurare debeas eve11ere de mente eius 
ranchorem et qm. remaneat bene contentus et reconciliatus." 
147. S.S. reg.13, fols. 210t. and 211, 1 March 1436. 
148. S.S. reg.13, fol. 201t; "Et insuper, si est contentus servire 
sm. mutare vellet conditionem capitulorum, auditis omnibus cum modis 
quibus hactenus servivit, q. pur persisteret in ista opinione, dicere 
debeas qm. scribes nobis quecumque tibi dixerit, et sic facies et 
expectabis mandatum." 
149. S.S. reg.13, fol.21S. 
150. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fol.191. 
151. S.S. reg.13, fol.215, 9 March 1436: "sed si pax esset, ve11et ab 
ipso capitaneato absolvi ••• " 
152. S.S. reg.13, fo1.211, 1 March 1436. "Et ad factum non essendi sub 
comiti Francisci ..... 
153. In fact, on 3 April 1436 Giovanni de Imperiis, the man who had played 
a part in the downfall of Carmagno1a in 1432, was sent to Francesco 
Sforza: lOut nobis libere dicere et aperire velit oppinionem et 
consilium suum de modis, viis et provisionibus observandis in casu 
quo veniamus ad hanc impresam seu guerram". (5.5. reg.13, fol.22lt). 
370. 
154. This view is proposed by Mahnke, op.cit., p.41. She says: "It is 
difficult to estimate how serious the antipathies dividing the Gonzaga 
family in the last decade of Gianfrancesco's life. Perhaps Ludovico 
went to Milan as a harbinger of his father, or to make sure that there 
would be a Gonzaga in the winning camp no matter which side triumphed. 
The stories of favouritism to Carlo may have been a smoke screen invented 
to reassure Venice of Gonzaga's continued good-faith. In Gonzaga history 
conflicts and in this case private animosities may have been resolved 
with the decision of alliance. But Carlo would continue to be a thorn 
in Ludovico's side." 
155. The exact date is unknown. The earliest eVidence is 15 April 1436. 
(S.S. reg. 13, fo1. 225)and so it must have occurred shortly before. 
156. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 20 April 1436. This letter is written in Ludovico's 
own hand. 
157. Arch. Gon. B. 51 (Condotte), 21 April 1436. 
158. S.S. reg. 13, fo1.225. 
159. Arch. Gon. B. 37, 16 April 1436. " •••• illam q. vobis heredem 
insitutetis, habemus in filium et reccomendatum nostrum ipsum quem 
per vos institutem heredem eiusque statum sua reccomendatione et protectione 
nra., tueri, defendere et conservare promittimus sic haetenus feeimus 
et facimus Ill. Mag. Yr. et statum vrm." 
160. Arch. Gon. B. 85, fase.14, fol.4, 3 Nov.1436: "Tibi etiam potestatem ••• 
va1eas instituere unum a1ium de filiis tuis legittimis tibi p1aeabi1~m 
ad sueeessionem Marehionatum et do~i,..orum tuorum." For the letter of 
9 June from Sigismund. to Paola see Arch. Gon. B. 428 (Imperial letters), 
fol. 126 ..... applieata ergo, dilecta et devota nostra, hane saeram 
parabo1am ad predietum Ludovioum qui, iuvenili furore conduetus, et 
sine forte Mediolani serpentus suasu, et •••• in earn miserium lap.us est ••• " 
, 
. ,II 
,I 
161. See Pesce, op.cit., p.52. Arch. Gon. B. 1419, fo1.56: "ad salutem 
et conservationem statum et libertas omnium partium et ad universale 
bon am totius Italie." 
162. See T. Toderini, "La prima condotta di Francesco Sforza pex: Venezia", 
Archivio Veneto, vol IX (lB75) for a fuller study of this. 
163. S.S. reg. 13, fo1. 23lt, 13 May 1436. 
164. Ibid., 242, 9 June 1435. "nam reddimur certi qm. parsimonizare 
curabit pecunias nostras, plus quam si sue proprie essent." The 
Venetians were quite confident in Gianfrancesco as far as these 
financial matters were concered. 
371. 
165. See S.S. reg.13, fols. 232 & 240t. This required a special dispensation 
because of consanguinity of the third grade. This was granted on 
3 Dec. 1436. (Arch. Gon. B.179, fols. 222 and 223-5). 
166. For details, of which this is a summary, see Treccani (Mi).p.319. 
167. Florence was to pay six tenths and Venice the remaining four tenths 
while he was south of the Po and vice versa when he was north of it. 
For the negotiations see S.S. reg.13, fol.269t, Oct.1436. Venice had 
originally suggested BOO lances and BOO infantry. 
16B. Ibid. 
169. See Smith, op.cit., p. B9: "Though the pay was less than he would have 
had in Milanese service, Sforza was at least Captain General, although 
Gonzaga had the same status. Despite the condotta, it is not certain 
that Sforza had not yet decided to break irrevocably with Filippo 
Maria ••• a secret stipulation that Sforza himself could decide whether 
or not he should cross the Po; the secrecy was insisted on by the League 
so that the Duke should not realise that its control of Sforza was 
conditional." 
170. Osio, vol. III, pt. 1 no. CXLIII, p.137. 
171. L.S.C. opening no. 104, 4 Jan.1437. This had really been started in 
the preceeding month in earnest. 
172. L.S.C. 106, 9 Jan.1437: "ut differe velit quam minus ei possibili est 
in Mantua ••• " 
173. LS.C. 107, 9 Jan.1437. 
174. L.S.C. lOB, lB Jan.1437. 
175. L.S.C. 110, 22 Jan.1437. 
176. L.S.C.112, 31 Jan.1437. 
177. L.S.C.llS, 6 Feb.1437. 
l7B. L.S.C. 119, 9 Feb. 1437. They sent Gianfrancesco 2B,000 ducats to try 
to sort this one out. 
372. 
179. L.S.C.139, 6 March 1437. The Senate instructed Gianfrancesco to 
"providere qm. gentes nras~ ab his violentes et predis prorsus abstineant ••• " 
180. L.S.C. 123, 14 Feb.1437. 
181. L.S.C. 124, 15 Feb.1437. 
182. L.S.C. 128, 18 Feb.1437. 
183. See Eroli, op.cit., pp.9l-2. Treccani (Mi.) p.320~ 
184. The first information of this is in L.S.C.129, 19 Feb.1437. See also 
C.Simonetta, "De impeto facto, hostes turbantur fusique in fugam 
circumquaque vertuntur suo cum maximo non dedecore solum, sed etiam 
detrimenti, amiss is tum equis quamplurimis, tum etiam machinis et 
impedimentis fere omnibus1 in ea pugna captus est inter steros fortissime 
dimicans juvenis, tum genere, tum virtute insignis, Ludovicus Gonzaga, 
Johannis Francisci mantuani principis filius ..... 
185. L.S.C.129, 20 Feb.1437: "precamur ut eis libeat providere q. prefatus 
Ludovicus detineatur et nobis assignetur." 
186. An example of the many assurances throughout this year L.S.C.143, 
11 March. They wrote to Gianfrancesco that they understood fully 
his feelings and anxieties regarding Ludovico and reassured him that 
Vitturi was busily involved on their behalf. "etiam suasit ipsi comiti 
(Sforza) ut idem Ludovicus retineatur et bene sa1vetur ac ta1iter 
custodiatur q. non. possit evadere ...... 
187. L.S.C.130, 23 Feb.1437. (The Senate to Stefano Contarini): lise 1evabit 
de horam in hora et de momento in momentum ••• " 
188. L.S.C.134, 1 March 1437. (Report to Vitturi in Florence). They go on to 
say that even though the major onus of the war is to' rest upon Lombardy, 
the Florentines are to be urged to arm as well because the threats to 
them by the Milanese are still great. 
189. See Ero1i, op.cit., pp.92-3. 
190. L.S.C.135, 2 March 1437. (Letter to Ermolao Donato, the Venetian 
ambassador to Eugenius IV). The letters to Donato frequently give up 
to date summaries of military operations while their major intention is to' 
get the Pope to allow Sforza to cross the Po to help them. This 
appears with greater insistence than ever. 
191. L.S.C. 136, 3 March 1437. (Venetian instructions to Contarini). The 
Senate wanted a punishing campaign. 
192. Eroli, op.cit., pp.93-4. See also Treccani, p.40. 
193. L.S.C.138, 4 March 1437. (Letter to Genoa): "per crescentiam aque 
i1lius flum1nis Abdue ••• qd. factum illud valde difficu1tavit •••• " 
. /' 
t ,I 
!~ 
194. L.S.C. 148, 18 March 1437. (Letter to Vitturi). The 500 infantry 
had been attacked by the Milanese. "super noctis mu1tis gentibus 
armigeribus et aliud gentibus partis adverse illi pedites nri. 
non vo1entes sustinere impetum, nec habentes aliquam fortitudinem, 
coacti fUerunt dare terga et deserere locum." Four constables and 
373. 
about 100 infantry were captured "unde omnia illa negotia impedita fuerunt 
(et gentes nre. retractis navibus et ponte retrocesserunt)." 
195. L.S.C. 137, 4 March 1437 (Senate to Gianfrancesco): " ••• nam si 
gentes inimici hoc perterrita hyeme cum tanta frigoris crudelitate, continue 
equitarunt, certum est q. nre. hoc tempore poterunt honorem nrm. et. 
vrm. viri1iter et potenter facere •••• " 
196. Re. Savoy/Milan alliance see Treccani (Mi.) pp.322-3. 
197. There are many references in L.S.C. to Piccinino's movements. e.g. 
141, 8 March in a letter to Sforza'S chancellor Angelo Simonetta. The 
Venetians were also trying to get Este to impede Piccinino's progress 
to Lombardy (L.S.C. 142, 11 March; letter to-Gianfrancesco). 
198. L.S.C. 141, 6 March (Senate to Gianfrancesco): "vos paterne 
rogamus ut non teneat[s.in animo a1iquam passionem, sed leto animo ••• " 
199. L.S.C. 142, 10 March 1437 to Brescia. 
200. L.S.C. 142, 11 March 1437 Piccinino "dismissis fere omnibus suis 
peditibus in partibus Luce", was marching towards Pontremoli from 
..... Sarzana on his way to Lombardy. Letters were also sent to the Podesta 
of Bergamo, Paolo Pasqualigo, regarding the security of the rocche 
of Romano, Col1oni and Vigani (L.S.C.143, 11 March ). 
201. L.S.C. 151, 23 March , the Senate wanted Gianfrancesco "ut 
provideatis tenere, seu allogiare illas gentes nras. quanto magis 
unitas et strictas sit possibile" along the frontier so that he could 
take the offensive when a sutiable opportunity should present itself. 
202. L.S.C. 151, 23 March (Senate to the Captain of Casalmaggiore). 
203. L.S.C. 154 30 March (Senate to Gianfrancesco). They promised to send 
it within three days but as late as 6 April the Mantuan ambassador 
to Venice, Matteo Corrado, was still discussing arrangements (L.S.C. 
160). Filippo Maria also kneW of this. See Manaresi, op.cit., vol.2, 
pt.l, no.167S. 
204. S.S. reg.14, fol.28t. The Senate's commission to Paolo Tron to persuade 
Gianfrancesco "exire poterat in castris, et viriliter attendere omnibus 
modis possibilibus ad damnam inimici et subditorum suorum." 
cf. L.S.C. 13 April (Senate to Tron): "non veniente Nicolao Picenino, 
habet gentes ad sufficienium q. sunt potentes ad tenendum campum, et 
propter multas alias considerationes, nobis prorsus videatur, et 
volumus, q. quanto celerius sit possibile, exeat in campum, contra terras 
et loca hostilia, nec debeat habere consideratio ad Nicolaum Picenlnum, 
qui in partibus il1is Tuscie et Ianuensis est talltus involutus ••• " 
205. S.S. reg.14, fol.28t. 4 April 1437. 
206. Eroli (p.96), suggests that Gattamelata suspected Gianfrancesco's 
fidelity; but he does not cite any documentary evidence to support 
this: "I Gattamelata erasi accanto a molt'indizi, che il Generale 
stava a bada per favorire il piccinino, e che mulinava con esso lui 
tradire la Repubblica." 
207. L.S.C.17l, 21 Apr.1437. Corrado was consulted over this in Venice and 
Tron was required to relay his fears about idle and vulgar gossip. 
On the 26 April they tried to reassure him that they were making every 
attempt to get Sforza to alleviate some of the pressure on him. (173). 
208. L.S.C.170, 21 April (Senate to Tron): "Audivimus ordinem datam in 
facto Brignani, quod sicut speramus, optatam sortietur effectum •••• " 
209. Arch. Gon. B. 2094, e.g. Fols. 158, 159, 197-200. 
210. Arch. Gon. B. 2185 for 1436-7 and B.108l (Pesaro affairs). 
211. See Jones, The Malatesta of Rimini, cit., p.187 (note 2). This work 
clarifies the complex background to the affairs of the Malatesta of Pesaro 
and their relationship with Rimini, Jones mentions the 'rocche' of Pesaro, 
Fossombrone and Montevecchio, but Arch.Gon. B.2l85 for March and April 
mentionsGradara and Montemarciano. 
212. e.g. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 20 April. 1437 (Gianfrancesco to Pesaro): " ••• A noi 
non e possibile per le insupportabel spese ...... 
213. e.g. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 22 March 1437 (Gianfrancesco to Paola): " •• perche 
fazemo mazore stima del Conte Francesco del quale ne havemo mazore 
bisogno cha de li di ti S. vri. fradell!. •• ~ " . 
214. Arch. Vz. L.S.C.176, 30 April. Tron was also to persuade Gianfrancesco 
"q. per consequenda et amplidana hac victoria bonum et valde utile foret." 
Tron was to stay with Gianfrancesco until Pietro Loredan arrived in a 
matter of a few days. 
215. L.S.C. 180, 5 May (Senate to Gianfrancesco). 
216. L.S.C. 181, 7 May (Senate to Loredan). 
217. L.S.C. 182, 8 May (Senate to Gianfrancesco): "Nam veniente Nicho1ao videmus 
q. dux. M1i. non habebit ultra equos 5,000 in Lombardia. Et nos cum 
Dei presidio habere credimus equos 9,000 computatio Mag.o. Dno. Arimini •••• " 
218. L.S.C. 197, 23 May (Senate to Loredan). See also 192, 19 May (to 
Loredan) • 
219. L.S.C. 206, 10 June; Senate to Loredan mentions 6 June. Treccani (Br.) 
p.40 says the tenth. 
220. L.S.C. 208, 12 June (Senate to Loredan): "Magno desiderio expectabamus 
singu1is diebus et horis audire successe exercitus nostri .•••• " 
I , 
375. 
221. L.S.C. 211, 22 June. 
222. L.S.C. 212, 25 June (Senate to Gianfrancesco). 
223. Simonetta, op.cit., p.70 reo success of Piccinino: "At ubi Piccinini 
huic factus est obviam cum philippanis viribus, non difficulter omnem 
ejus impetum repressit et ita .repressit, ut, amissa majore impedimentorum 
parte, iri Brixianos redite coactus fuerit." See Osio, vO!.iii, pt.l, 
no. CLI. 14 June 1437 on the quickening up of Milanese movements in 
the Cremonese. 
224. See Smith, op.cit., pp.89-90. 
225. to . Gianfrancesco regarded Piccinino as a formidable advers~. According 
to Manaresi, vol.2, pt.l, no.1684 (letter to Piacenza): ' ••• avendo di lui 
molta paura il Signore di Mantova". 
226. L.S.C. 216, 2 JU1Y1 Loredan reports "molestias et incessantia tedia ab 
ill. gentibus nris, pro facto pecuniarum". There was further trouble 
at the end of August (L.S.C.24S). 
227. L.S.C. 219, 6 July for differences of opinion between Brandolini and 
Traddeo Marchese. There were still reports of disaffection later in the 
month (227, 15 July). 
228. L.S.C. 221, 7 July (Senate to Gianfrancesco). 
229. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 7 July 1437: "Ip1- consortii mee dixit q. dux 
Mli. eidem comiti comisserat q. cum senserit secutam esse mortem 
coniungis Caroli nati mei, michi debe ret notificare se esse contentem 
ac libenter velle eius filiam in uxorem ipi. Carolo tradere dum hoc michi 
placeret •••• " At the end of August (24th) the Venetians supported 
Carlo's marriage to a daughter of the Marquis of Monferrat (L.S.C.24l). 
230. L.S.C. 225, 11 July (Senate to Gianfrancesco). 
231. L.S.C. 242, 12 August (Instructions from the Senate to Marco Dandolo). 
232. L.S.C. 242, 13 Aug. (Senate to Loredan). Preparation of the river 
fleet had been going on at least since the beginning of July (Arch.Gon. 
B.43, fol.192, 3 July, Foscari to Gianfrancesco). See also S.S. reg.14, 
fol.S3t, 17 Aug.: "super facto armato Padi qua. facere omnio 
deliberamus et potentes, et iam incepimus providere ad necessaria." 
Gianfrancesco had himself arranged the by now customary truces with 
Guastalla, Mirandula and Coreggio earlier in the year (Arch.Gon.B.43, 
fols. 248, 246, 238, 234, 224, 227). 
233. e.g. L.S.C. 248, 28 Aug. (Senate to Gianfrancesco): " ••• q. omnes 
gentes nras. undique ••• et unitas teneant ut semper cum maiori 
secur1tate et potente valeant honorem suum et nostrum facere ••• " 
234. L.S.C. fol.1S6t. 10 Sept. (From now on the numbering of the L.S.C. 
changes. The previous numberings refer to openings whereas the latter part 
has its pages individually numbered.) 
235. L.S.C. fol.156t. 10 Sept. (Senate to Gianfrancesco): nut gentes nre. 
quanto magis possibile sit teneaturuniti quamquam provideatur ad 
custodiam et conservationem illarum locorum nrorum. tam ultra quam 
citra Oleii que magis importantie videntur ••• " See L.S.C. fol.16O, 
15 Sept. in which the Senate expresses its fears to Sforza lest 
Piccinino should cross the O9110.:It was clear that .the Venetians had 
underestimated the strength of Milanese resistance. 
376. 
236. See Treccani (Br.) p.42. 
237. Cristoforo da Soldo, "La Cronaca" (1437-1468), ed. Giuseppe Brizzolara, 
R.I.S. vol. XXI, pt.iii, p.3: "etera ·stati zugno, luio, augusto e per 
fina alIi 9 de settembre e niente haveva fatto ne olsado cazarse inanci 
per pagura delle gente del Duca de Milano ...... 
238. Ibid., pp.2-3: " •••• E fu preso quasi tutto 10 cariazo; fupreso da 
circa cinque cento carri; senza altre persone e altre cose. Apresso a 
questo Nicol~ Picenino campeza quallo Bergamascho per modo che in 
4 zorni have plusor terrezole; et stete dal soprascritto di 10 fina 
a 25 de settembrio a campo a Calepio." 
239. L.S.C. fo1.168t. 25 Sept. The Senate replied to Tron that it sympathised 
with him and urged him to use all his powers of persuasion to induce 
Gianfrancesco to do their bidding. 
240. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 15 Sept.: ...... senties personam suum hic semper 
adesse ad bonam gubernationem et gentium istarum siquid accadet •••• " 
241. L.S.C. fol.176t. 29 Sept. (Senate to Tron). 
242. L.S.C. fol.182t, 3 Oct. (Senate to Gianfrancesco). See also Arch.Gon. 
B.14l9, fo1.63. 
243. Da Soldo, op.cit., p.3. In P. Spino, Istoria della vita e fatti dell' 
eccellente Capitano di guerra Bartolomeo Colleoni (Bergamo 1569), 
Bk. II, p.39, it states that Piccinino also had 500 men sent to him by 
Ludovico, but this is hardly likely. 
244. e.g. Platina writes about the crossing of the Adda; "Transierant jam 
cohertes aliquot atque equitum turmae cum tantus concursus factus est, 
ut vertere terga vix potuerint pars interficitur, pars nando 
gurgitibus absumitur, PrinCipe Mantuano temeritatem Praefectorum 
accusante, quod ignari rei militarie totiusque militae expertes, tantum 
exercitus periculo abiecerent ••• " (p.332). See also Tarducci, 
L'alleanza... cit., p.268, note 1. 
245. R.I.S. vol. XXI, co1.976-8. See also Platina, p.334: "Praeterea 
deprehendit, Praefectos Venetos plus Gatta quam sibi detulisse qua 
quidem in re, et detrahere auctoritati suae, quae in bello plurimum 
valet, et parum ei fidere sunt visi." See also Eroli, pp.94-5. For 
the Gubbio Chron. see R.I.S. vol. XXI, col.976: - "II Marches"e-.di Mantova 
aveva sdegno coi Provveditori della Signoria •••• " 
246. Bracciolini in R.I.S. vol. XX col.39. 
247. L.S.C. fol.184t. 5 Oct. (Instructions from the Senate to the Provveditori): 
" ••• quod valde molestia habuimus inconvalescentem illustri persone 
sue et rogitis eum parte nostra ut velit aliqualiter moderare labores 
suos et curare ad tenendum pessonum suam incolume •••• " 
248. L.S.C. ibid,; fol.200, 21 April, fol.197, 16 oct. 
249. L.S.C. fol. 191t, 12 Oct. 
377. 
250. The first reference to this in the Venetian Archive is in S.S. reg.14, 
fol.67 in a letter dated 27 Oct. in reply to Gianfrancesco's letter 
of the 20th. This is confirmed by L.S.C. fol.209.(27 Oct.) 
in instructions to Contarini. 
251. Ibid. 
252. Ibid.:" et intelligetis et cognoscentes quid importat ad pns. 
statui nro., ut gentes nre. sine gubernatione remaneatur ••• " 
253. L.S.C. fol.209; Contarini was instructed to report back immediately 
to the Senate. 
254. S.S. reg.14, fol.69t, 4 Nov. (Senate to Morosini):" et inter cetera 
Ill. Os. March. Mant. Capitan. nr. generalis asserit deliberasse 
amplius non ex;ercere artem militarem." 
255. S.S. reg.14, fol.70t, 6 Nov. (Instructions to Contarini): " ••• Et propterea 
iam missimus ad illustre Comitem Franciscum ad instandum et procurandum 
qd. Padum trans eat et gubernationem nostrarum gentium ipse solus 
habeat ••• qua facta, prefatus dns. Marchio liber sit, et absolutus 
remaneat a capitaneatu predicto, et gubernatio nostrorum gentium 
remaneat illi cui eam dederimus ••• Volumus ut eius Ill. m. dicatis qd., 
eo recedente, contente erimus ut ipse gentes sue ad nra. servicia 
remaneant ••• " These instructions were repeated on 11 November (L.S.C. 
fo1.215t. ) 
2S6. L.S.C. fol. 21St. 11 Nov. On the 17 November (fol.2l8) discussions with 
Sanseverino were going quite well. Venice offered him a condotta of 
500 cavalry and 300 infantry plus Fontanelle, together with "unam aliam 
bonam posessionem." 
257. 5.5. reg.14, fol.70t, 6 Nov. (Instructions to Contarini). 
258. Ibid., fol.72, 16 Nov. Also L.S.C. fol 223t, 23 Nov. One of the other 
reasons for asking Gianfrancesco to stay on until the end of December was 
,that there had been disagreements between Guidantonio Manfredi and 
Sigismondo Malatesta over winter lodgings for their respective troOps. 
The Senate did assure Gianfrancesco that they would make every effort 
to reappoint before the end of December and to liberate him at the 
earliest opportunity. 
259. 5.5. reg.14, fol.72, 16 Nov ....... ceterum qUiq.pridie nobis scripsistis 
ex gentibus aliquos esse non plene fideles ••• " 
260. L.S.C. fol.223, 22 Nov. (Sentate to Gianfrancesco): ...... Ill. N. plurimum 
gravari atque dolere, de aliquibus verbis que dicitis sensisse in 
diminutionem honorem vestrum hic diversimodi divulgari ••• " They go on 
to assure him that it is very difficult to control what people say 
in such a big city as Venice and that the Senate still regarded him as 
a most,loyal and devoted son. 
261. L.S.C. fol. 226t, 26 Nov. (to Contarini) and S.S. reg.14, fol.14t. 
to Gianfrancesco (same date): "quarum percepto tenore (of Gianfrancesco's 
persistence), displiCelntiam habuimus non exiguam, et maxime ob ea que 
videmus prefate Ill. m. reportata fuisse ••• " 
, , 
378. 
262. See Eroli, pp.96-97. Also S.S. reg.14 fo1s. 75 and 75t, 29 Nov.; 
L.S.C. fol.227t, 1 Dec. Contarini had to pour oil on troubled waters 
because it was more essential than ever to continue to have Gattamelata's 
services. 
263. Da Soldo, pp.5-6. 
264. Eroli, p.97 and S.S. reg.14, fol.78 (Instructions to Contarini): 
" ••• nobis non videbitur dan dum esse hoc onus Magnifico Gattamelate." 
The Senate emphasised that Sforza was still their first choice. According 
to their envoys to Sforza, he "nunquam se movere vo1uit, nec ire in 
aliquam partem ad requisitionem nram. absque 1icentia et consensu 
Florentinorum" (S.S. fols. 80t and 81, 12 and 14 Dec.), and Venetian 
relations with Florence were none too barmonious at this point. 
265. See Ero1i, p.98-9 and S.S. reg.14, fo1.83, 17 Dec. There was to be a solemn 
investiture in Brescia: "Verum vobis declaramus qd. esset nre. 
intentionis et ita providere debeatis, qd.pro supp1emento conducto 
suo 1.400 se fu1ceat de lanceis que fuerunt Ill. d.m.Mant.ac.de lanceis 
nris. spezzatis ••• " On 11 January 1438 he was to occupy the house 
formerly belonging to Gianfrancesco in Brescia (L.S.c.fol.243). 
266. S.S. reg.14, fo1.85, 28 Dec. (to Contarini): ...... est nra. intentio 
dividere gentes ipsas ••• in 1anceis spezzatis cum i110 habi1iori modo 
vobis sut possibile ••• " See also L.S.C. fo1.233t. 12 Dec. 
267. On 10 December the Senate sent Andrea Bernardo to consult with 
Gianfrancesco over this (L.S.C. fo1.232t.) 
268. L.S.C. fo1. 252. 10 Feb. Cari1ia = 40 lances; Pietro de Lucca = 60 lances; 
Donino de Paxma = 40-60 lances, Scaramutio de Lucera = 40 lances. See 
also S.S. reg.14, fols. 89t and 91. 
269. S.S. reg.14, fo1.94, 10 Feb; fo1.95, 17 Feb. fol. 98t, 1 March. 
270. A.S.M. Carteggio Visconteo Extra Dominium, cart.14, fol.16. 
271. Ibid., "E1 popolo de Mantova e alegrissimo sia levato como 'e. 
como sentimo., e palam e secrete." 
/ 
Cussi sta 
272. Ibid., "Vene a Mantova e1 genero del Duxe per ambassatore. Que110 di 
non have audientia. Comenciano esser mal veduti." 
273. S.S. reg.14, fol.94, 10 Feb.1438. Similarly in March he was worried 
about reinforcements aroud Brignano and Venice replied that there 
were no sinister intentions (S.S. reg.14, f01.99). 
274. E.g. S.S. reg. 14, fol.98t. 1 March. " ••• difficile sit nobis credere 
qd. Comes Fco. Sf. in'concordio sit cum duce ..... 
275. Treccani (Mi.) p.325. 
276. Smith, op.cit., p.92. 
277. Osio, vol. iii, pt.1, no. CLXIX, 18 Jan.1438. 
278. Ibid. No. CLXX 25 Feb.1438." •••• a cio che tra luy e nuy fosse una 
bona amicizia et intelligencia per modo che nuy facessemo per 
luy e 10 stato quello tutto che faressemo per 10 nostro proprio, 
e coss! luy versa vice fesse per nuy et per 10 nostro stato faria 
per 10 suo proprio, quello ch'el voria che nuy gli facessemo, non 
avendo effecto el parentado. Advisandoti che in ogni evento, noy 10 
volemo havere in carissimo et honorevole fratello •••• " 
279. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, Reg. no.4l, Rr als 0 (1434-41), Register 
of Giov. Francesco Gallina, fols. 363t-364t, 8 March 1438. 
280. See Treccani (Mi.) pp.328-9 and da Soldo, op.cit.,p.6: "Del mese di 
marzo si levd et andO per 10 Bologneso per andar a Ravenna: e 
subito have Ravenna ••• e 11 stete per fin a alIa fine de mazo. Com 
379. 
questi inzegni se diceva ch'~l monstrava di esser disdegnato com il Duca 
e volerse conzare com 10 Papa Eugenio chi era in liga com la'nostra, 
signoria de Venesia; et si diceva ch'el Papa ge donava Perosa, Siso e Citade 
di Castello; e'l faceva Confalonier di la Giesia, e'l faseva so Capitanio 
General. Ma infra questo, el ditto Nicolao Picenino menava trattado com li 
Bolognesi e con alcuni altri, e specialmente com 10 Marchese di Mantova 
si come apparse di puci. •• " See also C. Albicini, "11 governo 
visconteo di Bologna", Atti e Memorie della R. Deputazione di Storia 
Patria per le Provincie di ROmagna, 3rd ser., vols. 24-5, 1906-7. Also 
Sanuto, col.10S7. 
281. S.S. reg.14, fo1.104, 17 April 1438. (Senate to Badoer). " ••• ac de alii 
de novo conducimus solum ad finem conservandi non minus statum suum qm. 
nrum ••• " 
282. S.S. reg.14, fol.107, 24 April. (Instructions to Paolo Trevisan, 
Commander of the Po fleet). 
283. S.S. reg.14, fo1.l09, 3 May, 150 lances and 100 'lancie spezzati' 
formerly belonging to Gianfrancesco. Not long before" the Venetian 
were none too keen on Carlo joining their service and this sudden 
change of heart may have been a matter of concern for Gianfrancesco. 
284. Arch. Gon. B. 2038-9, fasc. 4 (Gridario), 6-7 May in which it is 
stated that any Venetian soldiers still in Mantuan territory were to be 
sent away: "Ma se fusseno arrivati e allozati vogliamo che debi 
destenerli e sequestrarli perche gie ne possa esser facto rasone 
segondo el tenor de la dicta crida." 
285. S.S. reg. 14, fo1.ll3, 20 May. Also sanuto, coL 1060. "Fu eletto 
Andrea Morosini savio del Consiglio oratore a Mantova per farci 
certo del volere di quel marchese, se vuol essere nostro capitano, 
overo quello che vuol fare. 
286. S.S. reg.14, fol.113t.24 May, 1438. 
287. S.S. reg.14, fol.114t, 26 May 1438. 
288. Ibid., fol.llSt, 29 May: " ••• 
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campo and6 ad accamparsi a Casal Maggiore, e subito gli tolse l'aqua 
delle fosse ••••• a dl primo di Lug1io s'ebbe nueva, avere Nicco1b Piccinino 
avuto Casal Maggiore in questo modo. GIl tolse prima l' ~ua, e dubitando, 
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allarum rerum de locls ducis Mediolani." 
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in peius res iste procedent, nisi cito et bene provideatur, ita ut 
fortasse differendo, difficile erit rimedium adhibere." 
299. Da Soldo, pp.8t9. 
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Treccani (Br.) pp.46-7. 
301. 5.5. reg.14, fo1.127 t. 7 July (Senate to Badoer):" dicatis 
et offeritis sibi nomine nostro Cremonam et Cremam si que tempore 
aquiretur, dummodo publice velit esse nobiscum." 
302. 5.5. reg.14, fol.128t. 9 July: " ••• nos non posse quiq. mali de 
eo credere, nec etiam suspicari ••• " They were not even deterred by 
Morosini's warnings on 6 July. See sanuto, col. 1060: "In questo giorno 
... 
a di 7 giunse Andrea Mauroceno stato a mantova, e riferi al Consiglio 
il tradimento del Marchese de Mantova." But in 5.5. reg .14, fo1.l27t. 
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On 8 July it was declared that Venetian money was no longer legal tender in 
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303. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale. Reg. Ducale no.44, Rr. als 0., fols. 385t-387t. 
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304. 5.5. reg.14, fol.130t. 14 July (Senate to Est~). Speaking of 
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305. 5.5. reg.14, fol.13lt. 14 July (Senate to Ermolao DOnato): " •••• galleonorum 
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306. 5.5. reg. 14, fol.131: "Et si idem dns. Marchio Mantue vellet 
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I 
Gianfrancesco and Filippo Maria Visconti 
... 
"Adi 13 de luio, la domenica de notte venendo el 
lunedl, arive nel campo de Nicolo Picenin 10 
Marchese de Mantova com ben quatro millia persone 
da pe e da cavallo. E in quella volta elditto 
Marchese si discoprete contra 1a nostra Signoria 
de Venetia la qual l'haveva sempre mai tenuto 
per suo grande amico". 
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Although it had been shown that the real situation was not as clear cut 
as Da Soldo's observation would have us believe, that moment when Gianfrancesco 
rode out to join Piccinino was a very brave one. It was also an action which 
involved immense risks. This was his first overt act of hostility towards 
Venice, but it was not a move which he made with unqualified confidence. 
We have seen from the previous chapter that Gianfrancesco was virtually 
forced into this compromising position1 Milan was the only viable alternative 
to an alliance which he believed to be fraught with increasing suspicion. 
In that sense there were no alternatives open to him; but the new alliance 
was very problematical indeed. In the first place he was dealing with 
people he did not know. Trying to deal with the enigmatic and tortuous 
personality of Filippo Maria Visconti alone would have been difficult enough, 
quite apart from the fact that the Visconti as a family had represented 
the most serious threat to the Gonzaga family in the past. In this 
respect it is perhaps significant that no modern scholar has yet attempted 
a full scale study of this man. Contemporaries frequently found his actions 
unintelligible and Gianfrancesco must indeed have been very worried about 
how his relationship with him might work out. After all Gianfrancesco's 
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need was much greater than Filippo Maria's - the very existence of 
Mantua was at risk while he was" obliged to put his faith in his former 
enemy. There is no doubt, however, that Filippo Maria regarded the 
alliance with Mantua as a desirable bonus in so far as Gianfrancesco, the 
former Captain General of Venice, could furnish him with valuable information 
about the enemy and could also put his not inconsiderable military experience 
at the disposal of Milan. The territorial position of Mantua, especially 
the area on the southern shores of Lake Garda, was very important because 
it controlled all easy communications between Brescia and the Venetian 
territories to the east. Indeed, the most important campaigns in this, the 
last stage of the war in this study, centre around this area. Furthermore, 
from the point of view of sheer morale, Gianfrancesco's defection must have been 
as damaging to Venice as it was a boost to Milan; the exact counterpart to 
Carmagnola's defection to Venice in the 1420's. 
While these were good reasons why Filippo Maria should be friendly 
towards Gianfrancesco it did "not necessarily follow that the Duke would 
effectively protect Mantua. Indeed Visconti policy had always tended towards 
absorption rather than protection and there was no telling what darker designs 
lurked behind the sunny words and extravagant promises in the correspondence 
prior to the agreement. Furthermore, whether he liked it or not, and 
however high his motives might have been, the stigma of deserter had attached 
itself to Gianfrancesco. Changing sides, of course, was very common among 
the condottieri of the period, but the high position which Gianfrancesco had 
occupied in Venetian service made this rather a different matter. How 
might this have affected his credibility with Filippo Maria; how open would 
the Duke be with Gianfrancesco regarding strategy and war aims? These were 
tantaliSing, but unanswerable questions at that moment. 
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Furthermore, Gianfrancesco's doubts about how effectively he 
might be able to influence events to the advantage of Mantua were further 
increased by the other men he had to deal with; particularly Piccinino 
himself and Alvise dal Verme. Both were ambitious men, suspicious of 
possible rivals and, moreover, they were as well established in Filippo 
Maria's favour as anyone could hope to be. Gianfrancesco was rather in the 
position of a new pupil joining a class in the middle of a term and, as 
it turned out, Gianfrancesco's fears that Filippo Maria might have to 
modify his promises to accommodate the ambitions of Dal Verme were indeed 
justified. Alvise, a Veronese, had seen service with Venice from 1425-1435, 
but, like Gianfrancesco he had turned to Milan because he had become 
increasingly frustrated at the restrictions imposed upon him by the Senate. 
All this tended to make Dal Verme very tenacious in his territorial ambitions. 
Furthermore, Gianfrancesco's decision to have to accept an inferior position 
in Milanese service must have been rather a severe jolt to his pride; 
The question uppermost in Gianfrancesco's mind was whether or not 
he had done the right thing in becoming the servant of the Visconti, and 
it is the purpose of this chapter to answer this question by concentrating on 
the relationship with Filippo Maria and what diplomatic and military 
repercussions this had on Mantua's position with Venice; how really interested 
Filippo Maria was in Gianfrancesco's affairs; how effectively he fulfilled 
his promises to him and how all this manifested itself in the events of the 
war up to the Peace of Cavriana. 
In fact it will be seen that the course 'of the war did nothing tp 
ease the misgivings which Gianfrancesco initially felt. Filippo Maria's 
ambiguous behaviour and the decline of Milanese fortunes after Francesco 
Sforza's arrival on the scene in 1439 tended to make matters worse. It 
was only after a great deal of insistence and good luck that Gianfrancesco 
t 
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managed at Cavriana to salvage what could easily have been a disastrous 
situation. 
The pressures on Gianfrancesco and Mantua were immense throughout 
this last period of the war but the crisis of 1438 was the supreme one 
in Gianfrancesco's career, and it is to these dramatic events that we 
must first of all turn in evaluating Gianfrancesco's decision. 
II 
The Crisis of 1438 
The documentation for 1438 is extremely good and it is possible 
to reconstruct in considerable detail the frenetic diplomatic activity 
of this period when Mantuan ambassadors were extremely busy in Milan and 
Ferrara. There has already been an examination of this material in 1899 
2/ by Tarducci, - but although this represents quite a detailed narrative 
of events for the year, there was no real attempt to fit them into the 
general framework of Gianfrancesco's career. Once again the true significance 
of the crisis is essentially lost when it is removed from the context of 
the preceeding years. Nevertheless, it forms a useful basis for a re-
examination of the extant material and will be .frequently referred to in 
the following pages. 
In July 1438 the most important consideration in Gianfrancesco's 
mind was what Venice would do in retaliation for his act. We have already 
referred to Sanuto's violent denunciation of Gianfrancesco and these 
sentiments were reflected elsehwere. A man with such a close knowledge 
of Venetian methods as Gianfrancesco cannot have imagined that some terrible 
retributLon would not follow fairly swiftly. It was Gianfrancesco's 
attempts to avert this possibility that provides the key to understanding 
the sometimes complex diplomatic exchanges of this initial period. There 
were essentially three distinct strands in the diplomacy of the time, 
all of which were closely interrelated and mutually dependent, so much 
so that it is very difficult to separate them. First and foremost 
Gianfrancesco felt that it was absolutely essential for a very rapid 
Milanese thrust against Venice in order to keep the enemy as busy as 
possible. This in turn would provide a valuable although short-lived 
breathing space to allow Gianfrancesco to get the Milanese to provide 
effective protection for the Mantovano, largely through the preparation 
and despatch of a large river fleet. Gianfrancesco had every reason to 
believe that the biggest threat from Venice would come from a river 
campaign. Finally, Gianfrancesco needed the urgent support and help 
of Niccolo d'Este whose friendship with Venice rested on very shaky 
foundations. Filippo Maria was constantly prompting Gianfrancesco to 
use all his energies in trying to detach Niccolo from the Venetians, 
largely through the intercession of Leonello. 
In the first instance the most pressing need was to prevent 
Gattamelata either from taking the initiative or from being adequately 
reinforced from the Veronese. In this respect it was important to act 
before the shock of Gianfrancesco's action had had time to wear off. 
As we have already seen, Gattamelata was obliged to retire 
somewhat precipitantly towards Brescia with Piccinino in hot pursuit. 
This Milanese commander does not seem to have encountered any real 
opposition at all; on the contrary a number of fine condottieri in the 
Bresciano took the opportunity to throw in their lot with.tbe enemy, 
.300. 
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including Donnino da Parma and Scaramuccio de Lucera, both of whom had 
seen considerable service in Gianfrancesco's company and whose loyalty to 
their old master prevented them from fighting against him. 
It soon became apparent to Gattamelata that the Milanese were 
going to attempt to isolate Brescia and this is what prompted him, apart 
from ensuring the defences of the city itself, to make sure of the security 
of the areas immediately to the east, such as Verola, Manerbio, Sal~ and 
Gavardo where he was planning to concentrate all the troops he could 
muster from the Val Trompia, the Val di Sabbia and Franciacorta. ~/ 
The arrival of Gianfrancesco with 4,000 men, however, swung 
the military balance decisively in favour of the Milanese and in order 
to avoid the very real possibility of defeat so early in the campaign, both 
the Senate and Gattamelata himself judged that the only prudent move was 
to retire to Brescia in order to reorganise their resources more effectively 
and in order to enrol more men. ~/ This retreat gave Piccinino a 
marvellous opportunity to press home his advantage and take control of the 
area around Salo thereby making it extremely difficult for any help to 
reach the beleagured Brescia. This strategy was completed by dividing 
the Milanese army into two, Piccinino was to concentrate on the Bresciano 
while Gianfrancesco was to be sent towards the Veronese with the express 
intention of preventing any Venetian assistance from crossing the Mincio. 
'He was able to concentrate his efforts 'initially upon the important area 
between Peschiera and Valleggio sul Mincio which strategicially was the 
most vulnerable area. In effect, the role which Gianfrancesco played in 
Milanese service was no different from what he had done for Venice, while 
sending him to the.Veronese, where Filippo Maria had promised him territory. 
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was an astute move in order to make him act with even greater determination. 
In view of the troubles which were to arise over these territorial promises 
during the year, it was also significant that Gianfrancesco was accompanied by 
Dal Verme. Filippo Maria was very careful to give the impression that he 
was not showing any undue favour to either side at this time. §/ 
Although Giovanni Malavolta put up a brave defence at Valleggio, 
it was captured by Gianfrancesco on 20 July and the Veronese now lay open 
to the Milanese forces. 2/ Subsequently a very successful campaign was 
waged in which the whole of the area around villafranca was captured and 
Milanese control of the Veronese shores of the lake was extended as far 
as Garda itself. The only area which presented any problem was Lazise, 
a venetian stronghold, which was besieged for six days before finally 
surrending. ~/ 
These well-planned and executed moves by the Milanese now placed 
the Venetians in an extremely difficult position. Communications between 
Brescia and Verona had now effectively been broken; the only possible 
alternative route due to the enemy's presence on both shores of Lake 
Garda was the long and perilous one around the north of the lake, a 
route which. at that time the Milanese did not consider that the Venetians 
would find practicable. Yet again, as on so many other previous occasions, 
the Mantovano lay at the heart of these operations. 
This plan of dividing the Milanese army had, therefore, yielded 
important results. Not only had Gianfrancesco been able to make 
considerable headway in the Veronese, but Piccinino had been able to 
complete the isolation of Brescia by the beginning of August by 
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concentrating on the area around Rovato and Palazzolo s~ll·Oglio. 
In this respect Gianfrancesco could rest assured that for the time being 
the Milanese had the upper hand. 
However, as far as Mantua itself was concerned, matters were 
not quite as simple as this. Important though the northern borders of 
the Mantovano had been in this stage of the war, he became increasingly 
worried about the threat of a river campaign along the Po. As we shall 
see, the Venetians were never to give up their attempts to get Gianfrancesco 
back onto their side, but the instrumental part which he had played in 
seriously embarrassing their position in Brescia can only have made them 
more and more determined to teach him a salutary lesson. In the first 
flush of their resentment at Gianfrancesco's desertion they had decided 
to send a very strong fleet into the Mantovano. The initial decision had 
10/ been taken on 14 July - and the news of Gianfrancesco's successes only 
s~rved to quicken up preparations, possibly in the hope that such an overt 
threat to the most important part of the Mantovano would lessen the 
11/ pressure further north. - As the Milanese position in the north became 
more strongly established Gianfrancesco was to turn his attention increasingly 
towards the defence of his own territories; as far as Gianfrancesco was 
concerned, it was this more than anything else which would provide an 
answer to that all-important question. This was why, at least for the time 
being, diplomacy became more important than purely military matters. Indeed, 
it is very arguable that it is in the diplomatic history of this period 
that the true nature of the Mantua/Milanese alliance can be sought. 
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The safety of Mantua did not solely depend upon Filippo Maria's 
determination to help Gianfrancesco, although this naturally was the 
.. 
most important factor; it also depended upon the attitude of Niccolo d'Este 
to a very great extent. The main practical reason for this is that the lower 
reaches of the Po passed through his territories and without his complicity 
it would be impossible for the Venetian river fleet to make any progress. 
At the end of July and the beginning of August there was much to 
lead Gianfrancesco to believe that even if Este did not declare himself 
whole.heartedly for Milan, he would at least remain neutral. Filippo 
Maria was very anxious to secure this, not only for the advantages it would 
bring to him, but also because the blocking of the Venetian river fleet 
might well absolve him from the necessity of preparing a river offensive 
of his own in order to protect the Mantovano. This was not evident 
to Gianfrancesco at the time but before the month of August was out it 
was becoming painfully obvious that the Visconti was not in a great hurry 
to transform fair words into facts, and that this was due as much to lack 
of money as to lack of inclination. Indeed, it is arguable that the 
financial foundations upon which the Visconti side of the war was fought 
were even more flimsy than Venice. 
Anyhow, Gianfrancesco was the main agency through whom Filippo 
Maria hoped to work in order to attempt to detach Niccol~ d'Este from 
the Venetian alliance. Niccolo's reputation as an elder statesman was 
very high indeed. Time and time again he had been asked to arbitrate 
in the disputes between Milan and Venice but, although this poSition 
implied equal friendship towards both sides,or at least a measure of 
aloofness, it was fairly clear both to Gianfrancesco and Filippo Maria 
that the close proximity of the aggressive Venetian state was disturbing 
to him. This feeling was given' some substance by the very fact that 
Niccolo himself had been party to the Mantuan alliance with Milan. 
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The actual treaty was signed in his presence as well as that of Leonello 
and Uguccione de'Contrari. l~/ Moreover the close bond which had been 
established between the Gonzaga and Este families by the marriage between 
Leonello and Margherita was further strengthened by the birth of a son to 
them around the time of the siege of Lazise. l~/ 
On paper these seem to be sound reasons for Este's falling in with 
Gianfrancesco and the Milanese, but in practice the situation was very 
much more difficult. Este could never ignore the safety of his own 
state and the prospect of making an open enemy of Venice was distinctly 
alarming for him. Even though he had connived at Gonzaga's rapprochement 
with Milan, he could not think of doing so himself because there could have 
never been any real possibility of backing for such an action, the geographical 
position of the Ferrarese state made this virtually impossible. In the 
circumstances even a declaration of neutrality would be fraught with danger. 
Even though Este's experience was invaluable during peace negotiations, 
Gianfrancesco should have realised that Niccolo was in no position to help 
him in matters of war. He may have recalled that in the first phase of the 
Lombard tvars, Este had failed to prevent the Milanese army from returning 
to Lombardy. 
Even though it is possible that Filippo Maria was encouraging 
Gianfrancesco's efforts with Este, the fact that Gianfrancesco perSisted 
is a measure of how desperate he judged his own position to be. Contrary 
to what Tarducci thinks, it cannot have come as a great shock to Gianfrancesco 
, 14/ 
that Niccolo had opted to continue his friendship with Venice. -
From a purely practical point of view it would have been suicidal not 
to have done so. 
The keynote of the letter which he wrote to Paola in Ferrara 
15/ 
on 22 July, and published 'in tota' by Tarducci, - is surely not surprise, 
but fear and a growing sense of desperation. Carlo Nuvoloni, the Ferrarese 
... 
ambassador, had already explained fully Niccolo's reason for embarking upon 
this courseof action, principally that Ferrara was too weak to resist 
16/ Venice. - The arguments which Gianfrancesco advised Paola to use 
with Niccol~ were very weak ones. All he could do was to give rather 
vague promises of military help, of assurances that he had plenty of 
17/ forces at his disposal to offset any threat from Venice; - arguments 
which were rather insulting to a man of Niccol~'s obvious intelligence. 
This insistence by Gianfrancescol~/ put Este into an extremely difficult 
position because he was also being pressed by Venice at the same time, 
Niccolo could not afford to delay in his dealings with Venice and the 
best that he could promise Gianfrancesco in the last resort was an 
undertaking to try his best not to compromise Gianfrancesco's position 
and try to mollify Venice's attitude towards him. 12/ 
On 29 July Uguccione arrived in Venice and convinced the Senate 
in Sanuto's words "avere il suo Signore perfectissimo animo verso la 
Signoria nostra". 22/ The Senate was so pleased with Niccolb that they 
decided to return freely the Pole sine which Este had pledged to Venice 
for the sum of 60,000 ducats. 2!/ It is, however, significant that it 
was not actually returned until Este had proved his loyalty to Venice in 
more concrete terms. It could well be that the prospect of such a reward 
for his adherence may have been a further spur to this decision. 
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Unfortunately, even though Niccolo's envoy did not actually 
aggravate Gianfrancesco's position, we have already seen that the Senate 
was in a vindictive mood. The threat from Venice, therefore, was still 
as great as ever and, for the time being, the only thing that could be 
done as far as Ferrara was concerned was to continue urging Leonello to 
intercede with his father on Gianfrancesco's behalf. 
Having failed· to get adequate protection from this direction, 
Gianfrancesco's only hope now was to get Filippo Maria to live up to his 
promises. The situation was so serious that Gianfrancesco himself went 
to Milan on or around 30 July. The prime motive here was to hurry the 
preparation of the Milanese river fleet. 2~/ On the last day of July 
Gianfrancesco wrote to Paola from Lodi commenting on how well he had 
been received and how Filippo Maria had given him good assurances of his 
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help. Moreover he had also had a long consultation with Zenebaldo de Brolio 
the Mantuan envoy to Milan who was to watch over the preparations for the 
fleet as well as keeping a watchful eye over political and diplomatic 
developments. He assured his master that matters would work out to his 
23/ 
advantage. - However, even with Filippo Maria's goodwill and help 
he reminded his wife of the sacrifices they would have to make for the 
protection of the Mantuan state, particularly as far as the raising of 
24/ 
money was concerned, - and in his absence in the field, the responsibility 
would fall upon her shoulders. This letter is yet a further indication of the 
supreme trust which Gianfrancesco placed in his wife even at this moment of 
greatest crisis. 
Gianfrancesco had been following very closely the developments 
which had been taking place in Venice. The Bishop of Mantua had been 
relaying information about the progress made in preparing the fleet. 
On 4 August Paola had relayed to him information that the preparations 
25/ 
were almost complete. He was therefore not only anxious that 
preparations in Milan should hurry up, but he also wanted to concentrate 
all his resources upon reinforcing his own fleet of 21 galleys 2§/ and 
keeping a close watch on the river area. This was why he was suggesting 
that Alvise should have reinforcements in order to keep up the pressure 
in the north in severing communications with the Veronese. Gianfrancesco 
was concerned that this would result in the fall of Brescia because the 
city's supplies were now perilously low. These were all requests which 
Filippo Maria was only too pleased to grant. In addition, Gianfrancesco 
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2'_7/ promised to continue to work on Leonello to obtain his father's neutrality. 
This was to remain a continuing strand in the diplomacy of the summer of 
1438 and beyond, and to this end more than one meeting was arranged with 
Leonello. Filippo Maria was always anxious that Gianfrancesco should 
capitalise on their close relationship. 2~/ One such meeting took place 
on 10 August at Ostiglia and, judging from Gianfrancesco's subsequent 
report to Filippo Maria on the following day, Leonello appears to have 
been very much in favour of his father's neutrality and very willing to 
continue persuading him, 22/ even though considerable pressure was being 
exerted upon Este by the Papacy to keep them in the Venetian camp. However, 
it is very difficult to judge just how much weight Leonello's words carried 
with his father. It may well be, as Tarducci suggests that Leonello 
himself had little love for the Venetians, 3Q/but in the final analysis the 
decision was not his; and although Niccolo tried, as we shall see, to 
remain as friendly and as uncommittal to both sides during the summer of 
1438, when the time came to make the decisions he ineVitably gravitated 
towards Venice. This is the general pattern behind the correspondence 
I . 
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during this period between Gianfrancesco and Ferrara, and Gianfrancesco 
was so desperate for help that he tended to over-react even to the 
slightest glimmers of hope from that direction. 
However, a great deal of activity was going on in the Mantovano 
at this time and Gianfrancesco was now devoting all his energies towards 
building up the defences on the south east of Mantua, especially in the 
crucial area around Ostiglia and Revere on opposite banks of the Po. 
Judging from the number of letters he wrote from Ostiglia around this 
time it would appear that he was supervising much of the work personally. 
He was careful to keep Filippo Maria fully informed of the progress of the 
work, which not only involved concentrations of troops along the river 
banks, but also the renovation of his own river fleet, a matter about which 
he was in fairly regular communication with the ducal fleet commander, 
Pasino de Eustachio. 3!/ 
Nevertheless, while these preparations were going well, they were 
clearly not sufficient to give Gianfrancesco the sort of security he 
required. This was why, in his letters both to Filippo Maria himself and 
to his ambassador Zenebaldo, he was becoming increasingly obsessed with the 
progress the Milanese fleet was making. He also requested that Filippo 
32/ Maria should send him 1,000 cavalry as reinforcements. - Zenebaldo was 
now given strict instructions to report the slightest development regarding 
this river fleet upon which Gianfrancesco increasingly felt the security 
of his state to depend. 
This, therefore, was a time when Gianfrancesco needed to have 
supreme confidence in Filippo Maria and he looked to the Visconti for 
some material action which might put his mind at rest. Unfortunately, 
this is precisely what he did not get. He got plenty of pr-tses from 
Filippo Maria, but the detailed reports which the punctilious Zenebaldo 
sent to him tended to show them up in their true light; and what is more, 
it was around the time that Gianfrancesco's confidence in the Visconti 
alliance was severely shaken by a controversy with Filippo Maria over the 
territories he had been promised. The fact that these two things occurred 
more or less simultaneously may well have not been coincidental. Filippo 
Maria was very well aware of how dependent Gianfrancesco now was upon him 
and Gianfrancesco himself increasingly came to feel that the Visconti, no 
doubt with the active complicity of Dal Verme, was capitalising upon 
this situation in order to go back upon the promises he made to him at the 
396. 
time of their agreement. It was in this affair that the difficulties in 
dealing with Filippo Maria were fully brought home to him; that, he had escaped 
one trap only to be trapped yet again, but even more so this time because' 
he could turn to no one else for help. 
The documentation for this period is so dense that to deal with 
it on a strictly chronological basis would be most confusing. In the 
pages which follow it would be more intelligible to discuss the various 
strands in the correspondence as separately as possible although, of course, 
some overlap is inevitable. 
A foretaste of territorial problems can be seen as early as G 
August when the original agreement between Gianfrancesco and Milan was 
ratified. The details of this have already been discussed and they remained 
unaltered in the ratification. There was, however, one modification in 
this document which at the time did not seem to be of any great significance, 
but which later became very important indeed. On this occasion there 
·was a much clearer stipulation that an~ territories held by Oal Verme 
were to be strictly inviolate. Although this clause evidently referred 
to the lands he had been granted in the Veronese, the wording of the 
clause was deliberately unspecific. It read as follows: 
"Item, cum hac moderatiane et additione q. ubi 
in suprascripto instrumento lige sit mentio q. in 
continentae in dicto instrumento non intelligantur 
persona, terre et bona Magnifici Comitis Alvysi dal Verme, 
que ipse comes tenebat quando recessit a servitiis 
domini Venetorum ubicumque sint. Immo remaneant libere 
dicto comiti. Intelligatur et peradditio et declaratio 
habeatur non solum ad bono q. ipse comes tempore dicti 
recessus tenebat, sed etiam ad bona que fuerunt et 
spectaverunt non solum ipsi comiti, sed et~m dependentibus 
suis." 
There is much to lead us to believe that Alvise had quite a 
lot to do with this modification. This change was being discuss~d in 
Milan even before the end of Gianfrancesco's visit. There had been some 
discussion of this ratification between Filippo Maria and Gianfrancesco 
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at the time but it was judged imprudent to mention any projected alterations 
in the initial agreement at the time. Both oal Verme and Filippo Maria were 
content to wait until Gianfrancesco returned to Mantua before advising him 
of this modification. 3~/ It would appear from this conduct that there 
was some ulterior motive, but when this alteration was included in the 
document of 6 August no exception seems to have been taken to it because 
it was approved on the same day by Gianfrancesco. 3~/ 
This behind-the-scenes manoeuvring by Filippo Maria and 
oal Verme was part of a deep laid plan to deny Gianfrancesco the 
territories he had been promised in the Veronese. Oal Verme had been 
disturbed at the possibility of a clash of interests between himself and 
Gianfrancesco and had determined to work upon Filippo Maria in order to 
eliminate his rival. It had been suggested that Dal Verme was looking to 
the future with a view to feathering his own nest once Filippo Maria 
d ' d 36/ ~e. - This may well have been the case, but as far as Gianfrancesco 
was concerned, what was to happen merely served to underline his fears 
and apprehensions at the worst possible time. 
The timing of this modification is even more significant when 
one considers that from at least 29 July Zenebaldo had been pressing 
Filippo Maria on Gianfrancesco's behalf to ~rant his master possession 
37/ 
of the lands already acquired in the Veronese. - This proviso had 
been part of the original agreement. This request was repeated on more 
than one subsequent occasion 3~/ but Filippo Maria had not made any 
decision on this; in fact, he had deliberately avoided giving a reply. 
If one takes into account the discussions which were going on between 
Filippo Maria and Alvise, the reasons for his silence are obvious. 
At this time Zenebaldo was fairly confident that the grant of 
the lands would be forthcoming, but by 13 August Gianfrancesco was getting 
more and more impatient at this silence. He therefore decided to force 
the Duke's hand by sending him a letter in which he freely renounced all 
the benefits accruing to him from the Milanese alliance with the exception 
of the lands promised in Verona and Vicenza. 32/ 
This was a bold and courageous move which could not be ignored 
by Filippo Maria; but the reply which was forthcoming still did not clarify 
his situation. In a good-natured letter dated 16 August he informed 
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Gianfrancesco that Zenebaldo had delivered his letter and he was very 
impressed with the fidelity and devotion towards him which it contained. 
Much of the letter is couched in such glib and unwholesome tones which 
seemed by now to have become a trademark of Visconti's communications 
with Gianfrancesco. However, Filippo Maria rejected Gianfrancesco's 
40/ proposal and went as far as returning his original letter to Zenebaldo. -
Filippo Maria clearly resented being manoeuvred into such a compromising 
position and tried to escape from it as best he could by trying to convince 
Gianfrancesco that he wanted to do more and not less for him. 
It was, therefore, clear that he was to get no satisfaction 
~O~ 
from Filippo Maria. Significantly, it was~Alvise himself that he learnt 
the Duke's true intentions, and this may well have been part of his 
devious plan to get someone else to do his dirty work. On the 18th August 
a meeting between Gianfrancesco and Alvise had been planned at Marmirolo. 
This was ostensibly to plan further operations in the Veronese across the 
Adige. The meeting was as harmonious as it could be between two men who 
were deeply suspicious of one another. However, the military plans paled 
into insignificance when Alvise broke the news of Filippo Maria's territorial 
intentions for Gianfrancesco. The details were reported in a shocked 
~ 
and anlr letter which Gianfrancesco wrote to Zenebaldo on the same day. 
The reasoning was as follows. The only logical extension of the war would 
be into the Padovano, Treviso and Friuli and this would involve a great 
deal of severe fighting. These territories would be difficult enough to 
hold under normal circumstances, but if Gianfrancesco were to have the 
territories he was promised in Verona-and Vicenza, the Duke would not 
consider it worth the effort. Consequently, he considered proposing to 
Gianfrancesco that instead of Verona or Vicenza he should have either 
41/ Brescia or Cremona. -
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Gianfrancesco must have had some inkling that there must 
have been some reasoning behind" the Duke's reticence over this matter, 
but this revelation, judging from the remarks he made at the end of 
this letter, was surprising and very disturbing. In fact, it was so 
unsettling that he refused to make any comment at all until some further 
clarifciation had been extracted from Filippo Maria by Zenebaldo. 
What tended to make this an even greater blow to his morale was that it 
came at a time when the help which Filippo Maria was continually promising 
him never seemed to arrive. All he could hope for was that the Duke could 
be induced to change his mind over this matter. 4~/ 
In reality, however, what sort of pressure could Gianfrancesco 
put upon Filippo Maria? In short, none! The arrival of a large Venetian 
river fleet was imminent, and his own resources were inadequate to meet 
this threat; Este's oscillations in and out of neutrality made any aid 
from that quarter exceedingly unreliable despite what Leonello was doing. 
Although his relations with Piccinino were good, he was heavily involved 
arou~ Rovato at this time, and now it had become painfully obvious that 
~ 
Dal Verme and Filippo Maria were conspiring together, using Gianfrancesco's 
helplessness to minimise upon their commitment to him. The serio-us decline 
in relations with Dal Verme was further accentuated by the precedence which 
Visconti was giving to him in military matters, again in flagrant contravention 
of the original agreement. 4~/ This was adding insult to injury, and in a 
bitter letter to Zenebaldo on 21 August reviewing all he had done in 
Milanese service in the Veronese, he said he would simply refuse to take 
the field under the command of Dal Verme. 4~/ Surely by now Gianfrancesco 
must have been regretting his decision to side with the Milanese; his 
relations with Venice had never been as tortuous as this. Unfortunately, 
this time there was no escape, however indignant at Milanese treatment he 
might have been. 
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As well as this controversy over territorial matters, this 
crucial month of August shows Gianfrancesco becoming increasingly 
frustrated at the promised help which never seemed to arrive. The 
exchange of letters between Mantua and Milan throughout this period 
was extremely regular: on a great number of occasions more than one 
letter was sent per day. The subject matter of the letters is fairly 
repetitive, however, and deals almost obsessively with the progress being 
made by the Milanese river fleet. Never before had Gianfrancesco shown 
himself to be so openly frightened at the prospect of the damage which the 
Venetians could do to the Serraglio should they be unopposed. Although 
a regular correspondence was naturally kept up with Filippo Maria himself, 
the brunt of the work was borne by Zenebaldo de Brolio. Of all the experienced 
Mantuan ambassadors available to Gianfrancesco at this time, he had chosen 
the best possible man to undertake this delicate task. Not only was he 
highly respected in Milan and elsewhere, he was extremely conscientious at 
his job, as his very detailed reports show, and there had always been a very 
close bond of devotion and loyalty between Zenebaldo and his master. 
On 14 August both Filippo Maria and Zenebaldo were giving assurances 
to Gianfrancesco that the fleet would soon be ready. In particular, Filippo 
Maria showed how important he judged this to be to his own interests as 
well as Mantua's. 4~/ Furthermore, he promised that the 1,000 cavalry 
which Gianfrancesco had requested would be sent as promptly as possible; 
but due to commitments around Brescia and Rovato they could not be despatched 
immediately. 4§/ 
However, in the foilowing days, and even weeks, nothing seemed 
to materialise. On 17 August Zenebaldo wrote of his disappointment that 
nothing was happening about the fleet and, what is more, he was finding it 
• 
increasingly difficult to get any accurate information about what was 
47/ going on. - This matter was becoming increasingly urgent not only 
because Este was moving more openly towards Venice, but also because 
disturbing news had reached Gianfrancesco about the size of the 
Venetian fleet which was being prepared. According to a letter which 
he sent to Milan on 18 August he stipulated over a hundred ships of 
various sizes. 4~/ He therefore begged the Duke to make all possible 
speed to counteract such an overwhelming threat. Meanwhile he assured 
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the Duke that he would pass on any more news about this from his contacts 
in Padua as soon as it reached him. 4~/ 
At the same time as all this was going on plans were being 
discussed to induce Francesco Sforza to fight on the Milanese side. Active 
attempts to enrol other condottieri were fairly common during this period. 
By this time it seemed fairly certain that Guidantonio Manfredi's services 
could be secured, the only problem here was the lack of money to pay him. 
Apparently his company was fairly large and Milanese finances were very meagre 
indeed and Gianfrancesco was entrusted with the difficult and awkward task 
of explaining this position to him. 52/ 
Of all the condottieri of his ~ime, Francesco Sforza was 
one of the most actively sought after. We have already seen how anxious 
the Venetians had been to obtain his services, in vain as it turned out. 
He h~d already had experience of fighting for Milan and Gianfrancesco 
considered it would not be unduly difficult to re-engage him. The fact 
that he still had Ludovico in his possession may well have been an added 
inducement here. At this time he was officially in the service of the 
Florentines who, at this time, were becoming increasingly disturbed at 
the extent of Venetian expansionist policies, and during the latter part 
of August, negotiations over this between Florence and Mantua became 
quite active. 
However,although Gianfrancesco could see the virtue of an 
alliance with Sforza, the whole situation was incredibly complex. Both 
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Filippo Maria and Sforza's actions were frequently unfathomable; collectively 
they appeared at times to be incomprehensible. It seemed that both the 
parties wanted to exploit each other while paying as little as possible 
in return. Of course the prospect of a marriage with Bianca Visconti could 
still be considered superficially a great inducement to Sforza; but for the 
time being there was a position of stalemate here, primarily because of 
Sforza's ambitions further south and because Bianca's supreme eligibility 
as a bride had resulted in her being offered to more than one prospective 
suitor, including Carlo Gonzaga. On 19 August Simone Ghillino was even 
sent to Este to offer Bianca to his family as an inducement for his 
friendship. 5!/ The possible results of a marriage with the Duke of Milan's 
only child, even though she was illegitimate, was certainly not lost on 
Sforza and were to provide much opportunity for haggling over the next 
few years. 
However, for the time being there were two powerful obstacles 
to overcome. Filippo Maria had already had a taste of the problems that 
disagreements among his commanders could create and there was a considerable 
degree of resentment between Sforza and Piccinino. Piccinino's reputation 
was so high that he felt his own position as commander of the Milanese 
army would be jeopardised by Sforza if he should be engaged. Furthermore, 
. I 
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the Venetians had never relaxed their efforts both directly and 
through Florence, to conclude an agreement which would induce him to 
cross the Po. Gianfrancesco was kept in touch with these last developments 
via Rolando Suardo, the Ferrarese envoy to Mantua. This information 
was relayed to Filippo Maria by Zenebaldo in an attempt to make him more 
determined to act promptly, especially as the threats to him were escalating 
more and more rapidly. 5~/ Gianfrancesco was convinced that if the 
Florentines could bepersuaded to make a formal agreement with Milan, 
53/ Sforza's engagement would soon be forthcoming. Commenting upon this 
matter to Zenebaldo, he confessed himself surprised that the Duke seemed 
54/ to be lethargic over this as well, - especially as it was a matter of 
the utmost importance. He urged Zenebaldo to be as persuasive as possible. 
It must have appeared to Gianfrancesco that he was the only person who seemed 
to be taking the initiative in getting the Duke to act; for instance, in the 
same letter he was also suggesting that reinforcements should be sent to 
help Dal Verme who was busy around Vigasio, just to the south of Verona. 52/ 
Filippo Maria replied to this in the letter of 24 August. His 
general attitude, however, does not seem to have changed at all. He was 
56/ 
still fairly confident over Este's friendship, - and was still giving 
57/ promises that the fleet would be ready. - As far as Sforza was concerned, 
Filippo Maria protested that he had written to him on at least seven 
occasions and was just as surprised as ,Gianfrancesco was at Sforza's 
reticence to join him. 5~/ He was quite happy to see Niccolo Valori, 
the Florentine ambassador, in order to negotiate the possibilities of 
59/ 
an alliance, - but although he agreed to send men to provide sup~rt 
at Vigasio he .once again said that they could not be spared until Rovato 
had been captured. 62/ For the most part, we are still in the world of 
promises here at the same time as things were' beginning to move in Venice. 
On 25 August Niccolo d'Este went personally to Venice where 
he was given a full state reception. The meaning behind the letter he 
wrote to Leonello on this day was very clear. The Venetians were making 
a determined bid for his friendship now because their fleet was ready to 
sail. In fact, in his letter he gave his son a fairly accurate picture 
of its overall size and structure and it corresponded more or less to the 
intelligence which ~ianfrancesco himself had received from Padua. 6!/ 
Niccolo also indicated that the Senate had deliberately intended this 
massive fleet primarily as a punishment for Gianfrancesco. Clearly 
he had seen this for himself and, moreover, he judged that its sheer 
405. 
size and strength were greatly superior to anything Mantua could provide. 6~/ 
It was on this visit that he was formally given back the Polesine. 6~/ 
Although Niccolo had written such a detailed letter to his son in the hope 
that Gianfrancesco could be warned of what had happened, there was clearly 
no way in which he could now avoid helping the Venetians. 
However, by the time this information had been relayed to 
Gianfrancesco by Leonello, Gianfrancesco was already fully aware of the 
imminence of the danger. In an anguished letter to Zenebaldo on the 
previous day he told him that the Venetian fleet was on the point of sailing. 
Even allowing for a certain exaggeration concerning numbers, the fleet 
was so large that it was imperative for Filippo Maria to send at least 
twenty ships immediately. 6~/ He was also very upset at the news of 
Este's journey to Venice. 
Although Gianfrancesco could voice his fears openly to Zenebaldo, 
his 'amour propre' did not allow him to grovel before Filippo Maria. His 
need of Milanese help was now more urgent than ever, moreover, he was 
now extremely short of money and had to raise more funds by pawning 
valuables in Ferrara and Milan •. 6~/ Nevertheless he instructedZenebaldo 
to put on a brave and determined front to the Duke, 6§/and he himself, 
in a nobly worded letter on 25 August, assured the Duke that he was 
6_7/ determined to fight to the end even against such overwhelming odds. 
Although Gianfrancesco hoped that such a show of determination 
would serve to prick the conscience of the Duke, he had not been completely 
inactive in other directions in his attempts to get some support against 
Venice, and these attempts were primarily directed towards Florence. 
Gianfrancesco sincerely believed that a firm agreement with 
the Florentines would be an immense asset to Milan. While their record 
had not been very encouraging in the earlier stages of the war, the fact 
that they had Francesco Sforza was the supreme reason for their importance. 
Moreover, Gianfrancesco's past experience in trying to obtain Sforza while 
he was in Venetian service had shown categorically that the relationship 
between those two cities had definitely undergone a decline. 6~/ 
Although Filippo Maria had stated that he was willing to discuss 
matters with the Florentines, he had not as yet shown very much initiative I 
after all, the previous history of relationships between Milan and Florence 
had not exactly been harmonious either. Consequently, much of the 
responsibility rested on Gianfrancesco's shoulders and it was to him 
that their envoy Bernardo de'Medici had gone in the first instance. These 
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were essentially exploratory talks and begun in secret on 26 August according 
69/ 
to the report which Gianfrancesco sent two days later to Filippo Maria. -
The negotiations were exploratory in the sense that the Florentines were 
by no means comfortable at the prospect of an alliance with the 
Visconti especially as they had heard reports that Filippo Maria was 
not really keeping his promises to Gianfrancesco. Moreover, they also 
wanted to know exactly what the position of Ferrara was in all this. 
Bernardo also explained that disagreements between Piccinino and Sforza 
and Filippo Maria's deliberately provocative behaviour as regards Bianca 
were still considerable barriers as far as Sforza's employment were 
concerned. 
It was fairly clear that the Florentines thought highly of 
Gianfrancesco and were prepared to set much store by his judgement before 
a more direct approach to Filippo Maria was attempted. Anxious as he 
was for the friendship of Florence, Gianfrancesco could not really hide 
from Bernardo the truth about Niccolo d'Este, but as far as the other 
matters were concerned, he did his best to reassure him of Filippo Maria's 
intentions and emphaSised especially that there was no possibility of his 
son Carlo marrying Bianca. 
The Duke replied promptly to the report and seemed to agree 
wholeheartedly with Gianfrancesco's action. He affirmed that he was very 
willing indeed to receive any ambassador from Florence and that Bernardo 
would be treated with all the honours due to his status. 721 Most of 
his letter, however, was devoted to Sforza. He realised that there 
were obstacles to a settlement; in fact he mentioned all three of them; 
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the differences with Piccinino, the question of Bianca and the problems 
about Some outstanding payments to him which Filippo Maria claimed occurred 
through his own financial embarrassment rather than his not wishing to 
pay. 7!/ The Duke considered that the two remaining obstacles depended 
, 
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upon each other; that the marriage could not take place until the 
differences with Piccinino had been sorted out. This is what Filippo Maria 
72/ 
wanted Gianfrancesco to try to accomplish, - either personally or 
through one of his ambassadors. However, the imminence of the Venetian 
fleet cannot have made this immediately feasible. Filippo Maria still 
did not want to take the initiative personally in this matter and the 
~t 
factlthe ball always seemed to be in Gianfrancesco's court, and at such 
a difficult time too, was profoundly disquieting and showed yet again 
that in reality Filippo Maria was not over concerned at relieving the 
already considerable pressures upon Mantua. 72/ In fact, the Visconti 
was more interested in getting other people to do the work for him in 
order that he could have maximum opportunity and liberty for manoeuvre. 7~/ 
In the same letter Filippo Maria was giving constant assurances 
about the fleet. On the previous day he had sent Gianfrancesco a letter 
confirming that thirty of his best ships were being prepared. 72/ 
When compared to the immense size of the Venetian flotilla even this number 
see~d somewhat inadequate, but when Zenebaldo wrote to his master on the 
same day an even more dismal picture emerged. By now Zenebaldo had grown 
suspicious of the ducal promises and he had consequently gone personally 
to Pavia to see with his own eyes what was going on. Far from witnessing 
the preparation of thirty of the best galleys, he discovered to his horrOr 
that orders had only been given for the refurbishing of fifteen and, what 
is more, discussions with the persons in charge had revealed that only 
eight of the smallest boats would be ready by the end of the first week in 
September. Instead of the 600 ducats set aside for this operation only 
76/ 200 had been actually sent. - Although orders for the prepar~tion of 
the remaining ships were soon despatched, no doubt because of Zenebaldo's 
., 
visit, the fact was that Filippo Maria had been playing Gianfrancesco 
false in keeping his hopes alive while in reality falling short of his 
promises. From now on Zenebaldo was only to trust his own eyes in 
this matter and on the following day asked his master to estimate how 
long it would be before the Venetian fleet arrived at Ostiglia so that 
he could make sure that preparaticns in Pavia were on time. 711 It was 
409. 
only on the 4th September that Zenebaldo could report with any confidence 
that a move was definitely being made at Pavia. 7~1 It was only after 
almost exasperating insistence that apything remotely resembling satisfaction 
had been received from this quarter, and even then it was still not certain 
that the Milanese fleet would arrive in full strength at the time when it 
would be required. 
The differences with Alvise dal Verme were basically unresolved 
and the only positive result which Gianfrancesco was aRe to extract 
from Filippo Maria concerned the question of the military command as in the 
original agreement. Once again Zenebaldo had been most insistent upon 
this and it paid off on this occasion. On 1 September Filippo Maria 
wrote to Zenebaldo that he was prepared to grant the command of the 
armies to Gianfrancesco in the absence of Piccinino. 7~1 Although both 
,Oal Verme and the Duke were in a position to dictate terms to Gianfrancesco, 
they did not want to antagonise him completely. Anyhow, as far as Oal 
Verme was concerned, this matter was of little significance when compared 
to the satisfaction of his territorial interests. 
In this last month Gianfrancesco was unsuccessful. The approach 
of the Venetian fleet had, for the time being, imposed a 'terminus ante quem' 
on any further discussion, but not before the indignity of having had his 
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agreement unilaterally broken was underlined by some rather transparent 
attempts by Filippo Maria and Oal Verme to give a veneer or respectability 
to their acts and it is this which sets the seal on the sort of relationship 
which existed between Gianfrancesco and the Visconti. 
Even though he had been more or less deprived of the lands in 
the Veronese and Vicentino by Dal Verme and Filippo Maria, Gianfrancesco 
had not yet totally given up the idea of reaching some sort of accommodation 
with the Duke. After all, as we have seen, Filippo Maria himself had not 
categorically informed Gianfrancesco of this; it had all come through Dal Verme. 
Neither had Gianfrancesco himself formally renounced his claims. On more 
than one occasion he had tried to draw Filippo Maria out into the open about 
this, but in vain. Although Zenebaldo continued to press for a decision, 
other matters for the time being tended to overtake it. 
However, on 28 August Filippo Maria suddenly announced to 
Gianfrancesco that he had issued instructions to Oal Verme to consgin to 
him the lands which had been acquired in the Veronese. After so much silence 
this was certainly a bolt from the blue and Gianfrancesco wrote to the 
Ouke thanking him for having decided in his favour. 891 
Filippo Maria's motives for the sudden change of heart, as always, 
are obscure. If one takes into account the collusion with Oal Verme over 
the previous discussions, it is very difficult to believe that he had 
suddenly been assailed by conscience. One can only conclude that it was 
yet another part of Filippo Maria's devious strategy to keep Gianfrancesco's 
hopes alive. After all, around this time he had been taking the initiative 
not only in defending his own territories, but also as far as Florence and 
Sforza were concerned. Moreover, he had already suffered a measure 
of disappointment at the conduct of Niccolo d'Este. It was also 
possibly part of an attempt to put the relationship between Gianfrancesco 
and Dal Verme on a more harmonious footing. 
However, even if this last consideration was part of Filippo 
Maria's plan, it did not have the desired effect; the suspicion with which 
he treated Dal Verme ran too deep for any lasting reconciliation. This 
was definitely shown in a meeting with Dal Verme at Ostiglia around this 
time and reported to Zenebaldo by him. In this letter it is very clear 
that he was very suspicious of the Duke's motives in suddenly appearing 
to change his mind over the territories and he warned Zenebaldo to be 
very alert to discover if there was some covert purpose behind these 
actions. 8!/ Far from calming his apprehensions, the seeming generosity of 
the Duke had exactly the opposite effect of making Gianfrancesco more guarded 
than ever. This is shown very clearly in his letter of 30 August to 
Zenebaldo in which he clearly specified his conditions before he was 
prepared to cross the Adige. These involved the command of the army in 
the absence of Piccinino, the consignment of lands to Gianfrancesco as 
they were conquered in the Veronese and assurances that.Dal Verme would not 
create any obstacles here. Finally, and this shows the measure of the 
bad relationship with Dal Verme, Gianfrancesco requested a ducal commissioner, 
82/ preferably Guido Torello, to act as a go-between. - Gianfrancesco was 
trying to protect his interests as far as possible, but even in this latter 
the limits of his ability were only too evident because he reported that 
he had heard that although the Venetian fleet had not yet left, the reports 
of its size and strength were confirmed: "piu che alcuna he foresseno mai." 
As long as the shadow of the Venetian fleet was over him, Gianfrancesco's 
powers of insistence were severely circumscribed. 
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It was precisely this that Filippo Maria was to capitalise 
upon to extort finally and categorically from Gianfrancesco what 
effectively amounted to a renunciation of his rights beyond the Adige 
(Verona and Vicenza). Yet again this was the result of a concerted 
effort between the Duke and Dal Verme. 
Gianfrancesco soon discovered that there was one condition 
attached to the ducal award of the territories in Verona and Vicenza. 
Matteo de Corrado, Gianfrancesco's envoy to Dal Verme, wrote to his 
master informing him that before the final transfer was made, Filippo 
Maria wanted the two men to discuss the matter personally. 821 This 
seemed to be a somewhat curious ~equest but Gianfrancesco was prepared to bow 
to his wishes if this would secure the desired result. The meeting took 
place around 31 August. 
The meeting, which was reported in a letter of 4 September, 
cruelly dashed any faint hopes which Gianfrancesco might have had. It 
seems that for the second time Filippo Maria had chosen to appoint Dal 
Verme as his purveyor of bad news and on this occasion it was but 
scantily disguised. Da! Verme informed Gianfrancesco that the Duke 
was quite willing to allow him possession of Verona, Vicenza or Brescia 
and their territories. However, at the end of the war he still wished 
to reserve the right to decide whether to award him Brescia or Verona. 
Similarly, Filippo Maria reserved the right to exchange Vicenza with 
either Padua or Treviso if he so wished. It was only if Gianfrancesco 
agreed to this that the lands in the Veronese would be placed at his 
disposal. 8~1 It required very little intuition to predict which cities 
Filippo Maria would choose. In fact, on 11 September Gianfrancesco 
received a visit from Alvise in which he had relayed the Duke's wish 
that he should receive Treviso instead of Vicenza and he had been obliged 
85/ to accept the proposal. - He had given the lands to him with one hand 
and reserved the right to take them away with the other. Moreover, the 
geographical position of either Padua or Treviso would make their 
acquisition of very doubtful value. 
Gianfrancesco deliberately avoided making any comment on this 
until Zenebaldo had received further clarification from Filippo Maria. 
This was a difficult time for the ambassador because he had been 'busy 
at Pavia during this period. On 2 September he wrote to Gianfrancesco 
that he had not yet been able to see the Duke. Nevertheless he echoed 
his master's anger and disappointment at what had occurred. 8§/ 
In fact, Filippo Maria was to make no comment on this matter 
whatsoever;. at least there is no surviving document which refers to it. 
Filippo Maria knew only too well that he would not have to wait long 
before Gianfrancesco was forced to give in to Alvise without him having 
to lift so much as a finger. The Venetian fleet was alarming him 
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more and more and all this occurred precisely at the same time as the startling 
revelations which Zenebaldo had made about the lack of readiness of the 
Milanese fleet. It is very doubtful that this was merely coincidental 
and the whole situation bristled with danger for Mantua. In the 
circumstances Filippo Maria's silence spoke louder than words. On 4 
September he could do no other but swallow his pride and give in to Alvise 
87/ 
with as much dignity as he could muster. - On the same day that 
Gianfrancesco gave in the instructions to hurry up the preparation of 
the Milanese fleet were issued. The significance of this shameful 
blackmail was certainly not lost on Zenebaldo, who could now see clearly 
the game which Filippo Maria had been playing. 8~/ 
Gianfrancesco, theretore, had been outmanoeuvred, but although 
his resentment ran deep there was not even time to lick his wounds 
because reports had reached him that the first Venetian ships had been 
89/ 
spotted at Corbole, - and the only thing he could do now was to devote 
himself wholeheartedly to preparing for battle and getting Zenebaldo 
to ensure the quick despatch of boats, men and provisions. He himself 
was completing the strengthening of Ostiglia, Revere and Sermide, but 
still needed the better part of a thousand men as reinforcements. 92/ 
Even as late as 11 September Zenebaldo was writing despairing letters 
about the lies which were still circulating over the despatch of the 
Milanese boats, of the shortages of men and money. He, like his master, 
was really beginning to lose heart and fear that Mantua would never get 
the assistance which had been so generously promised at the time of 
Gianfrancesco's declaration for Milan. 91/ 
As Gianfrancesco waited for the appearance of the Venetian 
fleet and the arrival of help from Milan, he must have felt sorely 
cheated. This one month, so richly documented, provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to observe the sort of way in which Filippo Maria 
Visconti acted. In the words of an unnamed commentatorJpossibly Matteo 
Corrado, the mind of the Duke was labyrinthine in the extreme. 9~/ 
The deviousness of Visconti's actions and the increasing frustration at 
his unfulfilled promises made him doubt the wisdom of his decision more 
and more. Gianfrancesco had tried his utmost to put his state and his 
military experience at his disposal, he had taken the initiative over 
Francesco Sforza and in exploiting the possibilities of a Florentine 
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alliance, but he had received nothing tangible in return. On the contrary, 
it has been patently obvious that his utter dependence had be~n exploited , 
to the full in order to cheat him of the territories he had been promised. 
With the approach of the enemy the time for talking~s past 
and we must now examine how the Venetian threat was faced. At this 
supreme crisis it was unfortunate that Gianfrancesco's morale had been 
so sorely dented. Was he the servant of the Visconti or had he become 
his slave? 
III 
Mantua against Venice 
After so much had been written about the preparations for the 
Venetian fleet it is somewhat surprising that there is practically 
nothing of an official character about the events themselves. For these 
we. have to rely almost exclusively on Platina and Sanuto; even Da Soldo 
makes no reference to the fleet. This is what Sanuto wrote: 
" essendo andata infino a Sermide, luogo del 
Marchese di Mantova, ivi trovarono ripari fatti pe' 
nimici di palate arbe. E il Marchese fece mettere 
grandissima quantita d'a1beri con chebe di sopra 
a modo di chebe di nave, con uomini sopra per combattere. 
E volendo andar su il Capitano Pietro Loredano, Procuratore 
dell 'Armata, g1i venne incontro Taliano Fur1ano con 
assaissima gente d'arme, e fanteria innumerabile; e 
sulle rive eran messe assai bombarde. Pure alla fine a 
dispetto de' nimici l'armata passo su ma con gran 
fatica, e furono morti assai e feritL II 
As the prospects of help arriving from Milan on time gradually 
dWindled, it was evident that Gianfrancesco was going to have to take 
desperate measures either to stop the progress of the enemy fleet, or 
at least seriously impede its progress. We have already noted that 
during this period Gianfrancesco was continuously at ostiglia and 
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was personally in charge of preparations. and fortifications. The blocking 
of the river and the shore batteries.were, between them, very successful, 
given the immense size of the Venetian armada. Gianfrancesco had 
obviously inspired his men to fight with ferocity and determination. 
He realised that he could not afford to let matters be decided on the 
outcome of a river battle between the two fleets because there would 
not be the remotest chance of success. Even with the help of the 
Milanese boats, which eventually arrived, they would be hopelessly 
outnumbered. Consequently Gianfrancesco, a true pupil of Carmagnola, 
had to use his fleet only as a second line of defence; and in addition 
to the blocking of the Po, had another well tried trick up his sleeve. 
This was ironically a tactic which Gian Galeazzo Visconti himself had 
tried against Mantua. Sanutotakes up the story once again: 
... 
liE stando cosi la notte, nella seconda guardia 
i nostri videro, che il Po era molto magro, 
e tuttavia andava calando. II Capitano, come 
savio e discreto s'accorse deli inganno ch'era, 
e subito fece dare aIle trombette, e venne giu 
a seconda coll'armata, quando piu presto pot~. 
E non volveva stare piu ivi, imperroche il Marchese di 
Mantova avea fatto tagliare gli argini si del Mantovano 
come del Ferrarese in tanto che avanti che fosse giorno 
tutta l'acqua del Po era andata per quelle bocche rotte, 
e dove la sera era la nostra armata, non vi rimase niente 
d'acqua. E se fosse venuto il suo pensiero ad effetto, 
tutta l'armata con tutti gli uomini prendeva egli a man 
salva. Oltre di questo il detto traditore avea ordinato 
di mandare a seconda zattareper affogarli, e dietro e 
quello erano apparecchiate 55 galeoni suoi e del Duca di 
Milano, e non mancava altro, che far montare le genti su 
per Ie vie. Ma il nostro Signore Iddio e Messer San 
Marco non hammo voluto tanto male, e de' disegni fatti coloro 
sono rimasti burlati." 94_1 
Of course Sanuto was trying to present this as a strategic 
retreat for the Venetian fleet, but, nevertheless, they had failed to 
teach Gianfrancesco a lesson. It is true to say the morale of,the 
fleet must have been adversely affected by the illness of Loredan 
and his replacement by Contarini, but'the defeat of the Venetian fleet 
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was a tribute to Gianfrancesco's determination and planning, effectively 
using his terrain. Apparently the level of the Po was already low for 
September and all Gianfrancesco had to do was to complete what nature 
had started. Moreover, Filippo Maria could not claim to haVe had any 
part in this Success because, although the Milanese boats had finally 
arrived, they were not really used. Once more, by dint of self help and 
a certain amount of luck, the soft underbelly of the Mantovano had been 
spared the terrible retribution which Gianfrancesco had feared. Moreover, 
the imminent danger which Brescia faced and the venetian determination 
to restore its communications with the Veronese meant that for some time 
to come, this part of the Mantovano, provided there was a reasonable 
degree of surveillance, would be relatively secure. It was impracticable 
for Venice to conduct the war on more than one front, certainly until 
they were to obtain Sforza's participation, a matter which was certainly 
not being neglected by the Venetians throughout this period. 9~/ 
As far as the war with Milan was concerned, the most important 
aim was to prevent the isolation and eventual siege of Brescia and to 
stop the enemy from making further incursions into the Veronese. By 
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acting quickly in the initial stages of the campaign the Milanese had 
placed themselves in an exceedingly favourable position. All they had to do 
now was to keep up a constant pressure upon the already hard-pressed 
Gattamelata. Now the Venetian threat in the south of the Mantovano 
had been averted, Gianfrancesco could now carry out the strategy which 
he had concerted with Dal Verme which seemed to provide a shield behind 
which Piccinino could be given time'to complete the work he had begun 
in the Bresciano. Obviously the Mantovano would be in the forefront 
in such a plan in which the next phase involved the crossing of the Adig~ 
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and threatening the city of Verona itself. This was certainly high 
on Dal Verme's list of priorities, but it was also necessary to safeguard 
not only the eastern boundary of the Mantuan state, but also an area 
which Gianfrancesco prized highly and whose eventual loss at the Peace 
of Cavriana was to be one of the biggest disappointments of his whole 
career. Up to June 1439 this strategy yielded a remarkable degree of success, 
but afterwards there was to be a sharp decline in Milanese fortunes. 
During Gianfrancesco's prolonged absence at Ostiglia the war 
around Brescia was going well with Piccinino concentrating most of his 
energies on besieging Rovato, 9§/ and capturing Monticelli, Guzzago, 
Iseo and areas to the north along the Val Trompia. It was evident to the 
Venetian senate that it would, in the circumstances, be advisable for 
Gattamelata to make a strategic retreat into the Veronese where he would 
be able to reinforce his army and reorganise his resources. In his present 
state he would be unable to prevent the enemy from beseiging Brescia. 
However, such a move proved to be very difficult, indeed impossible by 
conventional means, because Dal Verme and Mantuan troops had effectively 
blocked the route across the Mincio. With Piccinino's troops besieging 
98/ Orzinuovi until the end of September, - there was only one route still 
open to Gattamelata: that was the dangerous mountain route around the 
northern end of Lake Garda, a route which presented not only physical 
problems at this time of the year, but also passed through territory 
which was hostile to Venice. 
The story of this perilous journey, which does not strictly 
concern us,is an heroic one of endurance and luck. They were only just 
successful, the elements were very much against them and it was only 
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through the valiant efforts of the Provveditori that they were given 
safe-conducts through hostile territory. Even so they were harried by 
Viscontean forces around Arco and in the valley of the Sarca which flowed 
into the northern end of the lake. 9~/ This journey, which Pontano compared 
to Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, was even more remarkable because 
of the speed with which it had been undertaken. I.f we are to believe 
Sanuto's account, Gattamelata's troops were in Verona by 29 September 
100/ 
after a journey of only five days. - This was a great boost to Venetian 
morale at a time when it was sorely needed and the Senate was not slow 
101/ to show Gattame1ata its gratitude. -
Although Filippo Maria had been very pleased with Piccinino's 
work and by now Orzinuovi had fallen, the news of Gattamelata's escape 
was very annoying and frustrating and this, in turn, made him even more 
determined to crush Brescia. The campaigning season was almost over, but 
he could not afford to give Gattamelata any time, so he pressed Piccinino 
to begin operations immediately and at the beginning of October plans 
were put in motion. The water supplies were severed, all access to the city 
was blocked and large concentrations of Viscontean troops completely 
102/ 
surrounded the city. - Gianfrancesco and Dal Verme were called to take 
103/ part in the siege which began in earnest on 4 November. - Gianfrancesco 
was no stranger to such an action1 he had already considerable experience . 
of besieging Brescia in the first phase of the war and Piccinino quite 
rightly considered that his experience here would be invaluable. 
As in the first phase of the Lombard Wars , ,the siege of 
Brescia was the centrepiece of the campaign. Like the previous siege, 
the citizens put up an extremely fierce resistance, despite a lack 
of resources and illness,in the city. Consequently the siege was to 
prove a long and drawn out affair which was documented by Da Soldo in 
104/ great detail. ~ It would be superfluous to repeat these details 
here; we will merely concentrate on the part which Gianfrancesco played 
in these events. 
He was not merely employed in an advisory capacity, although 
he may have well played an important part in the positioning of the 
troops. Piccinino certainly consulted very closely during the siege; 
this was the first time that they had worked together for any length of 
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time. It would seem, from Platina's account of events, that Gianfrancesco's 
105/ 
efforts were mainly directed to the east of the city around the Torre Lunga. -
The ferocity of the resistance, however, was unexpected, but 
even so, without any further help from the Venetians, it was only a matter 
of time before the city would have to submit. Neither Piccinino nor 
Gianfrancesco for one moment imagined that the Venetians were not pursuing 
energetic plans to despatch Gattamelata once more into the Bresciano; 
and consequently, once the siege had been started they devoted much of their 
attention to obstructing these plans. 
In fact, throughout November the Senate was actively consulting 
. 106/ 
with Gattamelata over plans for relieving Brescia. - Among the plans 
discussed there were projects for repeating the mountainous route to the 
north, sending a Venetian fleet into Lake Garda and, of course, making 
a more determined effort to restore communications along the southern 
shores of the lake. The possibility was also conSidered of getting 
Gattamelata to make a thrust into the Mantovano to divert Gianfrancesco. 
from helping Piccinino. This would indicate just how important an-
asset Gianfrancesco was to the Milanese. It would certainly be much 
more convenient they argued, to secure ~nce more a crossing of the 
Mincio at Valleggio. 
The Senate decided to keep all these options open, but on 
1 December it took the definite decision of preparing to send a fleet 
into Lake Garda, a project which bristled with difficulties owing to the 
necessity of having to transport boats over difficult terrain from the 
Adige. lOZI At the same time a decision was also taken to ensure the 
safety of the northern land route either by negotiation or by force if 
necessary. In fact, during the following months all three possibilities 
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were to be tried and Gianfrancesco was to be employed, first of all in the 
Val di Sabbia, and subsequently once more on the eastern boundaries of the 
Mantovano around Lagnago. 
The difficulties of Brescia meant that there was little or no 
break in warfare during the winter of 1438-39. On 17 December Gattamelata 
was already at Peneda preparing his forces to rescue Brescia and by the 
beginning of January 1439, according to Da Soldo, he was ready to begin 
operations. 
"Nel mese di zenaro 1439 tutta via se apparecchia Gattamelata 
de secorrer Bressa e di voler passar Ii a quelli passi 
de que1li de Archo com una grande fantaria e grande 
quantita de farine e de biave, sperando haver spa11e da 
Parise da Lodrone e da passar per Ie suoi terre e da 
Venir per Valdesabio". lo~1 
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It was now up to Piccinino and Gianfrancesco to stop him. 
Gianfrancesco seemed to be well· placed to counteract this threat 
because he had been sent into the Valdisabbia in the previous month 
b P · i' 109/ 15 th b . i i h Y 1CC n1no. - On January ey egan a v1gorous campa gn n t e 
area, easily occupying a number of small fortresses with the invaluable help 
of Taliano Furlano.ll~/ Although the fighting in the area was very fierce, 
successful actions like the one against Lodrone had the result of making any 
111/ large scale help for Brescia impossible from this direction. - In the 
end Gattamelata had to retreat once more to Peneda, leaving the Venetian 
offensive largely in the hands of Parisio da Lodrone. 
It seemed very much to Gattamelata that the combination of 
Piccinino, Gianfrancesco and, to a lesser extent, Taliano Furlano, was 
very tough opposition indeed. Consequently he had recourse to his plan of 
trying to relieve the pressures on the Venetian army in the Val Trompia and 
Val di Sabbia by launching a series of attacks on the Mantovano, thereby 
forcing Gianfrancesco to rush to the defence of his own territories. 
Apparently the Senate was very much in favour of such a plan which could not only 
benefit Brescia but would also punish Mantua, and was pressing Gattamelata 
energetically towards this.ll~/ However, this policy p~esupposed that the 
Venetians had the resources to keep up a fairly constant pressure on the 
Mantovano, and this was by no means the case. Although an expedition was 
sent on 4 February, the preparations to launch the Garda fleet at Torbole 
were well under way and the immense amount of organisation which this 
involved meant that it could not be adequately followed up. However, the 
Senate was determined to take this up again after the successful despatch 
of the fleet. ll2/ While this was going on the Senate· was encouraging 
. 
Parisio to put up a fierce resistance to the Visconteans and to afford 
as much help to Brescia as possible. 
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By this time the only other way of bringing help to the 
beleagured Brescia was for the Venetians to concentrate all their 
efforts on sending a power.ful fleet across Lake Garda. It was an 
heroic project and illustrated the desperate situation in which they 
found themselves, having tried all other ways to break the Viscontean 
stranglehold. Their inability to cross the Mincio and the Milanese 
occupation of much of the southern part of the Veronese shores of the 
lake meant that they had to go a considerable distance out of their way in 
order to get their boats onto the lake. Much had already,been written about 
114/ the immense organisation involved, - and the fact that the Venetians had to 
resort to a plan which under any other circumstances would be eccentric 
in the extreme is perhaps the most striking example of the supreme strategic 
position of the Mantovano and the positive disadvantages of having 
Gianfrancesco as an enemy. The Venetians never forgot the lengths to which 
they had been driven and it certainly influenced their thinking at Cavriana 
when they were to make sure of a foothold to the immediate south of the lake. 
The labour of physically transporting some eighty boats to the 
. 115/ lake must have been immense, - when compared to the ease with which a 
Milanese fleet under the command of Biagio da Assereto, the celebrated 
victor of Ponza in 1435, was introduced via the Mincio. 
The date of the battle which took place between the two fleets 
116/ is uncertain, but it must have taken place at the end of February. -
. 117/ The outcome in a sense was indecisive I losses were heavy on both sides. -
However, the Venetian fleet was so badly damaged that it was unable to 
proceed and had to return to Torbole. Although the Senate was determined 
to build up the fleet·once more to its former strength it would be 'hors 
de combat' for some considerable time.ll~/ By now the inhabitants of Brescia 
were at the end of their resources. 
Venetian fortunes were at a very low ebb indeed. Gattamelata 
could not seem to make any headway at all against the Milanese who, in 
their desire to follow up their success, planned a bold move into the 
Veronese. In a sense, the siege of Brescia was now of secondary 
importance because the Milanese considered its fall was imminent, despite 
repeated Venetian attempts to get supplies of grain in the city.112/ 
This strategy involved a plan for Gianfrancesco to introduce 
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some of his ships into the Adtge at Castagnaro while Piccinino concentrated 
his forces at Cerea which lay some five kilometres west of Legnago. 
Around 20 March, 28 ships were involved in this operation. They had been 
prepared at Ostiglia and reached the Ad~ge by way of the Tartaro river. 
It was a relatively easy matter to accomplish because the swampy ground 
between the Po and the Adige was fretted with navigable canals. 122/ 
This meant rupturing the dykes in two places, at Castagnaro and Malopera. 
They were actively opposed by a Venetian fleet commanded by Marino Contarini 
and Ludovico da Molini. Apparently Gianfrancesco had managed to introduce 
8 ships into the Adige, and, although he was driven back initially, Piccinino 
came to his aid. In the meanwhile Gattamelata arrived with a very large 
force and on 15 April, after a great effort, the Milanese were successful 
121/ 
and the rest of the ships were able to pass through - and sail up the 
river threatening Legnago while Piccinino's army was able to pursue the 
retreating Venetians. This joint river/land campaign was unexpectedly 
successful and in the period up to the conquest of Soave on 23 May the 
whole of the triangle of land lying between Legnago, Verona and Vicenza had 
been occupied by Viscontean troops. This is how Da Soldo summed up the 
Situation: 
"Altro non scrivo senon che per tutto 10 mese 
de mazo 1439 hebbe tutto 10 Visintino e Veronese: 
grand merc~ alla gente de quelli paesi, Veroneso 
e Visintino, che sono tutti partesani del Ouca de 
Milano! Oico ch'el hebbe montagne e piano 
integralmente; non rimase piu una sola bicchochetta, 
salvo Rovaredo. E Gatta Mellata non asrett~ mai niente 
e se retiro nel seraglio pi Padua; et li stasera fe~ 
pur aspettando il secorso del Conte Francesco." 122 
The victorious Milanese army was soon at the walls of Verona itself. 
This was to be the high water mark of Milanese fortunes during 
425. 
the war. Apart from a notable defeat for Taliano Furlano around Maderno in 
123/ the earlier part of May, - the Venetians had been pushed back on every 
front. The bold crossing of the Adige had in many ways surprised the 
Senate and it may well have been responsible for advising Gattamelata to 
retire into the Padovano to await the arrival of Sforza.l2~/ 
After such a bad start in his relationship with the Visconti, 
this success must have come as a great relief to Gianfrancesco, even 
though the defence of his own territories was still largely his responsibility. 
Moreover his relationship with Piccinino was harmonious and durinq this 
period there is no evidence for any further disagreements with Oal Verme. 
This last point is not surprising because from a territorial point of view 
the latterhad got his own way, and the progress of the war in the Veronese 
could do nothing but good for his own ambitions. 
However, behind the optimism, the writing was on the wall. In 
the first place the Visconti had started off the war on very slender 
financial resources, and as the war extended into the Veneto the costs 
would get higher. This constant shortage of money meant that for the 
most part Gianfrancesco had t~ finance himself, and from now on increasing 
reference is made in the documentary material to the raising and 
despatch of considerable sums of money. As the limited resources of 
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Mantua finally dried up Paola increasingly had recourse to selling valuables 
to raise the necessary cash. For instance, in January 1439 she was 
already experiencing some difficulty in raising 12,000 ducats in Bologna 
and Ferrara.12~/ As the war progressed and as their fortunes declined the 
money was to become increasingly difficult to raise; and this was especially 
serious in July when the imminence of Sforza's arrival meant that money 
was urgently needed to pay for reinforcements for Mantua because Filippo 
Maria had failed to send any.12§/ 
It was the Venetian success in engaging Francesco Sforza which 
was to have the most baleful consequences for Milanese fortunes and in 
this matter Gianfrancesco·'s pronostlcations were proved only too correct. 
Although Gianfrancesco had made a certain amount of headway in opening 
negotiations with Florence and Sforza, the Visconti did not seem to want 
to get personally involved. This had the result of leaving the field wide 
open to the Venetians who were nothing if not insistent over this. Their 
reputation for tenacity is certainly borne out by their almost daily 
efforts throughout 1439 to encourage the Florentines in taking a more 
active stand against Milan as well as personal approaches to Sforza himself. 
The Florentines had been trying to remain as aloof as possible 
from the conflict but were quite prepared should it suit their interests 
to turn either to Milan or to Venice. This had been the task of Bernardo 
de'Medici during this period. The relative ease with which the Visconteans 
made their advance into the Veneto revived all their own fears of Milanese 
predominance in Lombardy; and these fears were amply fuelled by Jacopo 
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Donato, the Venetian ambassador in Florence. This resulted in the 
reconstruction of the alliance between Florence and Venice on 19 February 
1439, an alliance which ultimately included Eugenius IV, the Doge of 
Genoa, Niccolo d'Este and, finally, Francesco Sforza who was given command 
of the forces of the anti-Viscontean league for a period of five years. 
His condotta was agreed at 1,300 lances and 1,300 infantry, with payment 
of 17,000 florins per month. Not only was the security of all his territories 
in the Marche guaranteed, but he was given considerable liberty in the choice 
of territories on the right bank of the Po with the exclusion of Parma. 
In return for this Sforza was to enter the war against Milan and was to 
fight in whichever place the league dictated. 12Z/ It seemed that on this 
occasion Sforza's desertion of Milan was complete, and that the whole 
situation had been badly mishandled by Filippo Maria who had at one time" 
appeared to possess all the advantages. It may well be that the way in which 
Filippo Maria went back on his promises as far as Bianca was concerned 
was a powerful reason for persuading Sforza to fight north of the Po and 
his success in the ensuing war had the desired result of plaCing him in 
128/ the strongest possible bargaining position. - Venice already had a 
claim on Sforza's services by virtue of his agreement with the League in 
November 1436, but now his participation looked very much like beCOming 
a reality. 
As the situation in Brescia went from bad to worse in March and 
129/ April 1439, Venice was actively persuading the Count to come to their aid, -
and the appeals became more and more urgent as the Visconteans gradually 
pushed into the Veronese. In June he was ready to move and on 20th 
he arrived in the Serraglio di Padova where, as we have already mentioned 
Gattamelata had been ordered to wait for him. On his way Sforza passed 
through Ferrara. His arrival brought a new access of military strength 
to the Venetians. The army now numbered some 14,000 cavalry and 8,000 
. f t 1301 ~n an rye - They were now strong enough to make some impression 
on the Milanese and swing the fortunes of war in their favour. 
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Gianfrancesco's warning to the Duke had now become a disturbing 
reality, even though the interval of time between the formation of the 
league and the arrival of Sforza may have encouraged some false hopes. It 
is certainly the case that the agreement encouraged the energetic 
Viscontean tactics of the interim period. However, the final arrival 
of Sforza signalled the beginning of a new phase in the war which was to 
result in renewed danger to the Mantuan state. 
IV 
The Failing War Effort and the Peace of Cavriana 
On 20 June in a letter to Giovanni Pisani, Venetian ambassador 
to Sforza, the Senate made a reference to secret negotiations which had 
been proceeding between Este and Gianfrancesco at Stellate. The Senate 
still wanted to get Gianfrancesco back and, with Sforza about to cross 
the Po, this was a psychologically appropriate moment to renew its bid. l3!1 
According to the letter Gianfrancesco had been very surprised that Este 
had allowed Sforza to pass without hindrance. However, in this secret 
meeting Este had tried to persuade Gianfrancesco that his continued support 
for Milan now that Venice's power had been so substantially strengthened 
could only result in the inevitable submission of Mantua. 
Gianfrancesco needed no reminding of what might happen, but 
although he listened patiently to his old friend, there was no way in 
which he could change sides yet again without his personal sense of honour 
being damaged even though there were positive advantages of going back 
to Venice. He had made his decision and now for better or for worse he had 
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to stick to it. This, of course, only served to anger the Senate and make it 
more vindictive, and this was definitely apparent in the following month when 
Sforza was even offered the Mantovano if he so wished.l3~/ . It was this 
sort of attitude which underlined the perils facing Gianfrancesco's state 
from now on and, as in August 1438, meant that effectiv~ support from Milan 
was of paramount importance. However, once again, we shall see that 
Filippo Maria was only a fair weather friend. As the war turned sour for 
the Milanese, Gianfrancesco's correspondence with Milan increasingly shows 
disappointment which finally turned to anger and frustration at Visconti's 
persistent failure to support him with men and money. Furthermore, when 
approaches were finally made to Venice over the possibilities of peace, 
Filippo Maria's assurances to Gianfrancesco about maintaining the integrity 
of his state were shown up in their true light. In this final section 
of the chapter we will be concentrating primarily upon these two factors, 
trying to correlate them as far as possible with the way in which the war 
developed. 
As soon as Gattamelata and Sforza had united their forces they 
marched towards the Veronese and arrived at Lonigo on 23 June. Four days later 
it was occupied and this was closely followed by the recapture of two centres 
immediately to the north, Brendola and Montecchio Maggiore. Ideally 
they should have moved on towards Verona, but they were prevented from 
dOing so because the whole of the area to the west was in enemy hands. 
430. 
However, the arrival of Sforza and Gattamelata did have the effect 
of relieving the pressure on Verona because Piccinino and Gianfrancesco, 
fearing that the enemy would push westwards, moved to Soave where they 
dug themselves well in behind earthworks which extended as far as the Adige. 
However, a military presence was still maintained near Verona. This 
effectively halted the Venetian advance in this direction and meant that 
the only way of avoiding these fortifications was once again by way of the 
mountainous route across Monte Cal varina to San Giovanni Ilarione which 
133/ 
was reached on 9 July. - From here the Venetian army descended towards Soave 
and Piccinino, despite some determined resistance, was unable to prevent 
its advance. This surprise tactic caused some confusion among Piccinino's 
army and the dangers of a possible Venetian incursion into the Mantovano 
caused Gianfrancesco to retire across the Adi~_e. Piccinino did likewise 
and although a small force was left to defend Soave, it was finally captured 
on-S August. This move not only threatened the Mantovano, but also opened 
the way to Verona. 
This represented quite a change in the military situation. Now 
the Milanese were being pushed back towards the Mantovano and Gianfrancesco, 
terrified at the prospect of such an immense advancing army, wrote 
desperately to Milan for help. He was doing so long before the siege of 
Soave had begun. For instance, on 18 July Zenebaldo wrote despairingly 
to Paola about his continual attempts to get some reinforcement from 
Milan: 
"Io continua1mente non cesso de solicitare 
apresso questo I.S. el volia spazare queste 
zente darme perche Ie se ne vadano incampo 
considerato quanto pericullo importa e al stato e 
ala persona del nostro I.S. a ritrovarsse cum 
cossi poca zente contra a tanti millaia e da cavallo 
e da piedi, e quanto se ne sia doluto el capitanio 
che la S. sua non Ie Manda soccorso de zente non 13~/ vel poria dire." 
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As usual Zenebaldo got promises but no action because of a lack. 
of money. His anger and frustration at Filippo Maria's unwillingness 
to act in the face of danger is most evident in this letter.13~/ 
Although this did not augur well for the future, for the time 
being the Senate was more worried about relieving Brescia rather than 
waging a full scale campaign in the Mantovano. Sforza turned his 
attention to the Riviera Gardesana and occupied himself with reconquering 
the area aroud Bardolino. This campaign was cut short by illness in the 
Venetian army and around 30 August he was back at Zevio on the banks of the 
136/ Adige, just to the south east of Verona. - This in turn caused Gianfrancesco 
and Piccinino to fortify their position at Vigasio to obstruct any enemy 
movements either to the south or towards the Mincio, the key to the liberation 
137/. . 
of Brescia. - G~anfrancesco was to hold this position for some· time. 
A fierce campagin was also being fought to gain control of the 
lake at the same time. Here the Milanese were rather more successful. 
The fleet which had been reconstructed at Torbole was ready to sail and 
it was hoped that it could meet up with the land forces at Bardolino. 
This was not possible because Sforza had to retire and consequently the 
Viscontean fleet was given time to reinforce SalO on the opposite bank 
of the lake, the most convenient point of disembarkation for any move 
to help Brescia. The Venetian-boats had sailed as far as Maderno and 
this threat was such that Piccinino, Gianfrancesco and a contingent 
of his forces transferred to Sa10 to reinforce its landward position. 
It was important to stop the Venetians at this point because the situation 
in Brescia was intimately bound up with its outcome. On 26 September, in 
a finely concerted jOint action by land and water the Milanese were able 
to defeat the Venetians at Maderno and Taddeo Marchese, one of the finest 
soldiers, was taken prisoner.13~/ Once again a considerable proportion 
of the Venetian fleet had been destroyed and their bid to gain control 
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of the lake had failed. Some three days earlier the fortress of Lodrone had 
fallen to the Visconteans. 
Yet again all easy communication with Brescia had been made 
impossible, but as long as the northern route lay open Piccinino could 
not relax. Consequently he wished to follow up his success by an expedition 
139/ to Riva at the end of October. - Although it started off successfully, the 
arrival of Sforza and Gattame1ata soon changed this. The Venetians had 
assembled their forces at Arco, but because Riva was in enemy hands 
together with the fortress of Tenno, a stiff battle was inevitable. 
Although the Visconteans held strong poSitions they were finally dislodged 
by Sforza and in the battle which ensued on 9 November the Milanese 
140/ 
suffered quite a crushing defeat. - Gianfrancesco, still holding the 
Milanese position to the south of the lake, learnt that among the many 
prisoners taken in the Viscontean retreat, was his own son and heir 
Carlo, whose participation in the war his father for some time had come 
141/ to regret. - As we shall see, it was not until the following February 
that he was to obtain his final release. Carlo's capture, together 
with his continued alienation from Ludovico, were serious preoccupations 
during this period. He had consistently maintained a hostile attitude 
towards Ludovico and it may well be that his worries about the succession 
began to mollify his attitude towards him.14~/ 
Sforza soon laid siege to the fortress of Tenno and Piccinino 
just managed to escape in a rather humiliating fashion,142/ and rejoined 
Gianfrancesco at Peschiera where they planned their next move. It was 
to be a serious bid to capture Verona. A certain amount of pressure 
had been kept up at Verona throughout this period, under Gianfrancesco's 
supervision. Even before the attack began in earnest in November, the 
Veronese were beginning to get alarmed. In September matters were 
made worse by the outbreak of a plague and a constant stream of requests 
144/ for help was reaching Venice. - This constant pressure of Gonzaga's 
troops was clearly wearing them down. Anyhow, on 17 November, this 
surprise attack resulted in the capture of the citadel and the Veronese 
145/ population was too alarmed to put up any real resistance. - The only 
fortresses which remained in Venetian hands were those of Castel vecchio, 
San Pietro and San Felice. On 18 November the Senate sent a letter to 
Sforza and Gattamelata urging them to go to Verona in all haste. l4§/ 
The quick transportation of so many men was no easy task, but Sforza left 
first with a small force of some 500 men, closely followed by the rest of 
the army. He reached the fortress of San Felice late on 19 November and 
quickly took charge of affairs. He was soon joined by Gattame1ata 
and their swift action took the enemy completely by surprise. It 
had been estimated that Verona was recaptured by the Venetians within 
the space of 43 hours,142/much to the joy of the Senate. The Mantuart 
contingent seems to have suffered most in the rout. Gianfrancesco was 
obliged in the retreat to leave behind quite a larqe number of men who 
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were subsequently taken prisoner. In fact, most of the 800 prisoners 
148/ 
were Mantuan, - including a number who had been called especially 
from the city to take over the administration of verona.14~/ There 
was nothing else to do but to retreat to Vigasio once more to try to 
. 150/ 
reform ~n order to check the enemy's advance. - All the Milanese 
gains in the Veronese were now effectively lost and the war now moved 
towards the Bresciano. 
The winter of 1439 was very cold and the respective armies 
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should have retired into their winter quarters, but the fight for Brescia 
had become so fierce by now that neither side was going to give up. The 
parlous situation in which the inhabitants of Brescia found themselves 
would not allow any kind of truce. For instance, at the beginning of 
December Piccinino was active in Rovato, the Val di Sabbia and Franciacorta 
trying to make doubly sure that no supplies reached Brescia. According 
151/ to Da Soldo, this was a very ferocious scorched earth campaign, -
but the Val di Sabbia was already being gradually occupied by the Sforzeschi 
and Piccinino lost some 300 cavalry and 500 infantry in engagements with 
Sforza's captains Troilo de Rossano and Ciarpellone.15~/ 
The Venetians seemed everywhere to be redoubling their efforts. 
It was a war of exceedingly swift movement, with Sforza busily at work 
153/ 
ensuring communications around the north by trying to secure Arco, -
while Gattamelata was supervising the refitting of the fleet at Torbole. 
As the new year and decade dawned Gianfrancesco realised that now most of 
the running was being made by the Venetians. With the loss of the Veronese 
Filippo Maria's territorial promises no longer had any real meaning for 
him. On the contrary his main preoccupation now was to be the preservation 
of the integrity of the Mantua state. During the period of active 
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campaigning the diplomacy had been rather low key; but as the pressures 
upon the Mantovano increased and as the possibilities of peace began 
to be discussed, the Mantuan ambassadors were to be active once again. 
Alt~ough 1440 saw the effective retirement of Gattamelata 
154/ from the military scene, due to illness and old age, - this did not 
in any way imply any lessening of effort or weakness in the Venetian 
camp. Anyhow it could be argued that Sforza had been gradually taking 
more and more of the initiative since his participation in the war had 
begun. In fact, the year was to be extremely fruitful for the Venetians; 
not only was Brescia finally liberated in June, but the Venetian fleet 
gained control of Lake Garda and communications to the east of Brescia 
were finally restored. 
On the contrary, if there was any lessening of interest, it 
was to come from Filippo Maria himself. Not only did he send Piccinino 
into Tuscany at a most inopportune moment, but a combination of lack 
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of money and a growing preoccupation with the idea of exploring a profitable 
peace for himself further sapped Gianfrancesco's confidence in his master. 
This tended to be reinforced by Visconti's attitude to Francesco Sforza who, 
as an individual, thereby gained more from the war than anybody else. 
Gianfrancesco was increasingly driven to rely upon his own 
resources and, apart from a brief absence with Piccinino at Torbole in 
155/ 
a vain attempt to impede the refurbishing of the Venetian fleet in January, -
he remained very much in the Mantovano attempting to ward off the worst 
effects of the Venetian threat around Lonato and Peschiera. Such a 
limited commitment by Gianfrancesco did not contravene in any way the 
terms of his agreement with Milan. He was not expected to fight 
personally unless he wished to and, furthermore, he was not obliged to 
give the Viscontean forces any further help once the Bresciano and 
Cremonese were occupied. As always, the defence of his own territories 
was always his primary aim and this was reiterated on the two subsequent 
156/ 
occasions in April and May when the agreement with Milan was renewed. -
His morale got lower and lower as his requests for military, monetary 
and diplomatic aid achieved no effective response, only the by now 
customary promises. At the same time he was in constant touch with 
157/ Ferrara trying to monitor the protracted peace negotiations. -
Very high on Gianfrancesco's list of priorities at the 
beginning of 1440 was the release of his son Carlo. After his capture 
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he had been imprisoned in the Castelvecchio in verona,15§/ but Gianfrancesco 
immediately opened negotiations with Sforza over terms for his release. 
Naturally Sforza had to consult very closely with the Senate over such 
an important prisoner. Apparently he had been quite content to exchange 
Carlo for Domenico Malatesta, but the Senate conSidered that the value 
of the latter was such that Gianfrancesco should release Taddeo Marchese, 
Galvano de la Noza and a number of other captains. The Venetians were 
also inclined to use their possession of Carlo as a lever by which Este 
could continue to persuade Gianfrancesco to reach an agreement with them~52/ 
This, however, did not prove feasible and the Senate left the final 
decision up to Sforza who opted for a straight exchange with Malatesta. 
160/ The arrangements were completed on 2 February, - and two days 
later Gianfrancesco wrote joyfully to his wife from Peschiera "e non faremo 
dubio che per tuto domani sera ll".16!/ The return of Carlo was most 
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encouraging for Gianfrancesco at a time when he needed as much help 
as possible because it was precisely at this time that Filippo Maria 
suddenly sent Piccinino into Tuscany. On 4 February he left Lombardy, 
entrusting the command of the remaining troops to Taliano del Friuli 
and Dal verme. l6_2/ 0 3 M h h t d Bol ith 3 000 1 narc e en ere ogna w , cava ry 
and subsequently waged punishing campaigns in Tuscany, the Perugino and 
Umbria. 
This seemed to be an extraordinary move by the Visconti. It 
seemed incredible that he would even contemplate sending his own commander 
away at a time when Milanese fortunes in Lombardy were on the wane. It 
effectively left the Viscontean army without an overall commander and 
there was no possibility of inducing Gianfrancesco to undertake any new 
responsibilities at a time when his own territories were so severely 
threatened. A number of explanations have been put forward to justify 
this. It had been suggested that relations between Piccinino and the 
Duke were none too ha~onious and that he was suspicious of his ambitions. 
This, however, does not seem to accord with the Duke's subsequent actions. 
It is possible that it was part of an attempt to break up the anti Viscontean 
league, seeking by directing operations towards the Marche, to draw Sforza 
away at a time when Gattamelata was fading from the scene. This certainly 
became more obvious in the following June. 
This was not the first time that Filippo Maria suddenly seemed 
to change course. It certainly had the effect of bewildering the enemy, 
but there was always a powerful reason for such an action. It was most 
likely that it was done primarily for Sforza's benefit, but not only to 
threaten. One of the major stumbling blocks in his attempts to secure 
Sforza had been the latter's rivalry with Piccinino. His removal from 
the scene may well have been intended to facilitate a renwed attempt. 
After all, on 31 December 1439 Franchino and Guarnerio da Castglione 
were given a commission to sort' out differences between the two men 
163/ 
and to promise to consign Bianca to Sforza as soon as was practicable. -
There had been no response at the time from Sforza and, whatever Filippo 
Maria had intended his reaction to be in the following February, the 
result was negative as far as Milan was concerned. Sforza preferred to 
playa waiting game and capitalise upon the advantages of his position in 
Venetian service for the time being, especially in the light of the 
territorial promises the Venetians had made to him. However, this still 
required Sforza to keep his options open to a certain extent, and a 
regular contact was kept up with Filippo Maria. 
All this tended to exacerbate Gianfrancesco's position. From 
a military point of view he was in an extremely exposed position because 
he considered that Sforza would now think it worth his while to push 
through the Mantovano to reach Brescia and in the light of the continuing 
discussion it was difficult to foretell what Sforza would do. It was 
fortunate that, despite the Senate's impatience for a quick move, Sforza, 
prudent as always, concerned himself with the organisation of supplies 
at Torbole and their transportation to the other side of the lake, where 
they were sent to Brescia via the valley of the Ledro. Anyhow, Sforza 
was interested in hearing about the progress Piccinino was making. 
At the beginning of Ap~il the Milanese were also building up 
their fleet. On the 5th Filippo Maria's envoy Cristoforo Gallina was 
sent into the Mantovano to supervise the transfer of boats from the Po 
into Lake Garda in order to reinforce the existing fleet and ,Gianfrancesco 
164/ 
was requested to give him every assistance. - It still seemed for the 
time being that the biggest threat would come via the lake. 
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Anyhow, during the middle of this month Gianfrancesco 
considered that the situation in the Mantovano was secure enough to 
permit him to go to Milan, partly, no doubt, to try to negotiate 
personally with Filippo Maria over the question of men and money, but 
also in order to renew his agreement with him, to clarify still further 
his degree of commitment in the light of possible threats to his state. 
He had definitely returned by 25th because the position had once more 
become threatening. 162/ As far as Filippo Maria's attitude was 
concerned Gianfrancesco had returned from Milan encouraged by promises 
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of help, but the most momentous event of the visit was the reconciliation between 
Gianfrancesco and Ludovico which took place on 14 April~ This was an 
unexpected event, engineered by Filippo Maria to ingratiate himself with 
Gianfrancesco still further. 16§/ It had been a long time since father and 
son had last met and much had changed since then. Ludovico had matured 
considerably during these years and had gained valuable military experience 
167/ in Tuscany in Sforza's service. - It had been suggested that Vittorino 
da Feltre had had a hand in these happenings. He had certainly befriended 
his wife during the difficult years of her husband's exile.16~/ Judging by 
the fuller letter which Matteo de Corrado wrote on the following day it was 
. 169/ 
a very touching reunion at which G1anlucido was also present. - It 
seems that Gianfrancesco was prepared to forgive his son's past conduct. 
In Matteo's words: "La 'ex. tia de questo si monstro singular domestegeza 
al ditto Messer Lodovigo. E domane, deo dante, dieno andar a Gusago. 
E domenega se die disenare a casa de Vitaliano Bonronici, dove se apparechia 
170/ de fare uno bello pasta, e una bella festa~" - In the following days 
they spent a great deal of time getting to know each other again. He was 
later reconfirmed as Gianfrancesco's heir. 17!/ In the following month Filippo 
Maria invested Ludovico with the feudality of Or~inuovi in perpetuity, no 
doubt to give him a personal interest, like his father, in ensuring that 
. 172/ the Venetians made no progress here, - and to encourage his continuing 
loyalty. After all his disappointments it was at least a comfort to 
Gianfrancesco that his family was at last reunited. In June 1441 a son 
was born to Ludovico and Barbara. He was appropriately named Federico 
after the Emperor Frederick III, and was the first of at least eleven 
children. At least Gianfrancesco could rest assured that the succession 
was secure even though the state to which he would succeed was by no 
means certain. 
However, the pressures of the moment did not allow any sort 
of family life for Gianfrancesco. Ludovico's return to the fold was 
opportune in so far as he could be used in the struggle against the 
advancing Sforza and it became urgent for Ludovico to settle his affairs 
in Milan in haste and return to Mantua. This was something which he was 
only too willing to do because it was his new found inheritance which was 
at stake. l72/ 
This was just as well because the end of April brou ght the 
possibility of Sforza's intervention in the Mantovano even nearer, just 
as Gianfrancesco had feared. Earlier in the month the Venetians had 
finally established their ascendancy in Lake Garda. Around 10 April 
the Torbole fleet encountered the Milanese fleet and according to Sanuto 
a very closely fought battle ensued. However, on this occasion the 
careful preparations paid off and Stefano Contarini finally defeated 
the enemy, pursuing the scattered remains of the Milanese armada as 
far as Riva.l7~/ This was one of the last Viscontean bases at the 
northern end of the lake and after a siege lasting nearly a month it 
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175/ finally fell on 23 May. - The result of this was that the shores 
of the lake, with the exception'of the Mantuan side, were now firmly 
in Venetian hands. This meant that now supplies could reach Brescia 
without any hindrance and its liberation was imminent. 
While all this was proceeding Sforza had made no decisive move 
and Gianfrancesco was waiting to see what he would do. At this time he 
was trying to get as much information as possible about Sforza's intended 
movements. Particularly important in this respect was Carlo Nuvoloni, 
one of his ambassadors in Ferrara. During the months which followed both' 
he and his colleague Francesco Calcagnini were to be heavily involved in 
monitoring Venetian policy, capitalising upon Este's friendship and trying 
to get him to intercede with the Venetians or Sforza himself on Gianfrancesco's 
behalf. At the'same time Zenebaldo and Corrado in Milan were constantly 
pressing for help from Filippo Maria which seldom came. All this activity 
was proceeding against the background of the continUing war, Sforza's 
success, the Visconti's attempts to get him onto the Milanese side, and 
the early exploratory peace negotiations. All in all, it is a very complex 
and active period for Mantua, and one of anguish for Gianfrancesco in 
particular. 
On 30 ~pril Nuvoloni wrote that he had heard that Sforza was 
intending to move towards Vigasio. He advised Gianfrancesco of_the 
176/ dangers which this implied and of the necessity of reinforcing this area. -
On the 15th of the month Sforza had been in Venice and it was a very 
important element in the Senate's overall strategy to'point Sforza in this 
direction. 17Z/ Gianfrancesco immediately relayed this information to 
Milan asking for '200 bone cernide', more men in the Bresciano under 
Dal Verme's command, and 10,000 ducats in back pay. He also planned 
to send 1,000 cavalry to Legnag6 in order to obstruct any crossing of 
the Adige.17~/ Matteo replied politely that these requests had been 
noted but gave no guarantees that any aid would be sent. 
In fact, Sforza did not move until the beginning of June 
because a joint campaign was planned to liaise with the rest of the 
Venetian army when Riva had finally been captured. During this time of 
waiting Gianfrancesco was in constant touch with Ferrara over latest 
developments. Francesco Calcagnini had been in close contact with 
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Leonello over the possible strength of Sforza's army and what chances there 
were of success in the event of a battle. By 16 May no help from Milan had been 
forthcoming and the result of the discussions with Leonello and uguccione 
de'Contrari was that in the circumstances it would be ill-advised to prevent 
the passage of Sforza towards Brescia unaided. 1721 At the same time 
Gianfrancesco had communicated all this to Matteo Corrado and on 21 May 
Filippo Maria himself replied to Gianfrancesco in the following way: 
"Veduto ha scripto la f. vra.a 10 egregio 
suo consigliero Matheo de Corradi del passo 
10 quale sente gli debe essere rechesto per 
10 andare del Conte Francesco a Ie parte de 
soto, dicamo che a nuy pare e piace. che la 
f. vra. gli conceda el dicto passo, como 
habiamo facto respondere al dicto Matheo." 
He goes on ironically: 
"E tra vuy e nuy, non conven~o queste . 
182/ 
subtilitade pero che nuy sempre reputaressemo 
che tuto quello facesse la Ex. vra. 10 facesse 
a bono effecto et per bene del stado vro. e nro., 
como ancora siamo certi che reputaresti vuy el 
simile de tuto quello facessemo nuy." 
As a mark of his goodwill three days later Filippo Maria nominated 
l8~:1 
Pietro Visconti to raise supplies and men to be at the disposal of Gianfrancesco. 
On the surface, the advice which Filippo Maria gave to 
Gianfrancesco about letting Sforza pass through his territories is 
very curious indeed. Why should he want to facilitate the relief of 
Brescia after such a great deal of effort had been expended on 
besieging it? It seems contradictory in the extreme; but equally 
curious is Sforza's own apparent reluctance to move to the relief of 
Brescia despite the promptings of the Senate for quicker action. Why, 
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if the Senate had promised the Mantovano to Sforza, was Calcagnini so adamant 
that his sole intention was to pass through rather than overrunning it and 
that no harm would befall these territories l8~/ if Gianfrancesco did 
not impede his passage? 
This correspondence is yet another indication of the ambiguous 
position of Sforza. The only reasonable explanation for all this is that 
Filippo Maria was very confident of being able to persuade him to throw 
over the Venetians. Gianfrancesco for whom Sforza personally had a great 
deal of respect, had played a significant role in trying to achieve this; 
Ludovico, his heir, had been closely associated with him. Sforza's 
subsequent actions clearly indicated that he was not as anxious as the 
Senate to subdue the Mantovano completely. When, on 3 June, he crossed 
the Mincio, he did no damage at all to the Mantovano, nor did Gianfrancesco 
attempt to stop his transit. 
It could be argued that Visconti's advice and Gianfrancesco's 
inaction were a demonstration of goodwill towards Sforza, but surely 
more concrete assurances must have been forthcoming for such an action 
to be tolerated, an action which had such damaging consequences to the 
Milanese war effort and could be so perilous to the Mantovano. It 
444. 
will never be possible to find out the complete explanation for this, 
but a clue can be sought in the. correspondence for the end of May and 
the beginning of June 1440. 
During this period Filippo Maria, through Antonio de Becharia, 
was redoubling his efforts in Ferrara to construct an anti Venetian 
league in which the prime catch was to be Sforza. It is very clear 
from numerous references in Calcagnini's letters, that the Este, 
particularly Leonello, but 
with the Venetian alliance 
also Niccolo, were getting severely disillusioned 
183/ 
as they had been in 1438. - The Senate had 
been considerably angered by the defection of Borso d'Este to the 
184/ Milanese side earlier in the month, - but at least on one occasion 
Calcagnini reported that there was widespread approval for what he had 
done in Ferrara itself.l8~/ There was a great deal of discussion with the 
Florentine envoys over this matter and the reports which Calcagnini sent 
to Gianfrancesco indicate very clearly a great deal of optimism. This is 
what he wrote on the 21 May 1440: 
"Illustre Signor mio. Io non vidi questo S.mai 
meglio disposte a far ben. quanto hora: have 
dicto aperte chel voria vedere questi Venetiani 
in totu summersi. Et che lha attastado Ii 
fiorentini et etiam el conte a pigliar el 
desiderato partito, Ii quali el trova non 
punto desperati, immo ben disposti: pur che la 186_/ 
confidentia del duca ge fusse". 
Calcagnini went on to write that matters might well be expedited 
even further if Filippo Maria were to withdraw Piccinino from Romagna 
and Bologna and he pointed out that it would also be helpful if Gianfrancesco 
could get the Duke to give some other material evidence of his goodwill 
to the Florentines and Sforza. 182/ A stumbling block to any negotiations 
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with Filippo Maria was his past history of untrustworthiness and yet 
again Gianfrancesco was to act as the go-between as his state was to 
be the testing ground for the truth of the assurances which were eventually 
given. 
As far as Gianfrancesco personally was concerned, there was 
a great deal of negotiation at all levels about guarantees of security 
for the Mantovano. Not only was Becharia himself pressing for this, but, 
perhaps more than anyone else, Leonello, of whose efforts Calcagnini 
1881 
spoke very highly. - Furthermore Carlo Nuvoloni was conducting 
negotiations with Sforza's agent in Ferrara over this matter, with very 
optimistic results. 1821 All in all, by the end of the month, during the 
very period that Sforza was biding his time, the reports which reached 
Mantua gave great cause for reassurance that not only would the Mantovano 
be safe, but that the prospects for an anti-Venetian league were very 
1901 good indeed. -
The clearest statement of Filippo Maria's intentions is to be 
seen in a letter which he wrote to Gianfrancesco on 2 June 1440 Summing up 
the achievement of the previous month. By then Antonio Becharia had 
returned to Milan from Ferrara with the news that Ferrara, Florence and 
Sforza were well disposed to a league which, if Filippo Maria was agreeable, 
could also include Genoa as well as Mantua. 19!1 The ultimate aim of such 
a league was made perfectly clear: 
"facta la dicta liga ala quale ne conforta 
che vogliamo attendere cum fare presto, 10 
prefato conte FrancescO se ne andava nel Reamo, 
et la casa sua a le parte de sotto, et 10 
capitaneo nostro puoteria ritornare ala parte 
de qua cum tute quelle nostre gente, et alhor a 
se puoteria andarsene a campo et a Verona et a 
• 
Padua (promised to Gianfrancesco) et fare 
quello a li inimici nostri che se sforzano 
fare a tuti noi Signori de Italia cazandolil9_2J fino in l'aqua". 
This is perhaps the plainest evidence to date of the way in which the 
Visconti was playing Sforza off against Piccinino and, as far as 
Sforza was concerned, the Mantovano as well as Bianca was one of the 
pawns in this game. This is why this period was such a tense one 
for Gianfrancesco7 he initially stood to lose most if such a policy 
failed. Also, the whole scheme is another example of how skilfully 
Filippo Maria could conceive a plan which could work on more than one 
level. It was not only designed to work on Ferrarese discontent with 
Venice, but also actively to forment suspicion between Sforza and Venice. 
The trouble was that although it proved .relatively easy for 
Filippo Maria to get Piccinino out of the way, Sforza was altogether 
a different matter. Here Filippo Maria had met a man whose deviousness 
and sense of opportunism most closely matched his own. In the final 
analysiS Sforza's conduct in the war was not so much as a faithful 
servant of Venice or as the prospective servant of Milan, but as the 
most faithful servant of his own ambitions. We see, therefore, the 
intriguing situation of a double game being played by the two most 
important men in Lombardy at the time, both are of inestimable value 
to each other, and both have a talent for jockeying for a favourable 
position. It is not surprising as a consequence that unexpected events 
tend to happen in such a situation. 
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Even before Sforza moved there were definite signs that 
his adherence was not in reality going to be such an easy thing to 
accomplish. On 1 June Calcagnini wrote that a certain unnamed 'amico' 
of Uguccione de'Contrari had been discussing the recent negotiations 
at length with one of Francesco Sforza's secret envoys who had overhead 
a conversation in which Sforza himself had been extremely cynical 
about Visconti's motives; that he had always been a past master at the 
art of the empty prOmise. l92/ 
In the light of all this, it is very easy to view Sforza's 
actions more and more as those essentially of a free agent. On 3 June he 
crossed the Mincio and went, contrary to expectation, northwards towards 
Lake Garda. On the 5th he had reached Rivoltella from where part of the 
army went to recover Sala and the surrounding area, causing the Milanese 
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194/ to retreat beyond Bedizzole, capitalising upon his numerical superiority. -
Finally, the way to" Brescia lay open and at last, around the lOth of the 
month, the citizens of that brave city could throw open their gates to. welcome 
their li~erator. However, Sforza was more concerned with driving the enemy 
back than making a triumphal entry into Brescia. He wished to clear the 
whole area of Milanese troops, pushing them first across the Oglio and then 
ultimately across the Adda. There was little or no resistance, one by 
one all the important fortresses fell: Ghedi, Verola, Poncarole, Alghise, 
Manerbio, Gottolengo, Montichiari and Calvisano. The advance of the 
Sforzeschi was irresistible. Some fortresses, like that of Chiari, were 
abandoned by the Milanese even without a show of resistance. Filippo Maria, in 
desperation, 
the citizens 
sent reinforcements to Crema, Cremona and Lod! and encouraged 
195/ 
to put up a vigorous defence against the enemy, - but by 
now .the damage had been done. It was with justification that Da Soldo could 
.... -. 
say: ~ 196/ "E cossi hebbeno per tutto zugno tutta Gera d'Ada". -
Visconti's plan of playing Sforza off against Piccinino had been very 
badly misjudged and it is hardly surprising that he was now desperate 
to get Piccinino back to Lombardy once more. 
This devastating success was extremely alarming for Gianfrancesco 
because in a very real sense the Mantovano was now cut off and this was 
the direct result, moreover, of Filippo Maria's miscalculation. In spite 
of Este's continual assurances of support, he was now very much in Sforza's 
hands. For his part Filippo Maria was still continuing his efforts at 
Ferrara to find out what Sforza's true intentions were. According to a 
letter which Calcagnini wrote to Gianfrancesco on 29 June Este felt that 
there were still grounds for an amicable solution if only Bianca was 
handed over to him. l9Z/ At the same time Sforza's chancellor Battista da 
MOlltecchio was in Venice discussing with the Senate Sforza's terms for 
continued friendship, which included paying him the money he was owed 
and investing him with the lands he had conquered in the cremonese.19~/ 
Sforza was manoeuv~ring himself into such a position that he could offer 
himself for sale to the highest bidder. 
Although Gianfrancesco had not impeded Sforza's passage through 
the Mantovano he was now in a position of needing help badly •. On 13 June 
Carlo was sent north to Lonato to guard the area 
while Ludovico had been monitoring events on the 
around calcinate,192/ 
Adda front. 20Q/ The 
concentration of Milanese troops along the river combined with the unusually 
high level of the water for that time of the year did serve to halt Sforza's 
advance. The important question for Gianfrancesco was where he would turn 
to next. The situation looked none too promising because according to 
Sanuto Casalmaggiore, Viadana and Marmirolo were occupied by the 
201/ Venetians by the end of June. - If this was an indication of the 
direction of the enemy's strategy Gianfrancesco had every right to be 
frightened because Corrado was writing to his master of the financial 
difficulties in Milan at the time. He reported on 27 June: "De continuo 
se retrize piu le borse in forma che mi stago senza speranza de posser 
havere dinaro alcuno".20~/ 
On the following day Carrado informed Gianfrancesco that Sforza 
had moved towards Caravaggio and Treviglio and it seemed that he was 
intending to move towards Cremona. This, for the time being, represented 
203/ 
something of a reprieve for the .Mantovano. - On 1 July Caravaggio had 
been captured, only the 'roc~a' still held out. However, among the 
casualties was Sforza's own brother Leonello who had sustained fatal 
injuries in the attack. Even Corrado was speculating on Sforza's next 
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move, and praying that it would be towards the cremonese.20~/ The tensions of 
these days is reflected graphically in the correspondence. Matteo's 
despatches made it perfectly clear that Gianfrancesco could expect little 
material help from Milan because Filippo Maria was in considerable 
difficulties in providing for the safety of the Milanese itself. He could 
not be sure that Sforza would not cross the Adda, taking the war nearer to 
205/ Milan than it had ever been before. - Ludovico, on the banks of the 
Adda at Rivolta in the Cremonese had asked for money in vain; neither 
could Gianfrancesco himself give any money because Mantua's resources 
206/ 
were now exhausted. - All in all Mantua's fortunes had now reached 
rock bottom and despite Calcagnini's frantic efforts to get the Este to 
do something, the situation appeared to be hopeless. All that Calcagnini 
could offer in his letter -of 3 July was advice which he could relay to 
the Visconti in a last ditch effort to get Sforza's support. He suggested-
that there were a number of alternatives open: 
" •• 0 deliberasse de"havere el conte per 
tuttosuo dagandoge effectualiter questa 
Madonna Bianca, che credo piu tosto sia 
sta uno diavolo mandato in terra a desfatione 
del cielo, facendolo segno ad ogni suo modo, 
se ben ge devesse dare el Castello de Porta 
Zobia nele mane a sua segureza. OVeramente 
trovare dinari a bastanza cum summa celeritade per 
mettere in punto le sue zente darme e le nostro, 
cum quelle del capitanl0 ge sono restadi, sel 
vira e possendole menar de qua, chel ne fu 
dubio che le zente del Papa, e Fiorentini non ge 
togliano la via ••• Aliter non vede via che bona 
sla a salvarse: vogliando el conte insieme cum 
Venetaini proseguire ala segonda victoria". 202/ 
At this point Filippo Maria, whose actions had done nothing 
to encourage the slightest degree of confidence from Gianfrancesco, added 
insult to injury by asking him to provide men for the defence of Cremona. 
The insensivlty of such a request was made very clear to the Duke by 
208/ Corrado, - but this did not stop him making the official request on 
6 JUly. 202/ In fact Gianfrancesco's attitude to this was shown only two 
days earlier when, far from being unwilling to send men, he requested 
Corrado to get the Duke to send Ludovico back to the Mantovano. 21Q/ 
He had, in fact, returned by 11 July. 
All this speculation was soon to end. Around 3 or 4 July 
Sforza broke camp. Leaving for the time being the projected crossing 
of the Adda, he went south. On 7 he was between Crema and Castellone and 
he began a campaign designed to establish his position to the north of 
Cremona, but it soon became evident that his operations would include the 
Mantovano. 
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Although Gianfrancesco, through Corrado, assured Filippo 
Maria that he would try to defend their joint interests to the best 
of his abi1ity,21!1 the next weeks showed just how limited his ability 
was compared to the strength and determination of Sforza. 
By 8 July Gianfrancesco was already writing to the D~e 
that for the time being the defence of Cremona was not a first priority 
"perch& e1 Conte Francesco e 1evato de que11e parte e vene ali damni mei".21~/ 
Moreover, he protested in the very same letter that a lack of money, including 
payment from Milan that had never been received, prevented him from being in 
a position to defend his territories, or indeed Filippo Maria's, adequately. 
He got plenty of sympathy from Ferrara during this period, for 
instance, on 9 July Este was trying to convince Gianfrancesco that it was 
not really Sforza's intention to overrun the Mantovano comp1ete1y. 212/ 
It is true that later on in the month Leone110 was trying to raise some 
material help for Gianfrancesco, but in the fin~l analysis it amounted to 
1itt'e21~1 The Florentines were apparently angry at the Venetian 
success but this was not translated into action. Gianfrancesco himself 
observed "Fiorentini non stanno coss! caldi ne mostraveno". 2121 "Sono 
tute parole!" This remark of Corrado's is the most succinct statement of 
216/ Gianfrancesco's prospects of aid. - On 14 July he wrote to Corrado in 
explicit terms summing up his position. He said that he had been quite 
prepared to place his state at risk for Visconti's friendship and support, 
but there was a limit to what he. could do without adequate backing: 
"Ma che in tutto 10. vog1iamo perdere no, p.erch' siamo disposti 
morire Signore de Mantua, ne intendemo che1 manchi per noy. E a voler 
provedere a questo solamente ce uno rimedio, che habiamo 1e nostre zente 
darme in punto le qual non ge possiamo mettere ne mantenere que11e ge 
217/ 
sono senza dinaro". - Moreover, he realised that as matters then 
stood, there would be no pOint in pursuing any moves for peace with 
the Venetians when they were on the point of finally getting their 
revenge on Gianfrancesco. 
Effectively Gianfrancesco was going to have to face the 
Sforza threat alone.2l~/ It was to be too strong for him. The rebellion 
of Asola was an ill omen for what was eventually to occur. There had been 
a number of influential people in the 'squadra' of Asola who had resented 
Gianfrancesco's change of allegiance in 1438 and the approach of Sforza 
triggered off a rebellion. Galeazzo Daina, Bartolomeo della Luna,' 
Giacomo Filippo and Gelmino Ravani had formally asked to return under 
direct Venetian rule. Although Andrea da Pesaro and Giovanni CavalcabO, 
the Podesta, held out in the citadel, long term resistance was impossible. 
By 26 July Asola and its surrounding territory was firmly under Venetian, 
219/ 
or rather Sforza's rule. - Neither Carlo nor Ludovico, despite gallant 
attempts, were able to make any headway here. However, the Venetians 
were more anxious for Sforza to move northwards towards Valleggio, Lonato 
and Pesc.hiera "cum sunt claves territori Veronense". In the instructions 
to Pasquale Malipiero, the provveditore, they gave full vent to their 
vindictiveness against Gianfrancesco. They were reminding Sforza of their 
promise to give him Mantua, of how dangerous it would be for security 
220/ to allow the city to remain in the possession of the Gonzaga. - They 
were determined that their communications would no longer be threatened. 
To a certain extent Sforza did carry out Venetian policy. 
He did move northwards taking Guiduzzolo, Volta, Canedo, Cavriana, 
Rivoltella, Rana and Castiglione delle Stiviere. Having reached the 
. 221/ lake he then captured Lonato, - and finally, on 14 August, he laid 
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siege to the most important prize of all, Peschiara. On the previous 
day the Senate had issued instructions to Malipiero to get Sforza to 
capture Valleggio and Goito "quod navigia nostra in ipso lacu Mantue 
222/ 
conduci possint". - It wished to take the war into the city itself. 
After a very brief siege Peschiera fell on 17 August, closely followed 
by the surrender of vallegio.22~/ All this was Gianfrancesco's reward 
for being the servant of the Visconti! Throughout the period he 
continued to implore aid, but the result speaks for itself. 
Sforza's campaign was, on the surface, an unqualified 
disaster for Gianfrancesco; it was a chilling answer to the doubts which 
he had felt not much more than two years previously. However, all was 
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not lost. Although the Senate never ceased to urge Sforza to keep attacking 
224/ Gianfrancesco relentlessly, - he did not threaten Mantua itself, partly, 
no doubt, because there were large concentrations of men there. 222/ 
Instead he continued his campaign into the Veronese. Under his command 
Lazise and Malcesine were captured and the Valcamonica, Val Trompia and 
Val di Sabbia were finally cleared of Viscontean troops. It is true 
that Sforza was in an exceedingly strong position, but he was still open 
to offers by Milan and the only thing that Gianfrancesco could hope 
for was that Filippo Maria would use his diplomatic weight in order to 
obtain the restitution of the territories he had lost. The tragedy 
of Gianfrancesco's situation was that at every turn he was thrown on the 
good offices of one who had repeatedly played him false. 
Even while Sforza was busy in the Mantovano he. showed himself 
willing to continue negotiations with Milan. Even as early as 5 August Corrado 
was informing Gianfrancesco that Sforza was quite willing to consider 
Milanese terms, provided that Cremona and Crema could be used as 
security for the eventual payment of the 150,000 ducats of Bianca's dowry. 
Provided some agreement could be reached he was quite prepared to restore 
226/ 
all the fortresses that had been taken fr~m Gianfrancesco. - After all, 
the Gonzaga had hardly been the aggressor in this campaign. Despite 
Venetian protests to Sforza that any negotiations with Milan would be 
227/ 
"piena dolis et fraude", - some progress must have been made because 
on 28 August Bianca was sent by her father to Ferrara, presumably as 
228/ 
a demonstration of goodwill by her father. - According to Poggio 
Bracciolini this was done at the suggestion of Niccol0 d'Este who actually 
made the journey to Milan to escort her to Ferrara. 222/ If this is true 
it must have been a great accomplishment because Este was in very poor 
health during this period. The presence of Bianca in Ferrara, however, 
was also designed to put her eligibility in the marriage stakes to its 
maximum use. It was precisely this continued deviousness by Filippo Maria 
which was the biggest barrier to'a quick settlement. The eventual peace 
was thereby delayed for at least a year because of this attitude. It has 
been argued, with considerable justification, that the desire to get the 
better of Sforza tended to become obsessive with Visconti from now on;232/ 
it certainly drew from him some of his most tortuous behaviour. Moreover, 
it did play an important part in the humiliating losses which Mantua was 
forced to suffer in the Peace of Cavriana. 
Campaigns of one sort or another were to continue between 
Venice and Milan until the August of 1441, but for the most part they 
did not concern Mantua directly. The fighting .was prompted by the 
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eventual return of Piccinino during the wipter of 1440-1441 and was 
an attempt to regain some of the ground which had been lost to Sforza in 1440, 
but the campaigning was characterised by increasing war weariness on both 
sides. It was the spiralling cost of this increasingly sterile warfare 
which prompted the final moves towards peace. 
From the autumn of 1440 the discussions became more serious 
and the very full and plentiful reports from Gianfrancesco's ambassadors 
throughout this final period give us a fascinating picture of the remarkably 
complex nature of the discussions. This documentation shows how important 
the diplomacy had become for Gianfrancesco now. In the summer of 1440, as 
we have seen, he had lost a great deal and, despite the complexities and 
intricacies of the discussions in Milan, Venice and Ferrara, the issue 
which concerned Gianfrancesco was starkly simple - how possible would it be 
for Filippo Maria to get back the territories he had lost and live up to his 
promises of maintaining the integrity of his state? Of course, this was 
intricately bound up with the fate of Bianca and Sforza, but we shall try 
to highlight the interests of Mantua in the course of the negotiations of 
this period. 
Gianfrancesco did have a certain amount of support apart from 
that of the Visconti. Throughout the difficulties of the preceeding 
summer the Este, both father and son, had shown themselves to be faithful 
friends interceding not only with Sforza but also with Venice on his 
behalf. As far as Venice was concerned there seemed to be a slightly 
less belligerent attitude towards Gianfrancesco in September 1440. 
Although they were still urging a vigorous campaign in the Mantovano the 
Senate was yet able to say in its instructions to its Florentine ambassador 
Andrea Mocenigo on 7 September: "volumus venire ad pacem cum eodem 
Marchione Mantua iustam et rationalem". 23!/ Similarly, in November, the 
Senate through Leonardo Venier in Ferrara, was urging Gianfrancesco to 
discuss his position in secret if he so wished.23~/ The fact that 
Sforza was actively in touch with Milan at the time may have prompted 
233/ the Senate to mollify its attitude to Gianfrancesco, - but it all 
constituted a slight glimmer in the darkness even though the words 
'just' and 'rational' implied all sorts of limitations. In fact, in 
December the Senate went as far as asking Venier to convince Gianfrancesco, 
through Leonello if necessary, that Venice still wanted to offer its 
234/ protection to Mantua and was prepared to forget this lapse. - After 
all the events of the previous summer this was asking quite a lot of 
Gianfrancesco's credulity. 
The dominant theme in all the correspondence relating to 
Visconti and Sforza was the question of Bianca. By the end of the year 
a note of exasperation was beginning to creep into the comments of 
Calcagnini and other ambassadors. There seems to be little doubt, 
judging from what ultimately happened, that Sforza wanted the marriage 
to take place, and it was only the deep suspicion between the two men 
which dragged the matter out longer than it need have been. It was all 
part of this obsession of Filippo Maria's referred to earlier and it 
was most unfortunate ~t Gianfrancesco's territorial problems were 
intimately bound up with it. Bianca was Visconti's trump card and he 
was not prepared to play it until the stakes were right. Similarly, 
Sforza's mistrust of the Duke made him demand cast iron assurances that 
he would not go back upon his word. At the same time Filippo Maria 
was holding on until Piccinino'sultimate arrival in Lombardy could 
add military weight to his position while the Venetian Senate was using 
all its influence with Sforza via the Provveditori to convince him of the 
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Duke's insincerity. It was a situation of stalemate which existed as 
far as Milanese/Sforza relations were concerned, and a situation which 
admittedly involved a Milanese loss of all its gains in the war; but, 
more relevant to our case, it was Gianfrancesco who had lost most, and 
stood to lose more possibly if the situation was not resolved satisfactorily. 
The only way in which Gianfrancesco could influence matters was not by 
force but by words; by diplomatic pressure on all sides. It must have 
been extremely frustrating for Gianfrancesco to have witnessed Filippo 
Maria's actions of October 1440 in which he tried to use Bianca's 
235/ presence at Ferrara to his advantage. -
Throughout the course of this last phase of the war the Este 
had occupied a very ambiguous position. We have seen that although Niccolo 
and Leonello had a considerable amount of sympathy with Milan, the proximity 
of Venice did not allow this to be shown in a practical guise. The matter 
was further complicated after Gianfrancesco's declaration for Milan by 
the fact that there were close marital ties between the Gonzaga and 
Este families. Throughout the war we have observed that the Este, 
particularly Leonello, had given Gianfrancesco a great deal of moral 
support and, during the latter part of 1440, Niccolo, whose health was 
failing and was no doubt beginning to be concerned about the succession, 
was genuinely anxious to bring the war to an end. 
On 7 October 1440 Filippo Maria issued two sets of instructions 
to Simone Ghillino and Francesco da Landriano. In one he instructed 
them to give Bianca to Sforza' and to infeudate him with Cremona and 
236/ Pontemoli as dowry in r~turn for an oath of fidelity. - In the second 
237/ 
set of instrUctions these same men were to offer Bianca to Leonello, -
and to negotiate a dowry, while Filippo Maria promised to arrange the 
necessary Papal dispensations "non obstantibus aliquibus hac tenus inter 
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Comitem Francisum et ipsam gestis, cum eodem domino Leonello matrimoniam 
contrahere".23~/ It seemed that Filippo Maria was blind to his previous 
mistakes. He had tried this game of forcing Sforza's hand before, in 
vain. It had the same result on this occasion, but now he was in a 
much less strong position. In fact, Sforza, who was at Peschiera, refused 
to go to Ferrara to even discuss the matter and informed the Senate of 
what had happened. He merely continued his campaign in the Veronese. It 
was this sort of behaviour which aggravated Gianfrancesco's position and 
further convinced him that the Duke was too preoccupied with his rivalry 
with Sforza to help him. In the Spring of 1441 Bianca was returned to 
Milan and all the work of the Mantuan ambassadors in Ferrara and Milan 
counted for nothing. 
From November 1440 to March 1441 Zenebaldo, Calcagnini and 
Corrado were hard at work on Gianfrancesco's behalf. Numerous reports 
survive for this period and although their contents are somewhat repetitive, 
they do reveal that there was a general desire for peace, and, moreover, 
that there was sympathy for Gianfrancesco's predicament. On 23 November 
Calcagnini was reporting that there was a growing war weariness in Florence 
239/ 
and Venice. - Uguccione de'Contrari had promised to do everything in 
his power to help Gianfrancesco. In fact, Calcagnini had had a long 
discussion with him on the previous day and he had emphasised the importance 
of obtaining from the Venetians a guarantee "che non se sperasse may de 
240/ havere la S. vostra, se interamente non retituisse el vostro"~ -
The Florentine ambassador Bernardo de'Medici was in agreement with this, 
it was now a question of getting the Venetians to favour such a peace. 
In the circumstances it was not going to be easy to achieve as Calcagnini 
indicated. 24!/ One of the ways of trying to do this was for all other 
parties to agree to it, and to this effect, Zenebaldo, Ghillino, 
Landriano and Bernardo de'Medici had a meeting with Este on 27 
November to discuss this. A plan of action had been suggested by 
Bernardo and it was summedup by Calcagnini as follows: 
...... che remettendose el S. messer 10 
Duca liberamente nel conte cerca questa 
pase cum salvatione de lhonore de esso 
conte, e segurezza de Fiorentini, chel 
prefato havuto risposta di cio, andara 
immediate a Venesia e a tuta brigha 
adopera s1 che la pace, 0 vogliano 0 no i 
Venetian1, havera loco e luy andara nel reame 
a far 11 facti soi, cum promissione de cadauna . 
24~/ de le parte." 
There were a number of difficulties over this plan, not the least of 
which was that Filippo Maria's ambiguous attitude to Bianca's marriage 
had for the time being driven Sforza back towards Venice. Calcagnini 
was not at all sure how the details of this plan would work out, but 
seemed to be confident that the restoration of Mantuan territories 
would be one of the conditions.24~/ 
Discussions along these lines were to continue throughout 
the winter and Zenebaldo sent Gianfrancesco regular reports of what 
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progress was being made. Both Este and Florence wanted peace badly and 
Zenebaldo, in his letters, never ceased to tell Gianfrancesco of their 
good intentions; but even before the end of 1440 it had become clear 
that there were some formidable obstacles to overcome. First of all, 
the Venetians did not show themselves disposed to restore all the lands 
that had been taken in the Mantovano. This had become obvious even 
before the end of November. 24!/ However much they wanted to become 
more friendly towards Gianfrancesco they were clearly not gOing to 
jeopardise their communications with Brescia any more. Moreover, 
even though the Florentines were assuring Gianfrancesco of their 
support, when it came to broaching the subject with the Venetians 
245/ themselves they seemed unduly reticent. - Moreover, the Florentines 
were still very doubtful about Filippo Maria's sincerity. On 2 December 
Bernardo asked Zenebaldo about how genuine he was: 
.... sel S. messer 10 duca realmente venera 
a queste practiche del quale pur dubitano 
i Fio~entini:dicendome luy app.rtamente, 
se nuy fUssemo certi chel duca venisse ala 
pace sinceramente, e cercheressemo cum 
altra instantia chel S. messer 10 marchese 
di Mantua fusse interamente restituito,se 
bene devessemo venere ad altro cha a parole 
cum Venetiani. Ma dubitemo tropo che non 
vadi fugendo e squizando a suo modo usato." 24§/ 
Even though Zenebaldo tried his best to reassure Bernardo over thiS, 
these doubts ran deep. Bernardo was very conscious of how important a 
genuine move for peace was, especially as a continuation of the war 
would cost Florence dearly, as the Venetian ambassadors had never ceased 
to remind him. Similarly, Sforza's own attitude to these negotiations was 
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ambivalent, even though Zenebaldo did feel that he was fairly confident 
247/ that he would favour Milan in the long run. - The Milanese were reminding 
Sforza of what had happened to Carmagnola. Zenebaldo realised that the 
negotiations had reached a crucial stage and that it would soon become 
248/ 
clear whether it would be peace or war. -
In the following month the negotiations collapsed and the prospect 
of a renewal of the war drew nearer although when the fighting started 
it was not to be continuous (because the Venetian forces were not adequately , 
461. 
prepared). At the beginning of January 1441 Zenebaldo was writing that 
the Florentines were not as solicitous about Mantuan interests as they 
had professed themselves to be in the previous month: 
"Pare etiam che dicto Bernardo se doglia 
molto de Simonio chehabia dicta a Vinexia che 
Bernadeto ha promessi e dicto qui chel Conte 
e Fiorentini farano che Veneciani restitu~irano 
le tere vostre. Dicie Bernardeto ogni persona 
sa bene che lui e Fiorentini non possono a 
questo facto metre alltro che parolle cum monstrare 
a Veneciani che vogliano la pacie e simelmente el 
conte non glie puo alltro che confortare i Veneciani 
ala pacie cum restitutione de le tere vostre e quaxi249/ 
mete la cosa in gran dubio che la non habia loco." -
The situation looked very gloomy for Mantua and Zenebaldo judged that 
it was partly the result of Filippo Maria's unwillingness to give 
adequate assurances to the Florentines, particularly over the restitution 
of Bologna, captured by Piccinino. 252/ In fact the wranglings and delays 
of those who purported to be Mantua's friends caused the faithful Zenebaldo 
to comment acidly that what he had feared for some time was in fact true: 
roche de facti nostri ne sia facta una merchantia ... 25~/ It was one of the 
most pertinent comments made on Mantua's situation during this period. 
There was all the difference in the world between promises and action; this 
was becoming a familiar refrain to Gianfrancesco by now. 
By now the Venetians had set the final seal upon the diplomatic 
impasse by putting forward conditions for peace to which Filippo Maria 
would never be able to agree without swallowing his pride. He had to 
restore all lands he had taken in the Bresciano, Bergamasco and the 
Veronese, especially Legnago and Ostiglia. Sforza was to have Cremona 
and the Cremonese; Bologna and other lands. in the.Romagna Were to be 
returned to the Pope and all territory captured from the Florentines and 
. 252/ Genoese was to be restored to them. -
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Any real basis for a settlement was lacking and the discussions 
which took place in Venice during the month of January broke up with 
a great deal of· mutual recrimination. These bickerings are not 
253/ 
relevant to our present discussion. - As far as Mantua's interests were 
concerned, the despatches of Zenebaldo reveal the true story. Despite the 
promises of Bernardo and the Este, the Venetians were plainly not going 
to allow Gianfrancesco to keep those territories which their communications 
254/ between Brescia and Verona depended upon, especially Peschiera. -
It was with justification that Corrado wrote from Milan on 9 February that 
255/ by now peace was out of the question. - Anyhow, by now Piccinino had 
reappeared on the scene and Filippo Maria felt that here was another 
opportunity for him to impose his will upon Lombardy. In reality, however, 
it was to be a war waged upon the feeblest financial resources. Even before 
Piccinino took the field Corrado was writing: 
II ..... "'-Me e dicto da piu persone che le facende 
del ritrovar dinari non porono seguire 
per la via che era dato ad intendere al Capitanio, 
perche li populi sono molti sublevati a non voler 
pagar uno soldo. Et alcuni mi dicono sel fosse 
prinCipato a questa terra el facto del imbottato, 
como foe ad de le altre, seria seguito uno grande 
scandalo." 25§/ 
Venice found itself in a similar position. It is not surprising 
that the fighting between February and August achieved nothing. In the 
midst of all this was Gianfrancesco, and the bitter experience of these 
months proved to be a mere rehearsal of what was to follow at Cavriana. 
His interests at first had been courted by his allies, only to be subsequently 
cast aside when they proved to be incompatible with their own interests. 
The reappearance of Piccinino could give him no greater cause for confidence. 
On 8 February Calcagnini reported to Gianfrancesco a 
conversation he had had with the Ducal ambassador, who had reassured 
him of the continuing efforts to reach a peace which would guarantee 
the safety of Mantua and that the other parties were still well disposed 
t h ' 257/ o ~m. - Similarly, on the following day Corrado was writing in the 
same vein; that Filippo Maria was assuring him that he was more anxious 
for friends than territories and that Gianfrancesco could count on his 
258/ 
support. - However, by now Gianfrancesco had heard this sort of thing 
before and now he wanted deeds rather than promises. During the final 
months of the war he was still going to try to liberate his territories 
from Venetian occupation, but his main fear now was that Filippo Maria 
would make an agreement with Venice to his detriment. The way in which 
the discussions at Ferrara and Venice developed during the winter months 
was to haunt him for the rest of 1441. He feared that history might 
repeat itself: he turned out to be only too right. 
Despite the fact that fighting should have ceased during the 
winter months, there was a great deal of preparation in the Milanese 
camp after Piccinino's arrival. 252/ Apparently some 300,000 ducats was 
spent on these preparations, raised from the whole of the Milanese and, 
when the army crossed the Og110 on 13 February it consisted of 8,000 
260/ 
cavalry and 3,000 infantry. - The fighting extended through the 
Cremonese into the Ghiaradadda. Corrado was sending detailed reports 
about the movements of the army primarily because Carlo was fighting 
alongside Piccinino. According to Corrado Carlo had asked to be among 
the first troops to cross the Oglio. Apparently the Mantuan contingent 
fought well although Carlo was somewhat impatient that Piccinino was 
prepared to parley with the men of Chiari: 
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.. 
. . . . dice che Misser Carlo andoe da 10 
Capitaneo, et dissi questa era una gran 
vergogna a tanta zente a dover stare ad 
attendere a parole, et che se gie dovea 
dar la bataglia. Pregando la sua Mag.tia 
gie desse licentia chel fosse el primo, cum la 
sua compagnia, et cossi gie foe concessa, at 
tutto li altri seguitarono." 
464. 
26~/ 
Chiari was soon captured and by the end of February Visconti's strategy 
of quick movement had paid some dividend. Gottolengo, Gambara, Pontevico 
262/ 
and Soncino were all occupied. -
While all this was gratifying to Gianfrancesco he wanted 
Piccinino to fOllow up this success by a campaign in the Mantovano 
to recover those areas still in Sforza's hands, and Corrado was asked to 
press for this in Milan. On 24 February he was able to report to 
Gianfrancesco that Filippo Maria had promised some degree of intervention 
263/ after the Cremonese had been completely recovered. - One of the 
reasons for this was that he himself together with Ludovico had tried to 
remedy the situation by successfully obtaining the bridge at Valleggio 
on 22 of the month and he wanted some backing from Piccinino. This is 
evident from Corrado ':s report of 26 February in which he stated that 
defini.te instructions had been issued to Piccinino by the Duke to the 
following effect: 
" ••• che, postponuta ogni altra cosa, 
se drizi a venire ala recuperatione 
de le tere vostre, et del resto del 
piano de Bressana." 
Corrado had also written to Carlo so that he might encourage Piccinino 
264/ to come as quickly as possible. - Apparently, Filippo Maria had been 
very impressed with what Gianfrancesco himself was doing. He was more 
pleased to hear that he had recovered one of his territories than hearing 
that ten of his own had been recovered! 262/ Moreover, encouraging news 
had reached Milan that there were severe shortages in Verona and that 
there were still men in Peschiera and Lonato loyal to Mantua who were 
only too willing to rise up against their new masters should a suitable 
opportunity present itself.26§/ In the same letter of 3 March he 
mentioned the anger of Este against the Venetians and the rumblings of 
discontent at the continUing of ~he war in Padua, Vicenza and Verona. 
For the time being the fortunes of war seemed to favour Milan. 
A combination of swift action from Piccinino, war weariness in venice 
and a temporary hiatus in the command of the Venetian army had meant that 
that Piccinino was not strongly opposed. Gattamelata had effectively 
retired but it was not until the end of May that his successor Michelotto 
Attendolo was able to give any reinforcement to Sforza. This situation 
meant that as far as the Visconti was concerned, he was once again in 
a position to dictate terms regarding Bianca. It was about this time 
267/ . that she was returned to Milan, - and, despite hopes of a settlement, 
Filippo Maria returned to his old game. The situation was not eased 
by the presence of Piccinino and the revival of their animoSity. The 
revival of the issues which had effectively killed off the winter 
negotiations now only served to anger Gianfrancesco, as Este had been 
angered. This personal obsession of the Duke with Sforza was not only 
268/ humiliating for Gianfrancesco, but it further sapped his morale. -
465. 
Furthermore, the desire to pursue Sforza to Verona at the beginning 
of March seemed to supersede the plans for the recuperation of 
Gianfrancesco's territories.26~/ Moreover, at that time Filippo Maria 
owed Gianfrancesco a considerable amount of money in back pay, some 
20,000 ducats. In fact, this prompted far more open complaints 
from Gianfrancesco to the Duke than ever before, complaints that the 
Visconti was not really interested in Mantua at all. 27Q/ These were 
very reminiscent of the situation which had existed between Gianfrancesco 
and Venice in 1438. Although this produced elaboLate denials of this 
271/ 
charge from Filippo Maria on the very same day, - the relations 
between the two men remained tense, and were to be so from now on. 
These remaining months were ones of anguish for Gianfrancesco 
because it became increasingly clearer to him that he might well be the 
real loser in the war. On the one side Filippo Maria's promises 
were worthless, on the other side the Venetians were urging Sforza 
by promising him prizes which included Mantua as well as Cremona and even 
Milan itself! The tension between the Duke and Gianfrancesco was also 
272/ 
apparent to the Venetians. - As early as April he was seriously 
considering cutting his losses in favour of peace. One of the most 
revealing letters about hIs attitude during this period is to be seen in 
Corrado's letter to Paola on 17 April. He commented cynically "ma Ie cose 
di qua sono molto disforme." Furthermore the dangers of waging such a 
war without adequate financial resources were patently manifest. 
Gianfrancesco had always left the major decision of war or peace in 
Filippo Maria's hands. One of the major obstacles to peace had been the 
question of the Mantuan territories, but now he considered that the time 
had come for the conclusion of peace even though there was the humiliating 
466. 
prospect of sacrifices to be made. He stated: 
"Essa sera pill contento che non gie 
sia restituite le decte terre, et 
che per questo non se sera de far la 
pace che a dover stare a tanto dubio de 
pericolar et de perdere quelle che gie 
sono rimaste parendo pur ala E •• a sua de 
voler proseguire la guerra, post ponendo 
questa··sua impossibilit~ et star al 
periculo de la fortuna." 27~/ 
It was a terrible sacrifice to have to admit, but the risks were high 
in the game which Gianfrancesco had been involved. He naturally hoped 
that he might be able to salvage some of his losses, but from the 
beginning of his association with the Visconti it seemed to Gianfrancesco 
that all he had done was to make sacrifices. 
However, for the time being Filippo Maria had no intention 
of giving up his struggle with Sforza. On 27 April he entrusted Pietro 
Cotto with the task of negotiating an alliance with Este which included 
467. 
Bianca's marriage with "illi ex filiis dicti illustri domini Marchioni Estensi de 
quo dicta Petro procuratori de mente ipsius domini domini Ducis, plene 
274/ informato melius videbitur et placuerit". - It was a tactic which 
had failed twice, and it failed again. The matter was now out of 
Gianfrancesco's hands. He could do no more and now with Sforza reforming 
and with Piccinino not having moved nearer the Mantovano than Gambara, the 
strain was beginning to tell on him. Gianfrancesco's health was now 
beginning to deteriorate and, at the end of May, he was now considering 
attending the baths at Borni. 272/ 
The situation at the beginning of June looked threatening 
once again. By now the Venetians were p~epared to take the field and as the 
468. 
forces of the league marched out to meet Piccinino, Gianfrancesco's 
experiences of Sf~r.za's movements led him to fear very much that he 
might lose more territory. After all, the army of the league was in 
Verona and Piccinino was in Gambara; they Were separated only by 
the Mantovano. There was now no one in whom Gianfrancesco could trust 
to give him any help. There is some evidence that the Venetians were 
continuing to make approaches to him eVen as late as the beginning of 
June. Throughout this period they had been secretly trying to achieve 
the 'just' and 'reasonable' peace referred to above; but by now Gianfrancesco's 
morale was so low that he did not believe that they were sincere. On 7 
June the Senate wrote to the Rectors of Verona and the Provveditori to 
Sforza about the way in which discussions had broken down. A certain 
Alberto Orlando had just returned from Mantua and the letters he had brought 
with him categorically stated that Gianfrancesco believed "quod non attendanus 
ea quod promettemus sibi". The Senate indignantly protested that it had 
always kept i~s word and Gianfrancesco especially "qui longissime tempore 
practicavit res nostros" should have know them better. 27§/ Although 
they did not close the door to any further discussions " there are no further 
references to any more direct discussions taking place. 
On the eve of the departure of the Venetian army Gianfrancesco 
was to have one last attempt with the Visconti. On 8 June the Duke 
wrote to him in an attempt to improve their relationship and his lengthy 
letter is very revealing in so far as it documents clearly the differences 
between them and also GianfrancescO'S fears. By that time his ambassador 
Pietro Cotta had returned from Ferrara after the failure of the mission 
to marry Bianca to Leonello and he had reported Zenebaldo's attempts to 
277/ patch up the differences which Filippo Maria had largely created. -
However, the main portion of the letter deals with an assurance in 
writing which Gianfrancesco wanted from him. He had been very much 
disturbed by reports he had received about certain remarks of a 
hostile nature towards Gianfrancesco which the Duke was reputed to 
278/ have made. - Filippo Maria, for his part, strenuously denied 
these reports as lies protesting his affection for Gianfrancesco and 
Mantua and his gratitude for all he had done in his service. Not only 
did he promise to pay him 11,000 ducats but also all his back pay by 
the end of the month. This was rather a contrast to what Corrado was 
writing on 25 May. He was saying of the money: "Credo chel diavolo 
279/ tenga accechati e incatenati questor". - Finally, Filippo Maria 
promised to instruct Piccinino to do his best to recapture Asola and 
Castelgoffredo. However, should it not be possible to do so he would 
undertake to provide him with sufficient men and money in addition to 
Gianfrancesco's condotta of 500 lances and 500 infantry for the 
280/ defence of his state. - As far as this last matter was concerned, 
the Duke furnished a formal document confirming his intention to defend 
Gianfrancesco's territories. 28!/ 
469. 
Judging from Gianfrancesco's letter to Corrado on the following 
day, he was content with the promises and assurances which Filippo Maria 
had qiven.28~/ However, in the formal declaration no territories were 
specified; not even Asola and Castelgoffredo. Neither was there even 
a general promise to recover any other lands which had been lost. While 
he did undertake to send his own men into the Mantovano if it should 
be necessary, in the £irst instance the defence was to be undertaken 
by Gianfrancesco's own men. It seems very,much that once again the 
Duke's commitment was very minimal indeed. 
~,v. 
On 12 June the Venetian army left Verona and reached Bagnolo on 
the 23rd; on the 21st Piccinino moved to Manerbio from Gambara. Four 
days later the two armies met at Agnano and the Venetian army sustained 
283/ heavy losses. - The campaign took place almost entirely in the area 
between Brescia and Cremona and did not affect the Mantovano directly at 
all. The battle of Agnano was followed by what appeared more and more to be a 
personal competition between Piccinino and Sforza. The whole affair was 
pointless, inconclusive and, above all, very expensive. The final act 
of this campaign occurred at the beginning of July with Sforza's siege 
of Martinengo in the Bergamasco where he had heard that there were 1,000 
enemy cavalry. He was aiming to clear the way between Bergamo and 
284/ Brescia. - He was pursued by Piccinino and everything looked set 
for a fierce contest. However, surprisingly nothing happened. Da Soldo 
notes: " ••• stagando li campi in questo modo de l'una parte e de l'altra 
1 L . 285/ e non dogandose a tro, cioe de pace, senon di guerra". - This situation 
lasted for eighteen days. The forces were so evenly matched that neither 
side wanted to run the risk of losing. It was obvious that this situation 
could not be allowed to continue much longer. In fact, Sforza had planned 
to evacuate his troops from the area by the end of July or the beginning 
of August at the very latest; but before this could be. accomplished, on 
286/ 1 August a truce of eight days was suddenly proclaimed by Sforza himself. -
The background to these sudden developments is told by 
Simonetta and illustrates very well indeed how Filippo Maria had got 
himself into a very tight corner. On the night before the truce was 
declared Sforza was visited secretly by Antonio Guidobono, the Duke's 
envoy. Antonio repeated the offer of Bianaa's hand in marriage together 
with Cremona and pontremoli. 28Z/ One of the reasons why the ~wo armies 
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had not joined battle at Martinengo was that Piccinino had hoped to 
blackmail Filippo Maria by demanding the city of piacenza as a rewa~d. 
This was followed by territorial demands by other condottieri in the 
army partly as a recompense for payment which had never been made. Filippo 
Maria was unable to pay his army any more money and the alarming 
consequences of being forced to concede to his captains led him to 
288/ 
consider that to buy off Sforza was cheaper. - Likewise, Sforza 
found himself in financial difficulties and this was a good escape from 
the possibilities of suffering a defeat at the hands of Piccinino. On 
this occasion he accepted and his offer to mediate a peace with Milan 
was also a welcome relief for Venice. Both sides had heartily become 
tired of such a sterile war and were glad of any pretext to bring it to 
an end. When urbino di Giacomo brought the news to Piccinino together 
with instructions for the truce he was angered at being presented with 
such a 'fait accompli', but he had been outmanoeuvred by Filippo Maria 
289/ 
and had to give in. - On 3 August the two commanders met and arrangements 
were made for the dispersal of troops pending the re-opening of peace 
negotiations. 292/ 
What repercussions was all this to have on Gianfrancesco? It 
now looked as though the chances of peace were very good, but how did this 
affect Filippo Maria's promises to Gianfrancesco? As far as the money 
was concerned, there is no evidence whatsoever that it was paid. The 
more serious question was over his territories. What would become of them 
now that negotiations with Venice were about to open? Would the Duke try 
to defend Mantuan interests? 
Despite his undertaking to prclbct the Mantovano, the 
Duke knew perfectly well that no settlement could be reached on the 
basis of a complete restitution of Gianfrancesco's lands as early as 
the beginning of July. On 12 of that month a letter was written to 
Michele Gritti by another member of his family stating perfectly 
clearly the intention of the Senate. It reads: 
~ 
" ••• zoe che quel Marchexe sia in tutto 
reintegrato nel stato suo, aVizandove 
che la prefata Signoria ha fato respondere 
al predicto Signore Marchexe, e cussi e 
contenta sia dechiarido al Signore puca che 
non solamente Ie non vuol questo far ma la 
intende haver tutto quello che e de i territory 
de le cita de Brexa e de Verona." 
It concluded by stating that a peace would soon be forthcoming if the 
Duke were to agree to these terms. 29!/ This was repeated formally by 
the Senate on 21 JUly.29~/ Of course there was no intention of keeping 
all the areas occupied by Sforza, it was only those lands which affected 
their communications that they were determined to keep.29~/ This situation 
had not changed by the end of August when this was formally relayed by 
the Senate to Sforza who, it had been agreed, was to arbitrate the peace 
settlement. It stated that in return for the territories it wished to 
keep: Asola, Viadana, Peschiera, Lonato and Legnago, it was content to 
restore all the other areas which had been occupied. The Venetians 
294/ 
emphasised that they had to. insist upon this for security. - Because 
of the way in which Filippo Maria had been forced to come to terms with 
Sforza to protect him from the demands of his own captains, and his real 
~inancial need for peace with the Venetians, it is arguable that even 
before the discussions opened at Cavriana, ironically in the Mantovano, 
Gianfrancesco's fate had been settled and there was no way in which 
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Filippo Maria could alter it. His need to protect his own interests 
virtually dictated that Mantua had to be ditched. 
The discussions at Cavriana began in September and were 
attended by ambassadors from the Pope, Florence, Milan, Ferrara and 
Mantua. Francesco Barbaro and Paolo Tron represented Venice and their 
instructions as far as Mantua was concerned merely reiterated what had 
been decided beforehand.29~/ Consequently, any discussions over Mantuan 
interests were ultimately merely a formality. This did not mean that 
Gianfrancesco did not put up a fight for them; this is clearly indicated 
in a letter written by the Podesta of Mantua, Sceve de Curti, to Paola 
on 11 October. Apparently the Duke did put up some semblance of support 
for Gianfrancesco, but in the end it was evident that no one at Cavriana 
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296/ 
was prepared to sacrifice an eventual agreement by opposing Venice's demands. -
These discussions were punctuated by the marriage of Sforza to 
Bianca on 25 October at cremona. 291/ It was his wish to conolude this 
matter as quickly as possible. Whether Filippo Maria liked it or not, 
Francesco Sforza, the man he had so often attempted to beguile, was now 
a member of the Visconti family. There was no doubt who had won that 
parttcular struggle. Sforza, married to Filippo Maria's heiress, strong 
enough to defend her interests, certainly had a glittering future ahead of 
him. 
In Sforza's arbitration, which was published on 20 November, 
only one state registered any considerable losses - Mantua. None of the 
others had to make any sacrifices. The clock was essentially put back 
to 1433, the year of the second treaty of Ferrara. All lands taken after 
298/ that date were to be restored by the respective parties. - Once 
again the Adda boundary was established for the Milanese state; the Pope 
got Bologna and lmola; Florence and Genoa acquired the territories they 
had lost. But Gianfrancesco paid the supreme penalty of. losing Lonato, 
Peschiera and Asola. 292/ It is true that the other territories were 
restored to him and that he had known for some time that the Chances 
of losing them were great; but it was still a bitter pill to swallow. 
They were territories for which he had had a special affection, and, by 
now an ailing man, he found it very difficult to reconcile himself to 
their loss. In fact, he was still questioning the decision 1n April 1442, 
long after the peace was finally promulgated on 10 December l44l.3~/ 
Gianfrancesco must have wondered what had happened to all the promises his 
friends had made in the preceeding year. The Treaty of Cavriana might 
have brought peace to Lombardy, but for Gianfrancesco it was nothing but 
a triumph of self-interest which, moreover, bit all the more deeply by 
the last article which concerned him: 
"Item-arbitramus qm. prefatus I.D. 
Marchio Mantue remaneat et remanere 
debeat colligatus aut reccomendatus I.D. 30_1/ 
Ducis Mediolani". 
Even at the end he was tied to a man whose friendship had brought only 
bitterness and loss. The question which he had asked himself in'August 
1438 had finally be answered. 
"Tutti quanti li scholari com rami de 
oliva, com tutto 10 popolo, cadauno 
cridanolo "Pace! Pace:" che' 1 sonava 
che tutto 10 mondo tonasse. Era in 
quella martina sula piaza piu de 12 
millia persone che tutti quanti cridavano 
, Pace! Pace! " 
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This is how Da Soldo describedthe festivities which took place in 
Brescia when the peace was proclaimed. There are no such descriptions 
to be found among the Mantuan chroniclers. 
The disappointment over Cavriana overshadowed the final 
years of Gianfrancesco's life. It is, of course, arguable that matters 
could have been much worse for him and that he should have been grateful 
for having a state at all after what he had done in 1438. 
However, although the Peace of Cavriana canno~ testify to 
Gianfrancesco's success, neither can it stand as a failure. In 1438 
he was faced with an incredibly difficult situation and he had decided 
to risk everything in joining Milan because he felt that this was the best 
way of serving Mantua. There had been no alternative but this and 
unfortunately he little realised what sort of a man Filippo Maria Visconti 
was. In serving the Visconti he had had nothing but a succession of 
broken promises as a result of which his state had faced the greatest 
threat of his whole career. The war patently illustrated the weaknesses 
inherent in Mantua's position as much as the earlier struggle had 
illustrated its strengths. In the end, the very fact that Mantua existed 
at all is due as much to the desirability to Milan and Venice of having 
a buffer state between them as anything else and because of this the 
Marquis of Mantua could never be granted the luxury of resting easy. He 
always had to weigh the strengths of his protector against those of his 
adversary. Even though Gianfrancesco may well have thought that he had 
made the wrong decision in 1438, one cannot doubt his courage or his 
motives in having made it. 
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Indeed Lombardy was at peace once more - but for how 
long? How long would it be before the familiar pattern would repeat 
itself? It was not to be a question which would concern Gianfrancesco 
because, when war once more rolled across the Lombard plain, there 
was to be another Marquis in Mantua. 
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THE SERVANT OF THE VISCONTI (1438-1442) 
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Valle di Gonduco, Valle di San Martino, Brembilla, all the lands 
on the Cremonese previously in Venetian hands, Rocca Franca, Orago, 
Orzivecchi and Orzinuovi. Gianfrancesco and dal Verme had conqnered 
all the lands in the Veronese 'di qua dall'Adige' and the Valle di 
Agio. A.S.M. Regesti Viscontei, op.cit., vol.2, pt.l, Gli Atti 
Cancellereschi Viscontei, no.17l4. 
10. S.S. reg.14, fol.13lt, 14 July 1438. See also Sanuto, col.l06l: 
••• In questo giorno fu principiato a lavorare l'armata del Po nell' 
arsenale ••• ogoi giorno nell'Arsenale lavoravano 900 ~omini e piU. 
liE fu fomita tutta la detta armata di tutto quello ch'essa avea 
di bisogno, e di tutte le cose in pochi giomi, che fu grande 
mer.aviglia." This is in marked contrast to the difficulties which 
Gianfrancesco was to experience in trying to persuade Filippo Maria 
to get his fleet together. 
478. 
11. e.g. S.S. reg. 14, fo1.137, 29 July 1438, in instructions to Ug1,locione 
de'Contrari, Este's ambassador to Venice: "qd. videntes defectionem 
et tam gravem iniuriam nobis illata per Marchionem Mantue, quam 
considerantis omnibus considerandis nullo nro. expectabamus neque 
credere poteramus, deliberavDnus facere hanc potentem armatam, pro 
ulciscendo iniuriam ipsius Marchionis Mantue principaliter, et ad 
offensiones suas et status sui ac Ducis Mediolani". 
12. Arch. Gon. B. 43, fol.258: ...... in palatio infrascripti Marchionis 
Estensis ••• Domini Leonello ••• magnifico viro Ugutione de Contrariis ••• " 
13. See Tarducci, op.cit., p.28l. 
14. Ibid., p.284. 
15. Ibid., pp.285-6. Arch. Gon. B. 2099 (F.ll.6). 
16. Ibid: "circa ZQ alega la deboleza del state suo maxime de Ferrara, 
et.che e troppo apresso in Ie lor forze ••• " 
17. Ibid: "Siando nui possenti como ben seremo de zente ad obstarla, et 
havendo fatte le altre prov!sione 1e qual trovaramo a hostia et a Revero." 
18. A similar letter was sent to Paola only two days later on 24 July. 
19. Arch. Gon. B.118l, 26 July 1438 in which he had given instructions 
"quamquam Ugucio non sit ex nostra impositione talia verba 
enuntiaturus coram ducali dominii de ill. fratro nro. Do. Marchione 
Mantue, quem ill. Dom. obesse possuit ••• contentamur quod dictus 
Ugucio nullum ne minimum quidem verbum faciat in 1110 Senatu veneto 
dicto ill.-fratre nr ••• " 
20. Sanuto, col.l062. 
21. Ibid: "Fu pre so di fare un dono al predetto Marchese di Ferrara del 
Polesine il quale fu suo, e la Signorla l'Avea avuto in pegno per 
ducati 60,000. Sicche se gli dona liberamente." . 
22. Sanuto, col. 1062. "A di primo di Agosto s'ebbe •••• che i1 Marchese di 
Mantova s'era etiam lui ritirato dal Veronese, e dee andare a Milano; 
e questo perche egli ha buttatofuora ducati 22,000 per fare armata 
ln Po, e nulla e stato fatto •••• " 
23. Arch. Gon. B.2094, fo1.188, 31 July: "Sta optimamente ben veduti 
e acceptadl ••• tute Ie altre cosse opportune seguirano in boni termini •••• " 
24. Ibid: " ••• ma dal canto nostro e da far provision quanto se conviene, 
che alcuno mancamento non se Ii ritrovi ••• deveti pigliare ogni efficace 
cura •••• immo costrigendonege quella grandemente.per 1a salvatlone 
del state nostro e vostro ...... 
25. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 4 Aug. 1438 (To Conte Guido, Alvise & Lancelotto): 
" •••• el qual me dicie lei haver havuto da Messer 10 Vescovo de 
.. Mantoa che a Ferrara, e di continuo sta attento a presentire quello 
siegue del facto de larmada de Veneziani, za esser arrivato in Po 
quattro galeote; et che se tene per certo, essa armata dover essere 
in puncto a dl octo de questo mese, 0 in tuto ul. saltem in tanta 
quantitade che sera sufficiente a venir ali damni mei.~." 
26. Ibid: "Acio che io levando de Ie me zente, maxi me Ie fanterie 
e cernede come sera necessario per armare Ii mei XXI galeoni." 
27. There was also a plan to detach Guidantonio Manfredi from Venetian 
service because he was the only Venetian captain in a position to 
attack Ferrara; see Tarducci, p.289. There is no mention of this in 
the document cited by him, but it occurs in Arch. Gon. B.2l85 for 
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6 August 1438 in a letter to the same people: "Venendo Messer Leonello 
ad Hostiglia, vorrei da la signoria soa havere, per instructione, 0 
como Ii piacesse quanto io devessi tractare cum lui per che in quello 
mi comandara, non preteriro Ii commandamenti soi e etiam de facti del 
magnifico S. di Faenza del quale io facio grandissimo caso, considerato 
che non so vedere Ii Venetiani possono havere altro piu presto 
soccorso di gente e che presto sia a Ie offese del Marchese." The 
rest of the document virtually repeats the same requests as that of 
4 August. 
28. He states as much in a letter of 14 August.1438. (Osio, vol.iii, part"l, 
p.162, no. CLXXV): "pergratam habuimus operam quam dedistis apud 
il1ustrem Dominum Leonellum •••• ut illustris genitori suis cum Venetia 
partitum non capiat ••••• quia conjunctissimus vobis est •••• " 
29. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 11 Aug. (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria): "Et 
eandem reperi ipm. d. Leonellum per optime esse dispositum ...... 
30. Tarducci, op.cit., p.290: " •••• e Leonello che per propria d;sposi~ione 
d'animo aveva sentimenti avversi a Venezia, non solo promise l'opera 
sua presso il padre di restare neutrale e non favorire in alcun modo 
i Veneziani; e che intanto si fortificava con ogni premura per tenersi 
pronto contro la probabilita di un loro assalto." 
31. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 11 Aug. (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria). There is 
a great deal of correspondence in the Gonzaga archives relating to 
this, both in the Chancery Minutes (B.2185) and in the ambassador's 
reports from Milan (B.1620). 
32. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 11 Aug.1438. (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo). Although 
he acknowledged that the fleet was the most important means of 
protecting Mantua, he also felt that these reinforcements were 
essential in order to strengthen the land forces. 
33. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, Reg.Duc. no.4l, Rr als 0 (1434-1441) fol.397t •• 
34. Arch. Gon. B.43, fol.266, a copy of a letter to Alvyse and Guido dal 
Verme dated 2 August 1438: "Bene, e vero che Ii e uno capitolo, 
10 quale voriamo. che stasesse in altra forma, de 10 qualenon volemo 
fare altra mentione tanto che1 prefato S.Messer 10 Marchese sia i 
nostra terra. Anci volemo expectare chel sia tornato a cassa sua. 
Et alhora la faremo avisare de 10 dicto capitulo ac10 che sel gli 
piacera chel se puossa acontiare come nuy voriamo chal stasesse e 
in quanto el non volesse, chel staghicomo elata." 
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35. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, Reg. Duc. no.4l, Rr als 0., fols.297-400; also 
Arch. Gon. B.43, fols 271-2. 
36. Tarducci suggested on pp.327ff.: "il Conte Alvyse, in previsione dello 
sfarcelo che si farebbe alIa morte di Filippo Maria, veniva preparando 
Ie cose sue per tenersi pronto a trarre dagli eventi quel maggior 
profitto che forse possibile ••••• Ora in una probabile divisione 
della eredita del Visconti, qual parte a lui sarebbe venuta piU 
a proposito di Vicenza e di Verona, nelle cui terre aveva gia 
un qualche feudo." (p.327). 
37. Arch. Gon. B.1620, 29 July 1438 (Zenebaldo to Gianfrancesco); "10 stia 
de bona volia che sopra zo me mandera molto contento." 
38. e.g. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 6 Aug.1438: "Se. degni far scrivere al Mag. 
Conte Aloise per Ii terri di Veronese aquistate che tute liberamente 
e cossi Ie rocche me siano poste ne Ie mane e similmente que lIe se 
aquistarono ..... 
39. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 13 Aug.1438. (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria). 
40. Arch. Gon. B.1607, fol.25, 16 Aug.1438 (Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco): 
..... Recordandove impero che nuy non acceptamo puncto questa liberatione 
che ne haviti'facta ••• anci ne vogliamo essere molto, e molto piu 
ob1igati che denance ••• e per questo a Zanibaldo habiamo restituita la 
ditta vostra,littera." This reaction is also noted in Zenebaldo's 
report to Filippo Maria dated 17 Aug.1438 (Arch. Gon. B.1620, fo1.50). 
Although he confirmed that the Duke's mood was conciliatory, he himself 
WaS angered at the response which the letter received: ..... io potria 
sbater del p~ adusso ••• " 
41. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 18 Aug.1438 (Instructions from Gianfrancesco to 
Zenebaldo): ..... vo1enda noi contentarsi di permutare e tor Bressa 
o Cremona la soa Signoria ne rimara contentissima, offerendo di volere 
fare tal cautione e certezaa di attendere questo che ne siamo chiari e 
segurissimi e che a questo partito la soasignoria seria inanimata 
di metterge Milano e cia che potesse fare per isfogarsi a la total 
ruina di costoro. Quando noi non volessemo inclinarge che farse 
el si ritraria e descenderia a la pace per havere Bressa e Bergamo ...... 
42. In fact, as early as 19 August Gianfrancesco had been busily trying to 
make his rule acceptable in the area to the east of the Mincio. On 
that day a 'grido' was issued which guaranteed the security of all 
property not only for the area along the Veronese shores of Lake 
Garda, but also for the districts of Valleggio, Villafranca, Nogarolo 
and Vigasio. (Arch. Gon. B. 2038, fasc.4). 
43. Tarducci, op.cit., p.297. 
44. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 21 Aug.1438. (Instructions from Gianfrancesco to 
Zenebaldo): ••••• e per queste cossa poi comprender quanto perplesso sia 
lanimo nostro ••• ma dove vada l'onore nostro non 10 comportassemo ad . 
alcun modo, per non voler deventare dabate monaco." If the soldiers , 
"saranno ad obedentia del conte Aloise •••• non intendendeao mettere pe 
in campa!' 
45. Arch. Gon. B.1607, fols.23-24, 14 Aug.1438, (Filippo Maria to 
Gianfrancesco): " •••• immo faciemus quicquid poterimus, ut 
class is ipsa citissime paretur, et expediatur •••• Credimus enim 
et nos in ea consistere importantiam et bonum maximum status 
vostri et nostri,.qui sunt et semper erunt unum et idem ••• " 
This was echoed in Zenebaldo's report of the same day in Arch. 
Gon. B. 1520, fol.49. 
481. 
46. Ibid: "sed, obtento loco Roadi, quod presto futurum confidimus, 
exercitus ipse noster ibit, et se firmabit contra terram Urcearum 
Novarum et tunc vobis mi ttere poterimus, ac mi ttemus predictas gentes." 
In fact, Filippo Maria hinted that he might even be able to send 
Piccinino together with the whole army "si expediens fuerit". 
Filippo Maria always guarded himself by such phrases. Nevertheless, 
he promised to act quickly to counteract the threat from the Veronese. 
47. Arch. Gon. B.1620, fol.50, 17 Aug.1438. (Zenebaldo to Gianfrancesco): 
"10 non sento ancor aparechamento alguno a questa armata che molto me 
dolie." Zenebaldo found this delay very difficult to reconcile with 
what Filippo Maria had previously indicated. 
48. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 18 Aug.1438) (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria): 
"25 galeon., sex galearum et 80 barcarum armatorum ••• " 
49. Filippo Maria was encouraging the activities of Gianfrancesco's agents 
in Padua "Maxime per obviare a li sinistri che puotriano occorrere 
per questa armata de Venetiani". (Arch. Gon. B.1620, fol.26, 24 Aug. 
1438; Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco). 
50. Ibid., Filippo Maria was complaining to Gianfrancesco of the 
excessive wartime expenditure: "Ma gli puotremo ben meglio subvenire de 
gente cha de dinari, e piu habelmente gli puotriamo subvenire de 
mille cavalli, cha de mille fiorini, perche habiamo le gente e non li 
dinari ...... 
51. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, Reg. Duc. no.4l, Rr als 0, fols. 577-578. 
52. e.g. in Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 21 Aug.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo): 
In this letter he also informed the Duke of the progress he was making 
in reinforcing the fortress of Sermide, the first important fortification 
on the Po on the eastern frontier of the Mantovano. Sforza had sent an 
envoy, Giovanni da Cremona, to discuss mattel;s with Venice: "non 
cessassero di bater questo chiodo continuamente per mezanita del papa 
il quale ne e caldo e promptissimo." 
53. Ibid. The Florentines were already planning to send Niccolo Valori 
to Milan: ..... perche non e dubio chi hara riorentini hara el conte 
Francesco, e cusl del Conte Francesco chi hara luno hara laltro ..... 
54. Ibid. "Certo, Zenebaldo, ne pare de maraveyare grandemente, considerato 
cum quanta spesa et instantia el pre faro Signore Messer 10 Duca 
havia circato de retrare el dicta Conte dal amore de Venetian!', et 
vedendo adesso la soa Signoria da haver el zoco vinto afar le vendete 
di soi inimici, e quasi se po tegnirper farse Signore de Italia4 che 
voia privarse de tal Capitano e dele zente che ha e f arne forte Ii 
inimici soy. 
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55. Ibid:" ricordando che quanto piu presto ce fara forte de 
zente sera e1 meio, perche queste zente che habiamo non son 
da potere attendere a tante cose." 
56. Arch. Gon. B.1607, f01.26, 24 Aug.1438 (Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco): 
...... dicamo che nuy siamo certissimi chil habia sempre havuto verso 
nuy quello bono animo, de 10 qualo ve a-dicto, ni puotressemo 
may credere altramente." 
57. Ibid: ...... siando vuy forte de l'armata nostra g1i inim1ci non 
obserano may fare asalto ••• e pertanto die e nocte faciamo attendere 
cum grandissima diligentia a 1a reparatione e armamento de li 
nostri galioni per mandargli zuso ala f. v ••••• e siati certo che non 
g1i perderemo tempo veruno in fare prestissimo spaciare e mandarve li 
dicti galion!." 
58. Ibid: ...... nuy debiamo havere scripto per septe nostre lettere al 
conte Francesco de la quale cossa, pare pura che la f.v. se maraviglia •••• 
perche non sapiamo vedere che persona de questa mondo la dovesse may 
credere vedendo che habiamo facta tanta spesa e tante altre cosse a1 
prefato conte, come habiamo facto, per haverlo cum nuy." 
59. Ibid:" •• diciamo che sel vignera 10 vedremo molto voluntera e faremo 
~ 
quanto ricorda el prefato S. messer 10 Marchese •••• perche comprendiamo 
chiaramente chel dicie el vero." 
60. Ibid:" como sia obtenuto Rovado, .1 che crediamo sera presto cum 10 
aiuto de Deo, ve manderemo le gente ae le quale, e como per altre ve 
habiamo scripto". 
61. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 25 Aug.1438, copy of Niccolo d'Este's letter to 
Leonello, forwarded by the latter to Gianfrancesco: tI •••• te advisamo 
chel pre1ibato ill. principe ce ha dito che zobia mattino se puoterano 
infallanter li galioni lezeri che son in tutoL. Sabato subsequente se 
partira el capitaneo con 10 resto, che son in summa galioni LXV, galea x, 
gittarole XJ queste son nave che volano a coperte per li veretonti, 
barche XX, barbote coperte ligname grosso x, la qual armata dice non 
dubita, castigara 10 ill. s. nostro fratello Marchese de Mantoa dicendo 
noi mostreremo pure se lui ha facto bene a tradircein questa forma. 
Et facemOli portar pena del suo malfare ••• " 
62. Ibid: tlEt in summa Leonello, qui se tiene certissimo che questa armata 
vincera ogni riparo e provisione habia facto 10 ill.s. nostro fratello." 
63. Apparently the restitution of the Polesine was partly the Pope's idea. 
The documents were signed in Venice on 27 July, three days after Niccolo's 
arrival. See Tarducci, op.cit., p.30S, footnote no.l. 
64. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 24 Aug.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo): "nui havemo 
da piu persone fidedigni, e maxime per relatione del Mag.Ugutione di 
Contrari novamente ritornato da Venesia, che larmata de Venetiani domane 
se de partir de Venesia per venirce adosso. Questa armata e grandissima 
Zanibaldo, benche non crediamo ne sia tanto quanto se dice, rna bon 
pezo apresso si •••• , a parme che le cosse di qua vadino molto lente •••• 
et sollicita cum ogni instanza che ••• subito ne sia mandati quelli 
XX galioni •••••• queste cosse ••••• sono periculosissime e da procurne 
damni infiniti." 
i . 
, : 
65. e.g. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 25 Aug.1438 (Instructions to Zenebaldo). 
He had tried to raise 12,000 ducats by pawning goods in Ferrara, 
but because of Niccolo's conduct, he was doubtful whether the 
money would be forthcoming. He therefore instructed Zenebaldo as 
follows: "voremo tu vede se questa tal quantitade de denari, dando 
nuy bonissimo pegni, se poria haber 11 ••• " 
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66. Ibid. "Cercando de removere ogni ombra e scropolo che deli facti 
nostri potesse cadere in la mente de quello signore. E di cio te 
incareghemo asay." Zenebaldo was also asked to request 'bombardier!'. 
67. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 25 Aug.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria): 
" ••• Ego maiorem q. unquam cepi animam firmissime dispositus vitam 
meam, filios meos obedientes, statum et omnia mea totaliter pro 
status cel. vre. a quo meus etiam dependet, •••• et sic spero, 
veneto rum predictorum impetus deo adiutore repimere: et eos cum sua 
tam potenti et rabiata armata, mala tractare." 
68. Much of the background is discussed in chapter 4. See also Tarducci, 
op.cit., pp.305-30G. 
69. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 28 Aug.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Filippo Maria). There 
is also a letter of instruction to Zenebaldo. Both these documents are 
discussed in considerable detail by Tarducci on pp.306-7 and much of 
what follows parallels his description fairly closely. 
70. Arch. Gon. B. 1607, fol.29, 31 Aug.1438 (Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco): 
" ••• dicamo che venendo Ii suoy Ambassiatori ••••• Ii vedremo molto 
voluntera e gli faremo bona recoglienza secondo lusanza nostra, como 
meritano cussi notabili homini •••• " 
71. Ibid: "E cum bene Ii denari non gli siano dati in termine el non e 
pera che non se gli vogliano ben dare, e chel non gli vegna ben ad 
havere per modo e per forma chel non perderl nessuno •••• " 
72. Ibid: "E fra Ie altre cose perch~ non gli hal:>iamo ancora data nostra 
... , 
fiola si e perche non gie la dariamo mai, se primamente non sono tolte 
via Ie differentie chi sono tra 10 Magnifico Capitano nostro et esso 
Conte,. In la remotione de Ie quali differentie confortiamo e pregamo la 
s.v. che gli voglia fare ogni opera a lui possibile e maxime cum 10 
prefato nostro capitano •••• " 
73. In fact, in B.,2l85, 28 Aug. (as in note 67), Gianfrancesco was perplexed 
by information which he had received that Filippo Maria was deliberately 
encouraging Sforza to go over to the Venetians. This is discussed by 
Tarducci on p.3l5. The whole business seemed incredible, but this 
was quite in keeping with Filippo Maria's tortuous methods. In the 
final analysis he was convinced that Bianca as a diplomatic bait would 
ultimately lure him onto the Milanese side. This was an example of 
Visconti long-term strategy. 
74. e.g. at the beginning of September he was using Torello to whip up •. 
pro-Visconti enthusiasm in the Bresciano amongst the Avogadro and 
Martinengo families (see Tarducci, p.3l7). Gianfrancesco was also 
involved in this. In Arch. Gon. B.1607, fol.31 (3 September) Filippo 
Maria was saying: "diciamo che nuy lassiamo ala f.v. che,in ~esto 
proceda e facia quello e quanto a ley pare, e como habiamo ferma ' 
speranza in vuy perche de tuto restaremo contentissimi". 
75. Arch. Gon. B. 1607, 30 Aug.1438 (Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco): 
"Certifcantes vos quod ad apparatum et expeditionem armate nostre 
ga1eonarum si1icet triginta ex prestatioribus me1ioribus procedi 
facuimus die noctuque cum maxima ce1eritate et di1igentia •••• in 
re ista non deficimus nec deficere u110 modo disponiumus neque 
erimus animo bene contenti, donec fuit huiusmoda armata total iter 
expedita ••• " 
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76. Arch. Gon. B.1620, fo1.s3, 30 Aug.1438) (Zeheba1do to Gianfrancesco). 
77. Arch. Gon. B. 1620, fo1.ss, 31 Aug.1438) (Zeneba1do to Gianfrancesco): 
"A1 facto de questa armataquesto I.S. a1 prexente gie fa zo che 
puo perche sia in hordine non 1assando mancare a1guna cossa, cossi 
vo1esse Dio 1a fusse comenzata xv zorni piu tosto, prego 1a preffata 
S.vra. me aduixa inquanti zorni 1a penssa dicta armata de Veneciani 
possa venire ad Hosti11ia, perche questo S. ma domandato mo1te 
persone in quanto tempo potra vegnir ••• " 
78. Arch. Gon. B. 1620, fo1.57, 4 sept. 1438: ...... ozo dl 4 de questa 
con e1 nome de Dio e1 dicto Gabriele e partito, con e1 modo de poter 
amare gran parte de 1i 30 ga1ioni, de 1i qua1i spera mandare forssi 
1a mita 1unedl appresso verso Mantoa, ed e1 resto quanto piu presto li 
sera possibi1e." Filippo Maria echoed this on 6 Sept; in B.1607, fo1.31. 
79. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 1 Sept.1438 (Filippo Maria to Zeneba1do): "Ala 
parte che vog1iamo ordinare che 1e nostre gente manderemo di 1a 
siano ad 'obedentia sua, non siando1i e1 nostro Magnifico Capitaneo, 
dicemo che questo e mo1to ben razone e che vo1emo fare perche gli vog1iama 
molto ben attendere quello gli habiamo promesso." 
80. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 28 Aug.1438 (Filippo Maria to Gianfrancesco): 
"Ringratio essa s.v. piu che dire ne pensare potessi, r1cevendo d1 
cic que110 singo1arissimo piacere e contento che potesse alcun fio10 
e servitor dal suo optimo servitor e padre •••• " See also Tarducci, p.308, 
who considers the tenor of this reply to be far.too subservient. 
81. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 28 Aug.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo): " •••• tu starai ~ 
di continuo attento, habiando advertentia che sia senza a1cuna 
demonstratione, a presentir de facti nostri da ogni canto, si che la 
signoria sua titubassi 0 fossi su la disposition dela qual ce haveva 
parlato el Conte Alvyse, 0 per alcun respecto stesse sospeso di 
provvedere al passare deladise e ale altre cosse necessarie, noi 
possiamo haverne piena notitia, per sapere quello haressemo a fare." 
Tarducci was quite right in suggesting that the relations between the 
two men could never :ge good "Lluno eliminava llaltro" (p.3ll). 
82. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 30 Aug.1438. (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo): 
"., di 1 ' •••• perche ••••• non fosseno discor co. conte e nOi, perche 
tal modi poi considerare quanto seria ad incargo del honor nostro •••• " 
It is also interesting to note that in this same letter he informed 
Zenebaldo that, as a mark of his confidence in Milan, he had decided 
to send his youngest son, Gi~lucido, to study in Pavia. Zaccharia 
del Rio was going to be sent to make the necessary preparations "ahel 
.ne pare questa seria optima cosa per dimostrare alSig •. messer 10 Duca 
per ogni via certa confidentia de noi". 
83. Tarducci, p.312. 
84. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 4 Sept.1438 (Gianfrancesco to A1vise): "Se ben 
habiamo inteso quanto 1a mag. vra. ce ha dito e referito per parte 
del I.S. messer to duca nostro singo1arissimo padre, doppo 1i 
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mo1ti rasonamenti havuti tra nui in seme et etiam per mexanitate de 
Mathero de Corradi, in effecto e questo, che 1a Es. prendera contento 
de metter in 1e mane nostre Bressa e 10 bressano se prima 1a se 
acquistarse, 0 Verona 0 Vicenza acquistando1e prima che Bressa, 
et che poi fosse in soa dispositione de darme 1iberamente 0 Bressa 
o Verona luna per cambio de 1altra, si che noi f09semo tenuti ad accetarla 
qual essa volesse erestituirge 1altra ge Ihavessemo in 1e mane. Et 
ancora che vole cambiare per Vicenza 0 Padoa 0 Treviso, qual piu ne 
piacera. II 
85. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 11 Sept.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Zeneba1do). 
86. Arch. Gon. B. 1620, fol.86, 2 Sept.1438 (Z~d>aldo to Gianfrancesco). 
This is one of a number of letters in which Ze~aldo departs from the 
formal language of diplomacy and adopts a more openly emotional response. 
On the following day Gianfrancesco wrote in the following manner to A1vise: 
"novamente ne troviamo haver scritto a Zaniba1do qual tenemo apresso 
la excellentia soa •••••• et per simel di quel1e, terre che offerite, 
restituirne cum quel1a condicione etc., ne pare etiam de non 1e acetare 
e sopastare finch~ avemo la risposta dal dicto Zaniba1do" (Arch. Gon. 
B. 2185, 3 Sept.1438; Gianfrancesco to Zeneba1do). 
87. Arch. Gon. B.2l85, 4 Sept.1438; Gianfrancesco's agreement with A1vise da1 
Verme. It ends: "Insuper perchl speramo dever presto cum la gratia 
de dio inseme cum la M.Vra. passare ladese, pregamo la s.v. che voglia 
havere devuto riguardo al honor nostro." On the following day a copy 
was sent to Milan (Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 5 Sept.1438; Gianfrancesco to 
Zeneba1do) • 
88. Arch. Gon. B.1620, fol. 57, 4 Sept.1438 (zenebaldo to Gianfrancesco): 
"Dopo che fu partito e1 conte Guido Torello per andar a Pavia e de 11 
vegnir a Mantua verso ala parte de la s.v. me vedea menar 10 coda per 
la barba e non dare e1 modo che Gabriele capo di ferro potesse andar alo 
armamento deli galeoni, e dareli pur bene longe atrovar 1i denari me 
despoxi de gridar tanto che laudaria ad orecchi al duca de Milan." 
Later on in the letter he criticises the transparent and insulting 
reasoning of Dal Verme and Filippo Maria: "Da p6i ho sentito questo Ill. 
roo Signor ha opinione che la s.v. habia dentro de Brixia piu che lui •••• 
e cos! e stato intestato da questi vermi la prefata vostra signoria 
esser mal vol uta dentro da Verona, dicendo che mal poriano suportare 
vuy li fussi signore ricordandosi le inimicitie antiche, e chel 
Duca lie tropo ben voluto per rispeto dela bona signoria fatali per 11 
tempi passati: cossa che me vien volia dar de la testa contro terra, 
o farli dare altri p1uttosto." 
89. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 6 Sept.1438 (Gianfrancesco to Zenebaldo): " ••• habiamo 
di certo •••• l'armata de costoro za essere zunti in Corbole tre galee 
su le qual e M1sser Pedro Lodrono.~ •• " He estimates that the fleet 
will be at the borders of the Mantovano in four days. This itlformat1cm 
was repeated in a letter to Filippo Maria on 9 September which also 
advised him to send reinforcements for Piccinino and Dal Verme because 
Gattamelata was making renewed attempts to cross the Mincio. His so~ 
Carlo was involved in defending this. area. 
486. 
90. Arch. Gon. B.2185, 11 Sept.1438. 
91. Ibid, B.1620, 11 Sept.1438 (Zenebaldo to Gianfrancesco): "10 per 
altra haveva scrito ala s Vostra che si partira ben x 0 xii galioni, 
et vedendo che sono bosie." Furthermore, Filippo Maria was finding it 
difficult to raise men from elsewhere because of pressure imposed upon 
him by Piccinino. Zenebaldo says: "tuti me davano bone parole e 
poche fati." Five days earlier Filippo Maria was writing "senza 
fallo ne siano mandati Ii mille cavalli a numero como rechesta e 
forse maiore summa, e de questo stasitive de bona voglia." (Arch. 
Gon. B.1607, fol.31, 6 Sept.1438). 
92. Arch. Gon. B.2185; undated, but catalogued under 1438. The contents 
refer specifically to negotiations with Dal Verme: "Me pare esser in 
uno laberinto ad intendere queste tal pratiche, ma spero in dio che la 
s.v. cum la sua usata prudentia savera proveder al tuto." This 
paper appears together with instructions to Matteo de Corrado, 
Gianfrancesco's envoy to Dal Verme. 
93. Sanuto, col.l06S. This agrees in substance with Platina's description 
of events (p.344): "Attigerat iam Padum classis quae tardim, quam 
belli gerendi ratio exigebat, subvecta, Mantuano tempus ad ea loca 
munienda ac firmanda praesidio dedit, quibus a Veneto aliquid incommodi 
obvenire poterat. Ad Sermedum enim et Hostiliam Reverumque, quae in ripa 
Padi sunt sita, palas oblongos et grossis duplici ac triplici ordine 
in flumine'defixit, catenis colligatos quo navibus in terram accessus 
vertaretur. Ad haec frequentia Castella, propugnacula, tormenta in ripis 
locis opportunis disposita, unde hostium classis detineri posset, 
quo minus per Padum subveneretur." 
94. Ibid. See also Romanin, op.cit., vol.4, p.142: " •••• ne meglio andavano 
ai Veneziani Ie cose suI Po, ehe eontrariato anche dalla stagione secca, 
per la quale scarse erano Ie acque del Po, nulla pot~ operare, e fu uopo 
richiamare quell armata." 
95. There are a number of references in S.S. reg.14, to continuing negotiations 
for the rest of the year, notably fols.143,143t., 187, l87t, lBB. 
These negotiations were increasingly more successful. 
96. For a consideration of this campaign see Soranzo, pp.S3-S and Da Soldo, 
p.14. Rovato fell on 6 September (Sanuto, col.l074). 
97. See Soranzo, p.84. Eroli, pp.llSff., Sanuto, col:l064. Treeaani (Br.), 
p.47. 
98. Da Soldo, pp.14 & 15. 
99. Soranzo, pp.B6-7. Sanuto, col.1064: "Adunque Gattamelata •••• vedendosi 
essere serrato in Brescia •••• e non vedendo modo di potere passare 
sicuramente per venire nel Veronese •••• andO pel monti, e sulle creste 
delle montagne per la via Trento, cavalcando dl l e notte •••• E tanto 
fece, chlegli giunse ad Area e passo suI Veronese, rna scortic3 piU 
dl 600 cavalli." See also Eroll, p.117. 
100. Simonetta, "Rerum Gestarum Francisci Sfortie", cit., p.82. 
101. Sanuto, cols. 1064-5; "Fu pre so net Pregadi di fare Capitan Generale 
il Magnifico Gattamelata, e donargli una casa da stazione 1n questa 
Terra, la quale fu quella del Conte Luigi dal Verme suI campo di 
San Paolo. Item, si dava al detto Gattamelata condotta di cavalli 
3,000 e di fanti 500 e ducati 500 al mese per provigione della sua 
persona." 
102. Eroli, p.122, Treccani (Br.) vol.2, p.55. 
487. 
103. According to Da Soldo most of the month of Octoper was taken up not 
only with preparations for the siege, but also with skirmishing with 
the enemy: "E in questo modo se stete da trei dl de ottobrio sempre 
mai ogni zorno scaramuzando cum loro per fina:alli· 4 de novembr10 1438." 
(p.17) • . 
104. De Soldo provides the best description; see pp.17ff. See also 
Treccani (Br.) vol. 2, pp.54-72; Sanuto, cols. 1067-1073. See also 
E. Manelmi, Commentario~.m de obsidione Brixiae a.MCCCCXXXVIII, 2, ed. 
G.A.Astezati (Brescia 1728). 
105. Platina, op.cit., p.345: "Tum Piceninus et Mantuanus, veluti hac 
contemptu irritati, aucto militum numero, bombardas crebris in locis 
ad Turram longam (id ei loco nomen est) disposuit, quibus brevi adeo 
moenia et turres sunt disjectae, ut plures civium, desperata salute, 
de deditione fac1enda cog1taverunt." 
106. S.S. reg.14, fol. l64t, 16 Nov. 1438. These negotiations were conducted 
by Marco Foscari and Federico Contarini. 
107. S.S. reg.14, fol.168. 
108. Da Soldo, p.28. 
109. Eroli, p.125. 
110. Da Soldo, pp.28-9: "Nlccola Picenino et il Marchese di Mantova ••• 
feceno granda adunanza de cernidi ~t feceli andar fin a quelli logi de 
Archo per la via del lago. E simelmente gli anda Taliano Forlano com 
molta gente d'armi a cavallo e saccomani assai a piede." According 
to Soranzo (p.9l) Furlano had first of all allowed the Gatteschi to 
pass but subsequently pursued them. 
Ill. See Soranzo, p.9l, Platina, p.350, Eroli, p.l25, Da Soldo, p.29. 
112. See Eroli, p.126 and document no. XLV in the appendix; Soranzo, p.92. 
113. S.S. reg. 14, fol.leOt, 6 Feb.1439. 
114. Da Soldo, p. 30. Parte inedi ta della Cronaca di Anonimo Ve.ronese 
(1438-1445, 1488-1491). (Nuova Historia, Verona, 1955). 
115. Da Soldo, p.30: . "Si diceva esser tra galee brigantini et altri fusti 
benda circa 80." 
116. According to the Anonimo Veronese it was around 15 February (p.9S). 
See Soranzo, p.93, note 1. 
117. Sanuto, col. 1073: ...... s1 abbe nuova come il Marchese di Mantova • 
Niccolo Picenino erano venuti colI' armata del DUca di Milano per 
,. 
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ritrovare la nostra, e per la via di sopra colle genti d'arme, per 
modo che furono alle mani, e ne furon morti molti di que' del Duca, 
e presi molti, e quelli degli schiopetti fuIt).no tagliati a pezzi. 
Etiam pe' nostri furono prese parecchie navi e burchiele, che andavano 
da un luogo all'altro. La vittoria fu minore di quello che ne fu 
detto. I morti furono 500 e i prigioni 500." 
118. Soranzo (p.94) remarks that on this occasion only the materials would 
be sent, the ships themselves would be built 'in situ'. 
119. e.g. in April the Senate considered sending grain to Schio and thence 
through the Vallarsa and Val di Lappio to Torbole and then by water 
to Ponale. See Soranzo, p.94,'note 1. 
120. Sanuto, col. 1073: "S'ebbe nuova d'essere venuto alla Rotta del 
Castagnaro 28 Galeoni del Marchese di Mantova, per tagliare le Palate, 
ch'ivi son fatte." S.S. reg.14, fo1.192, 23 March 1439 (Senate to 
Francesco Barbadigo, ambassador to the Pope): " ••• qui quidem marchio etiam 
paravit et secrete misit ad ruptam Castegnari mu1tas galeonos et 
barbotas et tam per terram quam per aquam omnes hostes predicti 
propter lacum nostrum Leniaci se reduxerunt iamque per viribus suis 
fecerunt et faciunt experentiam transeundi atticem cum ingenti periculo 
statum nostrL" The Venetians were using this danger in order to 
persuade Sforza to join them immediately in Lombardy. In fol.192t. 
exactly the same letter is addressed to Sforza himself. See also 
Soranzo, pp.94-5. 
121. Da Soldo, p.31: "possa, del ditto mese de marzo, si leva (Le. Piccinino) 
et andete in Veronese et anda a lozar a Cerea e in quelle altre 
terrezole circondante. Et 11 stete piuzor giomi a far fare una certa 
fossa per candur certi suoi galioni in l'Adesse per dover buttar 
uno ponte •••• but to uno ponte sopra l'Adese a dispetto de nove mlllia 
cavalli e forsi sei millia fanti che haveva Gattame1ata 11 a1 iropeto 
delli inimici, li quali mai non fecero contrasto alchuno alli inimici, 
nel passare per difetto de uno messer Andrea Donato, Provisor in campo, e1 
qual non voleva. Passato ch'el fu, mise campo a Lignano com le 
bombarde." 
122. Da Soldo, p.31. 
123. He had been attacked by a contingent of Brescian troops under the 
command of Pietro Avogadro. Furlano was forcedto flee and many 
prisoners were taken. See Da Soldo, p.31. 
124. Soranzo, p.99. 
125. Arch. Gon.B. 2185, 26 Jan.1439. (Letter to Paola from her agent). 
126. Arch. Gon. B. 1620, 18 July 1439. Zenebaldo complains about this to 
Paola; he speaks of "le extreme necessitade nostre •••• " Later in the 
letter he says: "Per 10 spazamento de queste zente darme e prolungato 
a non poter haver denari •••• ionon 1i posse ne so far pi'll." See also 
Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fo1.49 (Bartolomeo Pendaglia in Ferrara, to paola). 
127. For details see S.S. reg.14, fo1s 187-8. See smith, op.cit., p.97, 
also Simonetta, p.SO, who adds that a secre~ clause in the agreement 
limited his activities to two years. 
489. 
128. There is a very good discussion of the relationship between 
Sforza and Filippo Maria in Smith, pp.97-l00 et. seq.: "Eventually 
this egoistic desire to put Sforza in his place became an obsession, 
dwarfing all other policy, even the traditional conflict with Venice 
and Florence." (p.1OO). 
129. e.g. See Osio, vol. iii,pt.l, pp.177-9; e.g. p.178, 14 April 1439: 
" •••• sed, ut non dubitamus il1ustrem Magnificentiam vestram sensisse, 
est Nicolaus Piccininus cum Marchione Mantue, et omnibus gentibus 
inimicis prope Acticis flumen, temptans omnibus viribus et industria 
transire ad damna nostra, quod, si occurreret quod Deus avertet, 
cognoscimus in hoc casu statum nostrum subjacere manifesto periculo ••• " 
On 6 May the Senate called him "solum et unicum nostrum refugium ac 
remedium ad conservationem et reintegrationem status nostri." (5.5. 
reg.14, fol.203). 
130. See Treccani (Mi.), p.335. Also Decembrio, "Vita Filippo Maria ••• " 
cit., p.263. 
131. 5.5. reg.14, fol. 209t, 20 June 1439. When Este had sounded out 
Venice on the prospects of Gianfrancesco, they had replied: "parati 
sumus iniuriam a predicto Marchione Mantue receptarum oblivisti et 
eum reassumere et acceptare ad benevolentiam nostram". (fol.210t). 
For earlier attempts at this see Soranzo, op.cit., p.lOl. 
132. 5.5. reg.14, fol.2l4t, 30 July 1439 (To Pisani): "et dicimus quod 
si ••• aquiret civitatem Mantue, contenti sumus quod ipsa civitas cum 
toto territorii Mantuano excellentie sue remaneat." The Venetians 
guarded themselves by saying that in the event of successful 
negotiations with Gianfrancesco, he would still have Cremona together 
with all the Cremonese. This was repeated on 24 June 1440 (5.5. reg.1S, 
fol. 27t). 
133. Much of this description is from 50ranzo, pp.103-4. 
134. Arch. Gon. 1620, fol. 70, 18 July 1439; (Zenebaldo to Paolal 
Zenebaldo was equally sceptical about any despatch of money. For 
instance, on 18 August he writes that 10,000 ducats had been promised, 
but he adds: "ma veramente credo esser ingannato a questo ••• dato che de 
1e a1tre ne siano dicte asai buxie." (B. 1620, fol. 72) • 
135. Ibid: " •••• hora essendo venuto el conte Francesco •••• non posseno 
pasar per alltra via che se darano su la testa. 10 me moro sentendo e1 
mio Signore e messer Carlo in questo pericu11a. Dio per sua pieta 
1i quarda •••• " 
136. Da Soldo, p.34: "Uno giorno del ditto mese di Auosto si leve, com una 
parte di1 campo e venne in Gardesana credendosi trovar la nostra 
amata forta su1 1ago. Et stete in Gardesana ben quatro giomi. 
De 1a qual venuta a tutte noi di Bressa ne fu una grande alegreza 
videndo10 ad approx1marse in que1 modo. In cavo de quatro zorni 
, ' 
si le~ de Gardesana e ando a Pontone. E 11 stete circa do! zorn!. 
Possa si leva e ando a Zevi." 
137. Da Soldo, p.3s: "Quando 10 vide (Le. Sforza) andar a Zevi, 
subito ritorno ••• e anda a lozarse a Vigase lui e 10 Marchese di 
Mantua com suo campo. Et 11 se feceno molto forti de fosse, de 
sbarre e de altre cose, et· steteno 11 grand tempo." 
490. 
138. Around the middle of August he was beaten by Taliano Furlano just 
outside Sala. See Soranzo, p.10s and Da Soldo, pp.35-6. See also 
Simonetta, p.86. 
139. Da Soldo, p.37. He went by water but was assisted on land by Alvyse 
de San Severino who reached Riva by way of Moncastello. 
140. Simonetta, p.87: "Magna earum pars capta est, qua rum in numero fuere 
Carolus. Gonzaga, Johannis Francisci Mantuani principis filius, 
Caesar Martinengus, Scaramor Vicecomes adolescens, aliique permulti 
clari nominis iuri •••• " Sanuto (coL 1083) includes a copy of a 
letter which Sforza and Gattamelata had written to the Doge describing 
the course of the battle. 
141. Arch. Gon. B. 2094 fol.268, 19 Sept.1439. Gianfrancesco to Paola 
from Vigasio, in wh±chhe and Filippo Maria have agreed "de mutar uno' 
capitulo •••• cioe, che dove la conducta de le zente chel ce da dice 
in persona de Carlo nostro figlolo se rescripta e dica in noy, lassando 
star Carlo •••• " See also A.S.M., Archivio DUcale Extra Dominium cart. 
14 Fol. 24, 15 Sept.1439. 
142. His youngest son Gianlucido was a student in Pavia at this time. There 
is a series of letters from Gianfrancesco's agent Zaccharia de Rio de 
Padova running from 24 Feb.1439 to 19 Sept.1439 reporting his good 
progress. (Arch. Gon. B. 1620, fols. 74-77 incl.). 
143. " •••• facendogli la notte stessa, sequita alla rotta, portar via, 
come fosse un cadavere dpn appestato, in un sacco da un rob~to e fedele 
famiglio Todeschino, e metter in salvo a Riva." (Soranzo, pp.107-8). 
144. s.s. reg.14, fol.228t, 28 Sept.1439. 
145. Da Soldo, pp.38-9: "Niccolo Picenino e il Marchese de Mantua erano 
intrati in Verona con tutto la suo perforzo. Subito el Conte Francesco 
si leve da campo alli 17 de novembrio di notte e ando verso Verona. 
Et fu bisogno andar per le mOntagne et trovo che Verona era tutta 
quanta persa, e forteze et ogni casa salvo 10 Castello Veahio 0 quello 
de Sancto Felice et una delle porte." 
146. S.S. reg. 14, fol.237. 
147. Soranz~, p.l09. There is quite a good detailed description of the 
battle in Eroli, pp.135-141, also Da Soldo, p.39, and Simonetta, p.90. 
148. Da Soldo, p.39: "Ne fu presi in grande quantita e fu preso carri 
assai et cernedi assai di quelli Mantuani." Simonetta (p.90) concurs: 
"Magnus certe virorum numerus ex mantuano delectu captus est, quem 
Johannes Franciscus per eos dies ad"'se evocaret et partim porta rum J. 
arcibus, partim praetorio partimque locis allis per urbem custodie~lS 
distribuerat." 
491. 
149. Eroli, p.140. 
150. Simonetta, p.90: "Piccininus vero ac mantuanus ipse, qui ut diximus, 
in urbiculam se reduxerant, diffisi viribus, urbicula effuso cursu, 
per planiciem illam veronensem potentissiman effuso cursu totam 
noctem ierunt, nec restituerunt, donec alii Mantuam, alii ad 
proxima municipia pervenerunt; ipsi autem duces cum paucis Valegium se 
receperunt ••• Verona igitur die tertio, postquam capta est, per hunc 
modum recepta." 
151. Da Soldo, p.40: "Nicolb Picenino non fese niente se non passar et 
andO a lozar •••• a Rotingo e a Saiano in Franza Curta. Et commenzorno 
a cazar fuogo per tutto e bruorno tutto quanto Gussago e Cellatica." 
152. Soranzo, p.llO. 
153. Da Soldo, p.42. 
154. This is examined by Soranzo at the end of his article (pp.llO-114). 
155. Da Soldo, p.43: "Ritornando a Nicolo Picenino, ando a Riva de Trento 
com una grande gente lui e 10 Marchese de Mantova, credo per veder de 
guastar et affogar la nostra armata che si lavorav~ a Torbole: et 
gli "fece delli assalti ma posseva far perch' il Conte Francesco gli 
teneva una grande fanteria". 
156. A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, "Reg. Duc. no.41, Rr als 0; fols. 527t-S28, 
20 April 1440 which reconfirmed the fiefs in the original agreement. 
See also A.S.M. Archivio Ducale, reg. Duc. no. 30 M als Bb (Lorenzo 
Martignoni), fol. 500, 13 May 1441: " ••• cum pactis modis et conventionibus 
de quibus et prout dicto procura suc Melius videbitur ••• " See also 
Smith, op.~ib.,pp.135-6. 
157. As early as 22 July 1439 Filippo Maria had appointed the bishop of 
Como, Gherardo da Landriano, to be his representative in peace 
negotiations with Venice and Genoa. see Osio, vol. III, pt.l, p.181, 
doc. no. CLXXXVIII. 
158. Sanuto, co1.1086. 
159. 5.5. reg.1S, fol. 9, 9 Jan.1440. (letter to Jacopo Antonio Marcello) 
"de permutatione persone dni. Caroli de Gonzaga cum Mag.Dno. Malatesta 
genero suo." The Senate recommended delay "quiaexpectabamus quod "Ill. 
Don. Marchio Esten. mediante persona ipsius Caro1i posset reducere 
Marchionem Mantue ad a1iquam compositionem nobiscum." 
160. Arch. Gon. B. 2185, 2 Feb.1440 (copy of letter to Sforza). 
161. Arch. Gon. B. 2094, fols. 285-6, 4 Feb.1440: 
adesso ce ha risposto chel rimane contento de 
cambio dal s. Malatesta ad Carlo (fol.286)". 
and Sanuto, col. 1090 • 
162. Da Soldo, p.43. 
"El conte Francesco Sforza 
l'ordine dato de far al 
See also Simonetta, pp.92-3 
492. 
163. Osio, vol.III, pt.1, p.194, doc. no. CLXXXXVIIII: "offerunt et cum effectu 
prefatam dominam B1ancham tamquam veram et 1egitimam sponsam, 
consortem, seu uxorem pre'fati Comitis Francisci Sfortie generi et filii 
carissimi prefati domini Ducis ...... This was to be accomplished by the 
end of January 1440. 
164. A.S.M. Archivio Duca1e, Carteggio Visconteo, Extra Dominium, cart. 
no. 14 fol. 29, 5 Apr. 1440: "ut certas galeonos nras. in f1umine Pade 
existentes conduci faciat in Lacum Garde ut armata nra. in dicto lacu 
exsistens potentior fiat et va1eat hostilem classem ibi exsistentem 
opprimere et perfligare." 
165. Arch. Gon. B. 1228, fol.54, 25 Apr.1440; letter of Carlo Nuvoloni refers 
to his return: "Ho inteso come la Ill. s.v. e ritornata da Milano 
sana e de bona voglia et ne ho havuto summa'consolatione ..... On 9 
April Gianfrancesco's arrival was imminent because elaborate preparations 
were being made for his welcome " ••• con abbondanti spese di ciberie ..... 
Luchino de Toscanis was sent to make provision in all the areas 
Gianfrancesco was to pass through (Gli Atti Cancellereschi Visconteo 
vol.3, pt.2, no. 570) • Gianfrancesco and Zenebaldo seemed to have 
achieved a measure of success because on 25 April a safe-conduct 
was issued to a number of merchants to trade freely with Mantua (no.583). 
On 28 April a licence was issued "di fare condurre 1,000 staia di grano 
a misura parmigiana" to the Mantovano during the month of May (no.587). 
166. Arch. Gon. B. 1620, fol.82, 14 Apr.1440 (Matteo de Corrado to Paola): 
"Adviso la I.S. vra. come •••• a hore xviiii Ii Illu. nostro Signore 
e andato da 10 Illu. Signor Messer 10 duca acompagnati •••• da 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FINAL YEARS (1442-1444) 
The Peace of Cavriana effectively rang down the curtain on 
Gianfrancesco's military career even though it did very little to calm his 
fears in the long run. The last two years of his life add very little to 
the picture presented in the preceeding pages. In fact, the documentary 
material available is very sparse and even the chroniclers find little to say. 
Ostensibly these were years of peace for Mantua, and for Lombardy 
in general; but they were disappointing and depressing ones for Gianfrancesco. 
They were also difficult years from a financial point of view. The Lombard 
Wars had lef.t a legacy of debt which took a long time to recover from. 
Mantua's resources were low and in these years, as in the period of ~ar, the 
problems of trying to get Filippo Maria to live up to his financial obligations 
were as great as ever. All this meant that it was imperative for Mantua to 
maintain a lower profile in the affairs of Lombardy, a policy which ~as 
faCilitated by the fact that, on the surface at least, Mantua was at peace 
with Venice. 
Although from one pOint of view the Peace gave no cause for 
rejoicing in Mantua, it nevertheless came as a great relief after six years 
of war. Like the other protagonists in the Lombard Wars, Mantua was 
suffering from war weariness; perhaps more so than others because it lacked 
the resources of its more powerful neighbours. Gianfrancesco's own 
health and vitality were by now undergOing a serious decline, as we shall 
see, and although he continued to govern up until his death, he merely 
concentrated on keeping the government on an even keel. As his strength 
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ebbed, he became more and more concerned about the difficult question of 
the division of his property and ensuring that there would be adequate 
protection for his state. Although the situation in 1444 was somewhat 
different from that of 1407, it was nevertheless still the case that a 
smooth transference of power was essential. Although Lucovico was eminently 
capable of taking over the reins of government, as far as other states were 
concerned, a new rule was always a time for reassessment, and the political 
atmosphere which had prevailed in Lombardy during Gianfrancesco's lifetime 
dictated that nothing could be left to chance. 
As well as such personal preoccupations, there were other matters 
which concerned Gianfrancesco during this period. According to the chroniclers 
the period after Cavriana was one of famine. It is very difficult to assess 
the way in which the wars had affected the economy of the Mantovano, but it 
was certainly the case that Gianfrancesco did care very much about the 
economic welfare of his people. Gasco's studies for 1430 demonstrated this 
very clearly. ~/ In 1442 and 1443 there were a succession of bad harvests, 
partly the result of uncharacteristically severe weather which many writers 
commented upon. The problems which this caused are alluded to in some 
documentary material. The shortages were worse in 1443, apparently the 
winter was exceptionally hard, the worst in living memory; and' there are 
a number of references to Gianfrancesco's efforts to get supplies of grain from 
elsewhere in the 'Gridario' entries for this period. ~/ The need was such 
that anyone bringing in supplies from outside was to be exempt from paying 
the usual import duties. In November 1442 Matteo de Corrado was given 
the task of trying to get urgent supplies from the Milanese: " ••• ma una cossa ge 
, ' , 
volea ricordare che in mantuana non era da manzar como im questi di •••• ge 
havea facto dire per le doe parti del tempo per fino aricolto, ne ancho 
sapea dove sene potesse haver, e circa de cia ne fessemo pUr alcuna 
discussione, tandem me dissi chel'sperava non mancharia per questo ••• " 
Lombardy as a whole, however, seems to have suffered considerably at this 
time and it is doubtful that the Duke could have done much personally to 
alleviate the problem. As usual it was the poorest people who suffered 
the most and, in order to help the neediest, Gianfrancesco is reputed 
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to have undertaken a number of what we would refer to today as job-creation 
schemes, such as the building of the Church of the Carmine and the arches 
around Piazza Erbe, which are still in existence. ZI 
Peace, therefore, was not only welcome,but necessary. However, 
it could be argued that the problems of peace were as difficult as those of 
war, and it is important to consider how Mantua stood with Venice and Milan 
at the end of Gianfrancesco's life. 
Cavriana may have brought an interlude of peace to Lombardy, but 
there was no real reason to believe that it would be any more permanent than the 
two treaties of Ferrara which had preceeded it. The suspicions still remained 
and although Gianfrancesco was at peace with Venice, it was a very uneasy one. 
Any attempts to normalise relations between Mantua and Venice would, of 
necessity, be coloured by the way in which the Senate had behaved in the 
peace negotiations. Close though he had been to his former tutor for the 
better part of his life, the last stage of the war had created a gulf 
between them which was almost impossible to bridge for the rest of 
Gianfrancesco's lifetime. 
There was not very much contact between Gianfrancesco and Venice 
in the remaining years and what little there was, if not openly hostile, was 
not particularly friendly. As we have seen, Gianfrancesco was still haggling 
with Venice over the provisions of the peace as late .as June 1442. ~/ 
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Even as late as 27 December 1442 Francesco Sforza was complaining that 
the fortress of San Michele had not been surrendered to him by Gianfrancesco. 
All this was indicative of the strained relations between Mantua and Venice 
throughout this period. 
Matters were not eased by Mantuan interference in the Veronese 
at the beginning of 1443. The background to this is not at all clear because 
the documentation is poor. There are some rather enigmatic references to an 
'impresa ' in the correspondence between Gianfrancesco and Corrado in the 
previous November. 191 It is difficult to judge how much responsibility 
Filippo Maria must bear in encouraging such an enterprise, but on the 
surface it seems to have been rather a fruitless affair and did nothing to 
ease the general situation. On 13 February 1443 Triadano Gritti and 
Francesco Barbaro were sent by the Senate to ne-gotiate with Gianfrancesco 
over these incursions "quod multum inferret territorio nostro Veronen. 
d II III di ffi amnum. - Accor ng to 0 cial instructions issued to Barbaro three 
days later there had been talk of Gianfrancesco planning to divert the Mincio 
thereby causing damage to the Veronese. 1~1 He was instructed to use the 
most forceful means at his disposal to dissuade Gianfrancesco from carrying 
out such a scheme; if necessary he was to threaten the use of force should 
Gianfrancesco so flagrantly ignore the terms of the peace. Judging from the 
fact that there is no more discussion of his matter in any of the official 
sources, it can only be concluded that the Venetian ambassadors were successful. 
Throughout the latter stages of the war Gianfrancesco had become 
obsessed with the safety and security of his boundaries with the Veronese 
and his apprehensions seemed, if anything, to increase during peacetime. 
The situation which existed was very much akin to the tensions experienced 
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during 1433-6 and this may partly explain Gianfrancesco's actions 
although it cannot completely justify them. His sensitivity about this 
area is shown repeatedly in his correspondence with Milan as we shall see 
in due course. 
This tension between Venice and Gianfrancesco affected Ludovico 
and Carlo as well and shows perhaps more clearly than ever that the peace had 
essentially changed nothing. At the end of December 1442 Carlo's secretary 
had been sent to Venice offering his master's services. To this offer the 
Senate relied politely, but firmly, that although Carlo could be assured of 
the Senate's best wishes, it would not be right to accept his services because 
of his father's attachment to Milan. They were, however, prepared to mediate 
on his behalf with Florence if he so wished. 12/ In fact, Carlo was to 
remain closely attached to Milan after having been jilted in this fashion, 
and subsequently saw service with the Pope. 
The Mantua interference in the Veronese also meant that the 
Venetians would have little to do with Ludovico in his father's lifetime. 
In July 1443 he had sent letters to the Senate offering his friendship 
and fidelity. It may well be that Ludovico was paving the way for better 
relations with Venice when he should succeed to the Marquisate. It is certainly 
the case that when he .did actually succeed his father he did tend to play the 
role of mediator between Venice and Milan rather more. On this occasion, 
however, the Senate's attitude was the same as in the previous December, 
"non obstantibus aliquibus occursis, semper m. suam dileximus et diligimus 
et commodum et bonum suum exoptabamus." Nevertheless, because of the 
"suspicionibus nunc vigentibus" between his father and the Senate, they could not 
14/ 
consider the possibility of his entering their service. -
507. 
Just what part Gianfrancesco played in these approaches to 
Venice is uncertain. He may have encouraged this action, but if so, 
whatever benefits he may have hoped to gain were not forthcoming in his 
lifetime. The Senate continued to maintain a very reserved attitude towards 
Gianfrancesco until his death. 
Likewise the relationship between Mantua and Milan remained 
essentially unchanged. Despite the way in which Filippo Maria had let 
Gianfrancesco down repeatedly during their association, Mantua remained. 
tied to Milan for the rest of Gianfrancesco's life and beyond. The problems 
which had characterised the relationship still existed. Although Gianfrancesco 
had no reason to trust the Duke any more than before, he still depended 
on Milan for protection. 
For his part, the Duke wanted to keep Gianfrancesco friendly to 
him more than ever. Although technically Sforza was now part of the Visconti 
family after his marriage to Bianca, there was little love lost between 
father and son-in-law. Moreover, Filippo Maria's territorial ambitions had 
not been extinguished by Cavriana and there was no doubt in his mind about 
the war with Venice being taken up again when he felt himself strong enough 
to do so. He realised, however, that because of the nature of the Cavriana 
settlement, he would have to be the aggressor, and this was basiqally why 
the friendship of Mantua was so important to him. 
It was thesemotlv8o which dictated the nature of the renewal of 
his agreement with Gianfrancesco after the peace. Even after the peace had been 
published Gianfrancesco had continued to voice his fears to Filippo Maria 
about the security of Mantua and his fears that Florence and Venice might 
renew the war. On 20 August 1442 "the Duke wrote him a long letter in 
which he tried to reassure Gianfrancesco that there was no immediate 
15/ prospect of the Venetians renewing the war for the time being. -
Nevertheless, he understood his fears and his prudent attitude towards 
defence and assured him that he would soon be in a much better posi~ion 
to protect Mantuan interests than ever before. For instance, he refers 
to the refurbishing of the twelve galleys which would be despatched to 
him with all speed. l§/ The letter ends in the following optimistic 
fashion: liE dio sa la bona dispositione nostra in questa verso de vuy, 
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se la possanza nostra respondesse a la voluntade. E se per 10 passato e 
seguito alcuno manchamento, sia chiara e certa la fraternitade vostra, non· 
e accaduto per non voler, anci per non potere, ma cum la gratia de Dio, 
se reformarano Ie cosse nostre in meglio al che se attende cum o9Oi 
17/ diligentia. E reformate che siano, poremo far quello non possiamo adesso." -
The tone of the ~ter was very familiar and although it seemed 
to calm Gianfrancesco's immediate fears, his basic apprehensions still 
remained. These were shown very clearly in his reply to this letter which 
was despatched to Milan on 27 August. Gianfrancesco realised that Filippo 
Maria was likely to be better informed about the intentions of Venice 
and Florence than he. Nevertheless, it was difficult to dispel from his 
mind the fears he had about the dangers facing Mantua: "Non resta chio non 
, 
veda il stato mio in continuo imminente periculo, perche siando Ii inimici 
mei possenti, non gli mancha altro cha la voluntade, che sempre la desfactione 
mia, e in suo arbitrio, trovandomi in li termini chio son". l~/ This was 
why he felt it necessary to have his eastern borders well protected by an 
army, and that the fortresses along this border should be strengthened even 
in peacetime. Gianfrancesco hoped that Filippo Maria would be able to finance 
l~/ this. 
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In effect, we see the same old problems arising vis-a-vis 
Milan. In the following January Gianfrancesco was still complaining 
of insufficient money and protection and on this occasion he was 
especially worried about Milanese intervention to the south in Bolgona, 
Assisi and Naples, because he felt that Mantua would be left without 
20/ protection and exposed to attacks from the enemy. - He clearly felt 
his eastern boundaries to be severely under-protected; quite different 
from the strength of the Adda boundary for Milan. In his letter to Corrado 
he instructed him to paint a sorry picture of Mantua's weakness: "Vedendome 
essere poveri, denudati de que110 che havevemo inanci 1a guerra passata 
si de forteze e de munitione come de ogni a1tro bene che al10ra trovavemo 
havere e non ci resta altro che la persona inferma e una povera citade 
laqual perdendo poressemo dire de andare al hospeda1e ••• " Gianfrancesco 
begged Filippo Maria to consider well before making any move which might 
have disastrous consequences for Mantua; and he also continued his request 
for not only the payments which were still owing to him, but also for the 
regular peacetime monthly payment of 1,000 ducats which had been part of 
the agreement. This was more immediately important than the territorial 
part of their agreement,which was largely, the same as that of 1438 although at th( 
beginning of February Brescia was substituted for Verona. 2~/ After the 
experiences of Filippo Maria's previous promises it was difficult to regard 
them very seriously; at best they were merely hypothetical. In fact, on 
20 January there was even a suggestion from the Duke, via Corrado, that if 
in the event of war Gianfrancesco were to lose Mantua, he was quite prepared 
to give him either Novara, A11essandria' or Piacenza. 2~/ This ludicrous 
scheme shows to what lengths Filippo Maria was prepared to go and ignored 
the fact that Mantua was more than a piece of merchandise to Gianfrancesco 
which could be exchanged at will. In the same report, however, Filippo 
Maria promised to make regular monthly payments to Gianfrancesco. 
lie cosi provedera senza fallo, 6 pace 0 guerra che segua." Similar 
promises were made to Ludovico when he succeeded his father,24_/ and 
he experienced the same difficulties in trying to extract the money so 
'reliably' promised. The familiar story of empty promises was repeating 
itself. 22/ As far as Mantua's standing with Milan was concerned at the 
end of Gianfrancesco's lifetime the same promises and suspicions subsist. 
While there are promises of help, it still remained to be seen whether they 
would be translated into action and this was to be one of the most crucial 
problems which Gianfrancesco was to bequeath to his successor. 
Throughout 1442 Gianfrancesco had been in indifferent health but 
by the winter of that year it seemed to take a definite turn for the worse. 
The pressures he had had to face during thepreceeding years had certainly 
taken their toll. As early as the beginning of March 1443 concern was 
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26/ being expressed at the fact that his strength appeared to be on the wane, -
·so much so that he was unable to receive the Milanese envoy. The 'copialettere' 
in the Gonzaga Archive give a full account of the ups and downs of Gianfrancesco's~ 
illness which was not merely 'gotta' but a steadily worsening stomach 
condition. Even Gianfrancesco himself in a letter of 8 March describes it 
to Carlo as a 'gravissimo male', 21/ and although there appeared to be 
periods of remission, it seemed to get gradually more debilitating. By the 
end of July it was so bad that he planned to attend the baths at Petriolo in 
the Cremonese, 2~/ but he was too ill to go throughout the summer. By 
29/ October his illness was beginning to interfere with the administration, -
and the illness appeared to have spread to his chest as well. 
, 
It would be tedious to document this illness in full. By the 
beginning of 1444 he had recovered somewhat, but by August the stomach 
disease took a final hold and from now on there seemed to be very little 
that could be done to alleviate the great pain which he was suffering from. 
Gianfrancesco himself explained his symptoms to the doctors in the following 
terms: "nos autem ut de statu nostro inteligatis ex hac stomachi passtone 
vehementer et assidue vexamur et male nos habemus." 
At Este's invitation Gianfrancesco, by now seriously ill, decided 
to leave Mantua "per trasferire ad un loco dove ne hera affermato esser uno 
zentile e bon aero per veder se cum questa mutatione del aere possessemo 
relevare dela nostra longa infermetade". 3!/ The visit lasted barely five 
days. He returned to Mantua on 8 September a dying man. Although his 
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condition appeared to stabilise, on 20 September, "contra el parer de medici", he 
had a relapse. The doctors had considered "che la virtu vitale e costante e 
32/ forte", - but now he was giving up the fight to survive. By 21 Paola 
realised that the end was near. She was informing her sons fIche sia piu tosto 
pezorato che migliorato". 3~/ Two days later he made his will. 
Chroniclers are not in agreement over the actual date of 
Gianfrancesco's death. For instance Equicola states the 23 September, 3~/ 
the same day as the will, whereas Platina cites the 25th. 32/ Judging 
from the 'copialettere' it is most reasonable to suppose the latter date to 
be nearer the truth. There is an entry for the 25 September in which 
Luca da Perugia, a doctor sent by the Este to attend upon Gianfrancesco, 
was sent for as quickly as possible because Gianfrancesco's life was in 
danger. 3§/ After that there is no further mention of his illness, but 
on 6 October there is .a reply to a letter of condolence which h~d been 
37/ 
sent,by the castellan of the 'rocca' at Ostiglia. - His death must 
have occurred on the 25th September or very soon afterwards. 3~/ He 
was 49 years old. 
According to the provisions of his will, Gianfrancesco wanted 
his funeral to be a very simple affair. It was his wish to be buried in 
the same church as his father, San Francesco, at night, with not more than 
twenty persons present. Moreover, his body was to be completely unadorned 
and dressed in a plain woollen garment. A sum of money was to be set aside 
for a hundred of the poorest people in Mantua to be fed and clothed on the 
thirtieth day after his death. 3~/ 
There were a number of monetary bequests to Mantuan churches and 
monasteries, provision for the payment of outstanding debts, and his 
executors were required to settle territorial differences between the 
Gonzaga and Caval cabO over Viadana, OOssolo and Riparolo. However, the 
most important part of the will concerns the way in which his territories were 
divided up among his sons because it does reveal quite a lot about 
Gianfrancesco's attitude to the security of the Mantovano. 
Gianfrancesco regarded his state as his own private property to 
be apportioned as he saw fit, and in his will he diVided the Mantovano 
up into four distinct parcels of land. As the eldest son Ludovico was 
to have the title of Marquis together with Mantua, Borgoforte and its 
surrounding area and all the territories on the eastern boundaries with 
the Veronese. Carlo was to have all the lands which Gianfrancesco held at 
that time in the Cremonese, especially Luzzara, Suzzara, Gonzaga, Serravalle 
and Reggiolo, with the exception of Pontoglio and Canedolo. These 
were the largest bequests. His twp younger sons got much less. Gianlucido, 
who seemed to have a promising ecclesiastical career ahead of him, got 
Volta, Cavriana, Rodigo, Ceresario and S.Martino Gusnago, while Alessandro 
was to receive Canneto and the lands which Gianfrancesco possessed in the 
Bresciano at the time of his death. Provisions were also made in the event 
of any of the sons dying without a surviving heir. In the event of Carlo 
dying without issue, his territories were to be divided into two: the 
Cremonese lands would go to the younger brothers while the lands to the 
south of the Po were to go to Ludovico. Gianlucido's lands were all to 
go to Ludovico while Alessandro's territories were to be divided equally 
between Carlo and Gianlucido or the surviving brother. 
It is arguable that such a division of property would be seen 
by other states as a weakness at a time when it seemed imperative that 
the Mantovano should have the strength of unity, but this is not the way 
Gianfrancesco saw it. He may have recalled the inter-family problems which 
40/ faced the sons of Luigi in the 1360's - and he explicitly stated in his 
will that unity would result only 1f each son had his own separate domain. 
In particular, the relationship between the two eldest sons was not close 
and Gianfrancesco felt that land held in common would only exacerbate their 
differences. As it turned out, Ludovico was to have his fair share of 
trouble with Carlo anyhow. 
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However, in the circumstances, any division of a state (as opposed 
to a private estate) presents immeasurable problems, not the least of which 
was Ludovico's overall authority as ru1e~. Gianfrancesco tried to provide 
for this by stating that all his younger sons were to hold their lands 
as fiefs from Ludovico, but in the final analysis this could provide no 
guarantee of unity even though it was explicitly stated that any 
of his sons would forfeit his iriheritance if he were to plot against 
41/ 
any of his brothers. -
The theory behind the division of lands was sound enough; that 
the two most important bequests should give the eldest sons a powerful 
interest in protecting their respective territories against possible 
threats from Venice and Milan. Although Ludovico had been preparing the 
way for a more peaceful and harmonious relationship with Venice even 
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before Gianfrancesco's death, the fact that he was awarded those territories 
which on the latter part of Gianfrancesco's own lifetime had been most 
gravely threatened clearly showed from which direction Gianfrancesco 
42/ believed the long-term danger to come. - This was a fear later shared 
by many other states. 
Carlo's lands bordered on the Milanese and were very substantial 
indeed. They also included the oldest Gonzaga possessions. Even after 
Ludovico's reconciliation with his father Carlo still remained Gianfrancesco's 
favourite son and it was Clearly the case that the security of this area 
was best left in Carlo's hands. After all, Carlo had been and was to remain 
more loyal to Filippo Maria than Ludovico. His engagement with Milan had 
been renewed in 1442, 4~/ and although he was granted a condotta from 
the Pope two years later, it was largely through his father's requests that 
he returned to Visconti service, although for the time being the Duke was 
44/ 
not able to offer him any immediate active engagements. -
This did not only give him a motive for the, safety of his 
territories, it also provided him with a base from which he could give 
, 
his brother trouble. Neither Gianiucido nor Alessandro gave Ludovico 
any problems. When Gianlucido died in February 1448 his territories 
reverted to Ludovico and Alessandro lived obscurely until his own death 
in 1466. 
In fact, Ludovico managed to outlive all his brothers and 
consequently ended up by ruling the whole of Mantovano in his own right. 
The rivalry between Carlo and Ludovico has been well documented elsewhere, 
but their rivalry was definitely over by 1452 when his inheritance was 
declared forfeit to Ludovico. 42/ There was, consequently, an element of 
good fortune involved in averting the shortcomings of Gianfrancesco's will, 
but it illustrates well the extreme difficulties confronting the ailing 
Gianfancesco in 1444 and also shows that degree of ambivalence which by 
now had become an essential element in Gonzaga policy. 
What, then had Gianfrancesco achieved both for himself and for 
his state in the political and military affairs of Lombardy? Can we really 
dismiss him as "mediocre ma non sgradevole" ? 
In the history of Mantua, and indeed of northern Italy as a 
whole, Gianfrancesco Gonzaga's role has been underestimated for far too 
long. His career may not have the attractiveness of a Ludovico Gonzaga 
or an Isabella d'Este but, in view of the political and military role which 
he played in Lombardy, the scant attention he has been paid by historians 
is most unjustified. Although Platina eulogised him as "vir magnitudine 
animi, clementia, gratia, liberalitate, magnificantia, humanitate, cum 
46/ quovis optimo Principe conferendus", - the accusation of faithlessness 
still. attaches to him and it seems to have erected a barrier to a fuller 
understanding of the man and of his policies, and has therepy prevented 
the opportunity of studying not'merely the relationship between smaller 
and larger states in a formative period of development, but, more 
significantly, the problems and pressures confronting states like Mantua 
at a time of political crisis. 
The diplomatic legacy of the tre-cento had been the art of 
political survival and the fact that Mantua existed in 1444 when many other 
similar states had disappeared shows how well Gianfrancesco had mastered it. 
The reason for this is that Gianfrancesco was able to manoeuvre himself 
through the tortuous jungle of early quattrocento politics by capitalising 
upon the advantages which Mantuan friendship could bring, and in the final 
analysis one of the most striking illustrations of the central position which 
Mantua occupied, physically and diplomatically, is that expanding dynamic 
states like Venice and Milan felt that there was a need for its continued 
existence not only as a buffer against expansion, but also as the front 
line in a policy of expansion. Gianfrancesco's rule illustrates both the 
advantages and disadvantages of this position and the way in which he emerged 
virtually unscathed from such a mightly clash is itself sufficient to stamp, 
his career as significant. 
It is important in another respect. As well as being the ruler 
of a state Gianfrancesco was also a condottiere and we have seen that a 
combination of the two roles can lead to complex problems. There were 
positive advantages for Gianfrancesco in using his military experience to 
bolster up the usefulness of his state but it also led to a number of very 
difficult dilemmas. The dual role worked well when the interests of 
employer and state coincided, but the progress of the Lombard Wars showed 
that this was not always the case. However, on every occasion it was 
the interests of state which claimed the first priority, but even in 
1438 there was no question of Gianfrancesco breaking his agreement with 
Venice. In fact, Gianfrancesco must go down as one of the most moral 
condottieri of his age. 
It cannot be said that the problems which confronted Gianfrancesco 
were of his own making. In a very real sense both he and Mantua were 
slaves of circumstances beyond his control. He was forced to accept a 
command from Venice which he felt would ultimately conflict with his duty to 
Mantua, and in 1438 he was forced to throw in his lot with a man so complex 
and unpredictable who later proved almost totally unreliable precisely 
because the balance of forces in Lombardy provided him with no viable 
alternative. A study of Gianfrancesco's career is valuable not only because 
it presents us with the complexities of the dual role of ruler and 
soldier of fortune, but it provides us with well documented accounts of 
his relationships with two very different masters - the Venetian Senate and 
Filippo Maria Visconti. In particular, his relationship with Carmagnola 
in the first instance and subsequently with the Senate itself as military 
commander provides us with a fascinating insight into the mechanics behind 
Venice's expansionist poliCies in the early fifteenth century. Indeed, it 
may well have been this dual role which prevented Mantua from becoming 
completely submerged. 
Mantua, then, was very much at the centre of Lombard affairs 
during this period. But Gianfrancesco was very much responsible for 
raising the prestige of his state in other ways. The Imperial title 
brought added dignity to Mantua even if it brought nothing in terms of 
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power. It also brought the prestige of a fine marriage for Ludovico. 
In fact Gianfrancesco used marriage very wisely to bolster up his family's 
position. The Brandenburg marriage may have helped to raise the standing 
of the Gonzaga in Lombardy as princes of the Empire, but the close relationship 
with the Este of Ferrara had also been most advantageous. Not only were 
the Estensi well established and highly respected, but the diplomatic 
influence which Niccol~ wielded was very useful to Gianfrancesco, certainly 
as far as peace negotiations were concerned. The only significant failure 
in this respect was the breakdown of negotiations to marry his younger 
daughter Cecilia to Oddantonio da Montefeltro, Guidantonio's son and 
heir to the dutchy of Urbino, largely because Cecilia wanted to take the 
veil. Like the Marchesa, Cecilia was a highly educated and pious young woman 
and, eVidently, very determined to have her own way, much to the anger of 
47/ her father. -
During Lucovico's rule Mantua became important as a cultural centre 
but the basis for his was laid by Gianfrancesco, due largely to the engagement 
of Vittorino da Feltre to educate his children. Although a consideration 
of the cultural aspects of his rule lies outside the bounds of this study, 
the fact that Vittorino's activ~t1es not only resulted in Gianfrancesco's 
own children being highly educated, in itself auspicious for Mantua's 
own cultural future, but also drew other people from outside. Not only 
were some prominent Mantuans like Francesco Calcagnini educated at the 
'Casa Giocosa', but also Federigo da Montefeltro, Cosimo de' Migliorati, 
Antonio Beccaria, Francesco da Castiglione, Lorenzo Valla and Giovanni 
48/ Aretino, to name but a few. - In a very real sense, Gianfrancesco's 
invitation to vittorino caused Mantua to nurture some of the finest minds 
of the time, and this was to have political as well as cultural results. 
So was the establishment of the Studium Pubblicum in 1433 under the 
49/ patronage of Sigismund. - It·is very likely that all this was under 
the more direct supervision of Paola, who had played such an important 
role in helping her husband through many difficult times. Although 
Ludovico was expressly charged by the will to take care of his mother and 
assign a portion of the Castello di San Giorgio for her personal use, she, 
like her daughter, chose to spend her last years in the Convent of Corpus 
Domini, which she herself had founded. They both took the veil shortly 
after Gianfrancesco's death and remained there~until they died. 52/ 
All in all, then, Gianfrancesco's achievement was considerable. 
There was no doubting the fact that Gonzaga rule in Mantua was stronger 
than ever in 1444. The boy of twelve who had so unexpectedly succeeded his 
father as the fifth "Capitano· of Mantua in 1407 had more than fulfilled 
the hopes which Donato de' Preti had voiced so long ago. Ludovico, the 
second Marquis, however, could not merely rest his security upon his father's 
achievement. Not only was he to continue in his efforts to regain those 
territories which had been lost at Cavriana 5!/ as well as the lands which 
he had been promised by the Visconti, but he realised that he would have to 
continue the vigilant task of weighing up the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of his powerful neighbours. Although he could try to improve upon his father's 
performance, the methods he was to use were basically the same. It was 
inevitable that in the near future his talents would be tested when the death 
of the ageing Visconti would once again unleash the dogs of war on Lombardy. 
There were many who hoped that history might repeat itself; that as in 1402 
there would be rich pickings for those who were daring enough. Ludovico, 
unfortunately, could rest assured that in Mantua's case, history fJOuZ.d 
repeat itself in so far as it would remain very much at the centre of the 
struggle. 
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"Quinta tenet primus "regni loca Marchio Janis Franciscus, vir 
fama ingens, ingentior actis". 5~/ This epigram which Amadei, a dedicated 
historian of Mantua, quotes in his "Cronaca Universale", goes to the 
heart of Gianfrancesco's place in the history of his state. It is 
essentially as a man of action that he must finally be judged. In the 
light of the way in which he faced the supreme threats to the Mantovano, 
and of the spirit and motives which governed his policies, Ludovico could 
have every reason to be proud of his father'S actions; and it is hoped 
that this study of them has gone some way towards giving Gianfrancesco 
Gonzaga the credit which has so long evaded him. 
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